You are here: / Court of Appeals

Tag Archive for: Court of Appeals

JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, reversing the appellate division, determined a juror who asked to be excused after four days of deliberations should have been discharged as “grossly unqualified.” The alternate jurors had been excused. The juror repeatedly told the judge she could not separate her emotions from her analysis of the facts. The defendant was charged with stabbing the victim 38 times:

Pursuant to CPL 270.35 (1), “[i]f at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict . . . the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . the court must discharge such juror. . . . If no alternate juror is available, the court must declare a mistrial.”

As explained in People v Buford, a juror is grossly unqualified “only ‘when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict'” (69 NY2d at 298 … ). * * *

…[ T]he record reveals that it was obvious the juror possessed a state of mind preventing her from rendering an impartial verdict and thus, she was “grossly unqualified to serve.” The juror declared forthrightly that she could not separate her emotions from her ability to deliberate and was incapable of fulfilling her sworn duty to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial and the law. Compelling the juror to resume deliberations could not cure the fundamental problem with her state of mind. The trial court’s implicit conclusion that the juror did not “possess[] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict” (Buford, 69 NY2d at 298 …) was erroneous. People v Spencer, 2017 NY Slip Op 05118, CtApp 6-22-17

CRIMINAL LAW (JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED)/JURORS (CRIMINAL, GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED, JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED)/GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED (JURORS, CRIMINAL LAW, JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED)

(1) SENTENCING COURT’S RELIANCE ON A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IN A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT, VIOLATED DUE PROCESS, (2) SENTENCING COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PUT THE REASONS FOR DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ON THE RECORD.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the appellate division, determined (1) a sentencing judge need not put on the record the reasons for the denial of youthful offender status and (2) the sentencing court’s failure to inform defendant of the nature of a “confidential” document included in the pre-sentence report and relied upon by the sentencing judge violated defendant’s due process rights:

​

In its current form, CPL 390.50 — which is entitled “Confidentiality of pre-sentence reports and memoranda” — declares that while PSIs are presumptively confidential, disclosure to the parties is required for sentencing purposes. * * *

​

​

… [I]f a court decides that it is essential to keep confidential any portion of a document that might reveal its source, the court should, at the very least, disclose the nature of the document or redacted portion thereof — to the extent possible without intruding on any necessary confidentiality — and should set forth on the record the basis for such determination. Alternatively, where possible, the court may choose not to rely on the document, and clearly so state on the record. Here, the court failed to explain the nature of the document or the reason for its confidentiality. …

​

As a result of the court’s failure to comply with its statutory obligation under CPL 390.50, defendant was deprived of the ability to respond to information that the court reviewed when imposing sentence, thus implicating his due process rights. Additionally, under the circumstances here, the appellate courts were unable to adequately review the sentencing court’s denial of disclosure. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to County Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. People v Minemier, 2017 NY Slip Op 05120, CtApp 6-22-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS, SENTENCING COURT’S RELIANCE ON A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IN A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT, VIOLATED DUE PROCESS)/CRIMINAL LAW (YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, SENTENCING COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PUT THE REASONS FOR DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ON THE RECORD)/PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS (PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS, SENTENCING COURT’S RELIANCE ON A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IN A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT, VIOLATED DUE PROCESS)/YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (SENTENCING COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PUT THE REASONS FOR DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ON THE RECORD)

PROPER PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS NOT FOLLOWED, CASE REMITTED.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, held Supreme Court did not follow the proper procedure for making an on-the-record determination of youthful offender eligibility and remitted the matter:

We agree with defendant’s contention that the trial court failed to make an on-the-record determination as to whether defendant was eligible for a youthful offender adjudication by first “considering the presence or absence of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3)” … . People v Lofton, 2017 NY Slip Op 05119, CtApp 6-22-17

CRIMINAL LAW (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, PROPER PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS NOT FOLLOWED, CASE REMITTED)/YOUTHFUL OFFENDER (CRIMINAL LAW,  PROPER PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS NOT FOLLOWED, CASE REMITTED)

,

UNION FOR NURSES EMPLOYED BY NEW YORK CITY WAS ENTITLED TO INFORMATION UNDERLYING DISCIPLINARY CHARGES LODGED AGAINST THE NURSES.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a dissenting opinion by Judge Garcia, determined two nurses facing disciplinary action for alleged time-card irregularities were entitled to some of the information upon which the charges were based. The nurses were employed by New York City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA). When the request for the information was denied, the “New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA, or the Union) filed an improper practice petition with the Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York (the Board), alleging that it had a right to information, under New York City Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL) … “. The Board found most of the requested information should be turned over to the NYSNA and the Court of Appeals agreed:

