New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THE BANK MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WHICH REQUIRES PROOF PAPERS WERE FILED WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS OF MAILING THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF DEFAULT; HERE THERE WAS NO PROOF WHEN THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE WAS MAILED, SO THE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment dismissing an affirmative defense (alleging failure to comply with RPAPL 1306) should not have been granted to the plaintiff in this foreclosure action. Because there was no proof of when the notice of default required by RPAPL 1304 was mailed, proof that plaintiff had filed papers with the superintendent of financial services pursuant to RPAPL 1306 was insufficient. RPAPL 1306 requires filing within three business days of mailing the RPAPL 1304 notice. But the date of mailing was not proven:

… [I]n the absence of evidence establishing when the plaintiff mailed the notices required by RPAPL 1304, the plaintiff could not establish, as a matter of law, that it complied with the requirement of RPAPL 1306 to file with the superintendent of financial services within three business days of the mailing of the notice required by RPAPL 1304. Thus, the court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing so much of the defendant’s fifth affirmative defense as alleged a failure to comply with RPAPL 1306…. . PROF-2013-S3 Legal Title Trust V v Johnson, 2023 NY Slip Op 01204, Second Dept 3-8-23

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, if there is no proof when the RPAPL 1304 notice of default was mailed, the bank can’t prove the papers filed pursuant to RPAPL 1306 were filed within three business days of mailing the RPAPL 1304 notice (which is a requirement of strict compliance with RPAPL 1306).

 

March 8, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-08 11:03:542023-03-12 11:35:11IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THE BANK MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WHICH REQUIRES PROOF PAPERS WERE FILED WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS OF MAILING THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF DEFAULT; HERE THERE WAS NO PROOF WHEN THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE WAS MAILED, SO THE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).
Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Real Property Law

AN ALBANY LOCAL LAW ADDED RESTRICTIONS TO EVICTION PROCEEDINGS AND RENT INCREASES WHICH ARE NOT IN THE STATE’S REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW AND REAL PROPERTY LAW; THE LOCAL LAW WAS THEREFORE PREEMPTED BY THE STATE LAW (CONFLICT PREEMPTION) (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined the Albany Local Law governing evictions conflicted with the state Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law and Real Property Law and was therefore preempted by state law. The entire Local Law F section 2 was nullified. Local Law F section 2 added sections 30-324 through 30-331 to the Code of the City of Albany:

We agree with Supreme Court that Local Law F § 2 is preempted by state law. To that end, the Code of the City of Albany § 30-327 requires a landlord seeking to evict a tenant to prove the additional element of “good cause,” which grounds are enumerated in the Code of the City of Albany § 30-328. This additional element contravenes the statutory construction of RPAPL 711, which permits a landlord to seek eviction following the expiration of a tenant’s lease or following a tenant’s default on rent. By adding an element, the Code of the City of Albany §§ 30-327 and 30-328 “prohibit[ ] conduct specifically permitted by State law or impose[ ] restrictions on rights granted by the State”… . Similarly, the Code of the City of Albany §§ 30-327 and 30-328 contradict Real Property Law § 228, as they require a landlord seeking to evict a tenant at will or by sufferance who has provided 30 days’ notice to also establish good cause for the eviction. Further, the Code of the City of Albany § 30-328 interferes with a landlord’s right to increase rent in compliance with Real Property Law § 226-c, as it imposes the additional requirement that a landlord must rebut a presumption that a rent increase of 5% or more is unconscionable. Therefore, despite defendants’ good intentions, the Code of the City of Albany §§ 30-327 and 30-328 impose restrictions on rights granted to landlords by state law and, thus, Supreme Court properly declared those provisions nullified by conflict preemption … . Pusatere v City of Albany, 2023 NY Slip Op 01124, Third Dept 3-2-23

Practice Point: Here an Albany Local Law added restrictions to eviction proceedings and rent increases which are not in the state’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law and Real Property Law. The Local Law was therefore preempted by the state law (conflict preemption). Ultimately the entire Local Law was nullified.

