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THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE DESTROYED THE UNDERGROUND OIL TANKS WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE LEAKED, CONTAMINATING PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY; HOWEVER THE DEFENDANT OIL COMPANIES DID NOT DEMONSRTATE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TANKS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE A DEFENSE; THEREFORE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION, NOT THE STRIKING OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff should have preserved the underground oil tanks which allegedly leaked and contaminated plaintiff’s property, but that striking the complaint was not warranted under the doctrine of spoliation. Because the defendants did not demonstrate the destruction of the tanks made it impossible to mount a defense, an adverse inference instruction was the appropriate sanction:

The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for a violation of Navigation Law § 181, alleging that the defendants Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Getty Oil Company, Getty Refining and Marketing Company, and Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations), Inc. (hereinafter collectively the defendants), discharged petroleum from underground storage tanks on the plaintiff’s property. * * *

… [T]he defendants demonstrated that the plaintiff had an obligation to preserve the tanks at the time they were disposed of, which was before the defendants had an opportunity to inspect the tanks, that the tanks were destroyed with a culpable state of mind, and that the tanks were relevant to the litigation … . However, the defendants failed to establish that their ability to prove a defense was fatally compromised by the destruction of the tanks, or that the destruction of the tanks was willful and contumacious … . Dagro Assoc. II, LLC v Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03884, Second Dept 6-15-22

Practice Point: Where spoliation of evidence does not take away the defendants’ ability to prove a defense, and where spoliation was not done willfully and contumaciously, striking the complaint is not warranted. The appropriate sanction is an adverse inference jury instruction.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE PLANS FOR THE EXPANSION OF A HOSPITAL WERE NOT YET FINALIZED, IT WAS CLEAR THAT SUCH AN EXPANSION WAS AN ANTICIPATED RESULT OF THE PROPOSED ZONING CHANGE; THEREFORE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) PROHIBITION OF “SEGMENTATION” REQUIRED CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPANSION AS PART OF THE “HARD LOOK” AT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ZONING CHANGE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the respondents (city) did not take the requisite “hard look,” required by the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), at the environmental consequences before approving a zoning change that would allow an expansion of a hospital. Although there were no finalized plans to expand the hospital, it was clear that the zoning change was a first step in an expected expansion. Failure consider the expansion constituted a prohibited form of “segmentation:”

As to the segmentation claim, although the City Council was not presented with any impending, specific development proposals, rezoning parcel 1 was the “first step” in the process of eventually developing parcel 1 … . In essence, before Saratoga Hospital could move forward with any development and expansion, it needed to acquire the “right” to do so … . The zoning map amendment for parcel 1 provided just that; it would be the green light to reignite development plans. … [T]he potential development of the parcel here was not so attenuated from the zoning map amendment that reviewing an expansion of the hospital constituted permissible segmentation … . Thus, the City Council was “obligated to consider the impacts to be expected from such future development at the time of rezoning, even absent a specific site plan for the project proposal” … . Matter of Evans v City of Saratoga Springs, 2022 NY Slip Op 01079, Third Dept 2-17-22​

 

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THE PETITIONERS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE OPERATION OF A CONCRETE PLANT WOULD CAUSE INJURIES TO THEM DIFFERENT FROM THOSE SUFFERED BY THE PUBLIC AT LARGE; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE RENOVATION AND OPERATION OF THE PLANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioners had standing to contest the renovation and operation of a concrete plant:

Supreme Court improperly determined that the Hill & Dale petitioners and the Veteri petitioners lacked standing to challenge the ZBA’s determination. The Hill & Dale petitioners alleged environmental injuries to a private lake owned by Hill & Dale, which was situated directly across from the subject property, as well as interference with recreational activities enjoyed in and around the lake, and impacts to their properties from increased noise, truck traffic, dust, and pollutants from the concrete manufacturing use. These alleged injuries were different from those suffered by the public at large … , and fell within the zone of interests protected by the Town’s zoning laws … . Similarly, the Veteri petitioners sufficiently alleged that they would be adversely affected by the ZBA’s determination and that their alleged injuries fell within the zone of interests protected by the zoning laws. Matter of Veteri v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Kent, 2022 NY Slip Op 01030, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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THE TOWN LAW STATUTE WHICH AUTHORIZES A TOWN TO REGULATE THE DISCHARGE OF “FIREARMS” DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A TOWN TO REGULATE THE DISCHARGE OF “BOWS” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the Town Law does not authorize the Town of Smithtown to regulate the discharge of “bows” pursuant to its authority to regulate “firearms:”

