Limited Liability Company Law – New York Appellate Digest

THE ADDITIONAL NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN CPLR 3215(G)(4) DOES NOT APPLY TO SERVICE UPON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AS OPPOSED TO A CORPORATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff was not required to comply with the additional notice requirement in CPLR 3215(g)(4) which does not apply to service upon a limited liability company (the defendant here), as opposed to corporations:

The court [in denying plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment] determined that the plaintiff had failed to comply with CPLR 3215(g)(4) and that the respondent had a reasonable excuse for failing to answer the complaint in that it had not been served with process. …

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the plaintiff was not required to demonstrate compliance with the additional notice requirement of CPLR 3215(g)(4) … . “By its express terms, the notice requirement is limited to situations where a default judgment is sought against a ‘domestic or authorized foreign corporation’ which has been served pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306(b), and does not pertain to a limited liability company” … . Mitchell v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 2022 NY Slip Op 06477, Second Dept 11-16-22

Practice Point: The additional notice requirement for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215(g)(4) does not apply to service on a limited liability company, as opposed to a corporation.

November 16, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Judges, Limited Liability Company Law

SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE DISCRETION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND A COMPLAINT AFTER THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined Supreme Court did not have the discretion to grant leave to amend a complaint which had been dismissed by the First Department for lack of standing. After the appeal, plaintiff had cured the standing defect and Supreme Court allowed the amendment after the time-period to commence a new action (CPLR 205(a)) had expired:

This appeal raises the interesting question of whether a trial court has the discretion to grant a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) … , after the Appellate Division has already ordered the complaint dismissed, with direction to enter judgment. We dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs, as non-managing members of a manager-managed Delaware limited liability company, lacked capacity … or standing to act on behalf of the Company when they obtained a Certificate of Revival of the Company before filing a second amended complaint. After plaintiffs purportedly remedied this deficiency of proper standing, they sought to revive the dismissed action by seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. As aforementioned, after we had already ordered the complaint dismissed, the motion court granted plaintiffs leave to file the third amended complaint. At the time plaintiffs sought leave to amend, the time to commence a new action had expired, including the six-month grace period provided by CPLR 205(a). … Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court lacked discretion to grant plaintiffs leave to amend a complaint that had already been dismissed by this Court. * * *

Given this Court’s outright dismissal of the claims based on a finding of lack of standing, there was no action pending when plaintiffs moved for leave to file the third amended complaint. Thus, the trial court lacked any discretion or authority to grant plaintiffs such leave, where we had properly dismissed the second amended complaint before plaintiffs filed the motion to amend … .Favourite Ltd. v Cico, 2022 NY Slip Op 03987, First Dept 6-21-22

Practice Point: Once the complaint was dismissed for lack of standing by the First Department, there was no pending action. Once the time for commencing a new action pursuant to CPLR 205(a) had expired plaintiff was out of luck. Supreme Court did not have the discretion to grant plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint after it had been dismissed by the First Department.

June 21, 2022/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Limited Liability Company Law, Real Property Law

THE LLC’S FAILURE TO CHANGE THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR A DEFAULT; PARTIES TO WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS TRANSFERRED AFTER THE LIS PENDENS WAS FILED ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE BOUND BY THE RESULT IN THIS ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) defendant E&A did not show a reasonable excuse for its default, and (2) the parties to which the property was transferred after the lis pendens was filed were not necessary parties because they are bound by the result of the instant action:

E&A asserted that it did not receive the summons and complaint, which had been served on the Secretary of State, because it had failed to keep its address updated. However, where a defendant does not receive service of process because it failed to keep a current address on file with the Secretary of State, courts will not find a reasonable excuse for a default … . …

Supreme Court should have denied E&A’s cross motion insofar as it sought to join as defendants Yuanqing Liu (who purchased the property from E&A) and NYC Happy Housing LLC (which purchased the property from Liu), as Liu and NYC Happy Housing are not necessary parties. On the contrary, Liu and NYC Happy Housing need not be joined to accord complete relief or to avoid an inequitable effect (CPLR 1001[a]); rather, they are “bound by all proceedings taken in the action . . . to the same extent as a party” because their conveyances were recorded after the filing of the notice of pendency (CPLR 6501 …). Majada Inc. v E&A RE Capital Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 03476, First Dept 5-31-22

Practice Point: A limited liability corporation’s (LLC’s) failure to change the address on file with the Secretary of State is not an acceptable excuse for a default. Because a lis pendens was filed against the defendant’s property here, the parties to which the property was subsequently transferred are bound by the result of this action and are not, therefore, necessary parties.