​

The Board held that section 12-306 (c) (4) [of the NYCCBL] extended to information “relevant to and reasonably necessary for the administration of the parties’ agreements, such as processing grievances, and/or for collective negotiations on mandatory subjects of bargaining,” citing several decisions of PERB [Public Employees Relations Board], the Board’s analogue for state employees … . As noted by the Board, PERB “has consistently upheld the right of a union to seek information for contract administration in the context of disciplinary grievances” … .

* * * Article VI, section 1.D. of the CBA [Collective Bargaining Agreement] defines “grievance” to include: “a claimed wrongful disciplinary action taken against an employee.” Thus, by defining “grievance” to include disciplinary action, the CBA, has, as a matter of contract, incorporated as to disciplinary actions the information requirements applicable to grievances. Matter of City of New York v New York State Nurses Assn., 2017 NY Slip Op 04492, CtApp 6-8-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, UNION FOR NURSES EMPLOYED BY NEW YORK CITY WAS ENTITLED TO INFORMATION UNDERLYING DISCIPLINARY CHARGES LODGED AGAINST THE NURSES)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, UNION FOR NURSES EMPLOYED BY NEW YORK CITY WAS ENTITLED TO INFORMATION UNDERLYING DISCIPLINARY CHARGES LODGED AGAINST THE NURSES)/DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW, UNION FOR NURSES EMPLOYED BY NEW YORK CITY WAS ENTITLED TO INFORMATION UNDERLYING DISCIPLINARY CHARGES LODGED AGAINST THE NURSES)

, ,

CONTEMPT ORDER IN A CIVIL MATTER INVOLVING THE SAME FUNDS DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING IN THE CRIMINAL MATTER IS NOT MOLINEUX EVIDENCE, THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ORDER ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT OUTWEIGHED ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined that a contempt order in a civil proceeding involving the same funds defendant was accused of stealing in the criminal action: (1) was not Molineux evidence because it involved the same subject matter as did the criminal action; and (2) the probative value of the order on the question of intent outweighed its prejudicial effect:

“When we limit Molineux or other propensity evidence, we do so for policy reasons, due to fear of the jury’s human tendency to more readily believe in the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected that he has previously committed a similar crime” … . In other words, the courts limit the admission of Molineux evidence because of the danger that the jury might conclude that if the defendant did it once, he or she likely did it again.

Where, as here, the evidence at issue is relevant to the very same crime for which the defendant is on trial, there is no danger that the jury will draw an improper inference of propensity because no separate crime or bad act committed by the defendant has been placed before the jury. * * *

The Appellate Division correctly concluded that the contempt order was relevant to prove defendant’s larcenous intent because “it showed that defendant’s conduct did not merely constitute poor financial management but, rather, that defendant, through his businesses, intended to deprive [the business entity] of the diverted money permanently” … . People v Frumusa, 2017 NY Slip Op 04495, CtApp 6-8-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, CONTEMPT ORDER IN A CIVIL MATTER INVOLVING THE SAME FUNDS AS DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING IN THE CRIMINAL MATTER IS NOT MOLINEUX EVIDENCE, THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ORDER ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT OUTWEIGHED ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MOLINEUX, CONTEMPT ORDER IN A CIVIL MATTER INVOLVING THE SAME FUNDS AS DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING IN THE CRIMINAL MATTER IS NOT MOLINEUX EVIDENCE, THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ORDER ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT OUTWEIGHED ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT)/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CONTEMPT ORDER IN A CIVIL MATTER INVOLVING THE SAME FUNDS AS DEFENDANT WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING IN THE CRIMINAL MATTER IS NOT MOLINEUX EVIDENCE, THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ORDER ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT OUTWEIGHED ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT)

,

TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY RESETTLED THE RECORD OF THE TRIAL BY CORRECTING TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN THE TRANSCRIPT WITHOUT A HEARING.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, with two concurring opinions, determined the trial judge properly resettled the record of the trial without holding a hearing. The original transcript indicated the jury was instructed the defendant was charged with “unintentional” murder. The prosecutor submitted an affirmation based upon a conversation with the court stenographer stating that the word “unintentional” was a typographical error and the stenographic notes reflected the word “intentional” was actually used. The stenographer submitted a certified corrected transcript:

