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You are here: Home1 / Trusts and Estates
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Trusts and Estates

PLAINTIFF, AS A “PROPOSED ADMINISTRATOR,” DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BRING A SURVIVAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY WAS NOT TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, as a “proposed administrator” did not have capacity to bring a survival action on behalf of the decedent’s estate. Only an administrator has such capacity:

The plaintiff’s motion, among other things, for leave to amend the complaint to substitute herself as “Administratrix” of the decedent’s estate in place of “proposed Administratrix” should have been denied. Here, the plaintiff failed to seek substitution within a reasonable time … .

“A personal representative who has received letters of administration of a decedent’s estate is the only party who is authorized to commence a survival action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the decedent or a wrongful death action to recover damages sustained by the decedent’s distributees on account of his or her death” … . “Thus, a ‘proposed administrator’ who has not obtained letters of administration lacks capacity to bring an action to recover damages for personal injuries or wrongful death on behalf of a decedent’s estate” … . Accordingly, dismissal is proper pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) where, as here, an action is commenced prior to the plaintiff receiving letters of administration … . As the plaintiff makes no allegations in support of any claim brought in her individual capacity, the Supreme Court should have directed dismissal of the complaint. Perez v Levister Redevelopment Co., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 06473, Second Dept 11-4-26

Practice Point: Only a party who has obtained letters of administration can bring a survival action on behalf of a decedent’s estate. Here the plaintiff’s action brought as a “proposed administrator” was dismissed.

 

November 4, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-04 16:10:192026-11-18 13:24:04PLAINTIFF, AS A “PROPOSED ADMINISTRATOR,” DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BRING A SURVIVAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY WAS NOT TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Fiduciary Duty, Trusts and Estates

THE PETITION RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER AND THE FAMILY ATTORNEY CAUSED THE APPELLANT TO MISS THE DEADLINES FOR FILING A SPOUSAL ELECTION; ALTHOUGH THE STATUTORY DEADLINES CANNOT BE EXTENDED, THE MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION HERE ASKS WHETHER APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE DEADLINES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Shulman, in a matter of first impression, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the facts alleged, if proven, could support the application equitable estoppel to preclude respondent-daughter from invoking statutory deadlines preventing her mother (the appellant) from filing a spousal election. The petition raised the question whether respondent daughter and the family attorney caused appellant to miss the deadlines:

Appellant is the 88-year-old surviving spouse of the decedent, her husband of 64 years. Over the course of their marriage, they acquired, rehabilitated, and operated 14 East Village buildings forming the core of a family real estate enterprise ultimately valued at more than $45 million. Appellant handled day-to-day management while the decedent handled the financials. Their two children include respondent and a son, Carlo. * * *

Following the decedent’s death, appellant experienced significant medical challenges and cognitive vulnerability leading to hospitalization and rehabilitation. During this period, the family’s long-time attorney, nonparty Gregg Weiss, prepared a broad, highly customized power of attorney naming respondent as attorney-in-fact. This document granted wide authority, with powers far beyond those typically granted in the statutory form, including the power to engage in trust related transactions. It was brought to appellant in the rehabilitation facility, where she signed it without any discussion or explanation of its consequences. * * *

Despite representing appellant and decedent’s estate at the time, Weiss never provided appellant with any drafts beforehand, nor is there any indication Weiss reviewed drafts with her or discussed their legal significance. These are just some of the facts the petition alleges that were the product of fiduciary nondisclosure and conflict. Critically, a video recording in the record shows respondent presenting the documents to appellant, who mutely signs them while visibly medicated on Lorazepam and impaired, without reading or understanding their terms. Matter of Giurdanella, 2026 NY Slip Op 06234, First Dept 10-22-26

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 22:03:452026-10-27 22:33:36THE PETITION RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER AND THE FAMILY ATTORNEY CAUSED THE APPELLANT TO MISS THE DEADLINES FOR FILING A SPOUSAL ELECTION; ALTHOUGH THE STATUTORY DEADLINES CANNOT BE EXTENDED, THE MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION HERE ASKS WHETHER APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE DEADLINES (FIRST DEPT).
Negligence, Trusts and Estates

PLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND ALLEGEDLY BECAME INTOXICATED AT DEFENDANT’S RESTAURANT, FELL DOWN A STAIRCASE AND DIED FROM HIS INJURIES; PURSUANT TO THE DRAM SHOP ACT, PLAINTIFF WIFE SUED THE RESTAURANT BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; HER INDIVIDUAL SUIT SURVIVED DISMISSAL; BUT THE SUIT ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE WAS DISMISSED; AN INTOXICATED PERSON, OR THE ESTATE OF AN INTOXICATED PERSON, CAN NOT SUE UNDER THE DRAM SHOP ACT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM INTOXICATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined Vera, the widow of the allegedly intoxicated decedent, could sue under the Dram Shop Act individually, but not as a representative of the decedent’s estate. Decedent fell down a staircase at defendant restaurant (Shuko):

In this Dram Shop Act action, plaintiffs allege that defendant Shuko, a restaurant, repeatedly served alcoholic beverages to the decedent, causing his intoxication and subsequent fall down a staircase inside the restaurant. The decedent sustained severe injuries which, according to plaintiffs, later resulted in his death. Vera, who is the decedent’s widow, is suing both in her individual capacity and as executor of the decedent’s estate, and is seeking damages, inter alia, for loss of support. * * *

…Vera’s allegations that Shuko sold alcohol to the decedent despite his being visibly intoxicated, and that she was personally injured by the loss of means of support is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss … . …

However, while “[t]he Dram Shop Act creates a cause of action in favor of a third party injured or killed by an intoxicated person, [ ] it does not create a cause of action in favor of the intoxicated person” … . Accordingly, “an intoxicated person or his or her estate cannot maintain a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act for injuries sustained as a result of that person’s own intoxication” … . The second cause of action against defendant Shuko therefore fails to state a cause of action insofar as it is asserted on behalf anyone other than plaintiff Vera individually. Vera v BH Broadway Owner LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05921, First Dept 10-13-26

Practice Point: Here the Dram Shop Act was applied where an intoxicated restaurant patron fell down a restaurant staircase and subsequently died from his injuries. Decedent’s wife could sue the restaurant under the Dram Shop Act in her individual capacity for loss of support. However, decedent’s wife could not sue under the Dram Shop Act on behalf of the decedent’s estate. …  “[A]n intoxicated person or his or her estate cannot maintain a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act for injuries sustained as a result of that person’s own intoxication” … .

 

October 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-13 14:07:032026-10-21 14:12:50PLAINTIFF’S HUSBAND ALLEGEDLY BECAME INTOXICATED AT DEFENDANT’S RESTAURANT, FELL DOWN A STAIRCASE AND DIED FROM HIS INJURIES; PURSUANT TO THE DRAM SHOP ACT, PLAINTIFF WIFE SUED THE RESTAURANT BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE; HER INDIVIDUAL SUIT SURVIVED DISMISSAL; BUT THE SUIT ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE WAS DISMISSED; AN INTOXICATED PERSON, OR THE ESTATE OF AN INTOXICATED PERSON, CAN NOT SUE UNDER THE DRAM SHOP ACT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM INTOXICATION (FIRST DEPT).
Family Law, Trusts and Estates

THE ASSETS TRANSFERRED TO IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS FOR THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, TRIAL COURT REVERSED OVER AN EXTENSIVE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this divorce proceeding, over a comprehensive dissent, determined the assets transferred to irrevocable trusts were not subject to equitable distribution:

While a trial court has broad discretion in fashioning an equitable distribution award, that discretion is not unlimited. Courts must respect the parties’ economic decisions made during the marriage, and may not disregard the legal character of property based solely on equitable concerns. As the Court of Appeals has emphasized, courts should not second-guess how parties chose to structure and allocate their assets during the marriage (see Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415, 420-421 [2009]). Consistent with this principle, assets transferred to valid, irrevocable trusts for third-party beneficiaries are not subject to equitable distribution absent evidence that the trust is a sham or that a spouse retains revocation power or a beneficial interest … . C.S. v R.H., 2026 NY Slip Op 05849, First Dept 10-8-26

Practice Point: Assets transferred to Irrevocable trusts for third-party beneficiaries are not subject to equitable distribution.

