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PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS FALLING OBJECT CASE; DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE JOB WAS NOT A HARD HAT JOB PRECLUDING DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined: (1) plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action stemming from his being struck by an unsecured heating duct during demolition; and (2) defendants (appellants) were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action premised on plaintiff’s failure to wear a hard hat:

With respect to falling objects, liability is not limited to cases in which the falling object is in the process of being hoisted or secured … . Rather, “a plaintiff must show that the object fell . . . because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” … . “To succeed on a cause of action under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated its duty and that the violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries” … . The burden then shifts to the defendant to raise a triable issue of fact … . A worker’s comparative negligence is not a defense to a cause of action under Labor Law § 240(1) … . Rather, only where the worker’s own conduct is the sole proximate cause of the accident is recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) unavailable … .

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action insofar as asserted against the owner and the general contractor by submitting evidence that while he was engaged in demolition work, he was injured when an unsecured HVAC duct fell and hit him, causing him to fall to the ground … . …

“In order to prevail on a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1), the plaintiff must establish that the job was a hard hat job, and that the plaintiff’s failure to wear a hard hat was a proximate cause of his injury” … . Here, the appellants failed to establish, prima facie, that this was not a hard hat job, and that the plaintiff’s lack of head protection did not play a role in the injuries he sustained when he was struck by the falling object. Aguilar v Graham Terrace, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 04906, Second Dept 9-16-20

 

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A PERMANENTLY AFFIXED LADDER VIBRATED CAUSING PLAINTIFF TO FALL; PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN REPAIR NOT ROUTINE MAINTENANCE; NO SHOWING PLAINTIFF WAS AWARE HE SHOULD WEAR A HARNESS AND FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD CONSTITUTE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WHICH IS NOT A BAR TO RECOVERY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged a permanently affixed ladder in an elevator shaft vibrated causing him to fall to the floor of the shaft:

… [W]hile an unsecured ladder that moves or shifts constitutes a prima facie violation of Labor Law § 240(1) … , the ladder from which plaintiff fell was secured to the structure, and, other than allegedly vibrating, it did not move, shift or sway. Under the circumstances, an issue of fact exists whether the secured, permanently affixed ladder that allegedly vibrated provided proper protection for plaintiff.

The record demonstrates, contrary to defendants’ contention, that at the time of his accident plaintiff was performing not routine maintenance but repair work, which falls within the protective ambit of Labor Law § 240(1) … . The work in which plaintiff was engaged occurred over the course of weeks, if not longer, and its purpose was to correct the unguarded condition of traveling cables that caused the cables to strike other objects within the elevator shafts … . …

Defendants failed to establish that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident, as they submitted no evidence that plaintiff knew that he was supposed to use a harness for climbing ladders or that he disregarded “specific instructions” to do so . Further, to the extent the ladder failed to provide proper protection, plaintiff’s failure to use a harness amounts at most to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim … . Kehoe v 61 Broadway Owner LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 04900, First Dept 9-3-20

 

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TREE-CUTTING IS A COVERED ACTIVITY PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) IF DONE IN CONNECTION WITH A COVERED CONSTRUCTION PROJECT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor 240 (1) should not have been granted, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action was properly denied, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured cutting trees, which is a covered activity when done in connection with a construction project:

Although trees are not structures and tree removal in and of itself is not an enumerated activity within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1), tree removal performed to facilitate an enumerated activity does come within the ambit of this statute (see Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 296 [1992]). Defendant failed to meet its initial burden on that part of its motion because defendant’s own submissions raised a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff’s tree removal work at the time of the accident was ancillary to the larger construction project, specifically the culvert installation work, that was ongoing at the time of the accident … . Contrary to plaintiff’s further contention, however, the court properly denied his cross motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s liability under section 240 (1) inasmuch as plaintiff failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact whether his tree removal work “[fell] into a separate phase easily distinguishable from other parts of the larger construction project” … . …

Although it is well settled that Labor Law § 241 (6) does not apply to a worker who engages in tree trimming that is unrelated to construction, demolition or excavation work … , as noted above, there is a triable question of fact whether plaintiff’s work at the time of his accident was related to the culvert installation work and was thus related to construction, demolition or excavation work.  …

