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EVERY CAUSE OF ACTION WAS ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED; THE PROPER CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE CORRECT STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined several causes of action including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of constructive trust, and breach of contract should not have been dismissed as time-barred:

“‘[W]here an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8)'” … . * * * … [P]laintiffs discovered the alleged fraud in 2019 and the cause of action was timely commenced within two years. * * *

… [T]he statute of limitations on the cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust did not begin to run until 2019, when [defendant] allegedly breached his promise … . …

“[I]n order to determine the statute of limitations applicable to an action for a declaratory judgment, a court must examine the substance of the action. Where it is determined that the parties’ dispute can be, or could have been, resolved in an action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily required, that limitation period governs” … . * * *

… Supreme Court erred in concluding that the causes of action alleging fraud in the inducement and promissory estoppel are time-barred. The statute of limitations for those causes of action is six years … . …

The statute of limitations applicable to a breach of contract cause of action is six years (see CPLR 213[2]), “and begins at the time of the breach, even when no damage occurs until later, and even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury” … . Statharos v Statharos, 2023 NY Slip Op 04226, Second Dept 8-9-23

Practice Point: Here the criteria for determining the applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of constructive trust, declaratory judgment, promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement and breach of contract are discussed in some detail.

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A CORPORATION (HERE A COOPERATIVE) DOES NOT OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE SHAREHOLDERS; THE INDIVIDUAL BOARD MEMBERS MAY OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE SHAREHOLDERS FOR INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BUT NO ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING BY BOARD MEMBERS WERE MADE (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that a corporation (or, in this case a cooperative) does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders:

… [T]he second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty as against the cooperative and the board member defendants also does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The cause of action cannot be sustained as against the cooperative “because a corporation owes no fiduciary duty to its shareholders” … . Furthermore, even assuming that the cause of action was addressed to the actions taken by the individual board member defendants, it “does not allege any individual wrongdoing by the members of the board separate and apart from their collective actions” taken in their capacity as board members … . Tahari v 860 Fifth Ave. Corp, 2023 NY Slip Op 01269, First Dept 3-14-23

Practice Point: A corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders. Individual board members may owe a duty which would be breached by wrongdoing, not alleged here.

 

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THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND MUTUAL MISTAKE; PLAINTIFFS-PHYSICIANS ALLEGED THE FORMS THE EMPLOYER REQUIRED THEM TO SIGN CONSENTING TO THE DISTRIBUTION (TO THE EMPLOYER) OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE DEMUTUALIZATION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURER WERE INVALID (FIRST DEPT).

The Frist Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint by physicians against their employer/malpractice-insurance-policy-administrator stated causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and mutual mistake. The dispute centers on whether the physicians or the employer which paid the malpractice insurance premiums are/is entitled to the proceeds when the insurer (MLMIC) demutualized. The employer had the physicians sign forms consenting to distributing the proceeds to the employer. The physicians allege the consent forms are invalid:

Plaintiffs allege that the forms by which they authorized MLMIC to distribute their demutualization proceeds to defendant are invalid because defendant obtained them in breach of its fiduciary duty, by fraud, or due to mutual mistake. If these forms are invalid, then the demutualization proceeds belong to plaintiffs … .

Transactions between a fiduciary and beneficiary are voidable if the fiduciary acts in its own interest and does not fully disclose all material facts … . Defendant is alleged not only to have withheld the policyholder information statement from plaintiffs, but to have significantly misrepresented their contents for its own gain. These allegations, which are not conclusively refuted by the documentary evidence, are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fraud is another basis for rescinding the consent forms … . Plaintiffs also properly allege constructive fraud, because they were owed a fiduciary duty by defendant and so were “warranted to . . . relax the care and vigilance they would ordinarily exercise in the circumstances” … . …

Mutual mistake “may not be invoked by a party to avoid the consequences of its own negligence” … . For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, however, it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiffs were negligent … . Cordaro v AdvantageCare Physicians, P.C., 2022 NY Slip Op 05267, First Dept 9-27-22

Practice Point: The complaint adequately alleged the employer, which also served at the medical malpractice insurance policy administrator, breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs-physicians by requiring them to consent to the distribution (to the employer) of the proceeds of the demutualization of the medical malpractice insurance carrier. The complaint also sufficiently alleged fraud, constructive fraud and mutual-mistake causes of action.