 

October 8, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-08 12:34:142026-10-18 15:00:54THE ASSETS TRANSFERRED TO IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS FOR THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, TRIAL COURT REVERSED OVER AN EXTENSIVE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Trusts and Estates

THE WORDING OF THE WILL RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR BECAUSE SEVERAL CHILDREN WERE MISIDENTIFIED AND ONE WAS OMITTED; THE PETITION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the wording of the will raised questions about the testator’s intent. Therefore the petition for construction of the will pursuant to SCPA (Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act) section 1420 should not have been denied without a hearing:

“The cardinal rule of construction of a will is to carry out the intent of the testator” … . “All rules of interpretation are subordinated to the requirement that the actual purpose of the testat[or] is sought and effectuated as far as is consonant with principles of law and public policy” … . “Intent is not to be gleaned by focusing upon any one particular word, sentence, or provision; rather, it must be ascertained from a perusal of the entire will by a reader mindful of the particular facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the instrument were framed” … . “The heirs of a testator are favored by the policy of the law and cannot be disinherited upon mere conjecture, and when the testator intends to disinherit them he must indicate that intention clearly” … .

Here, the Surrogate’s Court should not have, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding without a hearing … . The allegations in the verified petition, inter alia, that several of the decedent’s children were misidentified in Article THIRD and that Article THIRD contained the word “children” but omitted the name of one of the decedent’s children … , were sufficient to indicate that the testator’s intent was not clear and unambiguous.

Accordingly, the Surrogate’s Court should have held a hearing to give the petitioner the opportunity to submit proof to establish the decedent’s intent … . Matter of Covington, 2026 NY Slip Op 05785, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Here the wording of the will raised questions about the testator’s intent. The petition for construction of the will should not have been denied without a hearing at which petitioner could present evidence of the decedent’s intent.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 17:01:552026-10-15 18:11:12THE WORDING OF THE WILL RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR BECAUSE SEVERAL CHILDREN WERE MISIDENTIFIED AND ONE WAS OMITTED; THE PETITION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Trusts and Estates

THE DEATH OF A DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFFECTED THE MERITS OF THE ACTION; THEREFORE THE DEATH TRIGGERED A STAY OF THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING SUBSTITUTION OF A REPRESENTATIVE; HERE ALL THE DETERMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT MADE AFTER DEFENDANT’S DEATH WERE A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined the death of a defendant affected the merits of the action triggering a stay of all proceedings. Therefore the determinations made by Supreme Court after defendant’s death were a nullity:

“Generally, the death of a party divests a court of jurisdiction to act, and automatically stays proceedings in the action pending the substitution of a personal representative for the decedent” … . “Any determination rendered without such a substitution is ordinarily deemed a nullity” … . However, “if a party’s death does not affect the merits of a case, there is no need for strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution” … . “A judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all questions at issue between the parties, and concludes all matters of defense which were or might have been litigated in the foreclosure action” … . However, “[a] judgment of foreclosure and sale does not divest the mortgagor of its title and interest in the property until the sale is actually conducted” … .

Here, the decedent answered the complaint and was entitled to service of all papers in the action, including any motions to extend the time in which to conduct the foreclosure sale and any notice of sale (see CPLR 2103 …). … [T]he decedent’s death did affect the merits of this action and triggered a stay of all proceedings in the action pending substitution of a legal representative … . Any determinations made by the Supreme Court after the decedent’s death were a nullity, including the amended order and judgment of foreclosure and sale and the orders appealed from … . Real Estate Mtge. Network, Inc. v Perez, 2026 NY Slip Op 05562, Second Dept 9-30-26

Practice Point: Where a defendant’s death affects the merits of the action, the action is stayed pending substitution of a representative.

Practice Point: All rulings made while the action was stayed were a nullity.

