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PETITIONER CARE FACILITY WAS ENTITLED TO THE UNDERLYING DATA USED BY THE OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES TO CALCULATE MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT RATES; MATTER REMITTED FOR RECALCULATION WITH AN EXPLANATION OF THE FACTORS CONSIDERED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities, determined petitioner care facility was entitled to the underlying data used by the respondent to calculate the Medicaid reimbursement rate:

… [P]etitioner contends that the acuity factor utilized by respondents in calculating its rate determination is not transparent or verifiable, and that respondents’ refusal to disclose the data necessary to identify the factors in the regression analysis render the rate determination arbitrary and capricious. We agree. * * * The statutes demand empirical data in order to confirm the mathematical validity of the formula produced by the regression analysis in determining these rates, not simply blind reliance on an unknowable formula … .

Moreover, respondents’ wholehearted reliance on the consultant’s regression analysis, without confirmation of empirical data supporting the analysis, is inconsistent with the statutory scheme pertaining to state and federal statutes which require that the methodologies underlying the establishment of the rates and the justification for the rates be provided to petitioner (see 42 USC § 1396a [a] [13] [A]; Public Health Law § 2807 [3]). * * *

[R]espondents are directed to recalculate petitioner’s 2017-2018 and 2020-2021 reimbursement rates with appropriate explanation of the factors considered. Matter of Richmond Children’s Ctr., Inc. v Delaney, 2024 NY Slip Op 06406, Third Dept 12-19-24

Practice Point: Care facilities paid by Medicaid through the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities are entitled to an explanation of the factors considered in calculating the Medicaid reimbursement rate.

 

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THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S (DOH’S) UPDATED GUIDELINES WHICH PROHIBIT PHYSCIANS WHO TREAT CANCER PATIENTS FROM DISPENSING MEDICATIONS WHICH ADDRESS THE SIDE EFFECTS OF CANCER TREATMENTS ARE “IRRATIONAL” (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined the NYS Department of Health’s (DOH’s) definition of “oncological protocol” was irrational. The petitioner provides physician-care to cancer patients, including Medicaid recipients. Physicians who provide care to cancer patients can dispense medications (72-hour supplies) pursuant to the DOH’s “oncological protocol.” In the past, petitioner was dispensing medications which addressed the side effects of cancer treatments, including nausea, pain, vitamins, antibiotics and antipsychotics. Under the 2021 update to the DOH’s guidelines, the oncological protocol no longer covered medications which address the side effects of cancer treatments. That update was deemed “irrational” by the Third Department:

The record before us is replete with evidence of industry guidelines and authoritative medical literature strongly suggesting that respondents’ definition may inhibit the provision of adequate healthcare to oncology patients. This includes evidence of the need for ancillary or concomitant administration of medications presumably excluded from the definition in order to enhance the effects of cancer treatments and/or prevent fatal complications arising therefrom. That evidence also clearly contemplates supportive care medications being administered as part of cancer treatment regimens in order to address the often debilitating side effects of such treatment. Given the complete absence of any medical basis for the line drawn here, and guided by the Legislature’s intent to ensure that its general prohibition against prescriber-dispensing did not unreasonably impede the provision of adequate healthcare services in the context of oncology, we cannot find that the definition of oncological protocol before us is rational. Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health, 2024 NY Slip Op 05165, Third Dept 10-17-24

Practice Point: Here the Third Department deemed the Department of Health’s guideline which prohibited physicians who treat cancer patients from dispensing medications which address the side effects of cancer treatments “irrational” and therefore unenforceable.

 

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A NURSING HOME CAN BRING A PLENARY ACTION SOUNDING IN BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST THE AGENCY WHICH DENIED MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR A RESIDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff nursing home (Kings Harbor) properly brought a plenary action against the agency which denied Medicaid coverage for a resident. Plaintiff’s remedy was not limited to bringing an Article 78 proceeding on behalf of the resident. The action against the agency properly sounded in breach of contract:

“It is well established that a nursing home may, as here, bring a plenary action in its own right against the agency designated to determine Medicaid eligibility” … . The plaintiff’s “private financial interest in recovering expenditures rendered creates a relationship of purchaser and seller, thereby permitting it to bring a plenary action in its own right against the governmental agency designated to declare eligibility” … .

Furthermore, the plaintiff is not bound by the resident’s failure to exercise his separate right to an administrative appeal of the denial of Medicaid benefits … . Thus, the authorizations executed by the resident allowing the plaintiff to represent him “in all matters pertaining to [his] Medicaid Assistance application and follow up activities” did not impair the plaintiff’s right to commence its own plenary action independent from the pursuit of administrative review … .

