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HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO WHICH NO OBJECTION WAS MADE CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS HIT AND RUN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that hearsay evidence to which no objection was raised may be considered by the court. Here the hearsay was a GPS document which purported to show the location of vehicle owned by defendant AT&T submitted to demonstrate its vehicle was not involved in the hit and run accident:

… Supreme Court denied the motion on the ground that the GPS document was inadmissible inasmuch as it was submitted to the court without the proper foundation and there was no information as to its reliability. AT & T appeals.

“[I]n civil cases, inadmissible hearsay admitted without objection may be considered and given such probative value as, under the circumstances, it may possess” … . The Supreme Court should not have denied AT & T’s motion on the ground that the GPS document was inadmissible since the plaintiff never raised that issue in opposition to the motion … .

In any event, the other evidence submitted by AT & T established, prima facie, that AT & T’s vehicle was not involved in the subject accident … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the identity of the driver or owner of the vehicle which struck him … . Costor v AT&T Servs., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06098, Second Dept 10-28-20

 

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THE BUILDING MANAGING AGENT, WHO HIRED PEREZ, THE BUILDING SUPERINTENDENT, WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO DETERMINE WHETHER PEREZ, A REGISTERED SEX OFFENDER, HAD A CRIMINAL RECORD; THE BUILDING OWNER AND MANAGING AGENT, THEREFORE, WERE NOT LIABLE UNDER A NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION THEORY OR A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY FOR PEREZ’S SEXUAL ASSAULT ON INFANT PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the building owner, Carpenter, and managing agent, Lemle, could not be held liable for the sexual assault on infant plaintiff by Perez, the building superintendent. The managing agent, who hired Perez, was not under an obligation to determine whether Perez, a registered sex offender, had a criminal record:

Carpenter hired managing agents, who employed Perez. Lemle was the managing agent on the relevant date. However, no issue of fact exists as to whether Lemle can be held liable for Perez’s negligent hiring or retention because the record is devoid of evidence that Lemle had knowledge of Perez’s propensity to commit a violent act … . The fact that Perez was a registered sex offender does not avail plaintiffs, as, in the absence of knowledge of any facts that would cause a reasonable person to question a person’s background, an employer is under no duty to inquire whether an employee has been convicted of a crime … . The imposition of such a duty is a matter for the Legislature. There is no evidence that, prior to the incident in question, Perez ever did anything that should have indicated to his employer that he had a propensity to commit sexual abuse or any other crimes. Further, that Perez falsified identification records that he submitted for payroll purposes is of no moment, since the paperwork on its face would not have caused a reasonable person to question its veracity. Nor can Lemle be held vicariously liable for Perez’s conduct because the conduct was not in furtherance of Lemle’s business and was outside the scope of Perez’s employment … . Samoya W. v 3940 Carpenter Ave., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 06218, First Dept 10-29-20

 

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VETERINARY CLINIC MAY BE LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A DOG IN THE CLINIC’S WAITING ROOM, BUT THE CLINIC’S LIABILITY SHOULD NOT TURN ON WHETHER THE CLINIC WAS AWARE OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, THE STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD IMPOSED ON DOG-OWNERS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a two-judge concurrence, determined that the defendant veterinary clinic (Palmer) should not have been awarded summary judgment in this dog-bite case. As a veterinarian was returning a dog (Vanilla) which had just been treated to the dog’s owner in the waiting room the dog slipped out of its collar and allegedly attacked plaintiff. The question was whether the liability theory requiring knowledge of a dog’s vicious propensities applied to the clinic as it does to a dog-owner. The clinic had been awarded summary judgment on the ground it had demonstrated it was not aware of the dog’s vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals held the case against the clinic should be analyzed under a standard negligence theory, not under the strict liability theory applicable to dog-owners:

The vicious propensity notice rule has been applied to animal owners who are held to a strict liability standard, as well as to certain non-pet-owners—such as landlords who rent to pet owners—under a negligence standard … . However, we have recognized that other competing policies and contemporary social expectations may be at play in certain instances where domestic animals cause injuries. For example, we held that the owner of a farm animal “may be liable under ordinary tort-law principles” when that farm animal is allowed to stray from the property on which it is kept … . …