Practice Point: A judgment of foreclosure and sale does not divest a mortgagor of title to and interest in the property until the sale is conducted.

 

September 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-30 18:15:562026-10-04 18:38:30THE DEATH OF A DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AFFECTED THE MERITS OF THE ACTION; THEREFORE THE DEATH TRIGGERED A STAY OF THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING SUBSTITUTION OF A REPRESENTATIVE; HERE ALL THE DETERMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT MADE AFTER DEFENDANT’S DEATH WERE A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Trusts and Estates

THERE IS NO RESTRICTION ON THE NUMBER OF TIMES A PLAINTIFF MAY TAKE ADVANTANGE OF THE SIX-MONTH EXTENSION TO FILE A NEW ACTION (CPLR 205(A)) WHERE THE COMPLAINT IS DISSMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT YET OBTAINED LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the dismissal of a complaint on behalf of a decedent because plaintiff has not yet obtained letters of administration is not on the merits. Therefore a plaintiff can take advantage of the six-month extension to file another action (CPLR 205(a)) every time the complaint is dismissed on that ground:​

CPLR 205(a) provides that, “[i]f an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence . . . within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the prior action.” “Dismissal of an action for lack of capacity to sue is not a dismissal on the merits and, therefore, does not preclude the applicability of the six-month savings period under CPLR 205(a)” … . Where a complaint is dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) for lack of capacity to sue because the plaintiff has not yet obtained letters to administer the decedent’s estate, “there is no restriction on the number of times that a plaintiff may qualify for a six-month statutory grace period” under CPLR 205(a) … .

Here, the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) for lack of capacity to sue because the plaintiff had not yet obtained letters to administer the decedent’s estate. Under these circumstances, there is no restriction on the number of times that the plaintiff may qualify for a six-month statutory grace period under CPLR 205(a) … .  Greene v Five Towns Premier Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., 2026 NY Slip Op 05286, Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: Where a complaint is dismissed because plaintiff has not yet obtained letters of administration there is no restriction on the number of times plaintiff can take advantage of the six-month extension to file a new action pursuant to CPLR 205(a).​

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 23:02:292026-09-17 23:35:13THERE IS NO RESTRICTION ON THE NUMBER OF TIMES A PLAINTIFF MAY TAKE ADVANTANGE OF THE SIX-MONTH EXTENSION TO FILE A NEW ACTION (CPLR 205(A)) WHERE THE COMPLAINT IS DISSMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT YET OBTAINED LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION (SECOND DEPT).
Limited Liability Company Law, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Trusts and Estates

PROPERTY OWNED BY A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND A TRUST IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS OF THE UNIFORM PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY ACT (RPAPL 993); THOSE ENTITIES ARE NOT “INDIVIDUALS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this partition action, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Golla, determined a limited liability company and a trust are not “individuals” within the meaning of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) section 993:

In a case of first impression before this Court, we are asked to determine whether property owned wholly by a trust and a limited liability company may constitute “heirs property” pursuant to the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (RPAPL 993). That question requires a determination as to whether a trust and a limited liability company are “individual[s]” within the meaning of RPAPL 993. … [W]e find that trusts and limited liability companies are not “individual[s]” under RPAPL 993. Property wholly owned by such entities, and not owned by individuals who acquired title from a relative, cannot be “heirs property” within the meaning of the statute. * * *

Here, the brothers, after owning the subject property themselves for more than half a century, put their interests in the subject property into these sophisticated legal entities. The owners’ status as sophisticated legal entities provides its own protections from predatory parties. In any event, here, there is no outside third party who is seeking to invade a family’s right to possess real property, further demonstrating that the owners are not entitled to the protections of RPAPL 993. Flouret v Sagland, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05009, Second Dept 8-19-26

 

August 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-19 15:52:462026-08-23 16:18:16PROPERTY OWNED BY A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND A TRUST IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS OF THE UNIFORM PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY ACT (RPAPL 993); THOSE ENTITIES ARE NOT “INDIVIDUALS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Judges, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Trusts and Estates

