Environmental Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Administrative Law, Environmental Law, Land Use, Zoning

THE PLANNING BOARD TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK REQUIRED BY THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) WHEN IT APPROVED THE DEVELOPMENT WHICH INCLUDED APARTMENTS AND A COSTCO RETAIL FACILITY; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE APPROVAL AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in an exhaustive analysis which cannot be fairly summarized here, determined the Planning Board took the required hard look, pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEGRA), at all the aspects of the proposed development project. Therefore the Planning Board’s approval of the project should not have been annulled as arbitrary and capricious. The development included apartments and a Costco Wholesale retail facility. With regard to the compatibility issues, the court wrote:

In essence, although the Costco store may, to some, not be the most compatible use, the Planning Board properly viewed it in the context of the entire project. As such, the Planning Board considered not only the fact that the Costco store is a permitted use that complied with all of the design standards contained in Local Law No. 4, but also the other tangible benefits of the project, which directly aligned with the purpose of the Local Law. These factors included pedestrian and bicycle accommodations and improvements. Also, the Planning Board considered access management and transit improvements in design and layout, including the reduction of lanes … , the construction of a new roundabout to process traffic more efficiently, the reconfiguration of a major intersection to reduce vehicular speed and a new CDTA bus stop, which CDTA confirmed would ease congestion, improve safety and result in a “marked improvement for customers” in the area. The Planning Board proposed the construction of a new connector road … , and numerous project design features to prevent noise and visual and other impacts. All told, the Planning Board discharged its duty and took the requisite hard look as to compatibility and satisfied its obligations under SEQRA … . Matter of Hart v Town of Guilderland, 2021 NY Slip Op 04273, Third Dept 7-8-21

July 8, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Environmental Law, Municipal Law

THE CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A DEMONSTRATION OF URBAN BLIGHT OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC PURPOSE; THE SEQRA NEGATIVE DECLARATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, annulling the determination of the City of White Plains Urban Renewal Agency, held that the agency did not demonstrate the condemnation of the petitioners’ proper served a public purpose. The condemnation was founded on a 25-year-old study which found the area was affected by “urban blight.” The court noted that the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) negative declaration by the agency did not identify the areas of environmental concern and the agency did not take a hard look at them:

… [T]he remediation of substandard or insanitary conditions (i.e., urban blight) is a proper basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain … . Here, however, the agency relies only on conclusory assertions of blight based upon a 25-year-old urban renewal plan which itself lacks detail or documentation. …

Where a condemning authority does not demonstrate that property is substandard for the purpose of urban renewal, the authority must identify some public purpose other than the purported remediation of blight … . While a condemning authority may select virtually any project which “contributes to the health, safety, general welfare, convenience, or prosperity of the community” … , this broad discretion does not relieve the authority from selecting a particular project and, where demanded by the property owner, submitting that project to judicial scrutiny. Matter of Gabe Realty Corp. v City of White Plains Urban Renewal Agency, 2021 NY Slip Op 04134, Second Dept 6-30-21

June 30, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Environmental Law, Municipal Law

PURSUANT TO ECL 23-2711, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A MINING PERMIT BECAUSE THE TOWN LAW PROHIBITED MINING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined the mining permit issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must be annulled pursuant to Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) 23-2711 because the local law prohibiting mining. The permit purported to allow the expansion of an existing mining operation:

ECL 23-2703 (3) provides that, in the event that an application for a permit is received from an applicant whose mine falls within an area described in the statute, the agency may not process the application if the local zoning laws prohibit same. ECL 23-2703 (3) is not vague or ambiguous; it is concise and clear. Contrary to all other permit applications received by DEC, an application received from an area protected under ECL 23-2703 (3) must be put on hold until the status of the local laws is determined … . There is no qualification on what type of permit applications must be put on hold; rather, by its certain language, the statute applies to all applications. … . …

ECL 23-2703 (3) clearly recognizes that the local laws of the municipality are determinative as to whether an application can be processed. Here, where it is unchallenged that the Town’s laws prohibit zoning [SIC mining?], DEC cannot process the application, let alone issue the permit. It cannot do by fiat what is prohibited under the law. Therefore, the act of issuing the permits here, in contravention of ECL 23-2703 (3), was arbitrary and capricious. Matter of Town of Southampton v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 2021 NY Slip Op 03351, Third Dept 5-27-21

May 27, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Environmental Law, Land Use, Zoning

OWNERS OF BUSINESSES IN THE VICINITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION ALLEGED DECREASED PARKING SPACES, INCREASED TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE BLOCKING OF SCENIC VIEWS AS REASONS FOR OVERTURNING THE SEQRA NEGATIVE DECLARATION ALLOWING THE CONSTRUCTION; THE BUSINESS OWNERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE DECLARATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department upheld the negative SEQRA (State Environmental Quality Review Act) declaration approving the construction of a mixed use structure which would reduce the number of parking spaces available in Oneonta. The fact that the petitioners owned businesses in the vicinity of the new construction did not confer standing to contest the negative declaration:

Although petitioners have established that their businesses are within close proximity to the project site, that fact alone does not confer automatic standing in the SEQRA context … . Petitioners’ allegations largely hinged on economic business concerns occasioned by an alleged decrease in available parking … , and their claim relating to traffic impacts “fail[s] to demonstrate an environmental injury different from that suffered by the public at large” … . Although the obstruction of a scenic view may constitute an environmental injury within the zone of interests sought to be protected by SEQRA … , the concerns espoused by certain petitioners regarding potential adverse scenic impacts to their businesses were undeveloped and otherwise too speculative to establish standing in these circumstances … . We also note that the project site is located in a “mixed use” district (MU-1) — which permits the type of development contemplated — and, according to the full environmental assessment form, there are no officially designated scenic or aesthetic resources located within five miles … . Matter of Peachin v City of Oneonta, 2021 NY Slip Op 02863, Third Detp 5-6-21

May 6, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Environmental Law

THE CONSTRUCTION OF SNOWMOBILE TRAILS IN THE ADIRONDACK PARK IS PROHIBITED BY THE “FOREVER WILD” PROVISION IN THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined the construction of snowmobile trails in the Adirondack Park would violate the “forever wild” provision of the New York State Constitution:

… [W]e must determine whether the state’s plan for the construction of approximately 27 miles of Class II community connector trails designed for snowmobile use in the Forest Preserve is permissible under the New York Constitution. The plan requires the cutting and removal of thousands of trees, grading and leveling, and the removal of rocks and other natural components from the Forest Preserve to create snowmobile paths that are nine to 12 feet in width. We conclude that construction of these trails violates the “forever wild” provision of the New York State Constitution (art XIV, § 1) and therefore cannot be accomplished other than by constitutional amendment. * * *

The Forest Preserve is a publicly owned wilderness of incomparable beauty. Located in two regions of the Adirondack and Catskill Mountains, the Forest Preserve—with its trees, rivers, wetlands, mountain landscape, and rugged terrain—is a respite from the demands of daily life and the encroachment of commercial development. It has been this way for over a century because our State Constitution mandates:

“The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.” …

This unique “forever wild” provision was deemed necessary by its drafters and the people of the State of New York to end the commercial destruction and despoliation of the soil and trees that jeopardized the state’s forests and, perhaps most importantly, the state watershed. Protect the Adirondacks! Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 2021 NY Slip Op 02734, CtApp 5-4-21

May 4, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Environmental Law, Negligence, Real Property Law

PLAINTIFF, WHO PURCHASED THE PROPERTY, SUED THE PRIOR OWNER IN NEGLIGENCE FOR DAMAGES STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S EXPOSURE TO CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION ON THE PROPERTY; LIABILITY FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON PROPERTY GENERALLY CEASES UPON TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supeme Court, determined plaintiff’s negligence cause of action seeking damages for exposure to contaminants on the land plaintiff purchased from defendant city should have been dismissed. A property owner’s liability for a dangerous condition ceases upon the transfer of the property:

We … agree with defendant that the court erred in denying the motion with respect to the negligence cause of action, and we therefore further modify the order accordingly. That cause of action is based on allegations that plaintiff was injured due to a dangerous condition on the parcel of property that defendant sold to plaintiffs, i.e., chemical contamination, to which plaintiff was exposed after the sale. It is well settled that “[o]ne’s liability in negligence for the condition of land ceases when the premises pass out of one’s control before injury results. Such is the general rule” … . Thus, under that general rule, defendant’s liability for negligence based on a dangerous condition on the property ended when it sold the parcel to plaintiffs … , and “liability may be imposed upon defendant only if the allegedly dangerous condition . . . existed at the time [it] relinquished possession and control of the premises ‘and the new owner has not had a reasonable time to discover the condition, if it was unknown, and to remedy the condition once it is known’ ” … .

Here, defendant met its burden on the motion of establishing that any injury allegedly sustained by plaintiff was caused by exposure after defendant sold the property. In response, “plaintiff[s have] offered nothing to show that [they, as] the new owner[s,] did not have adequate time to discover and remedy such defects” … . Powers v City of Geneva, 2021 NY Slip Op 01684, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

March 19, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Appeals, Environmental Law, Land Use, Zoning

SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED TO THE NYC BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS ZONING RESOLUTION WHICH ALLOWED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 55 STORY CONDOMINIUM BUILDING; THE BUILDING IS COMPLETE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS APPLIES TO PRECLUDE THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should have deferred o the judgment of the NYC Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA) which allowed the construction of a 55 story condominium building. At issue was an ambiguous Zoning Resolution and the relationship between zoning lots and tax lots. The First Department held that the BSA had the necessary expertise to interpret the relevant statute and Supreme Court should have allowed the BSA’s interpretation to stand. In addition, the First Department found that the mootness doctrine had not been waived and the doctrine applied to the appeal because the building was fully completed and so steps to halt construction had been taken during the lengthy litigation:

The BSA’s interpretation of the relevant subdivision was “neither irrational, unreasonable nor inconsistent with the governing statutes” … . It rationally interpreted the resolution and properly considered Amsterdam’s reliance on the DOB’s [NYC Department of Building’s] longstanding Minkin Memo and the history of the block, as several other buildings on the block were issued certificates of occupancy, even though they also include partial tax lots. “When an agency adopts a construction which is then followed for ‘a long period of time,’ such interpretation ‘is entitled to great weight and may not be ignored'” … . …

“[T]he doctrine of mootness is invoked where a change in circumstances prevents a court from rendering a decision that would effectively determine an actual controversy”… . In the construction context, “several factors [are] significant in evaluating claims of mootness[,] [c]hief among them [being] a challenger’s failure to seek preliminary injunctive relief or otherwise preserve the status quo to prevent construction from commencing or continuing during the pendency of the litigation” … . Matter of Committee for Environmentally Sound Dev. v Amsterdam Ave. Redevelopment Assoc. LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01228, First Dept 3-2-21

March 2, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Negligence, Private Nuisance, Trespass

PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION STEMMING FROM PFOA CONTAMINATION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DID NOT APPLY; QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, PRIVATE NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ complaint in this PFOA contamination case properly survived defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, defendant owed plaintiffs a duty of care, defendant did not demonstrate it did not proximately cause the alleged injuries, there was a question of fact on the private nuisance and trespass causes of action, and the punitive damages claim was proper. With respect to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the court wrote:

[The] doctrine “applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views”… . Defendant argues that the various regulatory agencies, who have the requisite expertise, have been investigating the matter at issue and that the recovery sought by plaintiffs is already being provided by these agencies. We disagree. Although defendant points to an announcement that the Department of Health will be providing medical monitoring, this announcement merely stated that a study was being proposed and that, if funded, the study would last for five years. Contrary to defendant’s representation, there was no definitive statement that the medical monitoring would be provided. As to the remediation of plaintiffs’ private wells, the consent order and other announcements, upon which defendant relies, do not address all of the relief requested by plaintiffs in the second amended complaint. Accordingly, defendant’s argument is without merit. Burdick v Tonoga, Inc, 2021 NY Slip Op 01178, Third Dept 2-25-21