It is undisputed that Palmer owed a duty of care to plaintiff—a client in its waiting room. Palmer is a veterinary clinic, whose agents have specialized knowledge relating to animal behavior and the treatment of animals who may be ill, injured, in pain, or otherwise distressed. An animal in a veterinary office may experience various stressors—in addition to illness or pain—including the potential absence of its owner and exposure to unfamiliar people, animals, and surroundings. Moreover, veterinarians or other agents of a veterinary practice may—either unavoidably in the course of treatment, or otherwise—create circumstances that give rise to a substantial risk of aggressive behavior. …

… [W]e conclude that Palmer does not need the protection afforded by the vicious propensities notice requirement, and the absence of such notice here does not warrant dismissal of plaintiff’s claim. To be sure, “[w]e do not intend to suggest that [Palmer] would be subject to the same strict liability” as the owner of a domestic animal … . However, we are  satisfied that, under the circumstances presented here, a negligence claim may lie despite Palmer’s lack of notice of Vanilla’s vicious propensities. Furthermore, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must … , questions of fact exist as to whether the alleged injury to plaintiff was foreseeable, and whether Palmer took reasonable steps to discharge its duty of care. Thus, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. Hewitt v Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05975, Ct App 10-20-20

 

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NEITHER THE “HABIT” NOR THE “ERROR IN JUDGMENT” JURY INSTRUCTION WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the defense verdict in this medical malpractice case and ordering a new trial, determined: (1) the “habit” jury instruction should not have been given; (2) the “error in judgment” jury instruction should not have been given; and (3) plaintiff’s expert cardiologist should have been allowed to testify about the appropriateness of taking plaintiff off the anti-coagulant medication, DAPT. Plaintiff had a heart attack in 2012 and was put on DAPT permanently by his cardiologist to prevent blood clots. In 2014 defendant cardiologist agreed to the defendant gastroenterologist’s request to have plaintiff stop taking DAPT temporarily to allow a colonoscopy procedure. While plaintiff was off the DAPT he had another heart attack:

… [T]he very conduct that is the subject of the [habit] charge in question is the “course of treatment regarding patients they held in common.” In order for a habit charge to be appropriate, the proof must demonstrate “‘a deliberate and repetitive practice by a person in complete control of the circumstances'” … . “On no view . . . can conduct involving not only oneself but particularly other persons . . . produce a regular usage because of the likely variation of the circumstances in which such conduct will be indulged” … . Here, neither defendant had complete control, and both defendants testified that their decisions regarding temporary cessation of DAPT prior to or after a colonoscopy varied depending on the circumstances of each patient. …

An error in judgment charge “is appropriate only in a narrow category of medical malpractice cases in which there is evidence that [the] defendant physician considered and chose among several medically acceptable treatment alternatives” … . “A distinction must therefore be made between an ‘error in judgment’ and a doctor’s failure to exercise his or her best judgment. Giving the ‘error in judgment’ charge without regard for this distinction would otherwise relieve doctors whose conduct would constitute a breach of duty from liability” … . Here, the primary issue at trial was whether defendants deviated from the standard of care in determining to temporarily cease [plaintiff’s] DAPT both before and after his colonoscopy. There was no evidence presented that defendants chose between two or more medically accepted alternatives … . …

Plaintiffs’ cardiology expert established that he had knowledge and expertise in this area and should not have been barred from testifying as to whether [the gatroenterologist’s] decision to temporarily cease DAPT for 14 days after the colonoscopy was a departure from the standard of care … . Michalko v Deluccia, 2020 NY Slip Op 05991, Third Dept 10-22-20

 