APPARENTLY THE MORTGAGOR WAS DECEASED AT THE TIME THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED RENDERING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION A NULLITY; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION, SO AMENDING THE CAPTION TO ADD THE EXECUTOR DID NOT EFFECTUATE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE; ECHO BAY PURCHASED THE PROPERTY FROM THE MORTGAGOR’S SUCCESSORS FOUR YEARS LATER; ECHO BAY HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE, MOVE TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE, AND MOVE TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, granting the motion to intervene and dismissing the foreclosure complaint, apparently determined the mortgagor was deceased at the time the foreclosure action was brought rendering the action a nullity. Therefore Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to amend the caption to add the mortgagor’s executor. For years later, Echo Bay purchased the property from the mortgagor’s successors and properly moved to intervene, to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the complaint:

“‘A party may not commence a legal action or proceeding against a dead person'” … , and an action to foreclose a mortgage is a legal nullity insofar as asserted against a deceased mortgagor … . “A judgment or order issued without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that defect may be raised at any time and may not be waived” … . * * *

… [T]he fact that Echo Ray obtained its interest in the property after the action was commenced and the notice of pendency was filed does not bar intervention … , and that branch of the plaintiff’s prior motion which was for leave to amend the caption to substitute the executor of [mortgagor’s] estate as a defendant in this action did not effectuate jurisdiction over her estate … . * * *

… Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the motion of Echo Ray which were pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) to vacate the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the complaint, as the action was a legal nullity insofar as asserted against [the mortgagor], the sole borrower and property owner as alleged in the complaint … . The owner of the property is an indispensable party to a foreclosure action (see RPAPL 1311[1] …). “The absence of an indispensable party mandates dismissal of the action, and the plaintiff cannot maintain the action as against the other defendants” … . Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Jackson, 2026 NY Slip Op 04927, Second Dept 8-12-26

Practice Point: If the mortgagor is deceased when the foreclosure action is commenced, the action is a nullity and the judgment of foreclosure and sale is void. A subsequent purchaser of the property can successfully move to intervene, vacate the judgment and dismiss the foreclosure complaint.

 

August 12, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-12 17:07:092026-08-15 18:50:29APPARENTLY THE MORTGAGOR WAS DECEASED AT THE TIME THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED RENDERING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION A NULLITY; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION, SO AMENDING THE CAPTION TO ADD THE EXECUTOR DID NOT EFFECTUATE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE; ECHO BAY PURCHASED THE PROPERTY FROM THE MORTGAGOR’S SUCCESSORS FOUR YEARS LATER; ECHO BAY HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE, MOVE TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE, AND MOVE TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Trusts and Estates

WHERE THE PROPERTY OWNER DIES INTESTATE, AND THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT, THE FORECLOSURE ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT DIRECTLY AGAINST THE HEIRS OF THE PROPERTY OWNER; THE ESTATE IS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action against the heir of the decedent property owner should not have been dismissed. Where the property owner dies intestate, and plaintiff is not seeking a deficiency judgment, the foreclosure action can proceed directly against the heirs of the property owner. The estate is not a necessary party:

… [Where] “a property owner dies intestate, title to real property is automatically vested in his or her distributees” … . “Thus, where a mortgagor/property owner dies intestate and the mortgagee does not seek a deficiency judgment, generally a foreclosure action may be commenced directly against the distributees” … . Here, because the decedent died intestate, and because the plaintiff no longer seeks a deficiency judgment, the decedent’s estate was not a necessary party, and the plaintiff could proceed directly against the distributees of the decedent’s estate … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Unknown Heirs to the Estate of Jacinto Ortiz, 2026 NY Slip Op 04745, Second Dept 7-29-26

Practice Point: Where the property owner dies intestate, and plaintiff is not seeking a deficiency judgment, the foreclosure action may proceed directly against the distributees, the estate is not a necessary party.

 

July 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-07-29 12:10:492026-08-05 12:41:52WHERE THE PROPERTY OWNER DIES INTESTATE, AND THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT, THE FORECLOSURE ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT DIRECTLY AGAINST THE HEIRS OF THE PROPERTY OWNER; THE ESTATE IS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).
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