​

Several factors support the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Supreme Court acted within its discretion to resettle the transcript on the basis of the information before it. The trial judge could rely not only on the reporter’s certification of the corrected transcript, but also on undisputed portions of that transcript, including: the accurate balance of the charge; the fact that two of the five alleged misstatements were attributed to defense counsel, not the court; and, most significantly, the repeated failure of any party to object to what would have been prominent misstatements of the law. Furthermore, as there was no suggestion during oral argument on the motion that any person present at the trial five years earlier could recollect what words were spoken, it is not clear what evidence beyond the reporter’s original stenographic notes might have been obtained through a hearing.

Although it would have been preferable for the court to have received an affidavit from the court reporter, rather than an affidavit of counsel recounting a conversation with that reporter, we cannot say that Supreme Court acted outside its discretion to resettle the transcript without a hearing. People v Bethune, 2017 NY Slip Op 04493, CtApp 6-8-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (RESETTLING THE RECORD, TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY RESETTLED THE RECORD OF THE TRIAL BY CORRECTING TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN THE TRANSCRIPT WITHOUT A HEARING)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, RESETTLING THE RECORD, TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY RESETTLED THE RECORD OF THE TRIAL BY CORRECTING TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN THE TRANSCRIPT WITHOUT A HEARING)

, ,

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLAINANT’S DISCLOSURE OF ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE UP TO SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE ABUSE CEASED, THE EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL USED DISCREPANCIES IN THE DISCLOSURES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to evidence the complainant, who alleged she was sexually abused by the defendant many years earlier, disclosed the abuse to friends three years after the abuse ceased and again four years later. Defense counsel’s strategy was to show the complainant was a “troubled teen” and inconsistencies in the statements were part of a “recent fabrication” defense:

​

Here, defendant argues that counsel’s failure to object to the testimony regarding the victim’s disclosures must have arisen from his ignorance or misunderstanding of the law on prompt outcry testimony and, thus, cannot be considered a matter of strategy. We disagree. While “it is generally improper to introduce testimony that the witness had previously made prior consistent statements” to bolster the witness’s credibility, the use of prior consistent statements is permitted to demonstrate a prompt outcry, rebut a charge of recent fabrication, or “to assist in ‘explaining the investigative process and completing the narrative of events leading to defendant’s arrest'” … . “‘New York courts have routinely recognized that nonspecific testimony about [a] child-victim’s reports of sexual abuse [does] not constitute improper bolstering [when] offered for the relevant, nonhearsay purpose of explaining the investigative process'”… .

A conclusion that the fact of the victim’s disclosures herein to the school counselor and detective would likely be admissible to “complete the narrative” was “consistent with [a conclusion that] a reasonably competent attorney” could make  … . … [C}ounsel was not ineffective for failure to make a motion that had little chance of success …. Instead of objecting to that testimony, counsel strategically chose to use the evidence to defendant’s advantage by exploring the substance of, and the circumstances surrounding, the disclosure in depth to support the defense of recent fabrication. People v Honghirun, 2017 NY Slip Op 04496, CtApp 6-8-17

CRIMINAL LAW (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, EVIDENCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLAINANT’S DISCLOSURE OF ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE UP TO SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE ABUSE CEASED, THE EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL USED DISCREPANCIES IN THE DISCLOSURES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLAINANT’S DISCLOSURE OF ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE UP TO SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE ABUSE CEASED, THE EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL USED DISCREPANCIES IN THE DISCLOSURES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE)EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DELAYED DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ABUSE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLAINANT’S DISCLOSURE OF ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE UP TO SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE ABUSE CEASED, THE EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL USED DISCREPANCIES IN THE DISCLOSURES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE)

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE SPANISH COMPANIES OPERATING IN SPAIN, DEFENDANT IS SUBJECT TO NEW YORK’S LONG-ARM JURISDICTION.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, reversing the appellate division, determined that, although both plaintiff and defendant are businesses based in Spain, there were sufficient contacts with New York to support long-arm jurisdiction. Defendant’s wine was distributed by a New York company, Kobrand. “Through November 2006, defendant paid commissions to plaintiff in Spain on wine defendant sold to Kobrand. In or around January 2007, defendant stopped paying commissions to plaintiff even as defendant continued to sell wine to Kobrand. Defendant contends that its obligation to pay commissions under the oral agreement expired after one year:”

