Fiduciary Duty Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFFS LEARNED OF DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED FRAUD MORE THAN TWO YEARS BEFORE THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IS SIX YEARS BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the fraud, unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty causes of action were timely brought against defendant attorney. Defendant attorney represented a party who was found to have defrauded plaintiffs in an arbitration resulting in a $56,4 million judgment. Plaintiffs alleged the attorney’s participation in the fraud was not discovered until the arbitration proceedings:

The limitations period for fraud is the greater of six years from the date of the fraud or two years from the time when, with reasonable diligence, the plaintiff could have uncovered the fraud (CPLR 213[8] … ). In order to prevail, the defendant must show that there is no issue of fact under either prong. Here, defendant failed to show dispositively that plaintiffs were in possession of facts that would have triggered inquiry notice under CPLR 213(8) more than two years before the action was commenced … . …

Nor are plaintiff’s unjust enrichment or aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims time-barred. Both claims are subject to the six-year statute of limitations because they are based on allegations of actual fraud (CPLR 213[8] …). Sabourin v Chodos, 2021 NY Slip Op 03392, First Dept 5-27-21

May 27, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Fiduciary Duty, Trusts and Estates

THE FIDUCIARY TOLLING RULE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ACTION AGAINST AN EXECUTOR (WHO WAS REMOVED BY THE COURT) UNTIL THE SUCESSOR FIDUCIARY WAS APPOINTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the constructive trust action based upon alleged self-dealing by an executor who was removed by the court was not time-barred. The fiduciary tolling rule applied:

Under the fiduciary tolling rule, a claim alleging wrongful conduct by an individual in his or her fiduciary capacity does not accrue until there is an open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account … . This rule tolls the statute of limitations “for all misconduct committed by the fiduciary prior to repudiation of its obligation or termination of the [fiduciary] relationship” … since, absent either repudiation or removal, the aggrieved parties “were entitled to assume that the [fiduciary] would perform his [or her fiduciary] responsibilities” … , and it is highly unlikely that a sitting fiduciary would assert a constructive trust claim against himself or herself. … Under this rule, the toll continues until a successor fiduciary is appointed … . Matter of George, 2021 NY Slip Op 03231, Third Dept 5-20-21

May 20, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Fiduciary Duty, Judges, Trusts and Estates

PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT (SCPA), AN ADMINISTRATOR MAY BE SUSPENDED WITHOUT A PETITION OR ISSUANCE OF PROCESS FOR MISAPPROPRIATING ESTATE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the motion to suspend the administrators of the estate should have been granted. The administrators had allowed the estate to languish for 20 years and there was evidence estate property had been misappropriated by one administrator:

Pursuant to SCPA 719, “the court may make a decree suspending . . . or revoking letters issued to a fiduciary from the court . . . without a petition or the issuance of process” where, among other things, “any of the facts provided in [SCPA] 711 are brought to the attention of the court” (SCPA 719[10] … . The circumstances set forth under SCPA 711 justifying “a decree suspending . . . or revoking those letters” include a fiduciary “having wasted or improperly applied the assets of the estate” … or having “removed property of the estate . . . without prior approval of the court” … . “The removal of a fiduciary pursuant to SCPA 711 and 719 is equivalent to ‘a judicial nullification of the testator’s choice and may only be decreed when the grounds set forth in the relevant statutes have been clearly established'” … . The grounds set forth under SCPA 711 may be clearly established “by undisputed facts or concessions, where the fiduciary’s in-court conduct causes such facts to be within the court’s knowledge, or where facts warranting amendment of letters are presented to the court during a related evidentiary proceeding” … . “Thus, revoking a fiduciary’s letters . . . pursuant to SCPA 719 will constitute an abuse of discretion ‘where the facts are disputed, where conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, . . . or where there are claimed mitigating facts that, if established, would render summary removal an inappropriate remedy'” … .