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PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS INTOXICATED AND TRESPASSING, WAS INJURED FALLING THROUGH AN OPENING IN THE FLOOR OF A HOUSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S PRESENCE WAS FORESEEABLE AND PLAINTIFF’S INTOXICATION WAS NOT A SUPERSEDING CAUSE AS A MATTER OF LAW; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Plaintiff, who was intoxicated, entered defendants’ construction site at 3:00 am and fell through an opening in the floor of a house under construction. Because defendants were aware of trespassers entering the site in the past, there was a question of fact whether the accident was foreseeable. The fact that plaintiff was intoxicated was not a superseding cause, although it may speak to comparative negligence:

… [A] triable issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff’s presence on the property was foreseeable. The testimony … confirmed that it was common knowledge that people would routinely walk through houses still under construction. On this record, reasonable persons could disagree as to whether it was foreseeable for plaintiff to be on the subject property and whether defendants reasonably secured the property, thereby precluding summary judgment to defendants on this ground … . …

“An intervening act will be deemed a superseding cause and will serve to relieve [a] defendant of liability when the act is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates [the] defendant’s negligence from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be reasonably attributed to the defendant” … . Here, plaintiff had never been to the property before, and defendants did not establish that he either knew or should have known that such conduct was dangerous … . Further, there are triable issues of fact as to whether there was a no trespassing sign on the property, whether the property was properly secured to prevent entry and even whether the floor opening was covered. Although defendants’ expert opined that plaintiff was extremely intoxicated when he entered the property, [plaintiff’s friend] did not observe plaintiff having any difficulty walking. Plaintiff’s alcohol impairment may well have played a significant role in plaintiff’s accident for comparative fault purposes, but that fact does not exonerate defendants from liability as a matter of law … . Desroches v Heritage Bldrs. Group, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05992, Third Dept 10-22-20

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DEFENDANT RETAILER’S EMPLOYEE ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTED TO FIX A MALFUNCTIONING CROSSBOW AND RETURNED IT TO PLAINTIFF IN VIOLATION OF THE RETAILER’S RETURN POLICY; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS THEREAFTER INJURED BY THE CROSSBOW; THE RETAILER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligence cause of action against the defendant retailer which sold an allegedly defective crossbow to plaintiff should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged when he returned the malfunctioning crossbow to the retailer an employee attempted to fix it and gave it back to the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged he was thereafter injured by the crossbow:

… [E]ven accepting that defendant had no duty to warn plaintiffs of the alleged defect in the crossbow, it was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ negligence claim. Plaintiffs gave deposition testimony in which they explained that they were injured by the crossbow in separate incidents and that, when plaintiff James Garrison returned the crossbow to defendant’s store after the first incident, one of defendant’s employees attempted to repair it and gave it back to Garrison. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties and accepting their account of events as true … , a duty of care arose when the employee chose to undertake the crossbow repair … , and the fact that the repair violated defendant’s return policy for defective or damaged items constituted some evidence of negligence … . Defendant produced no evidence that conclusively demonstrated plaintiffs’ accounts to be untrue or showed the employee’s actions to have played no role in the second crossbow malfunction. Garrison v Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05996, Third Dept 10-22-20

 

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AN EYEWITNESS TO PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL TESTIFIED PLAINTIFF TOLD HER SHE TRIPPED OVER A MUDSILL BECAUSE OF DIM LIGHTING; PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT WAS ADMISSIBLE AS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Although plaintiff IHayward) testified she did not know why she tripped on a mudsill, an eyewitness (Espy) testified plaintiff told her she tripped because of dim lighting. Plaintiff’s statement was deemed admissible as an excited utterance. The court noted that defendants had demonstrated the mudsill was open and obvious and therefore did not need to demonstrate a lack of notice:

… [T]he defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the wooden mudsill that caused Hayward to fall was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention on appeal, having made that showing, the defendants were not required to make a prima facie showing that they lacked notice of the alleged defect. In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact, relying on, inter alia, Hayward’s testimony at a hearing held pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h and the affidavit of an alleged eyewitness, Janice Espy. During the 50-h hearing, Hayward testified that the area underneath the sidewalk shed was dim and that some of the lighting fixtures were missing light bulbs. However, Hayward testified that she was able to see where she was going. When she was asked why she tripped on the mudsill, Hayward stated that she did not understand the question and that she did not know why she tripped on the wooden mudsill. Espy averred that when she saw Hayward fall, she went to assist her. Hayward told Espy that she tripped on the mudsill and that she did not see it before she fell because the lighting conditions under the sidewalk shed were poor. Hayward’s statement to Espy was admissible as an excited utterance because it was made under the stress of excitement caused by her fall … . Under the circumstances, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the accident site was adequately illuminated and whether the mudsill was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Hayward v Zoria Hous., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05892, Second Dept 10-21-20

