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EVIDENCE THAT THE A-FRAME LADDER WAS NOT SECURED AND WAS “IMPROPERLY PLACED” WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THERE IS NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE LADDER WAS DEFECTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent which argued there are triable issues of fact, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this A-frame ladder-fall case. The court noted that plaintiff need not demonstrate the ladder was defective. It is sufficient to demonstrate the ladder was not secured and was “improperly placed:”

To establish a prima facie case of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must ” ‘show that the statute was violated and that the violation proximately caused [the] injury’ ” … . “Where a ladder is offered as a work-site safety device, it must be sufficient to provide proper protection. It is well settled that [the] failure to properly secure a ladder, to ensure that it remain[s] steady and erect while being used, constitutes a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1)” … . “[T]he fact that the ladder failed and [that the] plaintiff fell to the ground demonstrates that it was not so placed . . . as to give proper protection to [the plaintiff]” ( … “Evidence that the ladder was structurally sound and not defective is not relevant on the issue of whether it was properly placed” … ).

Here, plaintiff met his initial burden on the motion by submitting his deposition testimony wherein he testified that [an] … employee [of the lessor of the property] covered the ladder’s feet with socks [to protect the tile floor], that [the employee] instructed plaintiff to use the modified ladder, and that the socks caused the ladder to slide and plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff’s unrebutted testimony established that “the statute was violated and that the violation proximately caused his injury” … . Delisle v FBBT/US Props., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03529, Fourth Dept 6-5-26

Practice Point: In this ladder-fall case, the unsecured ladder was not defective. Rather it was deemed “improperly placed” warranting summary judgment. It was alleged that socks placed over the feet of the ladder to protect the tile floor caused the ladder to slide.

 

SUPREME COURT HAD RULED THAT, AT THE TIME HE WAS STRUCK BY A FALLING OBJECT, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN A TASK COVERED BY THE LABOR LAW; PLAINTIFF’S TASK AT THE EXACT MOMENT OF THE ACCIDENT IS NOT DISPOSITIVE; THE LABOR LAW COVERS ALL TASKS NECESSARY AND INCIDENTAL TO THE RELEVANT WORK, HERE THE REMOVAL OF DEBRIS FROM THE WORKSITE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s activities were within the scope of the Labor Law when he was struck by a falling object. Plaintiff was struck when returning to the truck he had just moved. Defendants successfully argued below that, at the time of his injury, plaintiff was not engaged in work covered by the Labor Law. The First Department disagreed:

Plaintiff was injured when an object, alleged to be a pallet or a skid, fell on his head while he was working as a garbage truck driver at an active construction site owned by defendant MIP One Wall Street Acquisition LLC and where defendant J.T. Magen & Company Inc. was the general contractor. Plaintiff’s employer, Independence Carting, had contracted with J.T. Magen to perform Saturday carting services at the site. Plaintiff drove the garbage truck to the loading area where J.T. Magen laborers tasked with debris removal at the construction site loaded construction debris onto the truck while plaintiff operated the truck’s compacting machinery. J.T. Magen laborers directed plaintiff to move the garbage truck to another location in the loading dock area for additional construction debris to be loaded. At this second location, plaintiff exited the truck to check its position. When returning to the truck he was hit on the head by an object alleged to be a pallet or skid that fell from an elevated platform adjacent to plaintiff’s truck.

Plaintiff’s task at the exact moment of his accident is not dispositive of whether he was engaged in a protected activity … . “Rather, the inquiry includes whether the plaintiff’s employer was contracted to perform the kind of work enumerated in the statutes . . . and whether the plaintiff was performing work ‘necessary and incidental to’ a protected activity” … . Here, plaintiff was performing construction debris removal services at the construction site pursuant to a contract between J.T. Magen and his employer. The record establishes that the work he was performing was necessary and incidental to construction-related cleaning for an active construction site … . Therefore, plaintiff was protected by the Labor Law. Lapinski v MIP One Wall St. Acquisition LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03392, First Dept 6-2-26

Practice Point: The exact task performed by a worker at the time of an accident is not dispositive of whether the accident is within the scope of the Labor Law. Here plaintiff’s employer was hired by the general contractor to remove debris from a worksite. The fact that the plaintiff was struck by a falling object after moving a truck at the request of employees of the general contractor did not take the accident out of the scope of the Labor Law.