Here, the record contains undisputed evidence of conflict between the administrators, and evidence that the animosity between them has interfered with the expeditious administration of the decedent’s estate, which they have allowed to languish for nearly two decades … . Moreover, Menfus [one of the administrators] admitted … he executed a deed to one of the subject properties to himself, and permitted his father to live in the other property rent free. Matter of Steward, 2021 NY Slip Op 02395, Second Dept 4-21-21

April 21, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Negligence, Securities, Trusts and Estates

IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE CONTRACT WHETHER DEFENDANT TRUSTEE WAS TO PERFORM A MERELY MINISTERIAL FUNCTION OR A GATEWAY FUNCTION IN ACCEPTING ASSETS FOR THE TRUST FROM A NONPARTY WHICH WAS ACTING FRAUDULENTLY; THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DAMAGES ASSOCIATED WITH ACCEPTING NON-NEGOTIABLE ASSETS WERE DIRECT OR INDIRECT AND WHETHER A FIDUCIARY DUTY WAS BREACHED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, reversing Supreme Court, determined the breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty action against defendant trustee, Wilmington, should not have been dismissed. Wilmington acted as a trustee for assets transferred to the trust by a nonparty. The contract stated Wilmington would be responsible only for its own negligence but also stated no non-negotiable assets were to be placed into the trust. The nonparty which transferred assets to the trust acted fraudulently and made risky investments rendering the trust assets out-of-compliance with state law. Plaintiff sued Wilmington for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Wilmington argued that any damages suffered by plaintiff from the assets transferred by the nonparty were indirect, not direct, and therefore barred by the trust agreements:

… [I]t can be argued that, in light of Wilmington’s promise not to accept nonnegotiable assets into the trusts, and to be responsible for its own negligence, maintaining the value of the assets in the trusts was inherent in the service Wilmington agreed to provide. Thus, there is merit to plaintiffs’ argument that when the assets proved not to be negotiable, they lost the benefit of their bargain and were entitled to recover as direct damages the diminution in value, and the concomitant costs of restoring the assets to negotiable status, such as professional fees. * * *

… [A]t this stage of the litigation, it is difficult to discern whether the parties contemplated that Wilmington would have to pay the damages sought by plaintiffs if it failed to perform under the trust agreements. Again, the agreements provided that Wilmington would be liable for “its own negligence,” which a reasonable factfinder could consider as recognition that Wilmington, if it did not perform its duties in accordance with a minimum level of care, would need to pay more than the nominal damages represented by its fee. * * *

Even though the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims involved the same conduct, the fiduciary duty claim alleges a breach of a noncontractual duty relating to the trustee’s independent duty to perform nondiscretionary ministerial duties with respect to the negotiability of assets. Thus, the fact that Wilmington’s failure to prevent nonnegotiable assets from entering the trusts breached both fiduciary and contractual duties does not bar plaintiffs from seeking damages related to the former … . Bankers Conseco Life Ins. Co. v Wilmington Trust, N.A., 2021 NY Slip Op 02355, First Dept 4-20-21

April 20, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Fiduciary Duty, Trusts and Estates

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PART PERFORMANCE DEFEATED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DEFENSE TO THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT AND WHETHER THE PROPERTY WAS HELD AS A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE PROVIDED FUNDS TO DEFENDANT TO PURCHASE PROPERTY WHICH. PURSUANT TO THE ORAL AGREEMENT, WOULD BE TRANSFERRED BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, affirming the denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion, determined there were question of fact about (1) whether part performance defeated the statute of frauds defense, (2) whether there was a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendant and (3) whether the property was therefore held by defendant as a constructive trust. Plaintiff and defendant were close friends. Plaintiff alleged, pursuant to an oral agreement, he provided funds to defendant for the purchase of property which plaintiff would manage until defendant transferred it to the plaintiff. The defendant alleged there was no such agreement, plaintiff did not provide funds for the purchase of the property and defendant owned the property outright:

… [W]hile the plaintiff’s work in negotiating the purchase of the subject property and in managing it might be susceptible to other explanations, his contribution of approximately $1.5 million toward its purchase, albeit partially in the form of loans from the defendant, would be “unintelligible or at least extraordinary” without reference to the alleged oral agreement … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that although the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the alleged oral agreement was barred by the statute of frauds, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding part performance … . …

The four factors to be considered in ascertaining whether the imposition of a constructive trust is warranted are the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, a promise, a transfer in reliance thereon, and unjust enrichment … . …

… [T]he transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant was not arm’s length but rather took place in the context of a friendship characterized not only by shared interests, cultural affiliations, and personal trust, but also by reliance on one another in business matters, including loans in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. While any single factor might not be sufficient, by itself, to establish a fiduciary relationship … . …

… [T]he terms of the agreement as described by the plaintiff and as evidenced by the parties’ actions are not fatally indefinite. The “doctrine of definiteness” … should not be “applied with a heavy hand” … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s promise to manage the property and pay its expenses was “a specific, bargained for legal detriment” irrespective of its value to the defendant … . Accordingly, the alleged oral agreement does not fail for lack of consideration. Toobian v Golzad, 2021 NY Slip Op 02185, Second Dept 4-7-21

The trial in this matter was held, plaintiff prevailed, and the Second Department affirmed: Toobian v Golzad, 2021 NY Slip Op 02186, Second Dept 4-7-21

April 7, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Condominiums, Contract Law, Fiduciary Duty

THE COMPLAINT BY THE CONDOMINIUM BOARD OF MANAGERS AGAINST THE CONDOMINIUM MANAGING AGENT STATED DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BOTH BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT; THE LAW FIRM WHICH REPRESENTED THE MANAGING AGENT IN AN UNRELATED MATTER INVOLVING THE CONDOMINIUM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this dispute between the board of managers of Brightwater Condominium and the condominium managing agent, FirstService, determined the complaint stated causes of action for both breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract, and the law firm (Woods) which represented FirstService in another matter with only a tangential relationship with Brightwater should not have been disqualified:

Managing agents of a condominium may owe a fiduciary duty to the condominium, depending on the functions they assume … . A fiduciary, in the context of condominium management, “is one who transacts business, or who handles money or property, which is not [its] own or for [its] own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as to whom [it] stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part” … . …

Although a cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty which is based on the same facts and seeks identical damages is duplicative of a breach of contract cause of action and should be dismissed on that basis … , here, in addition to breaches of the management agreement, Brightwater alleges specific breaches of trust which are outside the duties set forth in the management agreement, such as misappropriation of funds, and instances of self-dealing, set forth with specificity. …

FirstService did not dispute Brightwater’s showing that no confidential information was obtained from FirstService by the Woods Firm in connection with that prior action. As there is no indication in the record that confidential information was disclosed, there is no basis for disqualification … . Board of Mgrs. of Brightwater Towers Condominium v FirstService Residential N.Y., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 02128, Second Dept 4-7-21

April 7, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud

WHERE FRAUD IS THE BASIS OF A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS SIX YEARS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined that where the basis of a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty is fraud, the statute of limitations is six years:

[Defendant] Katten contends that even if the claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty is taken at face value, the statute of limitations is three years because plaintiff seeks damages, not equitable relief … . However, “a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty based on allegations of actual fraud is subject to a six-year limitations period” … . Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Albert Hallac for breach of fiduciary duty is based on allegations of actual fraud; hence, the statute of limitations for the claim against Katten for aiding and abetting Hallac’s breach of fiduciary duty is six years. Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v Hallac, 2021 NY Slip Op 01881, First Dept 3-25-21

March 25, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Fiduciary Duty, Trusts and Estates

THE TRUSTEES DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR LACHES DEFENSES TO THE ACTION SEEKING AN ESTATE ACCOUNTING; THE TRUSTEES DID NOT OPENLY REPUDIATE THEIR FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE TIME DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN FOR EITHER DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the action seeking an estate accounting should not have been dismissed as untimely because the statute of limitations had not been triggered by an open repudiation of the trustees’ fiduciary obligations. A similar open repudiation is necessary for a laches defense as well:

A proceeding to compel an accounting by a fiduciary is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[1]). “It is well settled that the statutory clock begins to run when the trustee openly repudiates his [or her] fiduciary obligations” or there is a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account … . “For a trustee to invoke a Statute of Limitations defense, a mere lapse of time is insufficient without proof of an open repudiation” … . There must be proof of a repudiation by the fiduciary “‘which is clear and made known to the beneficiaries'” … , “viewed in the light of the circumstances of the particular case” … . The party seeking the benefit of the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proof on the issue of open repudiation … . “Where there is any doubt on the record as to the conclusive applicability of a Statute of Limitations defense, the motion to dismiss the proceeding should be denied” … . Matter of Eisdorfer, 2020 NY Slip Op 06258, Second Dept 11-4-20

November 4, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Corporation Law, Fiduciary Duty

CAUSES OF ACTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND AN ACCOUNTING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; FAILURE TO TRANSFER ASSETS ALLEGED A CONTINUING WRONG AND PAYMENTS WHICH ALLEGEDLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE DURING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD WERE ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff stated causes of action for unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting against her sister (Weisel), the sole manager of A & Z, of which plaintiff is also a member. The court noted that the allegation that Weisel did not transfer assets to A & Z alleged a continuing wrong, so payments allegedly owed to A & Z within the statute of limitations period were actionable:

To state a cause of action for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered … . …

“[A] fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . barring not only blatant self-dealing, but also requiring avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty” … . Here, the plaintiff has alleged that Wiesel is the sole manager of A & Z—which, if true, would impose a fiduciary duty on Wiesel arising out of her position as the sole manager of A & Z … . The amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Wiesel is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, arising out of both her position as sole manager of A & Z and her familial relationship with the plaintiff … . …

A cause of action for accounting requires “the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship and a breach of the duty imposed by that relationship respecting property in which the party seeking the accounting has an interest” … . Greenberg v Wiesel, 2020 NY Slip Op 04927, Second Dept 9-16-20

September 16, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Family Law, Fiduciary Duty, Trusts and Estates

THE CAUSE OF ACTION SEEKING THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST TO PREVENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF WIFE ENTERED A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT REQUIRING PAYMENTS BY HER EX-HUSBAND; AFTER HER EX-HUSBAND’S DEATH HIS CHILDREN ALLEGEDLY EMPTIED THE ESTATE OF ASSETS, THEREBY PREVENTING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the cause of action alleging the existence of a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff and her deceased ex-husband entered a settlement agreement in which plaintiff would be entitled to certain payments until 2020 and 2023. Plaintiff’s ex-husband died in 2017 and the complaint alleged that all of the ex-husband’s assets had been removed from the estate by the husband’s children making it impossible for the terms of the settlement to be fulfilled:

The purpose of a constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment … . Accordingly, ” the constructive trust doctrine is given broad scope to respond to all human implications of a transaction in order to give expression to the conscience of equity and to satisfy the demands of justice'” … . ” A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, and may be imposed when property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest'” … .

Moreover, an agreement between spouses, such as the agreement and addendum here, involve a fiduciary relationship requiring the utmost good faith … . Since the agreement and addendum provide that, if necessary, the plaintiff could use the assets of Iannazzo’s [the ex-husband’s] estate to satisfy his obligations to her, and, thereafter, all of Iannazzo’s assets were transferred to the Trust before his death, his estate can provide no relief to the plaintiff and the obligations she is owed pursuant to the agreement and addendum will not be met. The plaintiff therefore adequately states a cause of action that the defendants would be unjustly enriched if the Trust is allowed to retain the portion of the assets now owned by the Trust that would satisfy the unmet obligations of Iannazzo and his estate pursuant to the agreement … . Derosa v Estate of Iannazzo, 2020 NY Slip Op 04917, Second Dept 9-16-20