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THE CLASS—LONG ISLAND POWER AUTHORITY (LIPA) CUSTOMERS AFFECTED BY POWER OUTAGES CAUSED BY HURRICANE SANDY—SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the class, Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) customers affected by Hurricane-Sandy power outages, should not have been certified:

The plaintiffs base their claims against LIPA on an allegation that LIPA failed to fulfill its promise, made in 2006, that it would spend $25 million annually on a 20-year “storm hardening” project (i.e., $500 million total) intended to render its electric system more durable and resilient in the face of major storms. …

… [T]o establish liability, the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that, had LIPA performed storm hardening work consistent with its promise, their outages would have been shortened or avoided. This is, as LIPA argues, a fact-driven inquiry which is both speculative and hopelessly individual since it would require the factfinder to determine not only what should have been completed … , but also to speculate whether that work, had it been performed, would have prevented or shortened individual class members’ outages. * * *

… [T]he Supreme Court should also have denied class certification on the basis that the plaintiffs cannot state a viable cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract … . Matter of Long Is. Power Auth. Hurricane Sandy Litig. v Long Is. Power Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 07545, Second Dept 12-29-21

 

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THE STATE PROPERLY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTICITY-GENERATING WIND TURBINES IN WESTERN NEW YORK (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming the approval of the construction of wind turbines for generating electricity by the NYS Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment (Board), determined: (1) the correct local wind-turbine law for the Town of Freedom was considered by the Board; (2) the Board correctly refused to consider a local wind-turbine law for the Town of Farmersville enacted after the evidentiary phase of the project was complete; (3) the Board properly considered the climate-change effects of the project and the effects on wild life and the land; and (4) the coalition contesting the Board ruling did not have standing to represent the First Amendment rights of the Amish community:

… [T]he Board must determine … whether a proposed electric generating facility “is a beneficial addition to or substitution for the electric generation capacity of the state” and whether “the adverse environmental effects of the construction and operation of the facility will be minimized or avoided to the maximum extent practicable” (Public Service Law § 168 [3] [a], [c]), and the Board must consider … “the impact on community character” and any additional “social, economic, visual or other aesthetic, environmental and other conditions” deemed pertinent by the Board … . “[T]he Board was created to provide for an expeditious review process and ‘to balance, in a single proceeding, the people’s need for electricity and their environmental concerns’ ” … . Furthermore, it is settled that “[t]his [C]ourt’s scope of review is limited to whether the decision and opinion of the [B]oard, inter alia, are . . . supported by substantial evidence in the record and matters of judicial notice properly considered and applied in the opinion . . . , are made in accordance with proper procedure . . . and are not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion” … . “The task of weighing conflicting evidence . . . is properly left to the . . . Board” … . Matter of Coalition of Concerned Citizens v New York State Bd. On Elec. Generation Siting & The Envt. & Alle-Catt Wind Energy, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 06221, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

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IN APPROVING A WIND TURBINE INSTALLATION THE STATE BOARD ON ELECTRIC GENERATION AND SITING AND THE ENVIRONMENT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER LOCAL LAWS ENACTED BY THE TOWN AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS CLOSED; THE LOCAL LAWS SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined the State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment (siting board) had properly approved the Bluestone Wind Farm Project. The siting board properly ignored local laws enacted by the town after the evidentiary hearing was closed which attempted to impose a moratorium on the project to allow further study:

The legislative history and intent fully support this decision. In enacting the predecessor to Public Service Law article 10, the Legislature acted with the express purpose of providing “‘for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning the location of major steam electric generating facilities presently under the jurisdiction of multiple state and local agencies, including all matters of state and local law, in a single proceeding'” … . In its current iteration, article 10 “was enacted in 1992 to provide ‘a comprehensive framework for developing and implementing sound energy policy for the [s]tate that integrates energy planning with consideration of environmental quality and [to provide] a one-stop process for the siting of major electric generating facilities'” … . “One goal of the legislation was to permit comprehensive review of the benefits and impacts anticipated from proposed facilities without unreasonable delay [and,] . . . [i]ndeed, the expeditious resolution of siting applications is a goal noted throughout documents submitted in support of the legislation” … .