 

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RES IPSA LOQUITUR NEEDN’T BE ALLEGED IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM OR THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE IT IS NOT A THEORY OF LIABILITY, IT IS AN EVIDENTIARY RULE; NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION CAN BE INFERRED UNDER THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff properly raised res ipsa loquitur in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment even though the notice of claim and the complaint did not allege it. Res ipsa loquitur is not a theory of liability, it is a rule of evidence:

Plaintiff investigated a hissing sound coming from the electrical circuit box in her apartment and as she drew close to the circuit box, it suddenly burst into flame, burning her right arm. Plaintiff may raise res ipsa loquitur in opposition to defendant’s motion without having alleged the doctrine in her notice of claim or complaint, as it is not a separate theory of liability, but rather, an evidentiary rule that involves “‘a common sense application of the probative value of circumstantial evidence'” … . Plaintiff’s evidence raised triable issues as to application of the doctrine, as it showed that she had resided in the apartment for nearly 19 years, she would contact defendant’s employees to remedy any issues with the circuit box, and defendant’s employees handled the inspection, maintenance, and repair of the circuit box … . To the extent defendant argues its lack of notice of the alleged dangerous condition, a triable issue of fact exists here regarding the applicability of the res ipsa doctrine, and proof of notice of a dangerous condition may be inferred under the doctrine … . Townsend v New York City Hous. Auth., 2020 NY Slip Op 05874, First Dept 10-20-20

 

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THE CURB AND TREE WELL ARE NOT AREAS OF A SIDEWALK WHICH ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER; THE PROPERTY OWNER’S/MANAGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the areas near the sidewalk where plaintiff slipped and fell were the curb and a tree well. Both the curb and the tree well, according to the NYC Administrative Code, are not the responsibility of the abutting property owner (Gore/UA):

The owner of premises abutting the public sidewalk has a nondelegable duty to maintain and repair the sidewalk abutting the premises (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7—210 …). The sidewalk includes “the intersection quadrant for corner property” (Admin Code § 7-210[a]). “Although section 7-210 does not define the term ‘sidewalk,’ Administrative Code § 19-101 (d) defines sidewalk as ‘that portion of a street between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines, but not including the curb, intended for the use of pedestrians'” … . In the absence of a definition in section 7-210, this Court has held that the definition in section 19-101(d) should govern … .

We find that Gore/UA’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Review of the photographs clearly show that the area where plaintiff fell is a curb, intended for the use of pedestrians. Therefore, the definition of the term sidewalk in section 19-101(d) shows that Gore and UA did not have a duty to maintain or repair the area where plaintiff fell. Further, to the extent that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the tree well, Administrative Code § 7-210 “does not impose civil liability on property owners for injuries that occur in city-owned tree wells” … . Brown v New York City Dept. of Transp., 2020 NY Slip Op 05807, First Dept 10-15-20

 

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DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE STAIRWAY HAD LAST BEEN CLEANED OR INSPECTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was not entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case because it did not demonstrate when the stairway where plaintiff slipped and fell was last cleaned or inspected:

Defendant did not demonstrate that it lacked constructive notice of the grease as it failed to show when the stairwell was last cleaned or inspected … . Proof of a regular maintenance schedule “does not suffice for purposes of showing that it was followed” … , and since the superintendent was due to clean the hallways and stairs on the day of the accident, plaintiff’s observation of debris on the stairs shows that no such maintenance was done prior to her fall. White v MP 40 Realty Mgt. LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05838, First Dept 10-15-20

 

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