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You are here: Home1 / Human Rights Law
Civil Rights Law, Constitutional Law, County Law, Human Rights Law

A COUNTY LAW WHICH PROHIBITS TRANSGENDER ATHLETES FORM PARTICIPATING IN WOMEN’S AND GIRLS’ SPORTS AT A COUNTY PARK IS PREEMPTED BY THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYSHRL) AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county law which prohibited transgender athletes from participating in women’s and girls’ sports at a county park was unconstitutional. The local law was called “A Local Law to Maintain a Safe and Fair Competitive Environment for Woman and Girls Participating in Sports and Athletic Events:”

Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “[n]o person shall, because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of the executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.”. * * *

“Discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression is also sex discrimination” (9 NYCRR 466.13[d]). “Gender identity or expression means a person’s actual or perceived gender-related identity, appearance, behavior, expression or other gender-related characteristic regardless of the sex assigned to that person at birth, including, but not limited to, the status of being transgender” … . “A transgender person is an individual who has a gender identity or expression different from the sex assigned to that individual at birth” … .

Here, the NYSHRL and Civil Rights Law § 40-c expressly prohibit the County from restricting access to places of public accommodation based on a person’s gender identity or expression, including whether the person identifies as transgender. Thus, the local law’s permitting scheme conflicts with, and is invalid as preempted by, the NYSHRL and Civil Rights Law § 40-c … . Long Is. Roller Rebels v County of Nassau, 2026 NY Slip Op 06427, Second Dept 11-4-26

Practice Point: A county law prohibiting transgender athletes from participating in women’s and girls’ sports at a county park is preempted by the NYS Human Rights Law and the Civil Rights Law.

Same analysis and result in a declaratory judgment action entitled People v County of Nassau, 2026 NY Slip Op 06472, Second Dept 11-4-26.

 

November 4, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-04 13:00:102026-11-15 16:10:10A COUNTY LAW WHICH PROHIBITS TRANSGENDER ATHLETES FORM PARTICIPATING IN WOMEN’S AND GIRLS’ SPORTS AT A COUNTY PARK IS PREEMPTED BY THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYSHRL) AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, Human Rights Law, Municipal Law

THE STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DISCRIMINATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY A PRIOR FEDERAL LAWSUIT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA); THE FACTS AND ANALYTICAL STANDARDS ARE DIFFERENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the wheel-chair-bound plaintiff was not collaterally estopped by a prior federal suit against the same defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The facts were different and the Human Rights Law was amended to require a more liberal construction of its terms than that required by the ADA:

… [T]he plaintiff is not collaterally estopped from asserting causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL based on the determinations made in the prior federal action. The federal court determined, inter alia, that the defendants did not discriminate against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA by failing to remove existing barriers to accessibility because such removal was not “readily achievable” … . The causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, however, involve a different legal threshold and different factual issues than those involved in determining whether the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA. Under the NYCHRL, which “must be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof,” regardless of whether similarly-worded federal laws have been so construed … , a covered entity must establish that the accommodation sought would cause “undue hardship” in the conduct of the entity’s business … . Thus, a cause of action asserted pursuant to the NYCHRL must be analyzed independently from similar or identical causes of action asserted pursuant to the ADA … .

Furthermore, although the standards for establishing unlawful discrimination in a place of public accommodation under the NYSHRL previously were the same as those governing cases alleging violations of the ADA … , in 2019, the New York State Legislature amended the NYSHRL to require that it “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of [the NYSHRL], have been so construed” … . Irish v Tropical Emerald, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 06423, Second Dept 11-4-26

Practice Point: Here the disabled plaintiff was not collaterally estopped from bringing State and City Human Rights Law causes of action by a prior lawsuit alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)  The facts and analytical standards are different.