 

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THE CONTRACTOR RETAINED PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER TO INSTALL AN OIL TANK; THE CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK; PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN A PIECE OF THE TANK BROKE OFF AND STRUCK HIM; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CONTRACTOR WERE DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action against a contractor, Controlled Combustion, should have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s employer was retained by Controlled Combustion to install an oil tank. A piece of the tank broke off and struck the plaintiff. Controlled Combustion did not exercise supervisory control over plaintiff’s work:

Controlled Combustion is entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims because it established that it did not “actually exercise[] supervisory control over” plaintiff’s work … . General oversight, regular inspections, and authority to stop unsafe work are insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or common-law negligence … . Plaintiff testified that while installing an oil tank in the basement of a building owned by 2350 Broadway, he was struck by a base piece of the tank when the piece detached and fell from an electric chain hoist, which was owned by his employer. Controlled Combustion, a commercial heating company, was retained to perform work in the building, and it in turn retained plaintiff’s employer to install the oil tank. Plaintiff also testified that his employer came up with the plan to move the base piece with a hoist and that all orders of how to do his job came from his employer, not Controlled Combustion. Rosario v C.C. Controlled Combustion Co., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03279, First Dept 5-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what constitutes “supervision and control” over a plaintiff’s work such that the contractor which hired plaintiff’s employer can be liable to plaintiff under Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence.

 

THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH GENERALLY PROHIBITS WORK IN AN AREA WHERE A WORKER CAN BE STRUCK BY EXCAVATION EQUIPMENT IS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO HOLD A CONSTRUCTION SITE OWNER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 241(6); PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY AN EXCAVATOR WHICH ROTATED INTO HIM (CT APP)

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissent, determined the Industrial Code provision at issue was not specific enough to support a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action for plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff was struck by the back corner of an excavator which rotated into him. Industrial Code 23-4.2 (k) provides “[p]ersons shall not be suffered or permitted to work in any area where they may be struck or endangered by any excavation equipment or by any material being dislodged by or falling from such equipment” … :

The references to “area” and “endangered” in section 23-4.2 (k) represent the type of “broad, nonspecific regulatory standard[s]” that this Court has held insufficient to support “an action against a non-supervising owner or general contractor” … . Section 23-4.2 (k) does not include a minimum distance that must be maintained between a worker and any excavation equipment, and its protections are not limited to any specific class of worker. The section also does not identify any protective measures or reasonable precautions that a site owner must take in order to comply with the section. Nor does section 23-4.2 (k) provide clear guidance about how owners and contractors should provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers. It merely states a general prohibition with broad applicability, lacking any specific directions. While the safety of workers is a critical concern, the language of section 23-4.2 (k) does not meet the legal standard for specificity required to hold site owners vicariously liable under the Labor Law.  Mann v Mezuyon, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03257, CtApp 5-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the level of specificity required before an Industrial Code provision can be the basis for holding a construction site owner vicariously liable for a worker’s injury pursuant to Labor Law 241(6). Here the Industrial Code’s general prohibition against allowing workers in an area where they can be struck by excavation equipment was not specific enough to render the owner vicariously liable.

 

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THE LABOR LAW LIABILITY EXEMPTION FOR OWNERS OF ONE AND TWO FAMILY HOMES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE WORK HAS A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE, I.E., RENOVATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR SALE OR RENTAL; HERE THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE WORK WAS FOR A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action against the owner of a one or two-family dwelling should not have been dismissed on the ground that owners of one and two-family dwellings who do not control the work, are exempt form Labor Law liability. The exemption depends on whether the work serves a residential or commercial purpose. Here, without describing the facts, the Second Department held there was a question of fact about whether the work served a residential or commercial purpose:

Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) impose nondelegable duties upon property owners to comply with certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in certain activities. Both statutes exempt from liability “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” (id. §§ 240[1]; 241[6]). However “‘[r]enovating a residence for resale or rental plainly qualifies as work being performed for a commercial purpose'” … . Where the property serves both residential and commercial purposes, “[a] determination as to whether the exemption applies in a particular case turns on the nature of the site and the purpose of the work being performed, and must be based on the owner’s intentions at the time of the injury” … .

Here … the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they were entitled to the homeowner’s exemption to Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), including whether the premises had a commercial purpose and whether the work the plaintiff performed related to a commercial purpose of the premises … . Moreno v Hossain, 2026 NY Slip Op 03159, Second Dept 5-20-26

Practice Point: The exemption from Labor Law liability for owners of one and two-family homes does not apply when the purpose of the work is commercial, renovation for sale or rental, for example.

 

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THE SCAFFOLD FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF FELL HAD NO SAFETY RAILINGS AND THE SCAFFOLD WOBBLED AND COLLAPSED BECAUSE OF THE KICKBACK FROM A HAMMER DRILL PLAINTIFF WAS USING; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this Labor Law 240(1) action was entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff demonstrated the scaffold from which he fell did not have safety railings and the scaffold wobbled and collapsed because of the kickback from a hammer drill he was using:

… [T]he plaintiff established a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) through his deposition testimony that he was injured when he fell from a scaffold that lacked safety rails and that he was not otherwise provided an appropriate safety device. The plaintiff further testified that the kickback from the hammer drill he was using caused the scaffolding to wobble and collapse, proximately causing both his fall and his subsequent injuries. Thus, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that the defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1), and that this violation was a proximate cause of his injuries … . Correa v NY Developers & Mgt., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03143, Second Dept 5-20-26

Practice Point: A fall from a scaffold with no safety railings warrants summary judgment under Labor Law 240(1); a fall from a scaffold which wobbles and collapses because of the kickback from a hammer drill similarly warrants summary judgment under Labor Law 240(1).​