 

March 1, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-01 13:21:192023-03-05 13:46:56AN ALBANY LOCAL LAW ADDED RESTRICTIONS TO EVICTION PROCEEDINGS AND RENT INCREASES WHICH ARE NOT IN THE STATE’S REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW AND REAL PROPERTY LAW; THE LOCAL LAW WAS THEREFORE PREEMPTED BY THE STATE LAW (CONFLICT PREEMPTION) (THIRD DEPT). ​
Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING THE RPAPL 1304 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE RPAPL 1304 AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (CT APP) ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the appellate division, determined the inclusion of additional information in the envelope with the 90-day foreclosure notice required by RPAPL 1304 does not violate the statute and therefore is not a basis for summary judgment in favor of a defendant in a foreclosure action:

The operative statutory language here contains two requirements: (1) the notice “shall include” the specified language and information; and (2) the notice must be sent “in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice” … . As to the first requirement, subdivision (1) does not say that the notice must state only the cautionary language set forth in the statute, but rather that the notice “shall include” that language. Where the “natural signification of the words employed” “ha[s] a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning” Here, the notice indisputably contains all of the mandatory language set forth in the version of section 1304 (1) in effect at the time Bank of America commenced this action. The statute says that the notice “shall include” certain information; the notice here does so.

The question then is the constraint imposed by the requirement that the envelope not contain “any other mailing or notice.” The bright line rule adopted by the lower courts effectively defines “any other mailing or notice” as “any additional material or information whatsoever.” Although it might be possible to read “other notice” as the lower courts did—such that any deviation from the statutory language, however minor, would void the notice—that interpretation would stand in great tension with “shall include,” a phrase that contemplates the addition of something else. The statute must be given “a sensible and practical over-all construction, which . . . harmonizes all its interlocking provisions” … . Application of a bright line rule here would require the use of a highly constrained definition of “other,” where it is more appropriately read to mean mailings or notices “of a different kind.” Here, “other mailing or notice” more aptly refers other kinds of notices, such as pre-acceleration default notices, notices disclosing interest rate changes to borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages … . Bank of Am., N.A. v Kessler, 2023 NY Slip Op 00804, CtApp 2-14-23

Practice Point: The inclusion of additional information in the same envelope with the RPAPL 1304 90-day foreclosure notice does not violate RPAPL 1304 and is no longer a basis for awarding summary judgment to a defendant in a foreclosure action.

 

February 14, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-14 13:10:152023-02-18 13:51:50THE INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING THE RPAPL 1304 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE RPAPL 1304 AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (CT APP) ​
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Uniform Commercial Code

THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF STANDING OR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate standing or compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

“[A] plaintiff may demonstrate its standing in a foreclosure action through proof that it was in possession of the subject note endorsed in blank, or the subject note and a firmly affixed allonge endorsed in blank, at the time of commencement of the action” … . Although the plaintiff attached to the complaint copies of the note and a chain of purported allonges ending with an undated purported allonge endorsed in blank, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the purported allonges, which were on pieces of paper completely separate from the note, were “so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof,” as required by UCC 3-202(2) … . …

Johnson’s [the foreclosure specialist’s] affidavit did not establish proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed …  Further, Johnson’s affidavit failed to address the nature of Fay’s [plaintiff’s loan servicer’s] relationship with LenderLive [third-party vendor which sent the RPAPL 1304 notice] and whether LenderLive’s records were incorporated into Fay’s own records or routinely relied upon in its business … . Thus, Johnson’s affidavit failed to lay a foundation for admission of the transaction report generated by LenderLive (see CPLR 4518[a] …). Finally, the tracking numbers on the copies of the 90-day notices submitted by the plaintiff, standing alone, did not suffice to establish, prima facie, proper mailing under RPAPL 1304 …) . US Bank N.A. v Okoye-Oyibo, 2023 NY Slip Op 00457, Second Dept 2-1-23

Practice Point: Here there was no evidence the allonge was firmly attached to the note; therefore the bank’s standing to bring the foreclosure action was not demonstrated.

Practice Point: The bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304.

 

February 1, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-01 09:35:332023-02-05 10:07:11THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF STANDING OR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS MAILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULDN’T HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate the notice of foreclosure was mailed in accordance with the requirements of RPAPL 1304:

… [T]he plaintiff relied on the affidavit of Brown, an employee of Nationstar, the plaintiff’s loan servicer, who stated that the plaintiff had mailed the RPAPL 1304 notice in accordance with the plaintiff’s practices and procedures. However, Brown then stated that her conclusion was based on her review of Nationstar’s file, and on Nationstar’s mailing practices and procedures. Thus, Brown’s affidavit failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to who actually mailed the RPAPL 1304 notice, and the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with RPAPL 1304 … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Matsuoka, 2023 NY Slip Op 00230, Second Dept 1-18-23

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, if the bank doesn’t prove who mailed the notice of foreclosure as required by RPAPL 1304 the bank’s motion for summary judgment should not be granted.