 

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A LEASE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND DEFENDANTS (ONE OF WHOM WAS A MEMBER OF PLAINTIFF’S BOARD) WAS NOT VOTED ON BY A MAJORITY OF DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS AND WAS THEREFORE VOIDABLE UNDER BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 713(B); DEFENDANTS BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARAY DUTY TO THE CORPORATION BY SUBLETTING THE LEASED PREMISES FOR A MUCH HIGHER RENT WITHOUT PLAINTIFF’S KNOWLEDGE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff cooperative apartment corporation (HDFC) demonstrated defendants (one of whom was a member of plaintiff’s board) had entered a lease with plaintiff which was not voted upon by a majority of disinterested directors and was therefore voidable under Business Corporation Law 713(b). In addition plaintiff demonstrated defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation:

Plaintiff, a low-income cooperative apartment corporation (HDFC), established prima facie that the lease between plaintiff and defendants Thomas Green and A Cup of Harlem was not voted on by a majority of disinterested directors and is therefore voidable under Business Corporation Law § 713(b). A Cup of Harlem is a partnership between Thomas Green and Siwana Green, who are married. Siwana Green is a shareholder in the HDFC and a former officer and member of plaintiff’s board of directors. By lease dated April 1, 2004, while Siwana Green was one of three members of the board, plaintiff leased one of the two commercial spaces in the building to Thomas Green and A Cup of Harlem for a 99-year term, with a monthly rent of $700 for the entirety of the term and an option to extend the lease for a 10-year term at a rate of $800 per month. In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted a former board member’s affidavit that he was elected to a one-year term in February 2004, that he only learned of the lease in 2018, when Siwana Green was removed from the board, and that he never would have approved a lease with such “outlandish” terms. …

The record demonstrates that Siwana Green breached her fiduciary duty to plaintiff by diverting a corporate opportunity without plaintiff’s knowledge or consent and admittedly receiving more than $200,000 profit from the sublessee to whom, in March 11, 2009, Thomas Green sublet the leased premises at a monthly rent of $2,500 for a ten-year term, which was then renewed for a monthly rent of $2,800. 67-69 St. Nicholas Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v Green, 2022 NY Slip Op 04087, First Dept 6-23-22

Practice Point: Here a low-rent lease between plaintiff corporation and defendants (one of whom was a member of plaintiff’s board) was voidable because the lease was not approved by a majority of disinterested directors. Defendants sublet the leased premises for a much higher rent without plaintiff corporation’s knowledge and thereby breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation.

 

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EACH TIME PLAINTIFF’S MARKETING DIRECTOR ENTERED A CONTRACT WITH A COMPANY IN WHICH THE DIRECTOR HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST CONSTITUTED A SEPARATE WRONG UNDER THE CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the continuing wrong doctrine applied to each time defendant hired Exit for video editing services within six years of filing the complaint. In addition, the complaint stated a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty:

This action arises from the conduct of plaintiff’s former director of marketing, Taufiq, in repeatedly contracting with Exit Editorial, Inc. (Exit), owned by Tristan Kneschke (together with Exit, the Exit defendants), for video editing services. Plaintiff claims that Taufiq falsely represented to it that he negotiated with Exit at arms length and that Exit’s prices were reasonable, when in fact its prices were well above market rate, he had an ownership interest in Exit, and he received a cash finder’s fee for each contract with Exit.

Plaintiff’s allegations and supporting affidavits were sufficient to permit an inference that a separate exercise of judgment, and thus a separate wrong, was committed each time Exit was hired, thereby enabling application of the continuing wrong doctrine … . * * *

The breach of fiduciary duty claim against Taufiq should be reinstated, as an agent has a duty to make full disclosure to its principal of any conflicts of interest and there is no requirement of justifiable reliance for such a claim … .Manipal Educ. Ams., LLC v Taufiq, 2022 NY Slip Op 02200, First Dept 3-31-22

Practice Point: An allegation that an employee entered contracts on behalf of his employer with a company of which the employee was a part-owner, without so informing his employer, supports causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Each contract constituted a separate wrong pursuant to the continuing wrong doctrine.