May 31, 2022/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Corporation Law, Limited Liability Company Law

DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE SUMMONS WAS NOT RECEIVED IN TIME TO DEFEND THE ACTION, AND DID NOT PROVIDE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DEFAULT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s did not demonstrate they did not receive notice of the summons in time to defend the action, and did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default. Therefore defendants’ motion to vacate the default judgment should not have been granted:

Pursuant to CPLR 317, a defaulting defendant that was “served with a summons, other than by personal delivery” may be permitted to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense … . Service on a limited liability company by delivery of the pleadings to the Secretary of State does not constitute personal delivery … . “The mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint is not sufficient to establish lack of actual notice of the action in time to defend for the purpose of CPLR 317” … .

The affidavit … submitted by the … defendants in support of their motion, amounted to nothing more than a mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint … . … [T]he … defendants did not contend that the address it had on file with the Secretary of State was incorrect … .

… [T]he … defendants’ mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint, without more, was insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) … .Andrews v Wartburg Receiver, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 01980, Second Dept 2-23-22

Practice Point: A denial of the receipt of the summons and complaint, without more, does not demonstrate actual notice of the summons was not received in time to defend, and does not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for a defaulting.

March 23, 2022/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Limited Liability Company Law, Negligence

THE SOLE MEMBER OF THE LLC WHICH OWNED THE PROPERTY COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DANGEROUS CONDITION SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF HIS MEMBER STATUS; HOWEVER THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE LLC COULD BE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this premises liability case, determined the sole member of the LLC (Romanoff) which owned the premises was not liable, but there was a question of fact whether the LLC had constructive knowledge of the defective railing which collapsed when plaintiff leaned on it:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Romanoff, as a member of the LLC, cannot be held liable for the company’s obligations by virtue of that status alone … , and the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence as to the existence of circumstances that would entitle him to pierce the corporate veil to impose personal liability on Romanoff … .

… [T]he Romanoff defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the LLC did not have constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition … . In support of their motion, the Romanoff defendants submitted … evidence that the porch railing that collapsed had not been physically inspected in the eight months following the purchase of the premises. They also failed to demonstrate that the alleged dangerous condition of the porch railing was latent and not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection. … [T]he Romanoff defendants relied upon the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that, as he leaned onto the railing to shake dust out of a blanket, he felt the railing move as soon as he made contact with it, and it did not appear to be attached to anything. Hayden v 334 Dune Rd., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04481, Second Dept 7-21-21

July 21, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Limited Liability Company Law

THE LIMITED RELIEF AVAILABLE TO A DISSENTING MEMBER AFTER THE MERGER OF TWO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, addressed the relief available to a dissenting member after the merger of two limited liability companies:

Limited Liability Company Law § 1002(f) provides that, subsequent to a merger, a dissenting member possesses no interest in the surviving or resulting business entity, but is instead entitled only to a cash payment of the fair value of his or her membership as of the close of the business day prior to the merger. Moreover, Limited Liability Company Law § 1005 provides for the payment of the value of that interest or, in the event of a dispute, sets forth the procedure for determining the value of that interest.

… Farro’s [plaintiff’s] membership in the subject businesses was terminated by the merger, and he subsequently sought appraisal of the value of his interest in order to be fairly compensated therefor. Under these circumstances, his exclusive remedy was appraisal and payment, and he was precluded from maintaining any derivative claims on behalf of the subject businesses … .

… [A] member of a merged company who has a right to demand payment for his membership interest “shall not have any right at law or in equity . . . to attack the validity of the merger . . . or to have the merger . . . set aside or rescinded.” Moreover, the language of the statute makes clear that an appraisal proceeding is the member’s “sole remedy,” and no exception exists for alleged fraud or illegality in the procurement of the merger … . Farro v Schochet, 2021 NY Slip Op 00150, Second Dept 1-13-21

January 13, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Debtor-Creditor, Limited Liability Company Law

ACTION TO ENFORCE A FOREIGN JUDGMENT AGAINST A DELAWARE DISSOLVED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATE OF CANCELLATION HAS NOT BEEN NULLIFIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action to domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment after defendant corporation had been dissolved could not be maintained:

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant, a Delaware limited liability company, to domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment in its favor several months after defendant had been dissolved and a certificate of cancellation filed (see 6 Del C § 18-203[a]). As the certificate of cancellation has not been nullified and plaintiff does not seek nullification, plaintiff cannot maintain this action (6 Del C § 18-803[b]) … . Epie v Herakles Farms, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05283, First Dept 10-1-20