 

November 4, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-04 12:53:292026-11-16 15:41:20THE STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DISCRIMINATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY A PRIOR FEDERAL LAWSUIT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA); THE FACTS AND ANALYTICAL STANDARDS ARE DIFFERENT (SECOND DEPT).
Administrative Law, Employment Law, Human Rights Law, Municipal Law

DEFENDANT EMPLOYER’S FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN COOPERATIVE DIALOGUE REGARDING ACCOMMODATION FOR THE DISABLED PLAINTIFF WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the disabled plaintiff was intitled to summary judgment on his NYC Human Rights Law claim because defendant-employer failed to engage in a cooperative dialogue regarding accommodation for his disability:

… [P]laintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his City HRL claim based on defendant’s failure to engage, within a reasonable time, in a cooperative dialogue regarding his accommodation, as the record presents no issues of fact as to defendant’s failure to engage plaintiff in a cooperative dialogue once defendant became aware of his condition (see Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-102; 8-107[28][a] …). Contrary to defendant’s contention, an employer’s failure “to engage in a good faith interactive process is . . . independently actionable under the [City] HRL” … . Kocher v Mount Sinai Hosp., 2026 NY Slip Op 06007, First Dept 10-15-26

Practice Point: An employer’s failure to engage in cooperative dialogue with a disabled worker about accommodation for the disability violates the NYC Human Rights Law.

 

October 15, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-15 15:25:492026-10-23 15:43:16DEFENDANT EMPLOYER’S FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN COOPERATIVE DIALOGUE REGARDING ACCOMMODATION FOR THE DISABLED PLAINTIFF WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).
Employment Law, Evidence, Human Rights Law

PETITIONER ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED LARGELY ON THE EMPLOYER’S REFUSAL TO ACCOMMODATE PETITIONER’S DISABILITIES BY ALLOWING HER TO WORK REMOTELY FROM HOME; THE EMPLOYER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT FACTUAL INFORMATION TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact precluding summary judgment on petitioner’s employment discrimination allegations which are based largely on the employer’s refusal to accommodate petitioner’s disabilities by allowing her to work remotely from home. The decision is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The decision lays out in detail what an employer must demonstrate to warrant summary judgment in this context:

“[T]he first step in providing a reasonable accommodation is to engage in a good faith interactive process that assesses the needs of the disabled individual and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested” … . “[T]he essential functions of the position need to be part of the interactive process the law requires, not a unilateral employer decision cloaked by business judgement” … . An employer generally cannot obtain summary judgment on a discrimination claim unless the record demonstrates that it engaged in a good faith interactive process … . * * *

To meet its prima facie burden on summary judgment, [the employer] sought to prove that petitioner could not perform those essential functions, even with an accommodation… .

Bereft of rudimentary discovery such as depositions of the parties, [the employer] failed to establish the essential functions of petitioner’s position. “To avoid unfounded reliance on uninformed assumptions, the identification of the essential functions of a job requires a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice” … . * * *

… [The employer] did not address which, if any, of petitioner’s duties must be performed in person. * * *

 … [The employer] failed to demonstrate that petitioner’s requested accommodation would constitute an undue hardship. Matter of Smelyansky v New York State Off. of Gen. Servs., 2026 NY Slip Op 03708, Third Dept 6-11-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what an employer must demonstrate to warrant summary judgment on an employment-discrimination action alleging the employer’s failure to accommodate petitioner’s disability.

 

June 11, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-06-11 13:55:032026-06-14 21:53:52PETITIONER ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED LARGELY ON THE EMPLOYER’S REFUSAL TO ACCOMMODATE PETITIONER’S DISABILITIES BY ALLOWING HER TO WORK REMOTELY FROM HOME; THE EMPLOYER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT FACTUAL INFORMATION TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Corporation Law, Employment Law, Human Rights Law, Municipal Law

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IS A NEW JERSEY RESIDENT WORKING FOR A NONDOMICILIARY EMPLOYER, SHE WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE REGULAR VISITS TO HER EMPLOYER’S CLIENT IN NEW YORK CITY; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS SEXUALLY HARASSED, IN NEW YORK CITY, BY THE CLIENT’S EMPLOYEE; BECAUSE THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT “HAD AN IMPACT IN NEW YORK,” NEW YORK HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Shulman, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York had jurisdiction over this employment discrimination action brought under the NYS Human Rights Law and the NYC Human Rights Law. The plaintiff is a New Jersey resident and Ethicon, alleged to be her employer, is a New Jersey corporation. Plaintiff alleged she was assigned to a sales account for Mount Sinai Health System, Inc. which required her to meet regularly with an manager at Mount Sinai in New York City. Plaintiff alleged Ethicon knew that she would be subject to sexual harassment by the Mount Sinai manager. The First Department held that the term “employer” in the Human Rights Law included the nondomiciliary Ethicon because the discriminatory conduct at issue “had an impact in New York.” ​