 

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THERE WAS A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS PARTNERS AND CO-OWNERS OF A BUSINESS, GIVING RISE TO AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO AN ACCOUNTING, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined the petitioners were entitled to an accounting for a business, Ocinomled, Ltd., because there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties as partners and co-owners of Ocinomled:

This Court has held “whenever there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties . . . there is an absolute right to an accounting notwithstanding the existence of an adequate remedy at law” … . It is undisputed that there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties as partners and co-owners of Ocinomled. An equitable accounting is “designed to require a person in possession of financial records to produce them, demonstrate how money was expended and return pilfered funds in his or her possession” … . While it is clear that respondents produced the full books and records, and the Special Referee went through thousands of documents and reviewed numerous expert reports, this is insufficient …, particularly because respondents’ bookkeeping was described as inadequate, and sometimes nonexistent, and there was evidence respondents intentionally destroyed key financial data during the litigation. Matter of Grgurev v Licul, 2022 NY Slip Op 02088, First Dept 3-29-22

Practice Point: There is a fiduciary relationship between partners and co-owners of a business giving rise to an absolute right to an accounting, despite the existence of an adequate remedy at law.

 

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIM’S ACT PROCEEDING PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ABUSE BY A PRIEST AND TEACHER IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE SCHOOL WAS OVERSEEN BY DEFENDANTS PARISH AND DIOCESE; THE 2ND DEPARTMENT HELD THE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THERE WAS NOTHING UNIQUE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND PLAINTIFF, AS OPPOSED TO THE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE OTHER PARISHIONERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the parish and diocese defendants’ motions to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action in this Child Victims Act case should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged he was sexually abused when he was 10 in 1973 by a priest and teacher in elementary school. Plaintiff alleged the parish and the school were overseen by the diocese:

“[T]he elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendants misconduct” … .. A cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty must be pleaded with particularity under CPLR 3016(b) … .

“A fiduciary relationship exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation” … .Two essential elements of a fiduciary relationship are de facto control and dominance … .

Here, the amended complaint did not allege facts that would give rise to a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants. The amended complaint failed to allege facts that demonstrated that the plaintiff’s relationship with the defendants was somehow unique or distinct from the defendants’ relationships with other parishioners generally … . J. D. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 2022 NY Slip Op 01766, Second Dept 3-16-22

Practice Point: Here the breach of a fiduciary duty cause of action against the parish and diocese which oversaw the elementary school where plaintiff allegedly was sexually abused was dismissed. There was nothing unique about the relationship between the defendants and plaintiff which set it apart from the relationships with the other parishioners.

 

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CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DO NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IS OPENLY REPUDIATED; CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION BASED UPON FRAUD ARE TIMELY SIX YEARS FROM THE CONVERSION OR TWO YEARS FROM DISCOVERY OF THE CONVERSION; THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION HERE, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined causes of action alleging defendant Filardo, plaintiff car dealership’s employee, used fraudulent schemes to steal funds from plaintiff over a period of years, should not have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, and/or on the ground the causes of action were not adequately pled:

The plaintiff asserted causes of action against Filardo for breach of fiduciary duty (first cause of action), breach of the duty of loyalty (second cause of action), faithless servant doctrine (third cause of action), conversion (fifth cause of action), fraudulent concealment by fiduciary (sixth cause of action), and promissory estoppel (ninth cause of action), and causes of action against both defendants for aiding and abetting fraud (fourth cause of action), civil conspiracy (seventh cause of action), fraud and deceit (eighth cause of action), unjust enrichment (tenth cause of action), money had and received (eleventh cause of action), and fraud by non-disclosure (twelfth cause of action). …

“The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” … Here, the plaintiff alleged that its relationship with Filardo was not terminated until November 2017, and there is no allegation that Filardo openly repudiated his employment obligations prior to that time … .

