Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S AFFIANT DID NOT HAVE FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE MAILING PRACTICES OF THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAILING THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE TO THE DEFENDANT; JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not prove the 90-day notice of foreclosure required by RPAPL 1304 was mailed to the defendant, a failure of proof which has been the ground for hundreds of reversals spanning many years:

… [P]laintiff proffered the affidavit of Trey Cook, a document execution specialist employed by the plaintiff’s loan servicer, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (hereinafter Nationstar), which was insufficient to establish compliance with RPAPL 1304. While Cook averred that he had personal knowledge of Nationstar’s business records and further averred that according to the business records he reviewed, 90-day notices were served via certified and first class mail at the mortgaged premises and last known address of the borrower, he did not attest that he was familiar with the standard office mailing procedures of Walz Group, Inc. (hereinafter Walz), the third-party vendor that apparently sent the RPAPL 1304 notices on behalf of the plaintiff. Thus, Cook’s affidavit did not establish proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … . Further, Cook’s affidavit failed to address the nature of Nationstar’s relationship with Walz and whether Walz’s records were incorporated into Nationstar’s own records or routinely relied upon in its business … . Thus, Cook’s affidavit failed to lay a foundation for the admission of a transaction report generated by Walz (see CPLR 4518 [a] …). Finally, the tracking numbers on the copies of the 90-day notices submitted by the plaintiff, standing alone, did not suffice to establish, prima facie, proper mailing under RPAPL 1304 … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Palomaria, 2024 NY Slip Op 04374, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: In yet another reversal on this ground, plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not produce an affiant with first-hand knowledge of the mailing practices of the party responsible for mailing the RPAPL 1304 ninety-day notice of foreclosure to the defendant. Therefore the judgment of foreclosure was reversed.

September 11, 2024

Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

HERE THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (CPLR 213(4)) ESTOPPED PLAINTIFF FROM ARGUING THE DEBT HAD NOT BEEN ACCELERATED ON A GROUND NOT RAISED AND ADJUDICATED PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) (CPLR 213(4)) prohibited plaintiff mortgage company from asserting a defense to dismissal of the foreclosure action on statute-of-limitations grounds which had not been timely raised and adjudicated. Plaintiff tried to argue the debt was not validly accelerated because of a prior dismissal based on reference to the wrong property address:

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, it failed to raise such a triable issue of fact on the asserted basis that the prior action did not constitute a valid acceleration of the debt in light of BOA’s [Bank of America’s] use of the improper property address and the resulting dismissal of the action. “[T]he recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act … amended CPLR 213(4) by adding paragraph (a), which provides that “‘[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated'” … .

Here, the prior action was not dismissed “on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated” … . Thus, under FAPA, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the prior action … . Reverse Mtge. Solutions, Inc. v Gipson, 2024 NY Slip Op 04335, Second Dept 8-28-24

Practice Point: This decision illustrates the effect of the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act which prohibits attacking a statute-of-limitations defense to a foreclosure action on a ground not timely raised and adjudicated prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

August 28, 2024

Civil Procedure, Evidence, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE HOLDER OR ASSIGNEE OF THE NOTE AT THE TIME THE ACTION TO RECORD THE MORTGAGE WAS BROUGHT; THE BANK DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing in 2017 to record a mortgage securing a note issued in 2008:

A plaintiff has standing where it is the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced … . “Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the . . . action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident” … . “[A]n assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery” .. .

Here, the affidavits of Fernandez were insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s standing to record the mortgage. Although Fernandez’s second affidavit provided a proper foundation for the admission of business records, and attached a business record … , “[i]t is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … . The business record attached to Fernandez’s second affidavit failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff had possession of the note prior to commencing the instant action, as it failed to mention the defendant or otherwise identify the note to which it was referring. Moreover, the business record identifies itself merely as a “Certification.” It does not state when the note was either delivered to or assigned to the plaintiff. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Healey, 2024 NY Slip Op 04054, Second Dept 7-31-24

Practice Point: Here the note was issued in 2008 and plaintiff bank sought to record the mortgage in 2017. The bank did not have standing to record the mortgage because it did not present proof it was the holder or assignee of the note when the action was brought.

July 31, 2024

Civil Procedure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

ALL OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS POTENTIALLY AFFECTED BY THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS TO A RECREATIONAL EASEMENT ARE NECESSARY PARTIES BUT NOT ALL WERE INCLUDED AS PLAINTIFFS; ALTHOUGH THE JUDGMENT WAS REVERSED, THE ACTION MAY BE RECOMMENCED WITH ALL THE PROPER PARTIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined all the necessary parties were not included in this suit seeking a declaration of the rights of property owners with respect to a recreational easement:

CPLR 1001 (a) provides, in relevant part, that all “[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiffs or defendants.” It is well established that “[t]he absence of a necessary party may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, by any party or by the court on its own motion” … . In an action seeking to determine the extent of a recreational easement, the owners of all parcels of land burdened or benefitted by the easement are necessary parties because there is a potential that their real property rights will be affected by the outcome of the litigation … . Inasmuch as owners of real property who are not currently named as parties may be affected by the outcome of litigation concerning the subject parcel, we reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint without prejudice (see CPLR 1003). Plaintiffs are thus “not precluded from recommencing the action in the proper manner naming all necessary parties” … . Follett v Dumond, 2024 NY Slip Op 03272, Fourth Dept 6-4-24

Practice Point: All property owners who may be affected by a declaration of rights to a recreational easement are necessary parties.