… [N]ot only was defendant physically present in New York on several occasions, but its activities here resulted in “‘the purposeful creation of a continuing relationship with a New York corporation'”… . Defendant’s contacts with New York establish that defendant purposefully availed itself of “the privilege of conducting activities within [New York], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”… . …

* * * … [T]he parties’ oral agreement was not performed “wholly in Spain” … . Rather … both sides engaged in activities in New York in furtherance of their agreement. There is an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between defendant’s New York activities and the parties’ contract, defendant’s alleged breach thereof, and potential damages. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff’s claim arises from defendant’s transaction of business in New York. …

… [D]efendant has established minimum contacts with New York by visiting the state on multiple occasions to promote its wine with the purpose of finding a United States distributor and thereafter selling wine to a New York-based distributor. … Having done so, defendant could reasonably foresee having to defend a lawsuit in New York. D&R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 2017 NY Slip Op 04494, CtApp 6-8-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LONG-ARM JURISDICTION, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE SPANISH COMPANIES, DEFENDANT IS SUBJECT TO NEW YORK’S LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)/LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE TWO SPANISH COMPANIES, DEFENDANT IS SUBJECT TO NEW YORK’S LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)

,

NYC ZONING ORDINANCES CONCERNING ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined New York City’s zoning ordinances concerning adult bookstores and clubs were constitutional and, therefore, enforceable:

​

Viewed in the proper light, the evidence and the factual findings of the lower courts support only one conclusion: that the City met its burden of showing continued focus on sexually explicit activities and materials by the adult bookstores and adult eating and drinking establishments.

The Appellate Division found that all but one of the adult bookstores had peep booths for viewing adult films, with an average of about 17 booths per store. Peep booths, by design, obviously promote sexual activities. The Appellate Division further found that all the bookstores used signage, displays, and layouts to promote sexually focused adult materials and activities. In addition, as the trial court found, many of the adult bookstores sold sex toys, adult novelties, and the like in the nonadult sections of the stores. This evidence showed that most of the adult bookstores predominantly emphasized the promotion of sexual materials and activities. * * *

​

As to the adult eating and drinking establishments, the Appellate Division found that, in all the clubs, “topless dancing takes place at all times daily for approximately 16 to 18 hours a day” and also that lap dances, a quintessentially sexual activity, were offered by dancers “in both public and private areas of the club” … . This evidence, without more, adequately supported the conclusion that the topless clubs retained a predominant sexual focus. For the People Theatres of N.Y. Inc. v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 04385, CtApp 6-6-17

 

ZONING (ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS, NYC ZONING ORDINANCES CONCERNING ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE)/ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS (ZONING, NYC ZONING ORDINANCES CONCERNING ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (ZONING, ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS, NYC ZONING ORDINANCES CONCERNING ADULT BOOKSTORES AND CLUBS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE)

THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a dissenting opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined the development of the old Shea Stadium parking lot, which is on parkland (Flushing Meadows Park), was subject to the public trust doctrine, requiring specific legislation. The court held that the existing provisions of the administrative code, which approved and described the construction of Shea Stadium, could not be interpreted to allow the proposed development (Willets West) which includes the construction of a hotel, mall and residential housing:

​

The statutory language and legislative history demonstrate that the legislation did not authorize further developments on the tract of parkland but, rather, ensured that the City was authorized to accommodate other public uses of the stadium and appurtenant facilities.

​

… [T]he text of the statute and its legislative history flatly refute the proposition that the legislature granted the City the authority to construct a development such as Willets West in Flushing Meadows Park.

We acknowledge that the remediation of Willets Point is a laudable goal. Defendants and various amici dedicate substantial portions of their briefs to the propositions that the Willets West development would immensely benefit the people of New York City, by transforming the area into a new, vibrant community, and that the present plan might be the only means to accomplish that transformation. Those contentions, however, have no place in our consideration of whether the legislature granted authorization for the development of Willets West on land held in the public trust. Of course, the legislature remains free to alienate all or part of the parkland for whatever purposes it sees fit, but it must do so through direct and specific legislation that expressly confers the desired alienation. Matter of Avella v City of New York , 2017 NY Slip Op 04383, CtApp  6-6-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE)/PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (PARKLAND DEVELOPMENT, THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE)/PARKS (PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy