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You are here: Home1 / Negligence
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Trusts and Estates

PLAINTIFF, AS A “PROPOSED ADMINISTRATOR,” DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BRING A SURVIVAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY WAS NOT TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, as a “proposed administrator” did not have capacity to bring a survival action on behalf of the decedent’s estate. Only an administrator has such capacity:

The plaintiff’s motion, among other things, for leave to amend the complaint to substitute herself as “Administratrix” of the decedent’s estate in place of “proposed Administratrix” should have been denied. Here, the plaintiff failed to seek substitution within a reasonable time … .

“A personal representative who has received letters of administration of a decedent’s estate is the only party who is authorized to commence a survival action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the decedent or a wrongful death action to recover damages sustained by the decedent’s distributees on account of his or her death” … . “Thus, a ‘proposed administrator’ who has not obtained letters of administration lacks capacity to bring an action to recover damages for personal injuries or wrongful death on behalf of a decedent’s estate” … . Accordingly, dismissal is proper pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) where, as here, an action is commenced prior to the plaintiff receiving letters of administration … . As the plaintiff makes no allegations in support of any claim brought in her individual capacity, the Supreme Court should have directed dismissal of the complaint. Perez v Levister Redevelopment Co., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 06473, Second Dept 11-4-26

Practice Point: Only a party who has obtained letters of administration can bring a survival action on behalf of a decedent’s estate. Here the plaintiff’s action brought as a “proposed administrator” was dismissed.

 

November 4, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-04 16:10:192026-11-18 13:24:04PLAINTIFF, AS A “PROPOSED ADMINISTRATOR,” DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BRING A SURVIVAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY WAS NOT TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
Contract Law, Insurance Law, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

IN THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE FINDING THAT THE PHYSICIAN SUED BY A PATIENT FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WAS COVERED BY THE DEFENDANT-INSURER’S POLICY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division in this action for a declaratory judgment, determined the physician, Dr. Kolli, who was sued by a patient, was covered by defendant insurance carrier, Kaleida Health:

We agree with the lower courts that Dr. Kolli is covered pursuant to the unambiguous terms of Kaleida’s self-insurance plan (SIP) and Kaleida’s employment agreement with Dr. Kolli. Kaleida’s SIP expressly stated that physicians employed by Kaleida for the purpose of providing patient care are “covered persons” while “acting on behalf of, or at the direction of” Kaleida. And section 6 (a) of Dr. Kolli’s employment agreement with Kaleida unambiguously provided that he would be covered by Kaleida’s SIP when acting pursuant to the employment agreement, as he was when he treated the patient at a Kaleida facility pursuant to his duties as a Kaleida on-call physician. We agree with the lower courts that Kaleida’s proposed reading of section 6 (b) (ii) of the employment agreement is not reasonable because it would render other provisions of the employment agreement a nullity. Specifically, Kaleida’s proposed interpretation would mean that Dr. Kolli was never covered under the SIP, despite the unambiguous terms to the contrary in section 6 (a) of the employment agreement. Instead, we agree with the Appellate Division that the only reasonable interpretation of section 6 (b) (ii) is that it applied when Dr. Kolli treated his private practice patients at a Kaleida facility, as opposed to patients he treated for the first time while performing his on-call duties for Kaleida. Kolli v Kaleida Health, 2026 NY Slip Op 06167, Ct App 10-22-26

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 10:53:342026-11-01 11:09:01IN THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE FINDING THAT THE PHYSICIAN SUED BY A PATIENT FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WAS COVERED BY THE DEFENDANT-INSURER’S POLICY (CT APP).
Judges, Negligence, Products Liability

HERE THE JURY WAS PRESENTED WITH SEPARATE INTERROGATORIES FOR “STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY” AND “NEGLIGENT DESIGN” RESULTING IN AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT; THE JURY FOUND THE DESIGN DEFECTIVE AND NOT REASONABLY SAFE BUT ALSO FOUND THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN SELECTING THE DESIGN; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial, determined the jury interrogatories in this products liability case led to an inconsistent verdict. Based on the interrogatories, the jury found the product (an automobile air bag system) was negligently designed and not safe but further found defendant (BMW) was not negligent in selecting that design:

… BMW contends that the verdict sheet is internally inconsistent and fatally flawed because it failed to combine plaintiff’s three causes of action into a single set of interrogatories, despite each cause of action being legally synonymous with the others. We find this contention to have merit. Under CPLR 4111 (c), “when the answers on a verdict sheet ‘are inconsistent with each other and one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall require the jury to further consider its answers and verdict or it shall order a new trial’ ” … . An inconsistency occurs “only when a verdict on one claim necessarily negates an element of another cause of action” … . Where, like here, a plaintiff “has pleaded both strict liability and negligent design causes of action, the standards set forth” for resolving a strict products liability claim “apply to both” … — and a verdict sheet which purports to inquire separately into whether a design was “negligent” or “not reasonably safe” is essentially “redundant” … . …

Here, plaintiff’s strict products liability and negligent design claims were both premised upon BMW’s use of an untethered, deflector-equipped driver-side airbag rather than a tethered design, and the same evidence concerning the risks and utility of that design and the feasibility of the proposed alternative was offered to support both theories. BMW objected to separate interrogatories, warning that they could produce inconsistent findings, and proposed a single interrogatory asking whether the airbag was “defectively or negligently designed.” Plaintiff opposed that request, expressly stating that he was “willing to accept the risk of an inconsistent verdict.” Supreme Court submitted the claims separately, resulting in a jury verdict finding that the airbag was defectively designed because it was not reasonably safe, but that BMW was not negligent in selecting that same design. Janof v Auto Warehouse, 2026 NY Slip Op 06189, Third Dept 10-22-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the overlap between strict products liability and negligent design theories and how separate jury interrogatories for each can result in an inconsistent verdict requiring a new trial.

​

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 08:35:512026-10-31 09:05:44HERE THE JURY WAS PRESENTED WITH SEPARATE INTERROGATORIES FOR “STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY” AND “NEGLIGENT DESIGN” RESULTING IN AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT; THE JURY FOUND THE DESIGN DEFECTIVE AND NOT REASONABLY SAFE BUT ALSO FOUND THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN SELECTING THE DESIGN; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

THE CITY’S PROOF IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city did not prove it did not have prior written notice of the defective boardwalk board which caused plaintiff to fall. Therefore the city’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied:

“‘Where a locality has enacted a prior notification law and is alleged to be liable for personal injuries sustained as a result of a defective condition, the locality establishes a defense as a matter of law by demonstrating that it did not receive prior written notice of the defective condition'” … . “Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) limits the City’s duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location” … .

Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that they did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of the Legal Liaison for the Parks Department, who indicated that she conducted a search of the relevant records related to the subject boardwalk over a period of two years prior to the date of the accident. However, the affidavit did not unequivocally assert that the search failed to reveal any prior written notice of the alleged defect on the boardwalk … . Moreover, the searched records apparently were not attached to the affidavit and, under the circumstances, the defendants otherwise failed to show that all of the relevant records were searched … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . Young v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 06166, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the proof a municipality must submit to demonstrate a lack of written notice of a dangerous condition which caused a plaintiff’s injury. Here the evidence fell short.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 16:15:572026-11-02 12:17:42THE CITY’S PROOF IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this intersection traffic-accident case, determined defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case. The Second Department held that a jury could find that, although defendant (Capobianco) had the right of way, plaintiff was already in the intersection and Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision. In addition, the Second Department found that Supreme Court should not have excluded evidence of the damage to the vehicles because the damage was relevant to liability for failure to see what should have been seen:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), a driver entering an intersection controlled by a stop sign must yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is already in the intersection or that is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard … , and a driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic law requiring them to yield … . A driver also has a common-law duty to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of the driver’s senses … . Thus, while a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision … , he or she still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection … .

Here, affording the plaintiff every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that even if Capobianco had the right-of-way, the plaintiff’s vehicle was already in the intersection, and that Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.

In addition, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding photographs depicting the nature and extent of damage to the parties’ vehicles after the accident. Even where a trial is bifurcated, some evidence of damages may nevertheless be admitted, in the trial court’s discretion, to establish liability at the liability phase of the trial, so long as such evidence is probative of liability and accompanied by an appropriate limiting instruction … . Pruessen v Richard Capobianco, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06155, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: A driver who had the right of way may still be liable in an intersection traffic accident if the other driver was already in the intersection and the driver who had the right of way did not exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Practice Point: In a bifurcated traffic-accident trial, evidence of the nature of the damage to the vehicles may have relevance to liability and, if so, should be admitted.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 13:00:062026-10-30 16:15:12EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).
Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE HAD THE GREEN LIGHT AND WAS GOING STRAIGHT; PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE INTERSECTION MAKING A LEFT TURN FROM THE ONCOMING LANE; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact concerning which of the two vehicles which collided had the right of way. Defendant had the green light and was driving straight. Plaintiff was making a left turn across defendant’s lane. Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1141, if plaintiff was in the process of turning when the light turned green, plaintiff would have had the right of way:

Plaintiff argues that defendant was required under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 to yield the right-of-way because plaintiff’s vehicle was in the intersection before defendant’s vehicle … . Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 provides, in relevant part, that traffic facing a steady green signal — here defendant — may proceed straight but shall yield the right of way to other traffic lawfully within the intersection at the time the signal is exhibited. Plaintiff testified that he almost completed his left turn through the intersection when he first saw defendant. The evidence does not conclusively establish which vehicle was required to yield. Moreover, both parties testified that the truck blocked the intersection and prevented them from being able to observe oncoming traffic.

