Negligence – New York Appellate Digest

DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DEMONSTRATED THAT THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (A PROPERTY OWNER WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR A SNOW AND ICE CONDITION UNTIL A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE PRECIPITATION HAS STOPPED); THE BURDEN THEN SHIFTED TO PLAINTIFF TO SHOW DEFENDANT’S EFFORT TO REMOVE SNOW HOURS BEFORE THE FALL CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; TO MEET THAT BURDEN AN EXPERT AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WAS NOT, SUBMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the property owner’s (Site A’s) motion for summary judgment in this ice and snow slip and fall case should have been granted. The evidence demonstrate it was still snowing at the time of plaintiff’s fall and plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit demonstrating how defendant’s snow removal efforts exacerbated the condition:

Site A made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment based on the storm-in-progress doctrine, because the meteorological data, its expert meteorological affidavit, and plaintiff’s deposition testimony annexed to its moving papers establish that there was a storm in progress when the accident occurred … . …

Although the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that Site A created the alleged condition or made it more hazardous by attempting to remove the precipitation from the driveway about five hours before he fell, plaintiff failed to meet that burden as he submitted no expert affidavit explaining how Site A, by not salting or sanding the area before the accident, could have created or exacerbated the naturally occurring ice condition … . Colon v Site A – Wash. Hgts., 2022 NY Slip Op 03173, First Dept 5-12-22

Practice Point: Here in this ice and snow slip and fall case, the defendant property owner presented prima facie proof that the storm-in-progress doctrine applied because it was snowing hours before plaintiff fell and was still snowing when plaintiff fell. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to show that defendant’s snow removal efforts undertaken hours before the fall exacerbated the dangerous condition. Because plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit on that issue, plaintiff’s burden of proof was not met.

May 12, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, WHICH RELIEVES THE OWNER OF A LEASED VEHICLE FROM LIABILITY FOR A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, DID NOT APPLY TO THE DEFENDANT OWNER; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate the Graves Amendment did not apply to the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, relieving the owner of a leased vehicle of liability:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1), “[e]very owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” However, pursuant to the Graves Amendment, which “preempt[s] conflicting New York law” … , the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner) cannot be held liable by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner) for personal injuries resulting from the use of such vehicle if: (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) (see 49 USC § 30106[a] …). Keys v PV Holding Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 03105, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: If the owner of a leased vehicle is not negligent (i.e., improper maintenance, etc.), the Graves Amendment relieves the owner of liability for a traffic accident involving the leased vehicle. Here the plaintiff did not demonstrate the Graves Amendment didn’t apply. Therefore the burden to prove the amendment did apply never shifted to the defendant vehicle-owner and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted.

May 11, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Evidence, Negligence

DEFENDANTS PRESENTED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL WAS LAST INSPECTED; THERFORE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. The defendants did not submit proof of when the area was last inspected and therefore did not demonstrate they lacked constructive notice of the condition:

A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it … . To meet its burden on the issue of constructive notice, a defendant is required to offer evidence as to when the accident site was last inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell … . Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate when they last inspected the walkway prior to the incident and they failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not have constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition … . The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that the cinder block was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Ferrer v 120 Union Ave., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03096, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: For years hundreds of cases were reversed because there was no evidence of when the area of a slip and fall was last inspected by a defendant and therefore defendant did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice and was not entitled to summary judgment. Now there are just a few cases reversed for this reason in a given year. The bar has learned this lesson.

May 11, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Municipal Law, Negligence

THE NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE ABSENCE OF TURNOUTS FOR DISABLED VEHICLES CREATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligent roadway design cause of action against the city should not have been dismissed in this traffic accident case. Plaintiffs alleged the absence of turnouts for disabled vehicles on Harlem River Drive created a dangerous condition:

Defendants failed to establish that they were unaware of dangerous highway conditions on the northbound Harlem River Drive where the decedent’s accident occurred … , or that the previous accidents in that area of the Drive disclosed by the record were not of a similar nature to the decedent’s accident, or that the causes of those accidents were not similar to the alleged design-related cause(s) of the decedent’s accident … .

… [I]n or about 1983, “the City had received a study recommending that shoulders be added to this section of the Harlem River Drive, and even the City’s engineer admitted that the absence of a shoulder or other place of refuge created an unsafe traffic condition” … . … [T]he record in this case discloses that at least 11 more motor vehicle accidents occurred on the Harlem River Drive between 165th and 183rd Streets between October 1990 and September 1993 that were “related to disabled vehicles in the travel lanes that could be directly attributed to the Drive’s lack of shoulders.” The record also reveals that … the City has justified its inaction by minimizing the significance of pertinent accident data, suggesting that the safety benefit of adding shoulders or turnouts to the Harlem River Drive would be outweighed by the onerousness of the undertaking, and estimating a multimillion-dollar cost of the endeavor. A municipality breaches its “nondelegable duty to keep its roads reasonably safe . . . when [it] is made aware of a dangerous highway condition and does not take action to remedy it” … . Chowdhury v Phillips, 2022 NY Slip Op 03067, First Dept 5-10-22

Practice Point: Where, as here, the municipality (or the state) has undertaken studies which concluded a roadway design, here the absence of turnouts for disabled vehicles, created a dangerous condition, the city (or the state) will be liable for an accident caused by that dangerous condition.

May 10, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK IN THE ON-COMING LANE WHILE ATTEMPTING A LEFT TURN IN AN INTERSECTION, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should not have been granted. Although plaintiff was making a left turn when he was struck by defendant in the on-coming lane, there was a question of fact whether defendant should have seen plaintiff. Plaintiff was making the turn after a stopped driver in the on-coming law gestured to him:

… [A]lthough the defendant submitted evidence that the plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way when turning left in violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1141, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the defendant was free from fault … . While testifying, the defendant admitted that he saw nothing out of the ordinary prior to the collision, that he could not recall if he observed the plaintiff’s vehicle, and that he only realized that there was a collision from hearing the sound. However, the defendant also testified that he was only driving at approximately 25 miles per hour and was looking straight ahead on a sunny afternoon with no obstructions to his view … . Moreover, the defendant acknowledged that he did not know if his vehicle or the plaintiff’s vehicle entered the intersection first. Thus, the defendant’s evidentiary submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s vehicle was already in the intersection as the defendant approached and whether the defendant should have observed the plaintiff’s vehicle making a left turn in time to take evasive action to avoid the accident … . Blake v Francis, 2022 NY Slip Op 02974, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Although plaintiff may have violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by making a left turn in the path of defendant’s car, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Here there was a question of fact whether defendant should have seen the plaintiff as he attempted the turn.

May 4, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

A CONTRACTOR WHICH CREATES A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON A PUBLIC SIDEWALK MAY BE LIABLE FOR A SLIP AND FALL BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant sidewalk-repair contractor’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. There was a question of fact whether the contractor who repaired the sidewalk created the hole which caused plaintiff to trip. A contractor may be liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in a dangerous condition on a public street or sidewalk:

“A contractor may be [held] liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in the creation of a dangerous condition upon a public street or sidewalk” … . Here, Amato [the defendant contractor] failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

At his deposition, Victor Amato, Amato’s owner, testified that his company had replaced a portion of the sidewalk at the subject location. … He acknowledged … that a two-by-four had been installed as a vertical “stake” to support a form that was used when the concrete was poured, and that he or one of his employees would have removed the stake after the concrete had set.

… [T]he plaintiff testified that she had not seen the hole because, from the direction she was walking, it was on the other side of an uneven, or sloped, portion of the sidewalk. Victor Amato admitted that this slope had been created deliberately (through a process known as “feathering”) because the new portion of the sidewalk was at a different height from the existing sidewalk. Pizzolorusso v Metro Mech., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03018, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Contactors which create a dangerous condition on a public sidewalk or road may be liable to a member of the public who is injured by the dangerous condition. The theory is similar to the “launch an instrument of harm” theory of contractor liability under the Espinal case.

May 4, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Evidence, Negligence

DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE STAIRS ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL BECAUSE THEY OFFERED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE STAIRS WERE LAST INSPECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this stairway slip and fall case should not have been granted. To warrant summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice, defendants must show when the stairway was last inspected, which they failed to do:

The defendants … failed to show … that they did not have constructive notice of the condition that the plaintiff alleged caused her to fall. “A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it” … . “To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last . . . inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell” … . Here, the evidence submitted on the defendants’ motion failed to demonstrate when the subject staircase was last inspected relative to the plaintiff’s accident … . Weiss v Bay Club, 2022 NY Slip Op 03026, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a slip and fall case, to warrant summary judgment the defendant must show it did not have constructive notice of the dangerous condition by demonstrating that the area of the fall was inspected close in time to the incident.

May 4, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Negligence

PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO THE EXTENT THE AMENDMENT AMPLIFIED THE ALLEGATIONS ALREADY MADE WITHOUT OBJECTION IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs were entitled to amplify the allegations in the supplemental bill of particulars in second and proposed third supplemental and amended bill of particulars:

The plaintiffs were entitled to amend their bill of particulars once as of right at any time prior to the filing of the note of issue … . Such amendment enables a party to include whatever could have been included in the original bill of particulars … . “‘Whatever the pleading pleads, the bill must particularize since the bill is intended to [afford] the adverse party a more detailed picture of the claim . . . being particularized'” … . B. E. M. v Warwick Val. Cent. Sch. Dist., 2022 NY Slip Op 02990, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Here plaintiffs were entitled to amend the supplemental bill of particulars to the extent the amendment amplified allegations already made without objection in the supplemental bill of particulars.

May 4, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

A CORPORATE OFFICER OR SHAREHOLDER CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR NONFEASANCE (DOING NOTHING), AS OPPOSED MISFEASANCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint against the individual defendant, John Milevoi, an officer or shareholder of the property management company, defendant M&L Milevoi Management, must be dismissed. Plaintiff alleged a leak in the ceiling of her apartment caused her slip and fall:

The complaint should be dismissed against the individual defendant John Milevoi, because there is no allegation that his liability stems from an act of misfeasance or malfeasance, as opposed to nonfeasance. A corporate officer or shareholder may not be held personally liable for a failure to act … . Defendant owner and defendant management company, on the other hand, have not established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. De Barcacel v 1015 Concourse Owners Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 02869, First Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: A corporate officer or shareholder cannot be personally liable for nonfeasance (doing nothing), as opposed to misfeasance. The complaint against the corporate officer or shareholder here was dismissed. But the complaint against the corporation was not. The corporation is a property management company and plaintiff’s slip and fall complaint alleged there was a water leak in her apartment.

April 28, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Employment Law, Negligence

PLAINTIFF DANCER STATED CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT DANCER AND THEIR EMPLOYER, THE NEW YORK CITY BALLET (NYCB), IN CONNECTION WITH INTIMATE IMAGES ALLEGEDLY DISCLOSED BY THE DEFENDANT DANCER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff, Waterbury, stated causes of action for: (1) violation of the NYC Administrative Code provision which prohibits the disclosure of intimate images without consent; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) negligent hiring, supervision and retention. The plaintiff (Waterbury) was a dancer with the defendant New York City Ballet (NYCB). The defendant Finlay, who allegedly disclosed the images, was also a NYCB dancer. The negligent hiring cause of action is against NYCB as the defendant-dancer’s employer:

Waterbury’s allegations that images depict her engaged in sexual activity suffice (see Administrative Code § 10-180 [a] …). Construing the complaint liberally and according Waterbury “the benefit of every possible favorable inference” … , the allegations that Finlay shared images of her breasts are also sufficient (see Administrative Code § 10-180 [a] …). …

Waterbury also sufficiently alleges that Finlay intended to cause her economic, physical, or substantial emotional harm. “A result is intended if the act is done with the purpose of accomplishing such a result or with knowledge that to a substantial certainty such a result will ensue” … . …

Waterbury alleges that NYCB dancers and others affiliated with NYCB shared images and commentary regarding other women and that NYCB knew that Finlay and other dancers were degrading and exploiting young women. She asserts that NYCB implicitly encouraged this behavior. Waterbury states that NYCB knew of Finlay’s sexual conduct towards young women and took no steps to prevent such conduct. Waterbury v New York City Ballet, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 02890, First Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: The NYC Administrative Code prohibits the disclosure of intimate images without consent. Here the complaint stated a cause of action based on an alleged violation of that code provision.

April 28, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, WHICH RELIEVES THE OWNER OF A LEASED VEHICLE FROM LIABILITY FOR A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, DID NOT APPLY TO THE DEFENDANT OWNER; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

DEFENDANTS PRESENTED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL WAS LAST INSPECTED; THERFORE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT).

THE NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE ABSENCE OF TURNOUTS FOR DISABLED VEHICLES CREATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT).

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK IN THE ON-COMING LANE WHILE ATTEMPTING A LEFT TURN IN AN INTERSECTION, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

A CONTRACTOR WHICH CREATES A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON A PUBLIC SIDEWALK MAY BE LIABLE FOR A SLIP AND FALL BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT).

DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE STAIRS ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL BECAUSE THEY OFFERED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE STAIRS WERE LAST INSPECTED (SECOND DEPT).

PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO THE EXTENT THE AMENDMENT AMPLIFIED THE ALLEGATIONS ALREADY MADE WITHOUT OBJECTION IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS (SECOND DEPT).

A CORPORATE OFFICER OR SHAREHOLDER CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR NONFEASANCE (DOING NOTHING), AS OPPOSED MISFEASANCE (FIRST DEPT).

PLAINTIFF DANCER STATED CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT DANCER AND THEIR EMPLOYER, THE NEW YORK CITY BALLET (NYCB), IN CONNECTION WITH INTIMATE IMAGES ALLEGEDLY DISCLOSED BY THE DEFENDANT DANCER (FIRST DEPT).

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