June 14, 2024

Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

ALTHOUGH ONLY STEPHEN BOTT SIGNED THE NOTE, BOTH HE AND CHRISTINE BOTT SIGNED THE MORTGAGE; THEREFORE CHRISTINE BOTT WAS A “BORROWER” ENTITLED TO SEPARATE NOTICE OF THE FORECLOSURE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1304; THE JOINT NOTICE WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s failure to notify both borrowers of the foreclosure action violated RPAPL 1304 and required that defendants’ summary judgment motion be granted. Although only Stephen Bott signed the note, he and Christine Bott executed the mortgage instrument. Therefor the joint RPAPL 1304 notice was invalid:

Although Stephen Bott was the only signatory to the note, both he and Christine Bott executed the mortgage, and Christine Bott is identified as a borrower on the first page of the mortgage. “Where, as here, a homeowner defendant is referred to as a ‘borrower’ in the mortgage instrument and, in that capacity, agrees to pay amounts due under the note, that defendant is a ‘borrower’ for the purposes of RPAPL 1304, notwithstanding . . . any ambiguity created by a provision in the mortgage instrument to the effect that parties who did not sign the underlying note are not personally obligated to pay the sums secured” … . Therefore, Christine Bott was entitled to notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 … . Since it is undisputed that a jointly addressed 90-day notice, rather than individually addressed notices in separate envelopes, was sent to the defendants, the plaintiff failed to comply with RPAPL 1304, and the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Bott, 2024 NY Slip Op 02524, Second Dept 5-8-24

Practice Point: A person obligated to pay the mortgage is a “borrower” within the meaning of RPAPL 1304 even if that person did not sign the note. Each “borrower” is entitled to separate notice of the foreclosure. Here, the joint notice was invalid and defendant-borrowers’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

May 8, 2024

Civil Procedure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

DISPUTES ABOUT ENCROACHMENTS ON EASEMENTS RESOLVED; UNCLEAN HANDS AND LACHES DEFENSES REINSTATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, modifying Supreme Court, determined the unclean hands and laches defenses should not have been dismissed in this complicated case resolving the removal of encroachments from easements. The case is too complex and entails too much minutia to fairly summarize. 214 Lafayette House LLC v Akasa Holdings LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 01762, First Dept 3-28-24

March 28, 2024

Civil Procedure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Trespass

TRESPASS BY PERMANENT PHYSICAL ENCROACHMENT (PLUMBING PIPES) IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS AS TRESPASS BY THE ARTIFICIAL DIVERSION OF WATER; TRESPASS BY PERMANENT PHYSICAL ENCROACHMENT IS A CONTINUING TRESPASS UNTIL THE EXPIRATION OF THE TIME PERIOD FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION OR AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the trespass cause of action should not have been dismissed as time-barred. A trespass claim based upon a permanent physical encroachment (here plumbing pipes connected to a septic system) is a continuing trespass which gives rise to successive trespass causes of action until the expiration of the time period for an easement by prescription or adverse possession:

… [P]laintiff’s claim for trespass seeking monetary damages should not be analyzed for statute of limitations purposes in the same way as a claim for the artificial diversion of water onto an adjoining property … , inasmuch as plaintiff’s trespass claim is based upon a permanent physical encroachment, i.e., the underground plumbing that defendants installed on plaintiff’s property. “[The] encroaching structure is a continuing trespass [that] gives rise to successive causes of action, except where barred by acquisition of title or an easement by operation of law” … . ” ‘Thus, for purposes of the statute of limitations, suits will only be time-barred by the expiration of such time as would create an easement by prescription or change of title by operation of law,’ [namely], by adverse possession” … . Inasmuch as the complaint, which was filed on July 23, 2021, alleges that defendants’ “plumbing material” was unlawfully installed on plaintiff’s property in 2014, plaintiff’s claim for damages here is not barred by the statute of limitations (see RPAPL 501 [2]). Kramer v Kleiber, 2024 NY Slip Op 01387, Fourth Dept 3-15-24

Practice Point: Trespass by artificial diversion of water is not subject to the same statute of limitations analysis as trespass by a permanent physical encroachment (plumbing pipes in this case). Trespass by permanent physical encroachment is a continuing trespass until the expiration of the time period required for adverse possession or an easement by prescription.