Additionally, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143, a driver “about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.” Plaintiff contends that defendant was required to yield because defendant attempted to enter the roadway from the bicycle and parking lanes to get around the truck. However, the record does not provide conclusive evidence of each vehicle’s location leading up to the accident and which party ultimately had a duty to yield. Accordingly, there are questions of fact precluding summary dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. Sanchez-Rodriguez v Bruce, 2026 NY Slip Op 06077, First Dept 10-20-26

Practice Point: In an intersection accident case where one vehicle is traveling straight through the intersection on green and the oncoming vehicle is in the intersection making a left turn when the light changed, the vehicle which is in the intersection first has the right of way (Vehicle and Traffic Law 1141).

 

October 20, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-20 17:55:452026-10-27 20:11:29DEFENDANT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE HAD THE GREEN LIGHT AND WAS GOING STRAIGHT; PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE INTERSECTION MAKING A LEFT TURN FROM THE ONCOMING LANE; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

NEW GROUNDS OR EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RAISED IN REPLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that new arguments or evidence presented in the reply papers should not have been considered:

… [P]laintiffs failed to establish that the defendant’s affirmative defense alleging the expiration of the statute of limitations was without merit as a matter of law. The plaintiffs’ moving papers did not support their conclusory allegations that the defendant’s treatment of the injured plaintiff beginning on May 11, 2021, and continuing through July 15, 2022, made their action timely based on the continuous treatment doctrine … . The plaintiffs’ attempt to remedy this deficiency by submitting portions of a purported medical chart through their counsel’s reply affirmation was improper. The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant and not to permit the movant to introduce new grounds or evidence in support of the motion … . Malone v Spaliviero, 2026 NY Slip Op 05948, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: Here new evidence submitted in reply papers should not have been considered by the court.

 

October 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-14 16:58:322026-10-23 17:09:52NEW GROUNDS OR EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RAISED IN REPLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Negligence, Trusts and Estates

PLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND ALLEGEDLY BECAME INTOXICATED AT DEFENDANT’S RESTAURANT, FELL DOWN A STAIRCASE AND DIED FROM HIS INJURIES; PURSUANT TO THE DRAM SHOP ACT, PLAINTIFF WIFE SUED THE RESTAURANT BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; HER INDIVIDUAL SUIT SURVIVED DISMISSAL; BUT THE SUIT ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE WAS DISMISSED; AN INTOXICATED PERSON, OR THE ESTATE OF AN INTOXICATED PERSON, CAN NOT SUE UNDER THE DRAM SHOP ACT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM INTOXICATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined Vera, the widow of the allegedly intoxicated decedent, could sue under the Dram Shop Act individually, but not as a representative of the decedent’s estate. Decedent fell down a staircase at defendant restaurant (Shuko):

In this Dram Shop Act action, plaintiffs allege that defendant Shuko, a restaurant, repeatedly served alcoholic beverages to the decedent, causing his intoxication and subsequent fall down a staircase inside the restaurant. The decedent sustained severe injuries which, according to plaintiffs, later resulted in his death. Vera, who is the decedent’s widow, is suing both in her individual capacity and as executor of the decedent’s estate, and is seeking damages, inter alia, for loss of support. * * *

…Vera’s allegations that Shuko sold alcohol to the decedent despite his being visibly intoxicated, and that she was personally injured by the loss of means of support is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss … . …

However, while “[t]he Dram Shop Act creates a cause of action in favor of a third party injured or killed by an intoxicated person, [ ] it does not create a cause of action in favor of the intoxicated person” … . Accordingly, “an intoxicated person or his or her estate cannot maintain a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act for injuries sustained as a result of that person’s own intoxication” … . The second cause of action against defendant Shuko therefore fails to state a cause of action insofar as it is asserted on behalf anyone other than plaintiff Vera individually. Vera v BH Broadway Owner LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05921, First Dept 10-13-26

Practice Point: Here the Dram Shop Act was applied where an intoxicated restaurant patron fell down a restaurant staircase and subsequently died from his injuries. Decedent’s wife could sue the restaurant under the Dram Shop Act in her individual capacity for loss of support. However, decedent’s wife could not sue under the Dram Shop Act on behalf of the decedent’s estate. …  “[A]n intoxicated person or his or her estate cannot maintain a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act for injuries sustained as a result of that person’s own intoxication” … .

