Medicaid Archives - New York Appellate Digest

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S DETERMINATION THE 91-YEAR-OLD PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTINUOUS CARE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Department of Health’s (DOH’s) finding that the 91-year-old petitioner was not entitled to continuous care was not supported by the evidence:

“In reviewing a Medicaid eligibility determination made after a fair hearing, the court must review the record as a whole to determine if the agency’s decisions are supported by substantial evidence and are not affected by an error of law”… . Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … . Here, since the subject determination was made after a quasi-judicial fair hearing, the substantial evidence standard applies, and not the arbitrary and capricious standard … .

The DOH’s determination that the petitioner failed to establish that she met the criteria for continuous personal care services was not supported by substantial evidence (see 18 NYCRR 505.14[a][2]). “Continuous personal care services means the provision of uninterrupted care, by more than one personal care aide, for more than 16 hours in a calendar day for a patient who, because of the patient’s medical condition, needs assistance during such calendar day with toileting, walking, transferring, turning and positioning, or feeding and needs assistance with such frequency that a live-in 24-hour personal care aide would be unlikely to obtain, on a regular basis, five hours daily of uninterrupted sleep during the aide’s eight hour period of sleep” … . Matter of Gurariy v Zucker, 2021 NY Slip Op 04356, Second Dept 7-15-21

July 15, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Contract Law, Medicaid, Municipal Law, Public Health Law, Social Services Law

FUNDS FOR PERSONAL CARE SERVICES ARE MEDICAID FUNDS SUBJECT TO THE AUDIT AND RECOUPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION; APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED (CT APP)..

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined funds paid for personal care were Medicaid funds which were subject to the audit and recoupment authority of the City of New York Human Resources Administration (HRA). The facts are explained in the Appellate Division decision:

For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion below (Matter of People Care Inc. v City of New York, 175 AD3d 134, 147-152 [1st Dept 2020] [Richter, J.P., dissenting]), we conclude that the funds for personal care services paid to petitioner People Care, Inc. under the Health Care Reform Act (Public Health Law §§ 2807-v [1] [bb] [i], [iii]) are Medicaid funds subject to the audit and recoupment authority of the City of New York Human Resources Administration (HRA) in accordance with the parties’ 2001 contract. Matter of People Care Inc. v City of N.Y. Human Resources Admin., 2021 NY Slip Op 01834, CtApp 3-25-21

March 25, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Medicaid

CERTAIN TRANSFERS AND LOANS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CALCULATION FOR THE PERIOD OF MEDICAID INELIGIBILITY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) the NYS Department of Health (DOH), determined several transfers and loans made before petitioner was diagnosed with Parkinson’s in 2016 should not have been included in the calculation for the period of Medicaid ineligibility. The facts are too complex to summarize here:

… “T]he relevant standard is not whether [petitioner] could or should have foreseen that nursing home placement might eventually become necessary, but whether she made the requisite showing that the transfers were made ‘exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance’ (Social Services Law § 366 [5] [e] [4] [iii] [B]). The fact that a future need for nursing home care may be foreseeable for a person of advanced age with chronic medical conditions is not dispositive of the question whether a transfer by such a person was made for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance” … . Matter of Underwood v Zucker, 2021 NY Slip Op 00951, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

February 11, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Medicaid

A CORPORATION OPERATING A SKILLED NURSING FACILITY MAY BRING A PLENARY ACTION BASED UPON THE DENIAL OF MEDICAID BENEFITS FOR ONE OF ITS RESIDENTS; NO NEED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the corporation that operates a skilled nursing facility may bring a plenary action based on the denial of Medicaid benefits for one of its residents:

Plaintiff, a domestic corporation that operates a skilled nursing facility, commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment or money damages for expenses it allegedly incurred in providing care for one of its residents after the resident was determined to be ineligible for Medicaid benefits during a penalty period of 11.74 months. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that the statute of limitations had expired … .

… [A]skilled nursing facility such as plaintiff “may bring a plenary action in its own right against the agency designated to declare Medicaid eligibility” … . In such a plenary action, the facility is “not bound by the patient’s failure to request an administrative appeal of the local agency’s denial of medical assistance” or “by the four-month Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 217” … . VDRNC, LLC v Merrick, 2021 NY Slip Op 00945, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

February 11, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Fraud, Medicaid

ALTHOUGH THE TWO INDICTMENTS ALLEGED THE SAME MODUS OPERANDI FOR MEDICAID FRAUD, THE CHARGES INVOLVED DIFFERENT PARTIES AND TIME PERIODS; THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION SEEKING TO PRECLUDE PROSECUTION ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS DENIED OVER A DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, denied the writ of prohibition seeking to preclude a second prosecution for Medicaid fraud on double jeopardy grounds. Although the alleged scheme to defraud was the same, the two indictments involved different parties and different time periods:

In essence, the wrongdoing charged in each indictment is the filing of fraudulent Medicaid reimbursement claims and related misconduct, such as payment of kickbacks. However, the indictments charge different specific criminal acts, which were perpetrated on different dates and over different time periods. Moreover, the indictments do not allege fraudulent billing of any of the same managed care organizations. While it appears that the different fraudulent acts charged in the two indictments had a similar modus operandi and were part of a common plan, this alone does not suffice to render them part of the same “criminal transaction” under CPL 40.10(2)(b) … . Matter of Dieffenbacher v Jackson, 2020 NY Slip Op 08015, First Dept 12-29-20

December 29, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Arbitration, Employment Law, Medicaid, Public Health Law

THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD, REINSTATING NURSING HOME EMPLOYEES WHO WERE FIRED AND INDICTED FOR ALLEGEDLY IGNORING A RESIDENT IN RESPIRATORY DISTRESS, VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitrator’s award, reinstating the employees to their former positions as care providers at a nursing home, violated public policy. The employees were fired and indicted for allegedly ignoring an alarm indicating a resident on a ventilator was in distress:

… [T]he record reflects that after the employees were indicted, inter alia, on felony charges, OMIG [Office of Medicaid Inspector General] notified the employees that they were excluded “from participation in the New York State Medicaid program based on New York State regulations authorizing the immediate exclusion of a person who has been charged with committing an act which would be a felony under the laws of New York and which relates to or results from,” among other things, “the furnishing of or billing for medical care, services or supplies.” Pursuant to 18 NYCRR 515.5(c), “[a] person who is excluded from the program cannot be involved in any activity relating to furnishing medical care, services or supplies to recipients of medical assistance for which claims are submitted to the program, or relating to claiming or receiving payment for medical care, services or supplies during the period.” The regulations also preclude reimbursement for medical care, services, or supplies provided by an excluded person (see 18 NYCRR 515.5[b]), and the Department of Health’s published Medicaid Update instructs Medicaid providers “to ensure that they do not employ, or are affiliated with, any individual who has been excluded from either the Medicare or the Medicaid program” … . There is no evidence in the record that the exclusion was vacated. Therefore, the final result of the arbitrator’s award, reinstating the employees to their former positions, creates an explicit conflict with the subject regulations and their attendant policy concerns … . Civil Serv. Employees Assn., A.F.S.C.M.E. Local 1000, A.F.L.-C.I.O. by its Local 830 v Nassau Healthcare Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 06777, Second Dept 11-18-20

November 18, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Evidence, Medicaid

A CRUCIAL DOCUMENT SUBMITTED TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF A MEDICAID LIEN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS A BUSINESS RECORD; THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY AN EMPLOYEE FAMILIAR WITH THE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE ENTITY WHICH PROVIDED THE DATA COLLECTED IN THE DOCUMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a crucial document needed to determine the amount of a Medicaid lien should not have been admitted as a business record pursuant to CPLR 4518 and 2307. The Department of Social Services (DSS) introduced a State Department of Health (SDOH) document, a claim detail report (CDR), which collected data provided by another entity (CSRA), but the certification was not by a person familiar with the business and record-keeping practices of CSRA:

DSS sought to lay the requisite foundation for admission of the CDR as a business record by way of the certification of an SDOH employee (see CPLR 2307, 4518 [c]). The certification stated, in relevant part, “that the annexed [CDR] is a true and accurate copy of the original [CDR], which was generated from data contained in the Adjudicated Claim File. The Adjudicated Claim File, a comprehensive computer data file, is created, maintained and transported in the form of magnetic media to the [SDOH] by CSRA, Inc. [(CSRA)], a fiscal intermediary which contracts with the [SDOH].” Thus, the certification clearly states that the data sought to be admitted in evidence via the CDR was “created” and “maintained” by CSRA, a third-party entity. The SDOH employee who certified the CDR did not, however, work for CSRA, i.e., the entrant of the information upon which the CDR is based. Further, although the certification stated that the CDR was “produced” in the regular course of SDOH’s business and that the data entries were “transported” to SDOH “at or about the time that such data [was] received and incorporated into the Adjudicated Claim File,” the SDOH employee did not establish that CSRA, as “entrant[,] was under a business duty to obtain and record the” data reflected in the Adjudicated Claim File … , or that he was familiar with the record-keeping practices of CSRA and that SDOH generally relied upon CSRA’s records … . At best, the certification demonstrated only that SDOH filed and retained the data created and maintained by CSRA, which fails to establish the requisite foundation … . Matter of Joseph M.W. (Blake), 2020 NY Slip Op 06583, Fourth Dept 11-13-20

November 13, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Medicaid, Social Services Law

SERVICES PROVIDED TO A DISABLED MAN BY THE NYS OFFICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES COULD NOT BE CURTAILED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the NYS Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) was properly prohibited from curtailing services to and disabled man, M,D., because of a lack of funds:

Even if the catch-all of “any other relevant considerations advanced by the parties” (OPWDD Policy and Procedures, Topic No. CP-10 [Rev (Feb. 1995)], at 4, ¶ 10) includes a provider agency’s financial difficulties connected to the provision of services to an individual, the Hearing Officer noted that petitioner “may well have valid fiscal concerns,” but concluded that it would not be proper or in M.D.’s best interest to discharge him on the basis of a lack of funding. We acknowledge the conundrum raised by petitioner — that providers face a difficulty in providing excellent services to a population with special needs but with no avenue of relief to help them financially when those services are more expensive than expected or than the maximum allowed under the HCBS [Home Community Based Services] waiver program. While we applaud providers such as petitioner for striving to provide excellent services to an underserved population, and are cognizant of their frustration when they deem the funding available for such services to be inadequate, the remedy must be for the service providers to apply to or lobby the relevant agencies, the Legislature or the Governor to provide more funding; the answer cannot be that administrative agencies or courts should allow service providers to simply discharge individuals with developmental disabilities from their services whenever the providers deem them too expensive. Based on consideration of the relevant factors, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s determination that it was not reasonable to allow petitioner to discharge M.D. from its program. Matter of Community, Work, & Independence, Inc. v New York State Off. for People with Dev. Disabilities, 2020 NY Slip Op 02301, Third Dept 4-16-20

April 16, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Education-School Law, Medicaid, Mental Hygiene Law, Social Services Law

NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR A DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILD HOUSED FOR MORE THAN FIVE WEEKS IN A HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM BECAUSE NO APPROPRIATE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY WAS AVAILABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, considering the appeal under an exception to the mootness doctrine, determined a 16-year-old developmentally disabled child (Olivia) did not have a private right of action against Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital (CVPH), the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) or the Department of Health (DOH) for housing her in the CVPH emergency room when no appropriate residential facility was available. The opinion is too comprehensive and covers too many substantive issues to be fairly summarized here:

In 2018, Olivia CC. (hereinafter the child), a minor with complex developmental disabilities, was stranded in the emergency room of respondent Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital (hereinafter CVPH) for more than five weeks while she waited for a residential school placement. The child was not in need of medical or psychiatric care. However, neither her family nor the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (hereinafter OPWDD) — the agency legislatively charged with protecting the welfare of persons with developmental disabilities — could provide her with safe interim housing. CVPH thus retained the child in the emergency room, where she could not attend school, participate in community activities or go outdoors, and CVPH was forced to use scarce medical resources to provide for her nonmedical needs. Unfortunately, the child is not the first minor with special needs to be marooned for weeks or months in an emergency room, as hospitals find themselves serving as the last resort for providing shelter to children in crisis … . The difficult legal issues presented here call into question the extent of the responsibilities of the legislative and administrative functions of government to some of our society’s most vulnerable members, and the limitations on the power of courts to protect them. * * *

Our conclusion that the amended petition/complaint provides this Court with no grounds to intervene in respondents’ operations should not be misunderstood as condonation of the child’s prolonged and unnecessary hospitalization or of respondents’ failure to provide her with appropriate assistance. Nevertheless, this record does not permit a determination of the propriety of constitutional or equitable relief, and relief grounded in the statutory provisions relied upon here must come from the Legislature or from respondents’ policy choices. Thus, we will not disturb Supreme Court’s judgment. Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Delaney, 2019 NY Slip Op 06119, Third Dept 8-8-19

August 8, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Contract Law, Medicaid, Municipal Law, Public Health Law, Social Services Law

THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RECOVER MEDICAID OVERPAYMENTS FROM PERSONAL CARE SERVICE PROVIDERS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kahn. over a two-justice dissent, determined that The City of New York Human Resources Administration Department of Social Services (HRA) does not have the authority to audit and recover overpayments of funds provided pursuant to the Health Care Reform Act (HCRA) from personal care service providers such as petitioner People Care Incorporated d/b/a Assisted Care:

The determinative issue on this appeal is not whether the HCRA funds were denominated as “Medicaid rates of payment” or “Medicaid rate adjustments” in the statute and the MOU [memorandum of understanding]. Rather, the issue presented here is whether, under the terms of the 2001 contract, Public Health Law § 2807-v(1)(bb)(i) and the MOU superseded the provisions of that contract as to the auditing and recoupment of HCRA funds. * * *

… [N]either Public Health Law § 2807-v(1)(bb), as the governing statute, nor the MOU between DOH [NYS Department of Health] and HRA, entered into pursuant to that statute, contains any language delegating DOH’s auditing and recoupment authority to HRA or any other agency. Matter of People Care Inc. v City of New York Human Resources Admin., 2019 NY Slip Op 05756, First Dep 7-23-19

July 23, 2019/by Bruce Freeman