“[I]nasmuch as [the] plaintiff was not bound by the administrative determination denying the [resident’s] application for medical assistance, and has commenced a plenary action in its own right, [the] plaintiff is not bound by the four-month Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 217” … . * * *

… [T]he purchaser/seller relationship between a nursing home provider and the governmental agency designated to declare Medicaid eligibility is construed as a contractual relationship, the alleged breach of which gives rise to a breach of contract cause of action … . Kings Harbor Multicare Ctr. v Townes, 2024 NY Slip Op 05093, Second Dept 10-16-24

Practice Point: An action by a nursing home against the agency which denied Medicaid coverage for a resident sounds in breach of contract and is properly brought as a plenary action, not as an Article 78 proceeding.

 

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FOR-PROFIT NURSING HOMES’ CHALLENGE TO ADJUSTED MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT RATES REJECTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, rejected petitioner for-profit nursing homes’ challenges to the adjusted Medicaid reimbursement rates which were to be implemented as of April 1, 2020:

… [W]e reject petitioners’ challenges to adjusted Medicaid reimbursement rates issued to comply with amended Public Health Law (“PHL”) § 2808 (20) (d), which mandates the elimination of one component from the computation formula used to set rates of for-profit residential health care facilities, on or after April 1, 2020. The amendment and the adjusted rates do not result in a retroactive effect and petitioners failed to establish that the rates are not “reasonable and adequate to meet costs” under PHL § 2807 (3) or that the rates violate their equal protection rights. We hold that respondents may implement the recalculated rates for services provided as of April 2, 2020 … . * * *

Petitioners, 116 for-profit nursing homes, filed this hybrid declaratory judgment and article 78 proceeding against State respondents—the Department [of Health] and its Commissioner and the Director of the Budget—challenging the Department’s implementation of the recalculated rates without the residual equity reimbursement factor. Simultaneously, petitioners moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from enforcing the equity elimination clause. Supreme Court granted petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the clause pending a final determination of the proceeding. Matter of Aaron Manor Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., LLC v Zucker, 2024 NY Slip Op 02126, CtApp 4-23-24

Practice Point: The procedures and criteria for challenges to Medicaid reimbursement rates for for-profit nursing homes explained in depth.

 

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PETITIONERS, RESIDENTIAL HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, SOUGHT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS PURSUANT TO CPLR ARTICLE 78 COMPELLING THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH TO HEAR RATE APPEALS WHICH CHALLENGE MEDICAID RATE PAYMENTS; BECAUSE THE REQUESTED RELIEF REQUIRED THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MANDAMUS RELIEF WAS NOT AVAILABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Reynolds Fitzgerald, determined that petitioners, 23 residential health care facilities which participate in the federal and state Medicaid programs administered by the NYS Department of Health, did not meet the criteria for mandamus relief pursuant to CPLR Article 78. Petitioner sought to compel the respondent to hear rate appeals which challenge payment rates:

… [I]t is axiomatic that “[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances. Such remedy will lie only to enforce a clear legal right where the public official has failed to perform a duty enjoined by law. While mandamus to compel is an appropriate remedy to enforce the performance of a ministerial duty, it is well settled that it will not be awarded to compel an act in respect to which a public officer may exercise judgment or discretion” … . “A discretionary act involves the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result” … .

To be entitled to such relief, petitioners must establish both a clear legal right to the relief demanded and a corresponding nondiscretionary duty — both are equally necessary for mandamus to lie. Petitioners, relying on Klostermann v Cuomo (61 NY2d 525 [1984]), contend that respondent’s duty to process rate appeals is clear and that respondent is mandated to process the appeals even if the statutory cap prevents respondent from paying the amount due. However, even if we agree with petitioners that respondent has a duty to process appeals, the determination of whether something has taken place within a reasonable time necessarily “involves a discretionary determination” … and thus precludes mandamus relief. Matter of Woodside Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v Zucker, 2024 NY Slip Op 00211, Third Dept 1-18-24

Practice Point: Only ministerial acts can be compelled by a writ of mandamus pursuant to CPLR Article 78. If, as here, the requested relief requires the exercise of discretion, mandamus is not available.

 

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DECEDENT’S SON’S ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES RE: MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT FOR DECEDENT’S NURSING-HOME CARE WAS CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE; NO NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS REQUIRED; THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF FATHER’S ASSETS TO SON FOR LESS THAN MARKET VALUE WAS FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN MEDICAID PLANNING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined no notice of claim was required for decedent’s son’s action against the Rensselaer County Commissioner of Social Services and there was a question of fact whether the transfer of decedent’s assets to decedent’s son was in anticipation of nursing home costs. The action against the county sounded in contract, not tort, and therefore there was no “notice of claim” requirement. It was not clear whether decedent’s need for nursing-home care was anticipated and whether there were reasons for the transfer of assets at less than market value unrelated to Medicaid planning. The county was seeking $178,084,47 for decedent’s nursing-home care, the alleged fair market value of the assets transferred to decedent’s son during the 60-month Medicaid look-back period:

… County Law § 52 — indisputably still rooted in tort-like claims — does not extend so far as to encompass claims that are contractual in nature … . * * *

Mindful that this is a plenary action, rather than a proceeding in which our review of an administrative determination is circumscribed, the Commissioner’s own submissions raise material issues of fact as to whether the subject transfers, or some portion thereof, were exclusively for a purpose other than Medicaid planning, necessitating denial of her motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers … . RSRNC, LLC v Wilson, 2023 NY Slip Op 05432, Third Dept 10-26-23

Practice Point: Actions against a county which are based in contract, not tort, do not trigger the notice-of-claim requirement.

