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THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT BASED ON “FAMILIAL STATUS” AND “CAREGIVER” DISCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYS AND NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action for “familial status” and “caregiver” discrimination under the Human Rights Law should not have been dismissed in this wrongful termination action:

… [T]he record presents issues of fact as to plaintiff’s familial and caregiver status causes of action under the State HRL [Human Rights Law], which prohibits discrimination based on “familial status,” including against “any person who . . . has a child or is in the process of securing legal custody” of a child (Executive Law §§ 292[26][a], 296[1][a]), and the City HRL, which prohibits discrimination based on “caregiver status” (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a]). On July 11, 2016, the day before DSC’s [defendant’s] decision to put plaintiff on probation, plaintiff attended a hearing in a custody proceeding regarding his daughter. According to plaintiff, Richard Greenberg, DSC’s co-chief investment officer, questioned whether plaintiff “was sure [he wanted] to do this” (that is, to participate in custody proceedings) and encouraged him to “[g]ive up on [his] daughter.” In addition, at plaintiff’s year-end review meeting, which plaintiff recorded, Greenberg gave him negative feedback about his job performance and stated, “I just want to know . . . is your heart still in it, you know? . . . I mean you’ve got all these things going on.”

Additionally, in January 2017, Jane Park, the firm’s director of business development and client relations, authored a memo for Smith and Greenberg that discussed whether to disclose to firm clients that a more junior investment analyst had received firm equity while plaintiff had not. The memo posited telling clients, as one option, that plaintiff “is going through some personal issues which make[] the current timing less than ideal for ownership disbursement.” Park testified at her deposition that she was referring to the fact that plaintiff was “distracted” because of his divorce and custody fight. …

Taken together, the evidence could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendants’ proffered reasons for denying plaintiff equity and ultimately terminating him were “false, misleading, or incomplete,” and that plaintiff was, in fact, terminated on the basis of his familial or caregiver status … . Mezinev v Donald Smith & Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 02209, First Dept 4-14-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what constitutes “familial status” and “caregiver” discrimination in the context of an alleged wrongful termination of employment pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law.

 

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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES ARE REVIEWED UNDER “NOTICE PLEADING” STANDARDS WHERE ONLY FAIR NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND ITS GROUNDS ARE REQUIRED; HERE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THAT A SUPERVISOR STATED SHE RECEIVED HIGH EVALUATIONS BECAUSE SHE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER SUPERIORS WAS SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE DISMISSAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a single remark by a supervisor may sustain an employment discrimination or hostile work environment claim. The court noted the more lenient pleading requirement for employment discrimination actions:

… [E]mployment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under notice pleading standards … . Indeed, a “plaintiff alleging employment discrimination need not plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination but need only give fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds” … . In an action brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), “[f]air notice is all that is required to survive at the pleading stage” … . * * *

Although a “single, isolated comment” or “stray remark” will not always suffice to sustain a discrimination or hostile work environment claim … , “a single comment that objectifies women being made in circumstances where that comment would, for example, signal views about the role of women in the workplace” could be actionable … . Here, where plaintiff alleged that her supervisor implied that she only received high evaluation scores because she was engaging in sexual relations with higher-ups, the alleged remarks and attendant hostile conduct were more than “petty slights and trivial inconveniences” … . Cummings v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 00972, First Dept 2-19-26

Practice Point: Pleading standards are more lenient in employment discrimination cases. Fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds are sufficient to survive dismissal.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATORY NON-PROMOTION AND TERMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYC AND NYS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WERE SUFFICIENT AT THE PLEADING STAGE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s claims of discriminatory non-promotion and termination pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law were sufficient for the pleading stage and should not have been dismissed:

Plaintiff’s allegation that he, an African American, was terminated from his job by defendant, his employer, after making one mistake while two of his white coworkers who made similar mistakes were neither reprimanded nor terminated was sufficient to state a claim for discriminatory termination under the broad protections of the State and City HRLs … . Plaintiff specifically alleged that one of the white coworkers was an IT Help Desk Technician, the same position he held, and that the coworker performed substantially similar work under similar working conditions. He further alleged that he helped fix some of the mistakes that this coworker had made in the past. These allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage … .

In support of his cause of action for failure to promote, plaintiff alleges that his coworker was promoted to a job that he was already performing, and that the position was not posted prior to it being filled. These allegations are sufficient to meet plaintiff’s pleading burden as this Court has previously held that it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to allege that he applied for a promotion where he has alleged that promotions were typically made unannounced and unsolicited (id.) or where defendant failed to advertise the position … . Altidor v Medical Knowledge Group LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 00870, First Dept 2-17-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the pleading requirements for claims of discriminatory non-promotion and termination pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law.

 

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THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (RETALIATION) ACTION PURSUANT TO THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PRECLUDED A RELITIGATION OF THE RETALIATION CLAIMS IN STATE COURT PURSUANT TO THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Shulman, determined plaintiff’s employment discrimination (retaliation) cause of action pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) was collaterally estopped by the dismissal of plaintiff’s action in federal court pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL):

Plaintiff asserts that his cooperation in [an] investigation [of another employee] provoked animus from his supervisors … who allegedly retaliated by reducing his business opportunities and ultimately terminating him.

Plaintiff alleged seven discrete adverse employment actions: (1) the artificial depression of his revenue; (2) denial of his request to transfer to a new position; (3) reassignment of his clients; (4) denial of funding to attend conferences; (5) a negative performance review; (6) no bonus in 2015; and (7) termination in August 2016. * * *

The City HRL is “uniquely broad and remedial,” requiring courts to construe its provisions “independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes” … . However, the requirement to interpret the City HRL under a more liberal lens does not relieve plaintiff of his burden to produce evidence of a retaliatory motive behind the adverse actions.

* * * Plaintiff’s arguments … invite relitigating facts already adjudicated by two federal courts after full and fair litigation. The federal courts expressly found no retaliatory animus after reviewing extensive evidence. … [T]his compels preclusion.

We emphasize that the City HRL’s liberal construction rule lowers the causation threshold, not the evidentiary one. Once the federal record established the absence of any retaliatory motive, no genuine factual issue remained even under the City HRL’s mixed-motive framework. To allow this case to go to a jury under the guise of liberal construction finds no support in the record. Abromavage v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 00052, First Dept 1-8-25

Practice Point: Here the federal courts’ dismissal of plaintiff’s employment discrimination (retaliation) claims pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) precluded relitigation of those claims in state court pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Consult this opinion for insight into when collateral estoppel will be invoked to preclude a state action under the NYCHRL which raises retaliation claims identical to those dismissed by the federal courts under the NYSHRL. Although the NYCHRL lowers the causation threshold in comparison with the NYSHRL, it does not lower the evidentiary threshold.

 

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THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING THE NYC PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST BLACK AND LATINO STUDENTS FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a partial dissent and a dissenting opinion, determined the complaint alleging the NYC public education system discriminates against Black and Latino students failed as a matter of law. The opinion is too complex to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs allege that the New York City public education system, through its admissions and screening policies, curriculum content, and lack of diversity among the teacher workforce, discriminates against and disproportionately affects Black and Latino students, leading to unequal educational opportunities and negative outcomes for those students. Plaintiffs further allege that these practices and policies deprive Black and Latino students of a sound basic education in contravention of the Education Article of the State Constitution (NY Const, art XI, § 1), denies them equal protection of the laws (NY Const, art I, § 11), and denies them access to educational facilities in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [4]). Although plaintiffs identify troubling aspects of New York City’s public education system, the claims as presented in the complaint fail as a matter of law. IntegrateNYC, Inc. v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 05870, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for a detailed discussion of the issues raised by a claim that a public school system discriminates against minority students. Here the court acknowledged the complaint identified “troubling aspects” of New York City’s public education system, but held the causes of action failed as a matter of law.

