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THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN REPAIR AS OPPOSED TO ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIR CONDITIONER WHEN HE WAS INJURED; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DIMSISS THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED; HOWEVER THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMIISED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined defendant’s (Chase’s) motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly denied but Chase’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been granted. There was a question of fact whether plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance repair of the air conditioner. But plaintiff was not involved in construction of the building, so Labor Law 241 (6) did not apply:

Chase’s own evidentiary submissions, including the injured plaintiff’s deposition testimony, raised triable issues of fact as to whether the injured plaintiff was engaged in repairs or routine maintenance at the time the accident occurred. Although it is undisputed that an outside party was to perform the ultimate repair to the defective division plate, the injured plaintiff testified at his deposition that his supervisor instructed him to perform a temporary repair to the division plate in order to make the air conditioning unit function. Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the injured plaintiff’s activity constituted a repair of the unit within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1) … . …

“Although the applicability of Labor Law § 241(6) is not limited to building sites, the work in which the plaintiff was engaged must have affected the structural integrity of the building or structure or have been an integral part of the construction of a building or structure” … . Cantalupo v Arco Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 02783, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A LADDER WAS INTENDED FOR USE AS A STAGE PROP BY ACTORS AS OPPOSED TO AN OSHA COMPLIANT LADDER; EVEN WHERE A LABOR LAW 200 ACTION WILL NOT LIE, A COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION MAY BE VIABLE; HERE IT WAS ALLEGED DEFENDANT LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM BY ALTERING THE LADDER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the Labor Law 200 cause of action against Center Line should have been dismissed but the common law negligence cause of action properly survived summary judgment. Although the decision doesn’t spell it out, it appears that defendant Center Line altered the ladder in question by gluing on an extra rung. Apparently the ladder was to be used by actors and Center Line argued it was a stage prop and was not intended for use an OSHA compliant ladder. The viable contract-based “Espinal” negligence theory was based upon launching an instrument of harm (altering the ladder):

Even assuming that Center Line is a proper Labor Law § 200 defendant, it cannot be held liable under the statute. This case is a means and methods of work case, and there is no proof that Center Line had authority to supervise and control plaintiff’s work … .

A claim for common-law negligence may lie even though there is no Labor Law § 200 liability … . A triable issue of fact exists as to whether Center Line negligently created or exacerbated a dangerous condition so as to have “launche[d] a force or instrument of harm” … . Although Center Line augmented the ladder as directed by Production Core, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Center Line could have reasonably anticipated that the gluing of the rung to the top of the ladder would pose a hazard and likely to cause injury … . While plaintiff and the codefendants claim that Center Line dangerously altered the ladder despite knowing that the ladder was structural and climbable, Center Line claims that the ladder was a prop ladder that was not meant to be OSHA compliant, and that it augmented the ladder in reliance on Production Core’s assurances that the top portion of the ladder would not be ascended by the actors. Such raises an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Mullins v Center Line Studios, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 02756, First Dept 5-4-21

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PIECE OF SHEETROCK, THE LADDER HE WAS STANDING ON SHOOK, AND PLAINTIFF FELL TO THE GROUND; THERE WAS NO NEED TO PROVE THE LADDER WAS DEFECTIVE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted, Plaintiff stood on an A-frame ladder while attempting to put up a piece of sheetrock on the ceiling. His arm which was holding up the sheetrock became tired, the sheetrock fell striking plaintiff’s head and then the ladder shook and moved and he fell to the ground. There was no need to prove the ladder was defective:

The undisputed facts establish that defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1) by failing to properly secure the ladder against movement or slippage and to ensure that it remained steady and erect … . Defendants failed to guard against plaintiff’s risk of falling from a ladder while using one hand over his head to hold the sheetrock in place and the other hand over his head to operate a drill … .

Because we find that the ladder did not provide adequate protection, it is irrelevant that it appeared “very sturdy” to plaintiff. A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that a ladder is defective in order to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment under Labor Law § 240 (1) … . Ping Lin v 100 Wall St. Prop. L.L.C., 2021 NY Slip Op 02605, First Dept 4-29-21

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY AN AIR CONDITIONER WHEN TWO OF THE FOUR RODS ATTACHING THE AIR CONDITIONER TO THE CEILING DETACHED AND ONE END OF THE UNIT FELL; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE AIR CONDITIONER WAS A FALLING OBJECT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether an air conditioner installed by plaintiff’s employer was a falling object which should have been secured in this Labor Law 240 (1) action. the air condition was attached to the concrete ceiling by four rods. Two of the rods came out of the ceiling causing one end of the unit to drop, striking plaintiff:

Plaintiff testified that he was standing on the fourth rung of an A-frame ladder, which he had set up on a solid and clean part of the floor and had been using without incident, directly under an air-conditioning unit, while attempting to follow his foreman’s instructions by connecting a “canvas” device to air-conditioning duct work, when the air-conditioning unit fell onto his head, causing him to fall off the ladder onto the floor. The air-conditioning unit had recently been installed by plaintiff’s employer as part of its work on the project and was not part of the pre-existing building structure as it appeared before the project began. The air-conditioning unit was mounted a few inches below the approximately 12-foot ceiling by four rods. Plaintiff testified that two of those rods detached from the concrete ceiling, causing one end of the unit to drop, while the other end of the unit remained attached to the ceiling by two bent rods.

There is an issue of fact as to whether the air-conditioning unit constituted a falling object that was required to be secured for the purposes of the undertaking … . Erby v 36 LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 02065, First Dept 4-1-21

 

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THE APPLICABLE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION APPLIES TO MORE THAN JUST THE OBSTRUCTION OF PASSAGEWAYS; IT ALSO APPLIES TO BUILDING MATERIAL WHICH IS NOT PROPERLY STORED AND SECURED (AND FALLS); PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action should not have been dismissed in this falling object case. Plaintiff was struck by a component of an unbuilt mail box which fell:

Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claim is predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1), which provides in relevant part that “[a]ll building materials shall be stored in a safe and orderly manner. Material piles shall be stable under all conditions and so located that they do not obstruct any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare” … . Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the scope of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1) is not limited exclusively to obstructed thoroughfares … . Rather, the plain text of the regulation creates three distinct obligations and potential sources of liability: first, “[a]ll building materials shall be stored in a safe and orderly manner”; second, “[m]aterial piles shall be stable under all conditions”; and third, “[m]aterial piles shall be . . . so located that they do not obstruct any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare” … . …

… [W]e agree with plaintiff that the mailbox component at issue qualifies as a “building material[]” within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1), and we further agree with plaintiff that triable issues of fact exist regarding the “safe[ty] and orderl[iness]” of the “manner” in which defendants “stored” that “building material[].” Slowe v Lecesse Constr. Servs., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01887, Fourth Dept 3-26-21

 

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PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY A FALLING REBAR, WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE REBAR FALLING; IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE REBAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED SUCH THAT IT WOULD NOT FALL; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action in this falling object case should have been granted. Plaintiff was struck by a falling rebar:

Plaintiff, a journeyman ironworker at the Hudson Yards project, was injured when a piece of rebar fell from 30 feet above, striking him. In moving for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, plaintiff was not required to show the exact circumstances of how the rebar came to strike him, as his testimony, that a coworker was working with rebar 30 feet above him on the same column immediately before the accident, was sufficient evidence that the rebar, whether it was dropped or fell in some other manner, was material requiring securing … . In that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment on his testimony alone, the admissibility of his coworker’s unsigned deposition transcript is a moot point. Defendants failed to adduce any evidence raising a question of fact to warrant denial of plaintiff’s motion. Pados v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 01855, First Dept 3-25-21

 

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PLAINTIFF, AN HVAC WORKER, LEANED ON A PIPE RAILING AS HE WAITED FOR AN ELEVATOR TO TAKE HIM TO THE FLOOR WHERE HIS WORK SITE WAS; THE PIPE RAILING GAVE WAY AND PLAINTFF FELL FOUR OR FIVE FEET TO A CONCRETE SLAB; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was at the construction site waiting for an elevator to take him to the floor where he was working (HVAC work) when he leaned back on a pipe railing which gave way and he fell four or five feet to a concrete slab:

… [T]he safety devices prescribed by Labor Law § 240(1) “are for the use or protection of persons in gaining access to or working at sites where elevation poses a risk” … .

… [T]he plaintiff established that he needed to use the elevator, one of two at opposite ends of the construction site, to gain access to the various floors where he would be working throughout the day. Thus, accessing and waiting at the loading dock for the elevator, even before working hours began, was necessary to the plaintiff’s work. We therefore conclude that the loading dock from which the plaintiff fell is included under “those parts, which must be accessed by a worker to do his or her job” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that the plaintiff was not engaged in HVAC work at the moment of his accident does not preclude the application of Labor Law § 240(1). Crutch v 421 Kent Dev., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01751, Second Dept 3-24-21

 

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THE ACKNOWLEDGED VIOLATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE WAS MERELY “SOME EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE” TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE FACTFINDER AND WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ON THE LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action, despite the acknowledged violation of an Industrial Code provision, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d). Plaintiff alleged he slipped and fall on metal decking on which there was some snow. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) requires that snow be removed from places where worker walk. The Fourth Department noted that the violation of the regulation, as opposed to a statute, is merely “some evidence of negligence” to be considered by the jury:

… [P]laintiff’s claim that defendants are liable under Labor Law § 241 (6) is based on the alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), which, in pertinent part, directs that workers not be permitted to use “a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface which is in a slippery condition” and requires that substances such as snow and ice be “removed . . . or covered to provide safe footing.” It is undisputed that “12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) mandates a distinct standard of conduct, rather than a general reiteration of common-law principles, and [thus] is precisely the type of ‘concrete specification’ ” upon which liability under section 241 (6) may be premised … . Moreover, defendants do not challenge plaintiff’s showing that the subject regulation was violated. As defendants correctly contend, however, the violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) is not conclusive with respect to defendants’ liability and, instead, merely constitutes “some evidence of negligence and thereby reserve[s], for resolution by a [factfinder], the issue of whether the equipment, operation or conduct at the worksite was reasonable and adequate under the particular circumstances” … . In particular, we conclude that plaintiff’s own submissions, including the deposition of [defendant] Burke’s owner who testified—in contrast to plaintiff’s testimony—regarding his efforts to clear snow from the metal decking upon arriving at the work site prior to any workers, “raised factual issues with respect to the reasonableness of the safety measures undertaken at the work site” … . Chrisman v Syracuse Soma Project, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01663, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION; DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes o action should have been granted. In addition defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 cause of action should have been granted, Plaintiff was standing on a scaffold with no railing when a piece of concrete fell from the ceiling and knocked him off the scaffold:

… [T]he plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, through his deposition testimony that the scaffold he was using lacked any safety railings and that he tried to grab onto something as he fell from the scaffold but “there was nothing to grab” … . …

Similarly, the plaintiff met his prima facie burden with respect to so much of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action as was predicated upon 12 NYCRR 23-5.3(e), by establishing that the scaffold lacked safety railings in violation of that regulation and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injuries … . * * *

[Re; the Labor Law 200 cause of action:] … [T]he defendants … demonstrated … that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the plaintiff’s work … . The defendants … further demonstrated … that they did not create or have actual or constructive notice of any alleged defect in the concrete ceiling. Since the concrete ceiling had been covered by a drop ceiling until the drop ceiling was demolished … , any alleged defect in the concrete ceiling was latent and not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection … . Leon-Rodriguez v Roman Catholic Church of Sts. Cyril & Methodius, 2021 NY Slip Op 08228, Second Dept 3-17-21

 

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THE REACH OF LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6) AND THE MEANING OF “OWNER” AS USED IN THAT STATUTE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant 2 Big Meadows’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action should not have been granted. The court explained the reach of liability under Labor Law 241 (6) and the meaning of the term “owner” as used in the statute:

Liability under Labor Law § 241(6) extends to “[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents . . . when constructing or demolishing buildings or doing any excavating in connection therewith.” “[T]he burden placed upon a defendant seeking summary judgment on the ground that it is not an owner is a heavy one” … . * * *

… “[T]he term ‘owner’ is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person ‘who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit'” … . “[T]he critical factor in determining whether a party is an ‘owner’ is whether it ‘possessed the right to insist that proper safety practices were followed; that is, the right to control the work'” … . The evidentiary submissions furnished by 2 Big Meadow in support of its motion for summary judgment did not eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether 2 Big Meadow, which clearly benefitted from the renovation of its property, was involved in contracting to have the construction project performed or had the authority to insist on proper safety practices. Cruz v 1142 Bedford Ave., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 08220, Second Dept 3-17-21

 

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