Practice Point: Transfers of assets for less than market value are not necessarily subject to the 60-month look-back for Medicaid nursing-home-costs reimbursement. Here there were questions of fact whether nursing-home care was anticipated at the time of the transfer and whether the transfer was made for legitimate purposes unrelated to Medicaid planning.

 

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NONPUBLIC RESIDENTIAL HEALTH CARE FACILITIES NEED PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW EQUITY OR TRANSFER ASSETS IN EXCESS OF 3% OF THE FACILITIES’ REVENUE; CORPORATE OWNERS NEED NOT INCLUDE FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAXES IN THE 3% CALCULATION; FACILITIES OWNED BY PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES (I.E., LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES) MUST INCLUDE FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAXES IN THE 3% CALCULATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in two full-fledged opinions by Justice Lynch, determined that nonpublic residential health care facilities owned by pass-through entities (i.e., a limited liability company, S corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship) must include federal and state income taxes in the calculation of equity withdrawals. Public Health Law 2808 (5) prohibits the withdrawal of equity or transfer of assets in excess of 3% of the facility’s total revenue without prior written approval of the Commissioner of Health. If the residential health care facility is owned by a corporation, federal and state income taxes are not included in the 3% calculation:

Public Health Law § 2808 (5) (c) responds to the Legislature’s concern that a facility’s improvident withdrawal of substantial assets would compromise the facility’s operation and “occasion irreparable harm within an especially fragile and dependent resident population” … . Given this context, “[w]ithdrawals for facility purposes”  are necessarily those that concern a facility’s own financial obligations and expenses … . … . Petitioners do not dispute that, for a pass-through entity, income tax liability is borne by the owner, not the facility. Thus, given the regulatory scheme, income tax payments by such an entity would necessarily be equity withdrawals or asset transfers satisfying the obligation of the owner, not the facility … . In other words, even though such withdrawals are for tax payments, they are not “[w]ithdrawals for facility purposes” … . Matter of Brightonian Nursing Home, Inc. v Zucker, 2023 NY Slip Op 00008, Third Dept 1-5-23

Practice Point: Unlike nonpublic health care facilities owned by corporations, nonpublic health care facilities owned by pass-through entities (i.e., a limited liability company, S corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship) must include federal and state income taxes in their calculation of withdrawals from equity. Withdrawal of equity or transfer of assets in excess of 3% of revenue requires the permission of the Commissioner of Health pursuant to Public Health Law 2802 (5).

 

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PLAINTIFF NURSING HOME CAN BRING A PLENARY ACTION TO DETERMINE A RESIDENT’S MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY WITHOUT BEING BOUND BY THE RESIDENT’S FAILURE TO REQUEST AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OR THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, held plaintiff nursing home can bring a plenary action in its own right to determined the Medicaid eligibility of a resident. The nursing home is not bound by the resident’s failure to request an administrative appeal and is not constrained the the four-month statute of limitations in CPLR 217:

The plaintiff, an operator of a nursing home facility, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring that one of its residents was entitled to Medicaid coverage for the period February 7, 2013, through August 31, 2014, with an appropriate transfer penalty. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the statute of limitations had expired, and the plaintiff failed to join a necessary party. In an order dated November 26, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals.

The Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. “It is well established that a nursing home may, as here, bring a plenary action in its own right against the agency designated to determine Medicaid eligibility” … . In such a plenary action, the nursing home is “not bound by the patient’s failure to request an administrative appeal of the local agency’s denial of medical assistance” or “by the four-month Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 217” … . Moreover, authorizations executed by the resident allowing designated employees of the plaintiff to represent him “during the Medicaid eligibility process” and during “any Fair Hearings” did not impair the plaintiff’s right to commence its own plenary action … . Kings Harbor Multicare Ctr. v Pierre, 2022 NY Slip Op 06920, Second Dept 12-7-22

Practice Point: A nursing home can bring a plenary action in its own right to determine the Medicaid eligibility of its resident without regard for whether the resident pursued an administrative appeal and is not constrained by the four-month statute of limitations in CPLR 217.