 

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THE PETITIONER, A NEW YORK CITY FIREFIGHTER, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE FIRE DEPARTMENT IMPROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR A RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FROM THE COVID VACCINE MANDATE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner-firefighter did not demonstrate the NYC Fire Department (FDNY) improperly denied petitioner’s request for a religious exemption from the COVID vaccine mandate:

Pursuant to the NYCHRL [New York City Human Rights Law], it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer “to refuse or otherwise fail to engage in a cooperative dialogue within a reasonable time with a person who has requested an accommodation” for, among other possibilities, “religious needs” (Administrative Code § 8-107[28][a][1]). Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the appellants’ process for resolving requests for a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate did not meet the requirements of the NYCHRL regarding cooperative dialogue … . The appellants provided information on the process for reviewing accommodation requests related to the vaccine mandate and informed employees on how to appeal request denials. The record demonstrates that the petitioner availed himself of this process. The record also shows that there were multiple communications between the petitioner, the FDNY, and the [City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel] regarding the petitioner’s accommodation request. The petitioner failed to establish that, under the unique circumstances present at the time of the vaccine mandate, the NYCHRL required a more robust or individualized dialogue.

The petitioner also failed to demonstrate that the determination to deny him a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate was arbitrary and capricious … . Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 03728, Second Dept 6-18-25

Practice Point: Here the petitioner-firefighter had won in Supreme Court and was reinstated with back pay. But the Second Department reversed finding petitioner was not entitled to a religious exemption from the COVID vaccine mandate.

 

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HERE THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYCHRL) BUT WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYSHRL) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the defendant hospital was not entitled to summary judgment in this disability discrimination case under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) but was entitled to summary judgment under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL):

In order to prevail on a claim of disability discrimination under the NYCHRL, “an employer must demonstrate that it engage[d] in a good faith interactive process that assesse[d] the needs of the disabled individual and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested” … . Here, the hospital defendants failed to show that they engaged in an interactive process and reasonable accommodation analysis prior to terminating the plaintiff’s employment … .

However, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the hospital defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging disability discrimination under the NYSHRL insofar as asserted against them. “To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Executive Law, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that he or she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without a reasonable accommodation” … . Here, the hospital defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, under the NYSHRL, the hospital defendants cannot be held liable for failing to engage in an interactive process where the employee has failed to provide evidence to the employer that he or she could perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation … . Makharadze v Ognibene, 2025 NY Slip Op 03713, Second Dept 6-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an example of a disability discrimination case where the defendants were entitled to summary judgment under the New York State Human Rights Law but not under the New York City Human Rights Law.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S WORKPLACE GENDER-DISCRIMINATION CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a necessarily fact-specific decision, determined plaintiff’s employment-discrimination suit should not have been dismissed:

To establish a claim for gender discrimination under the Human Rights Law, a plaintiff must “show (1) that he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) that he or she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) that he or she was qualified to hold the position for which he or she suffered the adverse employment action, and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination” … . “Verbal comments can serve as evidence of discriminatory motivation when a plaintiff shows a nexus between the discriminatory remarks and the employment action at issue” … . “Employers are . . . required to provide reasonable avenues for discrimination and harassment complaints, to respond appropriately to such complaints, and to take reasonable steps to eliminate the harmful conduct; where they fail to do so, they are subject to liability under [the Human Rights Law]” … . * * *

The gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations is that Gulnick’s [plaintiff’s immediate boss’s] sexist views toward women fostered a workplace where women’s legitimate grievances were met with dismissal and ridicule, and conflicts that would otherwise have been dealt with were instead allowed to fester. When plaintiff sought to have her valid claims of harassment addressed in-house and ultimately in an outside mediation, Gulnick’s rebuke of her efforts envenomed with discriminatory commentary turned to anger, ultimately leading to plaintiff’s demotion and decrease in wages. Mikesh v County of Ulster, 2025 NY Slip Op 01987, Third Dept 4-3-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a detailed fact-specific analysis of the criteria for a prima facie demonstration of gender discrimination in the workplace.​