​… [T]he issue here is how we should interpret the State HRL’s definition of an “employer” as used in the phrase “all employers within the state” for purposes of liability under the State HRL (Executive Law § 292 [5]). The motion court read this definition as requiring an employer to have a physical presence in New York and therefore found both the State HRL and the City HRL inapplicable to Ethicon, “a New Jersey employer of [plaintiff,] a New Jersey resident.”  * * *

… [T]he Court of Appeals in Hoffman v Parade Publs. (15 NY3d 285 [2010]), adopted an impact test for nonresidents who seek the protection of the City HRL and found that test “relatively simple for courts to apply and litigants to follow, leads to predictable results, and confines the protections of the City HRL to those who are meant to be protected—those who work in the city” …. . * * *

Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact in New York regardless of the residency of the parties. Here, plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, alleges that Ethicon, her nondomiciliary employer, assigned her to service a New York-based account, requiring her regular presence at Mount Sinai’s hospital where the alleged traumatic sexual harassment occurred. Plaintiff further alleges that Ethicon was aware of the harassment and nevertheless required her to continue the assignment because of the account’s importance. At the pleading stage, plaintiff’s allegations, among other discriminatory acts, that her Ethicon manager discouraged her from complaining and “coached her to ‘lean into’ the sexual harassment so Mount Sinai would continue using Ethicon’s services” are more than sufficient to allege sexual discriminatory conduct having a concrete impact on plaintiff within New York to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s residency outside New York does not preclude application of the State HRL or City HRL where the alleged misconduct occurred in New York City and affected plaintiff while she was working there. Arizzo v Ethicon, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03262, First Dept 5-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into subject matter jurisdiction under the NYC and NYS Human Rights Law. If a nonresident employee of a nondomiciliary corporation, as part of her job, meets regularly with a client in New York City and is sexually harassed by the client, New York has subject matter jurisdiction over Human Rights Law causes of action.​

 

May 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-26 09:13:402026-05-31 10:12:02ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IS A NEW JERSEY RESIDENT WORKING FOR A NONDOMICILIARY EMPLOYER, SHE WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE REGULAR VISITS TO HER EMPLOYER’S CLIENT IN NEW YORK CITY; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS SEXUALLY HARASSED, IN NEW YORK CITY, BY THE CLIENT’S EMPLOYEE; BECAUSE THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT “HAD AN IMPACT IN NEW YORK,” NEW YORK HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Employment Law, Human Rights Law

A SERIES OF REMARKS MADE BY HIS SERGEANT OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE REMARKS WERE MOTIVATED BY RACIAL ANIMUS; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO THE NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s racial discrimination complaint pursuant to the NYC Human Rights Law should not have been dismissed:

Plaintiff stated a cause of action for racial discrimination under the City HRL (see CPLR 3211[a][7]). … [Sergeant Martin] Toczek made many statements, both in the office of the NYPD Auto Crimes Unit and on a text thread with his subordinates including plaintiff, criticizing racial justice protests in the National Football League by Colin Kaepernick and other NFL players. On one occasion, plaintiff, who is Black, stated to Toczek that the players had a constitutional right to protest, and Toczek replied, “yeah, . . .but it’s my right . . . if I want to like [B]lack people.” Toczek also shared articles about Black NFL players committing crimes and described them as “perps.”

… Toczek directed plaintiff to accompany two White detectives in apprehending an arrestee who “had a history of assaulting police officers who tried to arrest him.” The arrestee had previously assaulted Dan Fox, a white Auto Crimes Unit detective. Plaintiff was on restricted duty at the time because of a shoulder injury and could not carry a gun or a shield. Toczek told plaintiff not to worry because, “[w]hen he sees you, he’s not going to fight, look how big you are,” and further suggested that the arrestee would not assault plaintiff “because, look at [Fox], look at him and look at you.” Plaintiff is 6’7″ and weighs about 260 pounds. Plaintiff suffered a serious injury when the arrestee resisted arrest; he retired shortly afterward with accidental disability benefits for his line-of-duty injury. * * *

… [I]t is a jury issue as to whether Toczek’s other comments about the NFL reflected racial animus. A reasonable juror could conclude that, once Toczek signaled that his objection to the protests was at least in part about race, every other reference to the protests and the NFL became infused with racial animus. * * *

The complaint … sufficiently alleges that Toczek’s assignment of plaintiff to the potentially dangerous arrest was “motivated at least in part by” plaintiff’s race … . * * *

… [A] reasonable juror could interpret Toczek’s assertion that plaintiff’s appearance, including his size, would deter violence from the arrestee, as an attempt to invoke the “classic and common racist trope that Black men are inherently threatening or dangerous” … . Taylor v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 03128, First Dept 5-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when remarks made over a period of years by a supervisor in the work place can raise a question of fact about whether the remarks were motivated by racial animus and constituted violations of the NYC Human Rights Law.