 

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THE $40,000 PAID BY DECEDENT TO HER CAREGIVERS SHORTLY BEFORE DECEDENT ENTERED A NURSING HOME WAS PAYMENT FOR PAST SERVICES RENDERED PURSUANT TO A PERSONAL SERVICE AGREEMENT (PSA); IT WAS NOT AN “UNCOMPENSATED TRANSFER” SUBJECT TO THE 60-MONTH LOOKBACK FOR MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the $40,000 paid to decedent’s caregivers shortly before decedent entered a nursing home was pursuant to a valid personal service agreement (PSA) for past services rendered. Therefore the payment was not an “uncompensated transfer” to which the Medicaid 60-month lookback applied:

“In determining the medical assistance eligibility of an institutionalized individual, any transfer of an asset by the individual . . . for less than fair market value made within or after the look-back period shall render the individual ineligible for nursing facility services” for a certain penalty period (Social Services Law § 366 [5] [d] [3]). The look-back period is the “[60]-month period[] immediately preceding the date that an [applicant] is both institutionalized and has applied for medical assistance” … . When such a transfer has occurred, a presumption arises that the transfer “was motivated, in part if not in whole, by . . . anticipation of a future need to qualify for medical assistance,” and it is the applicant’s burden to establish his or her eligibility for Medicaid by rebutting the presumption … . As pertinent here, “an applicant may do so by demonstrating that he or she intended to receive fair consideration for the transfers or that the transfers were made exclusively for purposes other than qualifying for Medicaid” … .

Here, petitioner submitted documentary proof of the PSA, which was entered into in 2015, more than three years before decedent entered the nursing home. As noted above, while the PSA contemplated monthly payments for the personal care services, it also contemplated that decedent may make payments in advance. In addition, petitioner submitted bank statements demonstrating that decedent did not have money to pay for the services until after she received cash value for the insurance policies. Petitioner also submitted a monthly calendar that documented the care provided to decedent during the relevant time period. While the calendar did not provide the number of hours spent on each task, “a daily log of hours worked and services rendered is not necessarily required” … . Matter of Boldt v New York State Off. of Temporary & Disability Assistance, 2022 NY Slip Op 06344, Fourth Dept 11-10-22

Practice Point: Here decedent entered a personal care agreement (PSA) in which she agreed to pay her caregivers $2500 per month. Shortly before decedent was admitted to a nursing home she paid $40,000 to the caregivers. It was demonstrated that the $40,000 was for past care rendered pursuant to the PSA. The $40,000 payment, therefore, was not an “uncompensated transfer” subject to the 60-month lookback for Medicaid eligibility.

 

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NURSING HOME REFORM ACT (NHRA), THE ADMISSION AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE NURSING-HOME RESIDENT’S GRANDDAUGHTER DID NOT IMPOSE PERSONAL LIABILITY UPON THE GRANDDAUGHTER FOR PAYMENT OF THE COSTS OF THE RESIDENT’S CARE; THE GRANDDAUGHTER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND THE BREACH-OF-CONTRACT COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the admission agreement signed by the nursing-home resident’s granddaughter (who was appointed guardian of her grandfather’s property) did not impose personal liability upon the granddaughter for payment of the cost of her resident’s care (provided by the plaintiff facility). Therefore, plaintiff should not have seized the granddaughter’s personal funds. The default judgment in favor of plaintiff should have been vacated, and the breach-of-contract complaint should have been dismissed:

… [t]he admission agreement in this case is subject to the Nursing Home Reform Act (hereinafter the NHRA). As relevant here, the NHRA provides that “[w]ith respect to admissions practices, a nursing facility must . . . not require a third party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission (or expedited admission) to, or continued stay in, the facility” … . However, that prohibition “shall not be construed as preventing a facility from requiring an individual, who has legal access to a resident’s income or resources available to pay for care in the facility, to sign a contract (without incurring personal financial liability) to provide payment from the resident’s income or resources for such care” … .

The admissions agreement set forth the relevant contractual obligations of the granddaughter, and the admissions agreement demonstrates as a matter of law that it did not render the granddaughter a “third party guarantee of payment” … .”The admission[s] agreement merely required the [granddaughter] to facilitate payment from the . . . resident’s available income and resources, and only to the extent that the [granddaughter] had access to such income and resources and only if [the granddaughter] could do so without incurring any personal financial liability” … . …

.. [T]he plaintiff failed to adequately allege a breach of the granddaughter’s contractual obligation to facilitate payment to the plaintiff from the resident’s “income or resources” … . Nassau Operating Co., LLC v DeSimone, 2022 NY Slip Op 04029, Second Dept 6-22-22

Practice Point: The Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) prohibits holding a third-party who signs an admission agreement personally liable for the costs of a resident’s care. The agreement may only obligate the third party to pay the costs from the resident’s assets (over which the third party exercises control).

 

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