 

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PURSUANT TO THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, PROPERTY OWNERS (LANDLORDS) MAY BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT OF THEIR AGENTS IN DEALING WITH PROSPECTIVE TENANTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kennedy, determined the owners of housing accommodations may be vicariously liable (pursuant to the NYC Human Rights Law) for discrimination by their agents who deal with prospective tenants. Here plaintiff is an indigent person with AIDS. The complaint alleges he was denied housing by defendant, who acted as an agent for defendant property owners:

… [A]bsent vicarious liability, landlords would evade liability under the City HRL except when they directly interact with a prospective tenant. This is neither the mandate of the statute, nor supported by the legislative intent behind § 8-107 of the City HRL … .

The text of the City HRL also supports the imposition of vicarious liability upon landlords. Specifically, the key statutory remedy in the City HRL for housing discrimination is to approve the rental and to provide housing (see Administrative Code § 8-120[a][7]). Moreover, §§ 8-122 and 8-502 permit a tenant allegedly aggrieved by discriminatory practices to seek injunctive relief. In the absence of vicarious liability against owners, who have title to the prospective property, these remedies would be unavailable and rendered meaningless … . Newson v Vivaldi Real Estate LTD., 2025 NY Slip Op 00052, First Dept 1-7-25

Practice Point: Pursuant to the NYC Human Rights Law, landlords may be vicariously liable for the discriminatory conduct of their agents in dealing with prospective tenants.

 

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AFTER THE DEATH OF THE COOPERATIVE OWNER, THE BOARD REFUSED TO TREAT PETITIONER AS DECEDENT’S “SPOUSE” WHICH WOULD AUTHORIZE AN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF DECEDENT’S LEASE AND SHARES; THE MAJORITY, OVER TWO DISSENTING OPINIONS, DETERMINED THE BOARD’S REFUSAL TO TREAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS NOT MARRIED TO DECEDENT, AS A “SPOUSE” DID NOT CONSTITUTE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON “MARITAL STATUS” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over two dissenting opinions, determined the cooperative board did not discriminate against the petitioner when it declined to treat petitioner as the decedent-cooperative-owner’s “spouse” for the purpose of transferring decedent’s shares to petitioner:

Petitioner Maryanne McCabe resided for 13 years in a New York City cooperative building with her “long-time romantic partner,” David Burrows. Upon Burrows’ death, he willed his real property, including his unit in the building, to petitioner, who then sought to acquire his lease and shares under a lease provision authorizing an automatic transfer to a shareholder’s “spouse.” The cooperative board declined to treat petitioner as a spouse but offered to consider whether she could retain the lease and shares under a clause covering a shareholder’s family member. Petitioner argues that the board’s failure to treat her as a spouse for purposes of the automatic transfer provision violated the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) (see Administrative Code of City of New York § 8-107 [5]). We disagree. * * *

The two were neither married nor in a registered domestic partnership, and petitioner was never added as a shareholder of his unit. Burrows bequeathed his apartment to petitioner when he passed away … . * * *

The NYCHRL does not define “marital status,” but Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[t]he condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed” (Black’s Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024], marital status). Along the same lines is the general understanding: “when one is queried about one’s ‘marital status,’ the usual and complete answer would be expected to be a choice among ‘married,’ ‘single,’ etc.” … . A plain reading of the term, then, is that marital status reflects the legal condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed. Marital status turns on whether an individual has “participated or failed to participate in a marriage …”. Matter of McCabe v 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 06290, CtApp 12-17-24

Practice Point: The cooperative board’s refusal to treat a “long time romantic partner” of the decedent-cooperative-owner as decedent’s “spouse” for purposes of an automatic transfer of the lease and shares did not constitute discrimination on the basis of “marital status” under the NYC Human Rights Law.

 

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