 

May 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-19 15:57:552026-05-29 12:29:30A SERIES OF REMARKS MADE BY HIS SERGEANT OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE REMARKS WERE MOTIVATED BY RACIAL ANIMUS; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO THE NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Employment Law, Evidence, Human Rights Law, Judges

DEFENDANTS DESTROYED SPEADSHEETS WHICH MAY HAVE DEMONSTRATED PLAINTIFF’S TERMINATION WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY THE NEED TO CUT COSTS; PLANTIFF IN THIS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION WAS ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY CHARGE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants in this employment discrimination action should have been sanctioned for spoliation of evidence. The defendants destroyed retail store spreadsheets which could have demonstrated plaintiff’s termination was not motivated by the need to cut costs. Plaintiff alleged he was terminated because he aided Egyptian employees who complained on national origin or religious discrimination. The First Department held plaintiff was entitled to an adverse inference jury charge:

… [T]he court erred in denying spoliation sanctions. Defendants breached their duty to preserve evidence by destroying retail store spreadsheets which were the only contemporaneous data on profits, payroll, and performance after litigation was reasonably anticipated … . Plaintiff’s October 2017 warning against tampering with accounting and payroll records triggered a preservation obligation that required defendants to suspend routine destruction policies … . Defendants cannot claim the records were deleted in the ordinary course of business, as a routine retention policy is no defense once the duty to preserve attaches … . Further, sanctions are warranted where a party’s negligence or intent deprives an opponent of the means of proving their claim … . Here, the destroyed spreadsheets are central to the issue of pretext. While defendants claim cost-based downsizing as the reason for termination, the destroyed data was the only evidence available to test whether the stores were actually underperforming or if plaintiff’s termination was retaliatory. Because this unique, irrecoverable evidence was within defendants’ exclusive control, its destruction is highly prejudicial. Accordingly, plaintiff should be granted an adverse inference charge at the time of trial. Pescales v Pax Ventures LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 02942, First Dept 5-12-26

Practice Point: Defendants in this employment discrimination action were sanctioned for destroying financial records which could have demonstrated plaintiff’s termination was not motivated by the need to cut costs.

 

May 12, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-12 11:41:232026-05-16 12:03:09DEFENDANTS DESTROYED SPEADSHEETS WHICH MAY HAVE DEMONSTRATED PLAINTIFF’S TERMINATION WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY THE NEED TO CUT COSTS; PLANTIFF IN THIS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION WAS ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY CHARGE (FIRST DEPT).
Employment Law, Evidence, Human Rights Law

THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT BASED ON “FAMILIAL STATUS” AND “CAREGIVER” DISCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYS AND NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action for “familial status” and “caregiver” discrimination under the Human Rights Law should not have been dismissed in this wrongful termination action:

… [T]he record presents issues of fact as to plaintiff’s familial and caregiver status causes of action under the State HRL [Human Rights Law], which prohibits discrimination based on “familial status,” including against “any person who . . . has a child or is in the process of securing legal custody” of a child (Executive Law §§ 292[26][a], 296[1][a]), and the City HRL, which prohibits discrimination based on “caregiver status” (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a]). On July 11, 2016, the day before DSC’s [defendant’s] decision to put plaintiff on probation, plaintiff attended a hearing in a custody proceeding regarding his daughter. According to plaintiff, Richard Greenberg, DSC’s co-chief investment officer, questioned whether plaintiff “was sure [he wanted] to do this” (that is, to participate in custody proceedings) and encouraged him to “[g]ive up on [his] daughter.” In addition, at plaintiff’s year-end review meeting, which plaintiff recorded, Greenberg gave him negative feedback about his job performance and stated, “I just want to know . . . is your heart still in it, you know? . . . I mean you’ve got all these things going on.”