March 15, 2024

Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

PETITIONER SOUGHT A TEMPORARY LICENSE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 881 TO ENTER RESPONDENT’S ADJOINING PROPERTY TO INSTALL PROTECTIONS PRIOR TO DEMOLITION WORK ON PETITIONER’S BUILDINGS; RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO FULL INDEMNIFICATION FOR ANY DAMAGE (AS OPPOSED TO INDEMNIFICATION “TO THE EXTENT COVERED BY INSURANCE”) AND TO REASONABLE EXPERT’S AND ATTORNEY’S FEES (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the respondent adjoining property owner was entitled to unrestricted indemnification from petitioner for damage to respondent’s property plus reasonable expert’s and attorney’s fees in this action by petitioner pursuant to RPAPL 881 for a temporary license to enter respondent’s property. Petitioner was doing demolition work on petitioner’s buildings and sought the license to install protections on respondent’s property. Supreme Court should not have limited respondent’s indemnification “to the extent covered by insurance.” And Supreme Court should have awarded respondent expert’s and attorney’s fee to the extent the fees are deemed reasonable:

RPAPL 881 allows a property owner to petition for a license to enter the premises of an adjoining owner when entry is necessary for making improvements or repairs to the petitioner’s property and the adjoining owners have refused access. The statute is designed to strike a balance between the petitioner’s interest in improving its property and the harm to the adjoining property owner’s enjoyment of its property … , and it gives the motion court the discretion to craft an appropriate remedy in connection with license and access “upon such terms as justice requires” … . Since a respondent compelled to grant access under RPAPL 881 does not seek out the intrusion and does not derive any benefit from it, equity requires that the respondent should not have to bear any costs resulting from the access … .

… [T]he judgment’s indemnity provision provides indemnification for third-party damage claims only “to the extent covered by insurance,” which unreasonably fails to shift the full risk to petitioner as is appropriate under RPAPL 881. Matter of 1643 First LLC v 1645 1st Ave. LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 01111, First Dept 2-29-24

Practice Point: When a property owner seeks a temporary license to enter an adjoining property pursuant to RPAPL 881 in connection with construction work, the adjoining property owner is entitled to full indemnification for any damage as well as reasonable expert’s and attorney’s fees incurred because of the temporary license.

February 29, 2024

Banking Law, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

A “HIGH COST LOAN” AS DEFINED BY THE BANKING LAW IS A DEFENSE TO A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the loan in this foreclosure action violated the Banking Law such that there is a defense to foreclosure pursuant to RPAPL 1302(2):

RPAPL 1302(2) provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall be a defense to an action to foreclose a mortgage [for a high-cost home loan] that the terms of the home loan or the actions of the lender violate any provision of,” among other things, Banking Law § 6-l … . “A home loan is a ‘high-cost home loan’ if, among other things, the total points and fees charged exceed five percent of the total loan amount” … . Here, the defendants demonstrated potential merit to their defense that their loan constituted a “high-cost home loan,” because the lender allegedly financed certain closing costs, thereby receiving indirect compensation related thereto … , and that the terms of the loan or actions of the lender violated provisions of Banking Law § 6-l. Wilmington Trust, N.A. v Newman, 2023 NY Slip Op 06557, Second Dept 12-20-23

Practice Point: Pursuant to RPAPL 1302(2), a “high cost loan” within the meaning of the Banking Law is a defense to a foreclosure action.

December 20, 2023

Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) APPLIES RETROACTIVELY; THE DEFENDANT MORTGAGE COMPANY IS ESTOPPED BY CPLR 213(4)(A) FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE HAS NOT EXPIRED; PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SEEKING DISCHARGE AND CANCELLATION OF THE MORTGAGE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined (1) the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) applies retroactively; and (2) because the defendant mortgage company is estopped by CPLR 213(4)(b) from asserting the six-year statute of limitations for foreclosure had not expired, plaintiff’s RPAPL 1501(4) complaint (seeking cancellation and discharge of the mortgage) should not have been dismissed:

Having concluded that FAPA applies retroactively, we must next consider whether defendant is estopped under CPLR 213(4)(b) from asserting that the statute [*6]of limitations for the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action has not expired because the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated in connection with the prior foreclosure action. CPLR 213(4)(b)’s potent estoppel bar will not be imposed, and a defendant will be free to assert that the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated in connection with a prior action, if, and only if, the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.

Here, defendant is estopped from asserting that the statute of limitations on a cause of action to foreclose on the mortgage has not expired. An action to foreclose on the mortgage was previously commenced and dismissed. Defendant is not saved by the limited exception afforded by CPLR 213(4)(b) because Supreme Court, in dismissing the foreclosure action, did not make an express determination that the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated. Rather, the court dismissed the foreclosure action on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants therein … . Genovese v Nationstar Mtge. LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06477, First Dept 12-19-23

Practice Point: The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) applies retroactively. Here the defendant mortgage company was estopped by CPLR 214(4)(b) from asserting the six-year statute of limitations for a foreclosure action had not expired.

December 19, 2023