This goal was manifested in the 12-month deadline imposed on the Siting Board to issue a final determination on each application before it … . … Public Service Law article 10 requires the inclusion of all substantive local laws in the record by way of a specific exhibit to be incorporated into each application … . Any disputes as to whether a proposed facility complies with a local substantive law are thus intended to be resolved by way of evidence presented during the hearing to the Hearing Examiners, and the statute explicitly places the burden on the municipality to present evidence in support of enforcement of the local law in question … . “Thus, the history and scope of article [10], as well as its comprehensive regulatory scheme, . . . would be frustrated by” last minute laws such as Local Law No. 4 … . Matter of Broome County Concerned Residents v New York State Bd. on Elec. Generation Siting & the Envt., 2021 NY Slip Op 05903, Third Dept 10-28-21

 

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION PRECLUDED THIS CIVIL SUIT AGAINST OFFICERS OF THE UTILITY AFTER THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DETERMINED PLAINTIFF’S ELECTRICITY HAD BEEN PROPERLY CUT OFF BY THE UTILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD REPLACED THE METER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precluded plaintiff’s lawsuit against former officers of the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation. Plaintiff believed the digital encoder receiver transmitter (ERT) installed at his home by the utility to replace an analog meter emitted cancer-causing radiation. Plaintiff removed the ERT and replaced it with an analog meter. The utility considered the meter dangerous and cut off plaintiff’s electricity. Plaintiff complained to the Public Service Commission (PSC) which supported the utilities’ power cut-off and informed plaintiff of his appeal rights. Plaintiff did not appeal and started the instant civil suit:

… [W]e find that Supreme Court was correct in its interpretation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court has the discretion to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over a matter where an administrative agency also has jurisdiction, and the determination of the issues involved, under a regulatory scheme, depends upon the specialized knowledge and experience of the agency … . Here, the issues concern the particular meter used by Central Hudson, plaintiff’s removal and replacement of same, the safety concerns caused by his actions and the validity of the disconnection of his service. These matters fall under the doctrine and, thus, were appropriate for PSC determination. We also agree with Supreme Court’s assessment that the causes of action found in plaintiff’s complaint amount to little more than a rebranding of his PSC claim and were properly dismissed … .

… [W]e agree with Supreme Court’s determination that review of a PSC ruling is limited to a CPLR article 78 proceeding. “Supreme Court, in determining the motion for [summary judgment,] properly considered whether the . . . primary jurisdiction doctrine[] precluded the causes of action propounded by plaintiff[]” … , and that, in order to review the original ruling, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to bring an article 78 proceeding … . [Romine] v Laurito, 2020 NY Slip Op 04432, Third Dept 8-6-20

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE OWNERSHIP OF A SIDEWALK UTILITIES GRATE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in this slip and fall case, determined there were questions of fact about whether: (1) a sidewalk grate belonged to the abutting landowner (11 Madison) or the utility (Con Ed); and (2) whether the installation of the grate by the prior owner of the property constituted a special use of the sidewalk:

The record does not demonstrate conclusively that the owner of the sidewalk vault grate on which plaintiff Marie Saez allegedly tripped was defendant Con Ed, rather than the 11 Madison defendants, who owned the property abutting the sidewalk where the grate was located. There is an affidavit by the president of defendant Sapir Realty Management Corp. averring that the grates were already installed when the 11 Madison defendants acquired the property in 2003 and that the 11 Madison defendants had never been advised by Con Ed that they had any responsibility for maintaining the grates over Con Ed’s utility vaults or presented with any plans concerning the grates. There is also evidence that the 11 Madison defendants’ predecessor in interest had purchased and installed the non-standard vault gratings, and there is a note on the plot plan for the vault construction stating that this entity was to “supply, install and maintain” the non-standard gratings it had requested. As issues of fact exist whether Con Ed or the 11 Madison defendants owned the gratings, it cannot be concluded that Con Ed was responsible for maintaining the gratings and the area around them in safe condition … .

Issues of fact also exist as to whether the 11 Madison defendants’ predecessor’s installation of the non-standard vault grates constitutes a special use of the sidewalk by these defendants. Although there is evidence that they had no access to the grates and the vault, the evidence is not conclusive. Moreover, there is evidence that the transformers in the vaults provided electrical service solely to their property … . Saez v Sapir Realty Mgt. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 03863, First Dept 7-9-20

 

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THE CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) EXEMPTED THE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY FROM ANY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL); THE COMPANY WAS FREE TO EXERCISE EMINENT DOMAIN OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissent, determined that the certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to petitioner, National Fuel Gas Supply, for construction of a gas pipeline, exempted National Fuel from any requirements of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL). Therefore National Fuel did not need to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of the EDPL before exercising eminent domain of the land in dispute:

In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to petitioner National Fuel Gas Supply for its proposed construction of a 99-mile natural gas pipeline spanning from Pennsylvania to Western New York. … [t]his certificate …—which did not condition National Fuel’s eminent domain power on receipt of a water quality certification and which remained valid and operative at all relevant times despite the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s intervening denial of National Fuel’s application for such a certification—exempted National Fuel from the public notice and hearing provisions of article 2 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) in accordance with EDPL 206 (A). …

The question before us distills to whether the certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to National Fuel satisfies EDPL 206 (A) so as to entitle National Fuel to exercise eminent domain over the land in dispute without undertaking additional review of the pipeline’s public benefit. If satisfied, EDPL 206 (A) excuses compliance with various provisions of EDPL article 2 where a proposed condemnor has successfully completed a review of the project’s public benefit and use before a state, federal, or local agency. * * *

… [W]here, as here, a gas company holds a valid certificate of public convenience or necessity from FERC for the proposed construction of a pipeline and that certificate places no relevant conditions on the eminent domain power and has not been stayed or revoked by FERC or a federal court properly reviewing its issuance, compliance with article 2 is excused under EDPL 206 (A). Matter of National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Schueckler, 2020 NY Slip Op 03563, CtApp 6-25-20

SUMMARY OF THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT DECISION REVERSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON JUNE 25, 2020

ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, over a two-justice dissent, considering a matter of first impression, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a gas supply company could not acquire easements over private property by eminent domain for the installation of a pipeline for which the state denied a permit:

In February 2017, the FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] granted petitioner’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a 97-mile natural gas pipeline from Pennsylvania into western New York. The pipeline’s proposed route travels directly across respondents’ land … . Within the voluminous certificate, the FERC found that petitioner’s “proposed [pipeline] project is consistent with the Certificate Policy Statement,” i.e., the public interest. “Based on this finding and the environmental review for the proposed project,” the FERC further found “that the public convenience and necessity require approval and certification of the project.” …

… [T]he New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) denied petitioner’s application for a WQC [water quality certification]. The WQC application, held the DEC, “fails to demonstrate compliance with New York State water quality standards.” Petitioner has taken various steps to challenge the WQC denial, including the filing of a petition for judicial review in the Second Circuit pursuant to 15 USC § 717r (d). It appears that those challenges have not yet been finally resolved. It is undisputed, however, that if the WQC denial is ultimately upheld, the pipeline cannot be built … . * * *

… [P]etitioner is trying to expropriate respondents’ land in furtherance of a pipeline project that, as things currently stand, cannot legally be built. Such an effort turns the entire concept of eminent domain on its head. If the State’s WQC denial is finally annulled or withdrawn, then petitioner can file a new vesting petition. But until that time, petitioner cannot commence a vesting proceeding to force a sale without going through the entire EDPL [Eminent Domain Procedure Law] article 2 process. Matter of National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Schueckler, 2018 NY Slip Op 07550, Fourth Dept 11-9-18

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS WORKING ON A ROOF WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY CONTACTED AN ELECTRIC WIRE LEADING TO THE HOME AND WAS KILLED; THE UTILITIES’ (CON EDISON’S) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE GROUND IT OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint against the Con Edison defendants in this electrocution case should not have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff was working on a roof when he alleged came into contact with an electric wire attached to the home and was killed. Con Edison argued it did not owe a duty to plaintiff’s decedent:

“[T]he existence and scope of a duty is a question of law requiring courts to balance sometimes competing public policy considerations” …. Contrary to Con Edison’s contention, it failed to establish that it owed no duty to the decedent … . Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, since the plaintiff alleged that Con Edison authorized the installation of an improper and non code-compliant connection between its electrical lines and the homeowner’s electrical system, such actions gave rise to Con Edison’s duty to the decedent who reasonably could be expected to come into contact with the property’s electrical wires … . Thus, Con Edison did not establish that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for negligence. Sucre v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03377, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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OWNER OF A SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM INSTALLED ON SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERTY WAS ENTITLED TO THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX DESPITE THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S RESOLUTION OPTING OUT OF THE EXEMPTION; THE RESOLUTION WAS NEVER FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the petitioner, Laertes Solar, the owner of a solar energy system installed on school district property, was entitled to the statutory exemption from property tax on the system. The school district had adopted a resolution opting out of the exemption. But the resolution had never been filed with the NYS Department of Taxation and Finance (Department) or the NYS Energy and Research Development Authority (NYSEARDA) as required by the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL 487):