Town Law § 130 (27) specifically authorizes certain towns to prohibit the discharge of “firearms” through ordinances that may be more restrictive than other laws where such discharge may be hazardous to the general public, and requires that notice be provided to the Department of Environmental Conservation of any ordinance “changing the five hundred foot [setback] rule” (Town Law § 130 [27]; see Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0931 [4] [a] [2]). While the term “firearm” is undefined in the Town Law, construing it in accordance with its “usual and commonly understood meaning” … , the term “firearm” does not encompass a “bow” … and we are unpersuaded that the Legislature intended otherwise when it used the term in the Town Law. Accordingly, Town Law § 130 (27) does not authorize Smithtown to regulate the discharge of bows. Hunters for Deer, Inc. v Town of Smithtown, 2022 NY Slip Op 00907, CtApp 2-10-22

 

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ALLOWING DRIVING AND PARKING ON A LONG ISLAND BEACH MAY CONSTITUTE A PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action for private and public nuisance against the town and village, based upon the code provisions and rules allowing vehicles to drive and park on the beach, should not have been dismissed:

… [P]hotographs of the subject beach area as well as the affidavits of [plaintiff] and her family describing the conditions on the beach raised triable issues of fact as to whether driving and parking in the subject beach area, in the manner and at the intensity allegedly occurring at the time of this action, was of an unreasonable character. …

“A public nuisance exists for conduct that amounts to a substantial interference with the exercise of a common right of the public, thereby offending public morals, interfering with the use by the public of a public place or endangering or injuring the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons” … . Here, contrary to the court’s conclusion, triable issues of fact existed as to whether summer daytime beach driving and parking in the subject beach area, in the manner and at the intensity allegedly occurring at the time of this action, endangered the health and safety of members of the public who use that portion of the beach as well as the beach itself, including the lands seaward of the high-water line, which are held in trust for the public. Thomas v Trustees of the Freeholders & Commonalty of the Town of Southampton, 2022 NY Slip Op 00894, Second Dept 2-9-22

 

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EVEN THOUGH THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EAST RIVER PARK WILL BENEFIT THE SURROUNDING COMMUNITY (FLOOD PROTECTION) AS WELL AS THE PARK, THE RECONSTRUCTION SERVES A PARK PURPOSE AND THE APPROVAL OF THE STATE LEGISLATURE IS THERFORE NOT REQUIRED UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined the planned reconstruction of the East River Park along the waterfront of the lower east side of Manhattan did not require approval by the state legislature pursuant to the public trust doctrine, even though the project benefitted the park and other community objectives (protection against neighborhood flooding):

Petitioners contend that the principal purpose of the project is construction of a coastal shore floodwall to safeguard the residential developments nearby. They argue that the conclusion of a nonpark purpose is warranted because the work proposed is disproportionate to the work required to preserve the Park. There is no dispute that the project will greatly benefit the nearby communities from the risk of coastal flooding. At its core, however, petitioners’ argument is that any project that serves a park purpose cannot serve a dual purpose. Stated differently, that a park purpose is served only if that is the sole objective of a particular project. This is too narrow a reading of the park purpose requirement.

A project that benefits a park as well as other community objectives can still be considered to serve a park purpose under the public trust doctrine. * * * … [E]ven though a coastal flooding protection project will provide communities adjacent to the Park with flood protection, it will also protect the Park from coastal flooding.

Once it is determined that there is a park purpose, the salutary goal of preventing the alienation of parkland is satisfied. Matter of East Riv. Park Action v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 06652, First Dept 11-30-21

 

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THE STATE PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTICITY-GENERATING WIND TURBINES IN WESTERN NEW YORK (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming the approval of the construction of wind turbines for generating electricity by the NYS Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment (Board), determined: (1) the correct local wind-turbine law for the Town of Freedom was considered by the Board; (2) the Board correctly refused to consider a local wind-turbine law for the Town of Farmersville enacted after the evidentiary phase of the project was complete; (3) the Board properly considered the climate-change effects of the project and the effects on wild life and the land; and (4) the coalition contesting the Board ruling did not have standing to represent the First Amendment rights of the Amish community:

… [T]he Board must determine … whether a proposed electric generating facility “is a beneficial addition to or substitution for the electric generation capacity of the state” and whether “the adverse environmental effects of the construction and operation of the facility will be minimized or avoided to the maximum extent practicable” (Public Service Law § 168 [3] [a], [c]), and the Board must consider … “the impact on community character” and any additional “social, economic, visual or other aesthetic, environmental and other conditions” deemed pertinent by the Board … . “[T]he Board was created to provide for an expeditious review process and ‘to balance, in a single proceeding, the people’s need for electricity and their environmental concerns’ ” … . Furthermore, it is settled that “[t]his [C]ourt’s scope of review is limited to whether the decision and opinion of the [B]oard, inter alia, are . . . supported by substantial evidence in the record and matters of judicial notice properly considered and applied in the opinion . . . , are made in accordance with proper procedure . . . and are not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion” … . “The task of weighing conflicting evidence . . . is properly left to the . . . Board” … . Matter of Coalition of Concerned Citizens v New York State Bd. On Elec. Generation Siting & The Envt. & Alle-Catt Wind Energy, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 06221, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