October 1, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Attorneys, Contract Law, Corporation Law, Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability Company Law

NO APPEAL LIES FROM A NONFINAL ORDER, HERE ORDERS WHICH DID NOT RESOLVE THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES; IN A SUCCESSFUL SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTION ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE PAID BY THE CORPORATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined no appeal lies from a nonfinal order and, in a successful shareholders’ derivative action, the corporation is liable for attorney’s fees. The facts of the case are too complex to fairly summarize here. Defendant limited liability company was formed to develop a residential subdivision. The action alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and sought dissolution of the LLC:

… “[A]lthough all of the substantive issues between the parties were resolved, the order was facially nonfinal, since it left pending the assessment of attorneys’ fees—a matter that plainly required further judicial action of a nonministerial nature” … . Further, plaintiffs’ “request for attorneys’ fees was an integral part of each of the asserted causes of action rather than a separate cause of action of its own,” and therefore that issue cannot be implicitly severed from the other issues … . Thus, the order … does not constitute a ” final order’ ” within the meaning of CPLR 5501 (a) (1) and does not bring up for our review any prior non-final order … . * * *

… [W]e agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and disbursements in his status as a derivative plaintiff acting on the LLC’s behalf and in awarding such fees and disbursements … . “The basis for an award of attorneys’ fees in a shareholders’ derivative suit is to reimburse the plaintiff for expenses incurred on the corporation’s behalf . . . . Those costs should be paid by the corporation, which has benefited from the plaintiff’s efforts and which would have borne the costs had it sued in its own right” … . Thus, plaintiff’s success as a derivative plaintiff is not an acceptable basis for an award of attorneys’ fees and disbursements against defendant individually. Howard v Pooler, 2020 NY Slip Op 03347, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

June 12, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Limited Liability Company Law

DEFENDANT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FAILED TO FILE ITS CURRENT ADDRESS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE SINCE 2011; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ALLEGING IT WAS NOT SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant limited liability company’s motion to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 317 should not have been granted. Defendant had not filed its current address with the Secretary of State since 2011:

Pursuant to CPLR 317, a defaulting defendant who was served with a summons other than by personal delivery may be permitted to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense … . Here, the defendant was not entitled to vacatur of its default pursuant to CPLR 317. The record reflects that, since September 2011, the defendant had not filed, with the Secretary of State, the required biennial form that would have apprised the Secretary of State of its current address (see Limited Liability Company Law § 301[e]), thus raising an inference that the defendant deliberately attempted to avoid notice of actions commenced against it … .

“In contrast to a motion pursuant to CPLR 317, on a motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), the movant is required to establish a reasonable excuse for his or her default” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s failure to keep the Secretary of State apprised of its current address over a significant period of time did not constitute a reasonable excuse … . Bookman v 816 Belmont Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01318, Second Dept 2-26-20

February 26, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Environmental Law, Limited Liability Company Law

MEMBER OF LLC WHICH OWNED A MOBILE HOME PARK IS PERSONALLY LIABLE, PURSUANT TO THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE, FOR AN $800,000 PENALTY IMPOSED FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REQUIRING SEWAGE-TREATMENT MEASURES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Burr, one of two members of a limited liability company, C & J, was properly held personally liable for the violation of an administrative order issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEP). C & J owned a mobile home park and the administrative order concerned the treatment of waste from the park. The penalty was more than $800,000.00:

Under Limited Liability Company Law § 609, a member of a limited liability company is generally not liable for the contractual obligations of the company. The 2008 order on consent, however, is not merely a contractual obligation. It is also an administrative order, the violation of which is subject to statutory enforcement (see ECL 71-1929). This Court has recognized that a responsible corporate officer may be held personally liable for violations of consent orders issued by DEC that implicate public health and safety … . Individual liability may be imposed where the corporate officer has the knowledge of and ability to prevent or remedy a violation that presents a public health hazard … . …

There can be little dispute that Burr was well aware of the ongoing sewage violations at the park, and, as managing member, he held a position of authority to address the problem. … [T]he 2008 consent order, which Burr signed on C & J’s behalf, expressly provided for stipulated penalties in the event that C & J “fail[ed] to strictly and timely comply.” The order further specified that it was binding on C & J and its officers. …

… [W]e conclude that Supreme Court did not err in holding Burr personally liable under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. State of New York v C & J Enters., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 00024, Third Dept 1-2-20

January 2, 2020/by Bruce Freeman