Additionally, in January 2017, Jane Park, the firm’s director of business development and client relations, authored a memo for Smith and Greenberg that discussed whether to disclose to firm clients that a more junior investment analyst had received firm equity while plaintiff had not. The memo posited telling clients, as one option, that plaintiff “is going through some personal issues which make[] the current timing less than ideal for ownership disbursement.” Park testified at her deposition that she was referring to the fact that plaintiff was “distracted” because of his divorce and custody fight. …

Taken together, the evidence could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendants’ proffered reasons for denying plaintiff equity and ultimately terminating him were “false, misleading, or incomplete,” and that plaintiff was, in fact, terminated on the basis of his familial or caregiver status … . Mezinev v Donald Smith & Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 02209, First Dept 4-14-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what constitutes “familial status” and “caregiver” discrimination in the context of an alleged wrongful termination of employment pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law.

 

April 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-14 11:04:212026-04-19 11:22:54THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT BASED ON “FAMILIAL STATUS” AND “CAREGIVER” DISCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYS AND NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Employment Law, Human Rights Law

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES ARE REVIEWED UNDER “NOTICE PLEADING” STANDARDS WHERE ONLY FAIR NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND ITS GROUNDS ARE REQUIRED; HERE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THAT A SUPERVISOR STATED SHE RECEIVED HIGH EVALUATIONS BECAUSE SHE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER SUPERIORS WAS SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE DISMISSAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a single remark by a supervisor may sustain an employment discrimination or hostile work environment claim. The court noted the more lenient pleading requirement for employment discrimination actions:

… [E]mployment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under notice pleading standards … . Indeed, a “plaintiff alleging employment discrimination need not plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination but need only give fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds” … . In an action brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), “[f]air notice is all that is required to survive at the pleading stage” … . * * *

Although a “single, isolated comment” or “stray remark” will not always suffice to sustain a discrimination or hostile work environment claim … , “a single comment that objectifies women being made in circumstances where that comment would, for example, signal views about the role of women in the workplace” could be actionable … . Here, where plaintiff alleged that her supervisor implied that she only received high evaluation scores because she was engaging in sexual relations with higher-ups, the alleged remarks and attendant hostile conduct were more than “petty slights and trivial inconveniences” … . Cummings v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 00972, First Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: Pleading standards are more lenient in employment discrimination cases. Fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds are sufficient to survive dismissal.

 

February 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-02-19 17:41:002026-02-22 21:05:27EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES ARE REVIEWED UNDER “NOTICE PLEADING” STANDARDS WHERE ONLY FAIR NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND ITS GROUNDS ARE REQUIRED; HERE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THAT A SUPERVISOR STATED SHE RECEIVED HIGH EVALUATIONS BECAUSE SHE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER SUPERIORS WAS SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE DISMISSAL (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Employment Law, Human Rights Law

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATORY NON-PROMOTION AND TERMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYC AND NYS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WERE SUFFICIENT AT THE PLEADING STAGE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s claims of discriminatory non-promotion and termination pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law were sufficient for the pleading stage and should not have been dismissed:

Plaintiff’s allegation that he, an African American, was terminated from his job by defendant, his employer, after making one mistake while two of his white coworkers who made similar mistakes were neither reprimanded nor terminated was sufficient to state a claim for discriminatory termination under the broad protections of the State and City HRLs … . Plaintiff specifically alleged that one of the white coworkers was an IT Help Desk Technician, the same position he held, and that the coworker performed substantially similar work under similar working conditions. He further alleged that he helped fix some of the mistakes that this coworker had made in the past. These allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage … .

In support of his cause of action for failure to promote, plaintiff alleges that his coworker was promoted to a job that he was already performing, and that the position was not posted prior to it being filled. These allegations are sufficient to meet plaintiff’s pleading burden as this Court has previously held that it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to allege that he applied for a promotion where he has alleged that promotions were typically made unannounced and unsolicited (id.) or where defendant failed to advertise the position … . Altidor v Medical Knowledge Group LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 00870, First Dept 2-17-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the pleading requirements for claims of discriminatory non-promotion and termination pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law.

 

February 17, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-02-17 13:25:502026-02-22 13:39:23PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATORY NON-PROMOTION AND TERMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYC AND NYS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WERE SUFFICIENT AT THE PLEADING STAGE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
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