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IN APPROVING A WIND TURBINE INSTALLATION THE STATE BOARD ON ELECTRIC GENERATION AND SITING AND THE ENVIRONMENT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER LOCAL LAWS ENACTED BY THE TOWN AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS CLOSED; THE LOCAL LAWS SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined the State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment (siting board) had properly approved the Bluestone Wind Farm Project. The siting board properly ignored local laws enacted by the town after the evidentiary hearing was closed which attempted to impose a moratorium on the project to allow further study:

The legislative history and intent fully support this decision. In enacting the predecessor to Public Service Law article 10, the Legislature acted with the express purpose of providing “‘for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning the location of major steam electric generating facilities presently under the jurisdiction of multiple state and local agencies, including all matters of state and local law, in a single proceeding'” … . In its current iteration, article 10 “was enacted in 1992 to provide ‘a comprehensive framework for developing and implementing sound energy policy for the [s]tate that integrates energy planning with consideration of environmental quality and [to provide] a one-stop process for the siting of major electric generating facilities'” … . “One goal of the legislation was to permit comprehensive review of the benefits and impacts anticipated from proposed facilities without unreasonable delay [and,] . . . [i]ndeed, the expeditious resolution of siting applications is a goal noted throughout documents submitted in support of the legislation” … .

This goal was manifested in the 12-month deadline imposed on the Siting Board to issue a final determination on each application before it … . … Public Service Law article 10 requires the inclusion of all substantive local laws in the record by way of a specific exhibit to be incorporated into each application … . Any disputes as to whether a proposed facility complies with a local substantive law are thus intended to be resolved by way of evidence presented during the hearing to the Hearing Examiners, and the statute explicitly places the burden on the municipality to present evidence in support of enforcement of the local law in question … . “Thus, the history and scope of article [10], as well as its comprehensive regulatory scheme, . . . would be frustrated by” last minute laws such as Local Law No. 4 … . Matter of Broome County Concerned Residents v New York State Bd. on Elec. Generation Siting & the Envt., 2021 NY Slip Op 05903, Third Dept 10-28-21

 

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ALLOWING THE APPLICANT FOR SITE PLAN APPROVAL TO RETURN WITH A SIGNAGE PROPOSAL AFTER THE PLAN WAS APPROVED DID NOT CONSTITUTE (IMPERMISSIBLE) SEGMENTATION UNDER SEQRA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the fact the site plan was approved by the planning board without signage did not constitute segmentation under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA):

The fact that the site plan was approved without signage did not constitute segmentation under SEQRA. Segmentation is defined as the division of the environmental review of a single action such that various activities or stages are addressed as though they are independent, unrelated activities, needing individual determinations of significance (see 6 NYCRR 617.2[ah]). The regulations which prohibit segmentation are designed to guard against a distortion of the approval process by preventing a project with potentially significant environmental effects from being split into two or more smaller projects, each falling below the threshold requiring full-blown review … . Here, signage is not being treated as an independent, unrelated activity, but as a part of the entire project, and allowing [the applicant] to return to the Planning Board with a signage proposal will not distort the approval process. Matter of Route 17K Real Estate, LLC v Planning Bd. of the Town of Newburgh, 2021 NY Slip Op 05858, Second Dept 10-27-21

 

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NOXIOUS ODORS FROM A LANDFILL DID NOT SUPPORT THE PUBLIC NUISANCE AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION; COMPLAINT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, over a dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined the public nuisance and negligence causes of action stemming from odors from a landfill should have been dismissed. The public nuisance cause of action alleged only injury to the public at large, not the required special injury unique to the parties. The negligence cause of action did not allege any tangible property damage or physical injury:

… [P]laintiffs here have not asserted an injury that is different in kind from the relevant community at large, which, in our view, consists of the other homeowners and renters impacted by the landfill’s odors … . * * *

To recover in negligence, a plaintiff must sustain either physical injury or property damage resulting from the defendant’s alleged negligent conduct … . …

… [T]he noxious odors at issue are transient in nature and do not have a continuing physical presence. … [P]laintiffs have not alleged any tangible property damage or physical injury resulting from exposure to the odors. … [T]he economic loss resulting from the diminution of plaintiffs’ property values is not, standing alone, sufficient to sustain a negligence claim under New York law … . Davies v S.A. Dunn & Co., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 05751, Third Dept 10-21-21

Similar issues and result in Duncan v Capital Region Landfills, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 05757, Third Dept 10-21-21

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