 

October 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-13 14:07:032026-10-21 14:12:50PLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND ALLEGEDLY BECAME INTOXICATED AT DEFENDANT’S RESTAURANT, FELL DOWN A STAIRCASE AND DIED FROM HIS INJURIES; PURSUANT TO THE DRAM SHOP ACT, PLAINTIFF WIFE SUED THE RESTAURANT BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; HER INDIVIDUAL SUIT SURVIVED DISMISSAL; BUT THE SUIT ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE WAS DISMISSED; AN INTOXICATED PERSON, OR THE ESTATE OF AN INTOXICATED PERSON, CAN NOT SUE UNDER THE DRAM SHOP ACT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM INTOXICATION (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Corporation Law, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Negligence

A FEDERAL COURT APPOINTED PLAINTIFF-RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER A BUSINESS RUNNING A PONZI SCHEME; THE PLAINTIFF-RECEIVER SUED THE BROKER TO WHICH THE PONZI-SCHEME FUNDS WERE TRANSFERRED; BECAUSE PLAINTIFF-RECEIVER STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF A WRONGDOER (THE PONZI SCHEME OPERATOR) TO SUE ANOTHER WRONGDOER (THE BROKER), THE “IN PARI DELICTO” (“IN EQUAL FAULT”) DOCTRINE APPLIED TO PROHIBIT THE SUIT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Michael, over a comprehensive dissenting opinion, determined the plaintiff-receiver (appointed by the federal court to takeover a business running a Ponzi scheme) was prohibited from suing the broker to which the Ponzi scheme funds were transferred by the doctrine of “in pari delicto” (“in equal fault”). Under the doctrine, the courts will not get involved in a suit between two wrongdoers. The issue in this case is whether the court-appointed receiver steps into the shoes of the “Ponzi scheme” wrongdoer. The First Department held that the doctrine applies to the receiver, over an extensive dissent:

The common law doctrine of in pari delicto “mandates that the courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers” … . In other words, the doctrine bars a corporation engaged in wrongdoing from suing its co-conspirators on the grounds of negligence or fraud … . “The justice of the in pari delicto rule is most obvious where a willful wrongdoer is suing someone who is alleged to be merely negligent” … . The notion that “a wrongdoer should not profit from his own misconduct is so strong in New York that we have said the defense applies even in difficult cases and should not be weakened by exceptions” … .

The wrongdoer’s misconduct is not only imputed to the corporation through the bad acts of its officers … , but also to the corporation’s successors … . …

Plaintiff [receiver] argues, and the dissent agrees, that the in pari delicto doctrine does not apply to plaintiff because he is not a derivative shareholder plaintiff or a bankruptcy trustee appointed pursuant to 11 USC § 541, but rather a receiver appointed pursuant to 28 USC § 3103. It is true that plaintiff, as a receiver, is not subject to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference between bankruptcy trustees and nonbankruptcy receivers for purposes of in pari delicto … . Castleman v Interactive Brokers LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05904, First Dept 10-13-26

Practice Point: Here the “in pari delicto” (“in equal fault”) doctrine was applied to prohibit a suit by a court-appointed receiver which had taken over a business running a Ponzi scheme. The receiver sued the broker to which the Ponzi-scheme funds had been transferred. Under the “in pari delicto” doctrine, a court will not get involved in a dispute between wrongdoers. The doctrine applies to a wrongdoer’s successor, even a court-appointed receiver.

 

October 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-13 08:12:532026-10-21 09:02:13A FEDERAL COURT APPOINTED PLAINTIFF-RECEIVER TO TAKE OVER A BUSINESS RUNNING A PONZI SCHEME; THE PLAINTIFF-RECEIVER SUED THE BROKER TO WHICH THE PONZI-SCHEME FUNDS WERE TRANSFERRED; BECAUSE PLAINTIFF-RECEIVER STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF A WRONGDOER (THE PONZI SCHEME OPERATOR) TO SUE ANOTHER WRONGDOER (THE BROKER), THE “IN PARI DELICTO” (“IN EQUAL FAULT”) DOCTRINE APPLIED TO PROHIBIT THE SUIT (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT REAR DRIVER PROVIDED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this rear-end collision case raised a question of fact precluding summary judgment. Defendant alleged plaintiff abruptly changed lanes without signaling and came to a sudden stop in front of defendant’s vehicle:

… [A] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision to rebut the inference of negligence” … . “A nonnegligent explanation may include that a vehicle made a sudden lane change in front of a defendant’s vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly” … .

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting an affidavit wherein she averred that the rear of her stopped vehicle was struck by the front of the defendants’ vehicle … . However, in opposition, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of a nonnegligent explanation for striking the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. According to the defendant driver’s affidavit, the accident occurred when the plaintiff’s vehicle abruptly changed lanes, without signaling, and immediately came to a sudden stop in front of the defendants’ vehicle … . Johnson v Payne, 2026 NY Slip Op 05775, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an example of a “nonnegligent” explanation for a rear-end collision which precluded summary judgment.​

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 11:30:362026-10-12 11:53:00DEFENDANT REAR DRIVER PROVIDED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​
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