The … examination of “the language of the statute and the legislative intent underlying it” … leads us to agree with Supreme Court that the filing requirements of RPTL 487 (8) are mandatory and that the 2014 resolution was inapplicable to the system given the school district’s failure to meet those requirements during the relevant period (see RPTL 487 [8] [a]). Indeed, although we need not defer to the Department’s interpretation of RPTL 487 given that this case presents a question “of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent”… , it is notable that the Department has also taken the position that an opt-out resolution “must be filed” with both it and NYSERDA … . It follows that — even assuming that the system may be viewed as a distinct parcel of real property that may be taxed — Laertes was entitled to the RPTL 487 exemption for which it applied (see RPTL 487 [6]). Matter of Laertes Solar, LLC v Assessor of the Town of Harford, 2020 NY Slip Op 02302, Third Dept 4-16-20

 

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ALTHOUGH SOME MONETARY RELIEF WAS SOUGHT, THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE CLAIM WAS A DECLARATION VERIZON HAD WRONGFULLY DISCONTINUED CLAIMANT’S LIFELINE SERVICE; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is generally limited to money damages. Therefore the action, which was seeking a ruling that claimant’s Verizon Lifeline Service was wrongfully discontinued, was properly dismissed:

The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction determined by the Constitution and statute (see NY Const art VI, § 9; Court of Claims Act § 9). Its jurisdiction is generally limited to money damage awards against the State … . “Whether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim, is dependent upon the facts and issues presented in a particular case” … .

Here, while the claimant alleges certain monetary losses, the essential nature of his claim is one seeking to compel the PSC [NYS Public Service Commission] to investigate and issue a determination on his complaint that Verizon wrongfully discontinued his Lifeline Service, which he alleges the PSC is required to do. The money damages sought are merely incidental to the primary question of the PSC’s investigation and regulation of Verizon with respect to the Lifeline Service program. Aliksanyan v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01137, Second Dept 2-19-20

 

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UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LEASE AND VILLAGE REGULATIONS, THE HERKIMER COUNTY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, AS THE OWNER OF PROPERTY ABANDONED BY THE TENANT, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNPAID WATER CHARGES INCURRED BY THE TENANT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency (HCIDA) as the owner of property which had been abandoned by the tenant was responsible to the Village for water charges incurred by the tenant:

… [W]here, as here, an owner “consents to the tenant’s using water in [a] building, supplied through pipes installed by the owner, or continued by the owner, for the purpose of connecting the building with the [municipality’s] water main, the owner assents to the [municipality’s] supplying water to the tenant for use in the building” … . In the case before us, it appears that the water pipes of the facility that were connected to the Village’s water mains “were installed by the owner of the [facility], if not by the present owner, [HCIDA], then by [its] predecessor in title and the connection was never shut off or disconnected by [HCIDA],” and we note that “[t]he only purpose of maintaining a connection between [the facility] and the [Village’s] water mains [was] to have the [Village] supply the [facility] with water”… . Moreover, the lease contemplated that the tenant would incur utility charges as part of its operation, use, and occupancy of the leased facility. “When such assent [to] or arrangement [for the tenant’s use of water] is made, it must be deemed to be made with a view to the existing law” … . We therefore must evaluate the existing law at the time of HCIDA’s assent to the Village supplying water to the tenant in order to determine whether liability for the unpaid water rents may be imposed upon HCIDA. …

… [U]nder the section entitled “Liability for Water Service,” Rule No. 7 of the [Village] regulations provides that “[a]ll bills, whether for use of water or repairs to water service, are a charge against the owner of the premises or property where the water is used, and said bills will be rendered to the owner or occupant of said premises.” Under the same section, Rule No. 8 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll bills for the use of water become due and payable and are a lien on the premises where the water is used” and that “[f]ailure to receive bills for said water services . . . does not relieve the owner and/or consumer from liability to pay.” … Upon construing the regulations as a whole and according to the ordinary and plain meaning of the words therein, we conclude that the regulations provide for the imposition of liability on property owners for water consumed on such property and supplied by the Village.  Herkimer County Indus. Dev. Agency v Village of Herkimer, 2019 NY Slip Op 06237, Fourth Dept 8-22-19

 

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