 

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IF A LADDER IS NOT SECURED AND IT MOVES, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER IT MOVES BEFORE OR AFTER PLAINTIFF LOSES HIS BALANCE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION IS WARRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S PURPORTED STATEMENT IN AN UNCERTIFIED MEDICAL RECORD WHICH WAS NOT GERMANE TO TREATMENT WAS INADMISSIBLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) the fact that the ladder was not secured and moved warranted summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, and (2) plaintiff’s purported remark which was included in an uncertified medical record and was not germane to treatment was inadmissible:

Plaintiff’s testimony that he fell because he lost his balance and the ladder on which he was standing shook established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim … . Contrary to the motion court’s conclusion, “[i]t is irrelevant whether plaintiff initially lost his balance before or after the ladder [shook] because . . . the ladder failed to remain steady under plaintiff[ ] . . . as he performed his work” … . Nor is this “a case where an issue of fact is raised as to whether plaintiff simply lost his balance or footing while working on a properly secured ladder. Indeed, plaintiff’s fall was directly related to the work that he was performing, as opposed to his own misstep” … . “Defendants were obligated to ensure that the ladder was secured to something stable” … . “Where a ladder is offered as a work-site safety device, it must be sufficient to provide proper protection. It is well settled that failure to properly secure a ladder, to ensure that it remain[s] steady and erect while being used, constitutes a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1)”  … . …

Defendants failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident. The only evidence on which defendants relied was a recorded statement purportedly made by plaintiff after his accident that appears on a single page from his medical records. However, not only was the medical record uncertified and, therefore, inadmissible, but plaintiff’s description of the accident in that statement was not germane to his diagnosis or treatment … . Diaz v Boston Props., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03114, First Dept 5-19-26

​Practice Point: Ladders which are not secured to something stable violate Labor Law 240(1).

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN A GRINDER WITH NO GUARD KICKED BACK; THE ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF WAS TOLD TO USE A SLEDGEHAMMER, NOT THE GRINDER, DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT; A SLEDGEHAMMER IS NOT A SAFETY DEVICE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured when a grinder with no guard kicked back. The allegation that plaintiff was told to use a sledgehammer, not the angle grinder, did not raise a question of fact:

Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as that claim was predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(3), which mandates that equipment in use shall be kept sound and operable and that damaged equipment shall be immediately repaired, restored, or removed from the job site. …

… [E]ven if plaintiff was negligent by using the grinder instead of the sledgehammer, this at most constitutes comparative negligence, which is insufficient to defeat plaintiff’s motion … .

To the extent that [defendant] argues that plaintiff was recalcitrant in ignoring the alleged instructions to use a sledgehammer and to not use an angle grinder, this is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. … [E]ven if the defense were to apply to a Labor Law § 241(6) claim … it has no application where, as here, no adequate safety devices were provided because a sledgehammer is not a safety device.  Terron-Alcantara v Charlie’s Real Estate LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03091, First Dept 5-14-26

Practice Point: Comparative negligence does not defeat a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

Practice Point: Here, the allegation plaintiff was told to use a sledgehammer, not the unsafe grinder, did not raise a question of fact on the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action.

 

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A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION UNDER LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (PREMISES LIABILITY); BUT A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CANNOT BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) OR 241(6) FOR CONSTRUCTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a prior owner of property may be liable pursuant to Labor Law 200 and common law negligence for a dangerous condition which the new owner did not have time to remedy, but prior owners cannot be liable under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) which relate to construction activities:

… Supreme Court properly denied those branches of Federal Brick’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against it to the extent that they sounded in premises liability. … Federal Brick failed to establish, prima facie, that it could not be held liable for the allegedly dangerous premises condition as a former owner. Inasmuch as “Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty of property owners and general contractors to provide workers with a safe place to work” … .

… T]he “narrow exception” that allows for premises liability to be extended to prior owners of property … does not apply to the statutory liability imposed by Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). Those statutes apply to certain construction-related activities … , rather than premises conditions for which a prior owner might remain responsible. Quintero v MBH Capital, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03010, Second Dept 5-13-26

Practice Point: Under some circumstances a prior property owner may be liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition if the new owner has not yet had time to learn of it and remedy it. This prior-owner liability may be pursunat Labor-Law-200 and common-law negligence theories.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY THAT THE UNSECURED LADDER MOVED SUDDENLY AND TILTED TO THE LEFT WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined plaintiff in this ladder-fall case was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff testify the unsecured ladder moved suddenly and titled to the left:

… [T]he claimant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The claimant’s deposition testimony established that the unsecured ladder moved suddenly and tilted to the left, causing him to fall … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the claimant’s own acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of the accident … . Bista v State of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 01936, Second Dept 4-1-26

Practice Point: A plaintiff’s testimony that the ladder was unsecured and moved suddenly can be sufficient to warrant summary judgment in a Labor Law 240(1) action.

 

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