 

January 18, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-01-18 11:27:292023-01-22 11:50:58PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS MAILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULDN’T HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE BANK DID NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE AND MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

… [P]laintiff failed to establish its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304. The plaintiff relied upon the affidavit of Summer Young, a vice president of the plaintiff’s purported loan servicer. The affidavit was based upon Young’s review of her employer’s records, which were attached thereto. Young did not aver that she had personal knowledge of the mailing, and her affidavit did not contain proof of the standard office mailing procedure at the time the RPAPL 1304 notice allegedly was sent … . Nor did the annexed records demonstrate, prima facie, that the requisite RPAPL 1304 mailings were completed … . Because the plaintiff “failed to provide proof of the actual mailing, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure, the plaintiff failed to establish its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304,” and therefore failed to establish, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law …  The plaintiff also failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with the notice of default requirement of the mortgage agreement … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Michalczyk, 2022 NY Slip Op 07222, Second Dept 12-21-22

Practice Point: the bank in this foreclosure action did not present sufficient evidence of compliance with the notice and mailing requirements of RPAPL 1304.

 

December 21, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-21 11:10:052022-12-23 13:49:57THE BANK DID NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE AND MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
Foreclosure, Judges, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

PLAINTIFF IN THIS NON-JURY TRIAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1303; JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the judgment (after a non-jury trial) of foreclosure and sale, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate compliance with RPAPL 1303:

RPAPL 1303 requires that a notice titled “Help for Homeowners in Foreclosure” be delivered to the mortgagor along with the summons and complaint in residential foreclosure actions involving owner-occupied, one- to four-family dwellings … . “The statute mandates that the notice be in bold, 14-point type and printed on colored paper that is other than the color of the summons and complaint, and that the title of the notice be in bold, 20-point type” … . “Proper service of an RPAPL 1303 notice is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action, and noncompliance mandates dismissal of the complaint” … . The foreclosing party bears the burden of establishing compliance with RPAPL 1303 … .

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not offer any evidence at trial establishing that it complied with the specific requirements of RPAPL 1303, or that it delivered such notice to Nodumehlezi [defendant] at all. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court’s reliance, in a posttrial decision, on documents that had been previously e-filed to establish the plaintiff’s compliance with RPAPL 1303 was improper, since Nodumehlezi had no opportunity to rebut the previously filed affidavit of service and the related documents … . 21st Mtge. Corp. v Nodumehlezi, 2022 NY Slip Op 07212, Second Dept 12-21-22

Practice Point: Here there was a non-jury trial and plaintiff did not prove compliance with RPAPL 1303. The judgment of foreclosure and sale was reversed.

 

December 21, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-21 10:46:552022-12-23 11:09:57PLAINTIFF IN THIS NON-JURY TRIAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1303; JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 OR THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1303 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate compliance with the notice (mailing) requirements of RPAPL 1304 or the notice requirements of RPAPL 1303:

… [T]he letter log submitted by the plaintiff and relied upon by the employee of the plaintiff’s alleged loan servicer in his affidavit failed to establish that the 90-day notice was actually mailed to the defendant by both certified mail and first-class mail … . “‘[I]t is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted'” … . None of the other documents submitted by the plaintiff, considered individually or together, including the copies of the 90-day notice letters themselves, provided any information as to whether the notice was sent to the defendant by regular first-class mail … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s submissions did not demonstrate that the notice served upon the defendant complied with the type-size requirements in RPAPL 1303 … .Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Raja, 2022 NY Slip Op 06912, Second Dept 12-7-22

Practice Point: Once again, the bank in this foreclosure action did not submit sufficient proof of strict compliance with the notice and mailing requirements of RPAPL 1303 or 1304.