[Re: the Labor law 200 cause of action] defendant met its burden … by submitting evidence establishing “that the alleged dangerous condition arose from the . . . methods [of plaintiff’s employer] and that defendant did not exercise supervisory control over the removal of the tree or any aspect of plaintiff’s activities” … . Krencik v Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 04642, Fourth Dept 8-20-20

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS NOT WEARING A HARNESS AND FELL FROM A ROOF; THE FACT THAT HARNESSES MAY HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Although plaintiff was a ground worker the on roofing job, he fell from the roof alleging that a toe board “gave out.” The fact that plaintiff was not wearing a harness, in the face of allegations harnesses were available, was not enough to defeat plaintiff’s motion. The dissenters argued the evidence that all the toe boards were in tact after the accident raised a question of fact whether that safety device failed:

… [P]laintiff met his initial burden on that part of the motion by establishing that his ” injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential’ ” … . Specifically, plaintiff submitted his deposition testimony, wherein he stated that the toe board failed, causing him to fall from the roof. He also testified that he was not provided with a harness and that there were no available harnesses nearby. …

The ” presence of [other safety devices] somewhere at the worksite’ does not [alone] satisfy defendants’ duty to provide appropriate safety devices” … . …

… “[T]he mere failure by plaintiff to follow safety instructions” does not render plaintiff the sole proximate cause of his injuries  … . The evidence presented by defendants established only that plaintiff possibly failed to follow safety instructions, not that he outright refused to “use available, safe and appropriate equipment” … . Defendants failed to demonstrate that plaintiff ” chose for no good reason not to’ ” wear a safety harness … . At most, plaintiff’s “alleged conduct would amount only to comparative fault and thus cannot bar recovery under the statute” … . Schutt v Bookhagen, 2020 NY Slip Op 04651, Fourth Dept 8-20-20

 

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APPELLANT WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OR OWNER, DID NOT SUPERVISE AND CONTROL PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORK SITE; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS CONSTRUCTION-DEBRIS-SLIP-AND-FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the appellant, which was hired by the construction manager to put in concrete steps, was bit an agent of the general contractor or the owner and did not exercise supervisory control plaintiff’s work in this Labor Law 200, 240(1) and 241(6) action. Plaintiff worked for an HVAC contractor and fell over construction debris on a temporary ramp leading to the entrance of the premises:

To hold a defendant liable as an agent of the general contractor or the owner for violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), there must be a showing that it had the authority to supervise and control the work that brought about the injury …  “The determinative factor is whether the party had the right to exercise control over the work, not whether it actually exercised that right” … . “Where the owner or general contractor does in fact delegate the duty to conform to the requirements of the Labor Law to a third-party subcontractor, the subcontractor becomes the statutory agent of the owner or general contractor” … .

Here, the appellant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that it was not an agent of the general contractor or the owner with regard to the plaintiff’s work … . There was no evidence that the appellant had any authority to supervise or control the work of the plaintiff … . … [T]he appellant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that it did not have control over the work site … . Fiore v Westerman Constr. Co., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 04460, Second Dept 12-12-20

 

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DEFENDANT ARGUED THE INSURANCE COMPANY WHICH REPRESENTED THE PROPERTY OWNER AND THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE UNFAIRLY APPORTIONED THE PAYMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THEM SUCH THAT THE NON-NEGLIGENT, VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PARTY PAID $2 MILLION, AND THE NEGLIGENT PARTY PAID $200,000; AFTER INDEMNIFYING THE PROPERTY OWNER IN THE AMOUNT OF $2 MILLION DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO BE INDEMNIFIED BY THE NEGLIGENT PARTY; THE ATTEMPT WAS REJECTED UNDER BOTH CONTRACTUAL AND COMMON LAW INDEMNIFICATION THEORIES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a concurrence, determined Lamela & Sons, Inc. (Lamela), the employer of plaintiffs James and Robert Lamela, was required to indemnify the property owner, Satin, for Satin’s portion of the $3.2 million settlement in this construction accident case. The settlement agreement required payment of $2,199,999 by Satin and Verticon, the general contractor. Lamela paid Satin $2 million in satisfaction of its contractual indemnity obligation to Satin. The insurance company which represented both Verticon and Satin apportioned a larger portion of the settlement to Satin, which was not negligent but was vicariously liable, and a lesser portion to Verticon, which was negligent. Lamela argued that a larger portion of the settlement should have been apportioned to the negligent party, Verticon. Lamela’s indemnity obligation to Satin, therefore, should have been less. On that basis, Lamela sought indemnity from Verticon. Lamela’s argument was rejected:

Verticon submitted the construction contract … between Verticon and Lamela, which provides for indemnity flowing from Lamela to Verticon, specifically stating, “To the fullest extent permitted by law, [Lamela] shall indemnify, defend and save harmless [Verticon] . . . against any and all suits [or] actions . . . arising from the use or operation by [Lamela] of construction equipment, tools, scaffolding or facilities furnished to [Lamela] to perform the [w]ork.” The provision, as expected, does not provide for indemnification flowing the other way, from Verticon to Lamela, as is being sought by Lamela. Thus, as “the subject of indemnification [is] clearly contemplated and expressly addressed by [Lamela and Verticon] in their contract, . . . there [can] only be a one-way obligation to indemnify by [Lamela] as the indemnitor, and any reciprocal obligation is extinguished” … . * * *

… .[C]ommon-law indemnity is not the appropriate relief here because Lamela is not responsible by operation of law … ; rather, its payment to Satin was based solely upon a voluntarily assumed obligation that it undertook by virtue of the contract. There has been no case cited that permits common-law indemnity under this scenario. Although we are mindful that Lamela’s motivation for seeking common-law indemnity stems from its concern that the settlement was unfairly apportioned, to attempt to remedy this by way of common-law indemnity is unavailing. Lamela v Verticon, Ltd., 2020 NY Slip Op 04214, Third Dept 7-23-20

 

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DEFENDANT HOME OWNER DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION WHICH ALLEGEDLY RESULTED IN PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES IN THIS LABOR LAW 200 ACTION; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED AN AFFIDAVIT FROM A NOTICE WITNESS WHO WAS NOT DISCLOSED PRIOR TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant home owner’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 200 action should have been granted. Defendant was not home when plaintiff fell through an open hole in the deck while removing a window. The defendant demonstrated he did not have any control over the manner of plaintiff’s work and did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Supreme Court should not have considered the affidavit of a nonparty who was not previously disclosed as a witness who had actual notice of the condition.

… [T]he defendant established, prima facie, that he did not exercise supervision or control over the performance of the work giving rise to the accident … . Further, to the extent that the accident could be viewed as arising from a dangerous or defective premises condition at the work site, the defendant established, prima facie, that he did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition … .

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination to consider the affidavit of a nonparty witness submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendant’s motion. In his discovery demands, the defendant sought disclosure of, inter alia, the name of any witness who had actual notice of the alleged condition, or the nature and duration of such condition. The nonparty witness was not disclosed in the plaintiffs’ discovery responses, the plaintiffs failed to offer an excuse for their failure to do so, and nothing that transpired during discovery would have alerted the defendant of the potential significance of the nonparty’s testimony … . Casilari v Condon, 2020 NY Slip Op 04146, Second Dept 7-22-20

 

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CERTAIN LABOR LAW 200, COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE, AND LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; QUESTION OF FACT RE: WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE; THE PROJECT COORDINATOR MET SEVERAL DEFINITIONS OF ‘OWNER’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240(1), INCLUDING AS THE HOLDER OF AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined common law negligence and Labor Law 200 causes of action should have been dismissed re: several defendants because of the absence of supervisory control, several of the Labor Law 241(6) causes of action should have been dismissed because the Industrial Code provisions did not apply, and plaintiff should not have been awarded summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action because there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the fall, The dissenters argued plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly granted. Plaintiff fell when he switched from one ladder to another and the ladder kicked out from under him. The definition of “owner” within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1) was discussed in some depth:

Although the term owner generally refers to the titleholder of the property, it may “also encompass[ ] one who has an interest in the property [and] . . . who contracted for or otherwise ha[d] the right to control the work” … . Here, Tucker Homes [the project coordinator] had an equitable interest in the property by virtue of provisions in its contract with the titleholders that permitted it to take possession of the deed and obtain legal title to the property if the titleholders did not pay for the home’s construction. Moreover, Tucker Homes, as the only entity that had a contractual relationship with RGGT [defendant subcontractor], was the only entity that could insist that RGGT adhere to safety practices and obtain insurance. The titleholders, by contrast, had no contractual relationship with RGGT and did not obtain any insurance on the project. Thus, the court properly concluded that Tucker Homes, “as the only party with [both] a property interest and the right to insist on safety practices,” was an owner within the meaning of the Labor Law … . …

Even if Tucker Homes was not an “owner” for purposes of the Labor Law, we conclude that the court properly determined that Tucker Homes was a general contractor based on its power to enforce safety standards and essentially select the responsible subcontractors to perform work on the project, such as RGGT … . …

Plaintiff also met his burden of establishing that Tucker Homes was, at the very least, a statutory agent of the titleholders, and Tucker Homes did not raise a triable issue of fact in opposition … . Unrefuted evidence established that, under the terms of the subcontract, Tucker Homes had the power to supervise and control the work being done by RGGT at the time of the accident … . …

… [T]he court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, and we further modify the order accordingly. Plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden on that part of the motion inasmuch as issues of fact exist whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident … . Walkow v MJ Peterson/Tucker Homes, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 04098, Fourth Dept 7-17-20

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS RE: DEBRIS IN PASSAGEWAYS AND KEEPING EQUIPMENT IN GOOD REPAIR IN THIS LABOR LAW 241(6) ACTION PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) causes of action should not have been granted. There were questions of fact whether the Industrial Code provisions re: debris in passageways and keeping equipment in good repair were violated. Plaintiff was injured when a wheeled dumpster allegedly tipped over:

Plaintiff’s claim premised upon § 23-1.7(e)(2), which concerns debris in passageways, is viable because the area where the accident occurred was a passageway for the purposes of that provision … . The provision applies not just when loose debris causes a direct trip and fall, but also in circumstances similar to those involved here … .

With regard to § 23-1.28(b), which pertains to hand-propelled vehicles, and § 23-1.5(c), which prohibits use of machinery or equipment that is not in good repair and safe working condition, defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the wheeled dumpster was not defective … . Sancino v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 2020 NY Slip Op 03615, First Dept 6-25-20

 

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LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A DANGEROUS CONDITION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, APPELLANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION; JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DENIED A MOTION ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY A PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action properly survived summary judgment. The Second Department noted the court should not have, sua sponte, denied appellants’ motion on the ground the deposition transcripts were inadmissible because that issue was not raised. Plaintiff was working in the bottom of a hole which was muddy from heavy rain and littered with boulders and rocks. Plaintiff was injured when he allegedly slipped and fell because of the mud. The Second Department held that the causes of action were based upon a dangerous condition, not the method and manner of work, and the appellants did not demonstrate they lacked actual or constructive notice of the condition:

Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed on owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers with a safe place to work … . There are “two broad categories of actions that implicate the provisions of Labor Law § 200” … . The first category involves worker injuries arising out of alleged dangerous or defective conditions on the premises where the work is performed … . In those circumstances, “[f]or liability to be imposed on the property owner, there must be evidence showing that the property owner either created a dangerous or defective condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it without remedying it within a reasonable time” … . The second category of actions under Labor Law § 200 involves injuries arising from the method and manner of the work … . A property owner will be held liable under this category only if it possessed the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the work … .

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the plaintiff’s accident arose from a dangerous premises condition, not from the method and manner of the work. Where a plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured at a work site as a result of a dangerous premises condition, a property owner’s liability under Labor Law § 200 and for common-law negligence rests upon whether the property owner created the condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable amount of time within which to correct the condition … . Modugno v Bovis Lend Lease Interiors, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03508, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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