February 25, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Attorneys, Environmental Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

ONE PURPOSE FOR ASSESSING ATTORNEY’S FEES AGAINST THE AGENCY IN A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW CASE IS TO DISCOURAGE DELAYS IN RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS; THEREFORE, EVEN THOUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (DEP) TURNED OVER THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE APPEAL, THE DEP STILL SHOULD PAY THE ATTORNEY’S FEES RELATED TO THE APPEAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the request for attorney’s fees for the appeal in this Freedom of Information Law action should not have been denied. Supreme Court reasoned that the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had turned over the requested documents before the appeal:

Supreme Court suggested that it would be “unduly punitive” to include appellate counsel fees and costs in its award given that DEC had already disclosed all responsive, nonprivileged documents to petitioners. The goal of an award of counsel fees and costs under Public Officers Law § 89 (4) (c), however, is to deter “unreasonable delays and denials of access and thereby encourage every unit of government to make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of FOIL” … . As we detailed in our prior decision (169 AD3d at 1311-1312), DEC failed to respond to petitioners’ FOIL administrative appeal in a timely manner and disclosed responsive documents after petitioners advanced a FOIL claim in this action/proceeding, and DEC then resisted petitioners’ efforts to recover counsel fees and costs incurred as a result of its dilatory conduct. In our view, those facts demonstrate that the portion of the prior appeal relating to petitioners’ FOIL claim stemmed from “the very kinds of unreasonable delays and denials of access which the counsel fee provision seeks to deter,” and Supreme Court accordingly abused its discretion in declining to include the counsel fees and costs connected thereto in its award … . Matter of 101CO, LLC v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 2020 NY Slip Op 07969, Third Dept 12-24-20

December 24, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Environmental Law, Land Use, Zoning

NYC’S “OPEN SPACE” ZONING REQUIREMENT IS MET BY ROOFTOP GARDENS ON A SINGLE BUILDING IN A MULTI-BUILDING ZONING LOT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, reversing the Appellate Division and upholding the NYC Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA), over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined the “open space” requirement of the NYC Zoning Resolution in a zoning lot with multiple buildings was met by rooftop gardens accessible to a single building’s residents:

The question before us is whether an area must be accessible to the residents of every building on a zoning lot containing multiple, separately owned buildings in order to constitute “open space” within the meaning of the New York City Zoning Resolution … . The Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA), which is responsible for administering the Zoning Resolution, has interpreted the definition of open space to encompass rooftop gardens accessible to a single building’s residents as long as the residents of each building on the zoning lot receive at least a proportionate share of open space. …

… “‘Open space’ is that part of a zoning lot, including courts or yards, which is open and unobstructed from its lowest level to the sky and is accessible to and usable by all persons occupying a dwelling unit or a rooming unit on the zoning lot” … . The minimum amount of open space required on a zoning lot is determined by the “open space ratio,” which is “the number of square feet of open space on the zoning lot, expressed as a percentage of the floor area on that zoning lot” … . … [T]he minimum amount of open space required on a zoning lot is calculated by multiplying the given open space ratio by the total residential floor area on the zoning lot. * * * The Appellate Division … opined that the definition of open space in ZR [Zoning Resolution] § 12-10 unambiguously requires that open space be accessible to the residents of every building on a zoning lot. By contrast, the dissent concluded that the statute was ambiguous and would have deferred to the BSA’s practical reading of the open-space definition as applied to multi-owner zoning lots. * * *The BSA’s interpretation is rational as applied to multi-owner zoning lots. Matter of Peyton v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 2020 NY Slip Op 07662, CtApp 12-17-20

December 17, 2020/by Bruce Freeman