 

December 7, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-07 20:18:392022-12-10 21:05:47THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 OR THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1303 (SECOND DEPT).
Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE PROPERTY OWNER, MCWHITE, HAD BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE ORIGINAL FORECLOSURE ACTION AND HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HAD NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE WHICH FALSELY NAMED HER AS A DEFENDANT; THE REFEREE’S DEED-HOLDER DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORECLOSURE AGAINST MCWHITE AND MCWHITE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HER QUIET TITLE CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s deed-holder’s (I & I’s) complaint failed to state a cause of action for reforeclosure (RPAPL 1503, 1523) against McWhite, the owner of the subject property. McWhite had been dismissed from the original foreclosure action because plaintiff never moved for a default judgment. The foreclosure plaintiff was aware McWhite was not included in the foreclosure when it filed its judgment, which falsely indicated McWhite’s interest in the property had been extinguished. McWhite was entitled to summary judgment on her quiet title action:

Under the circumstances of this case, I & I failed to state a cause of action against McWhite for reforeclosure because the defect in the foreclosure action was due to the willful neglect of the foreclosure plaintiff as a matter of law. The underlying objective of foreclosure actions is “to extinguish the rights of redemption of all those who have a subordinate interest in the property and to vest complete title in the purchaser at the judicial sale” … . The defect in the underlying foreclosure action was that McWhite’s interest was not validly extinguished in the judgment of foreclosure and sale due to her effective dismissal from the action. … [T]he foreclosure plaintiff here knew that McWhite had been effectively dismissed from the action and that the judgment of foreclosure and sale could not validly extinguish her interest in the premises. The foreclosure plaintiff nevertheless made a conscious decision to proceed to judgment and sale without validly extinguishing McWhite’s known interest … . * * *

Here, the judgment of foreclosure and sale was void as to McWhite and the foreclosure sale did not transfer her interest in the premises to I & I. Moreover, McWhite established, prima facie, that the foreclosure action accelerated the mortgage debt, that the foreclosure action was dismissed as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), and the commencement of a new foreclosure action would be time-barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4] … ). In opposition, I & I failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of McWhite’s motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint in the quiet title action. McWhite v I & I Realty Group, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 06795, Second Dept 11-30-22

Practice Point: Here the foreclosure plaintiff was aware the owner of the subject property, McWhite, had been dismissed from the original foreclosure action because plaintiff never moved for a default judgment. Yet the foreclosure plaintiff filed the judgment of foreclosure falsely indicating McWhite’s interest in the property had been extinguished. The owner of the referee’s deed therefore could not bring a reforecloscure action (RPAPL 1503, 1523) against McWhite and McWhite was entitled to summary judgment on her quite title action.

 

November 30, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-30 18:18:572022-12-03 19:02:49THE PROPERTY OWNER, MCWHITE, HAD BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE ORIGINAL FORECLOSURE ACTION AND HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HAD NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE WHICH FALSELY NAMED HER AS A DEFENDANT; THE REFEREE’S DEED-HOLDER DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORECLOSURE AGAINST MCWHITE AND MCWHITE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HER QUIET TITLE CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

IN THIS FORECLOSURE DEFICIENCY-JUDGMENT CASE, THE FAIR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WAS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE LIQUIDATION VALUE USED BY THE COURT TO CALCULATE THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the fair market value of the property in this foreclosure-deficiency-judgment proceeding was considerably greater than the liquidation valued used by the court:

“RPAPL 1371(2) permits the mortgagee in a mortgage foreclosure action to recover a deficiency judgment for the difference between the amount of indebtedness on the mortgage and either the auction price at the foreclosure sale or the fair market value of the property, whichever is higher” … . “It is the lender who bears the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, the property’s fair market value as of the date of the auction sale” … . “When a lender moves to secure a deficiency judgment against a borrower, ‘the court . . . shall determine, upon affidavit or otherwise as it shall direct, the fair and reasonable market value of the mortgaged premises as of the date such premises were bid [o]n at auction or such nearest earlier date as there shall have been any market value thereof'” … .

Here, the record does not support a finding that the estimated liquidation value of $620,000 constituted the fair and reasonable market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale … . Rather, the record supports a determination that the higher estimated value of $1,060,000 presented by the plaintiff’s appraiser constituted the fair and reasonable market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. Rhinebeck Bank v WA 319 Main, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 06507, Second Dept 11-16-22

Practice Point: Here the court should have used plaintiff’s appraiser’s determination of the fair market value of the foreclosed property to calculate the amount of the deficiency judgment pursuant to RPAPL 1371(2). The court used a much lower “liquidation value.”

 

November 16, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-16 18:41:262022-11-19 18:43:21IN THIS FORECLOSURE DEFICIENCY-JUDGMENT CASE, THE FAIR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WAS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE LIQUIDATION VALUE USED BY THE COURT TO CALCULATE THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Page 1 of 27123›»

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2023 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Scroll to top