… [W]hen the allegations of fraud are essential to a cause of action alleging conversion based upon actual fraud, the cause of action is governed by the limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8). That statute provides that, in an action based upon fraud, “the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” … .Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo, 2022 NY Slip Op 01476, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty does not start running until the fiduciary openly repudiates the duty.

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for conversion based upon fraud is six years from the conversion or two years from discovery of the conversion.

 

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THE COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY STATED FACTS AMOUNTING TO A BREACH-OF-FIDUCIARY-DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT REAL ESTATE BROKER, DESPITE PLAINTIFF-SELLER’S CONSENT TO THE BROKER’S “DUAL AGENCY;” IT WAS ALLEGED THE BROKER WAS AWARE THE PROPERTY WAS TO BE SUBDIVIDED AND SOLD BY THE BUYERS FOR THREE TIMES THE PRICE AND SHE WOULD BE THE BUYERS’ BROKER FOR THE SUBSEQUENT SALES (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by the defendant real estate broker, despite the plaintiff’s consent to the broker’s “dual agency:”

Although the complaint does not explicitly articulate a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, such a cause of action is manifest in its factual allegations, and the documentary evidence fails to utterly refute those allegations … . In connection with his sale of certain real property, plaintiff signed a disclosure form pursuant to Real Property Law § 443, giving his informed consent to a “dual agency with designated sales agent” relationship with defendants. The form states that a dual agent cannot give the seller or buyer “undivided loyalty.” Nevertheless, it does not relieve defendants from all fiduciary duty. The form states that defendant Nikki Carchedi, of defendant Stone House Properties, “is appointed to represent the seller in this transaction.” The complaint establishes a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty beyond the acknowledged “divided” duty by alleging that [defendant] Carchedi failed to disclose that she had a personal stake in the sale to the buyers, who planned to subdivide the property immediately after purchase and retain her as the broker for the sale of the subdivided parcels, and that they did so, listing the subdivided parcels for almost three times the price plaintiff received in his sale … . We also note plaintiff’s assertion that the agent representing the buyer was the son of Carchedi’s longtime client about whom plaintiff had expressed concern. Hahn v Stone House Props. LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 01416, First Dept 3-8-22

​Practice Point: Even though breach-of-fiduciary-duty was not explicitly pled, the facts alleged stated a cause of action against defendant real estate broker.

Practice Point: Even though the seller signed a form consenting to the broker’s “dual agency,” the broker was not relieved of her fiduciary duty to the seller. Allegedly, the broker was aware the buyers were going to subdivide the property, sell it at three times the price, and that she would be the broker for the subsequent sales.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE TRUSTEE DID NOT PROVIDE AN ACCOUNTING, HE NEVER REPUDIATED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES; THEREFORE THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACCOUNTING WAS NOT TRIGGERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the cause of action for an accounting of a trust should not have been limited to the six years before the filing of the complaint. Although the trustee did not provide a requested accounting. the trustee did not openly repudiate his fiduciary duties, so the six-year statute of limitations was never triggered:

The statute of limitations for a cause of action seeking an accounting is six years (see CPLR 213 [1] … ). It is well settled that the limitations period begins to run only when ” ‘the trustee openly repudiates his [or her] fiduciary obligations’ ” and ” ‘a mere lapse of time is insufficient without proof of an open repudiation’ ” … . “The party seeking the benefit of the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proof on the issue of open repudiation” … . Here, defendants “failed to sustain their burden of establishing that [defendant] had openly repudiated [his] fiduciary obligations to [plaintiffs] so as to start the statute of limitations clock” … . Although defendant failed to provide plaintiffs with an accounting, he never outright refused to do so. Further, defendant continued to conduct his duties as trustee by handling the taxes and expenses for the trust, and making the necessary disbursements to plaintiffs as beneficiaries. Thus, the cause of action for an accounting had not accrued at the time plaintiffs commenced this action. Massey-Hughes v Massey, 2021 NY Slip Op 07405, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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