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IN THIS DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACTION, THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE AMOUNT OWED BY THE DEFENDANT OR THE REASONABLENESS OF THE SALE OF THE COLLATERAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating the damages award in this action on a motor vehicle retail installment contract, determined the plaintiff did not present evidence sufficient to determine the correct amount of the deficiency judgment or the reasonableness of the sale of the collateral:

… [T]he court should have denied plaintiff’s motion insofar as it sought summary judgment on the amount of damages. Plaintiff did not meet its initial burden of establishing the amount of the alleged deficiency as a matter of law … . We note in particular that plaintiff failed to provide evidence of defendant’s payment history, and failed to establish whether it applied certain applicable credits, including an unearned credit service charge pursuant to Personal Property Law §§ 305 and 315.

Moreover, plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish that the vehicle was sold in a commercially reasonable manner … . A “secured party seeking a deficiency judgment from the debtor after sale of the collateral bears the burden of showing that the sale was made in a commercially reasonable manner” ( … see generally UCC 9-627 [b]). We conclude that, “[h]aving failed to set forth any of the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale, plaintiff failed to satisfy a prerequisite to obtaining a deficiency judgment and is not entitled to summary judgment” with respect to damages … . Ally Fin. Inc. v Jonathan, 2020 NY Slip Op 05630, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO RETURN OF ENGAGEMENT RING AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE WERE CALLED OFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in an action for the return of an engagement ring after the engagement and marriage were called off:

As a general matter, a party not under any impediment to marry may maintain an action to recover property, such as an engagement ring, given in contemplation of marriage where the contemplated marriage does not come to pass (see Civil Rights Law § 80-b …). Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the cause of action for the return of the ring by establishing that he gave the ring to the defendant in contemplation of their marriage, and thus, he was entitled to its return at the time of the termination of their engagement … .

In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Although the defendant maintained that the plaintiff made an inter vivos gift of the ring to her after the termination of their engagement, the evidence she submitted failed to support this assertion. A valid inter vivos gift requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of “the intent on the part of the donor to make a present transfer; delivery of the gift, either actual or constructive to the donee; and acceptance by the donee” … . Here, the text messages upon which the defendant relied did not clearly demonstrate a donative intent on the part of the plaintiff with respect to the ring, nor did they establish an acceptance of the ring as a gift by the defendant. Rambod v Tazeh, 2020 NY Slip Op 03382, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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Once an Amended Complaint is Served the Action Must Proceed As if the Original Complaint Never Existed—A Summary Judgment Motion Based Upon an Affirmative Defense Asserted for the First Time in the Answer to the Amended Complaint Was Properly Brought, Even Though a Prior Summary Judgment Motion on the Same Ground Had Been Denied/Medical Billing Software, i.e., Intellectual Property, Is “Personal Property” Covered by General Obligations Law 5-903—The Automatic Renewal Provision of the Medical Billing Contract Was Therefore Void

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and an affirmative defense asserted in the answer to the amended complaint could be the basis of a summary judgment motion, even though the same ground was asserted in a prior, unsuccessful summary judgment motion. The substantive issue was whether billing software licensed to a doctor was “service … to or for … personal property” within the meaning of General Obligations Law 5-903 (2).  The court determined the billing software was covered by the General Obligations Law and, therefore, the automatic renewal provision in the contract between the software company and the doctor could not be enforced.  The “General Obligations Law” affirmative defense was not asserted in the original answer and a summary judgment motion based on the unpled affirmative defense had previously been denied:

We find that the second summary judgment motion, brought after the pleadings were amended on a substantive issue not previously decided by the court, was procedurally proper. “Once plaintiff served the amended complaint, the original complaint was superseded, and the amended complaint became the only complaint in the action. The action was then required to proceed as though the original pleading had never been served” … . Thus, defendant’s appeal from the prior order denying summary judgment became moot …, and “sufficient cause . . . exist[ed]” for his motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint … . …

General Obligations Law § 5-903 does not define “personal property,” although it broadly defines “person” as “an individual, firm, company, partnership or corporation” and also states that its restrictions apply unless “the person receiving the service” is served with advanced notice calling its attention to the renewal clause in the contract (General Obligations Law § 5-903[2]). The statute does not require that the person own the “personal property” being serviced, and section 5-903 has been analyzed by courts in a variety of circumstances to determine its applicability. Personal property has been interpreted to include intellectual property as well as tangible personal property … . The purpose of the notice provision is to protect service recipients from the harm of unintended automatic renewals of contracts for consecutive periods … . Since § 5-903 is remedial in nature it is construed broadly … .

We find that the parties’ agreement was “for service . . . to or for . . . personal property” within the meaning of the General Obligations Law. The services provided were directly and inextricably related to the billing and medical records of the practice, which are personal property. Healthcare IQ LLC v Tsai Chung Chao, 2014 NY Slip Op 03216, 1st Dept 5-6-14

 

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