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THE LANGUAGE IN THE HIPAA FORM, INDICATING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICIAN MAY BUT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO SPEAK WITH DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WAS PROPERLY APPROVED BY SUPREME COURT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, over a dissent, determined Supreme Court properly approved language in the HIPAA form informing plaintiff’s physicians that they may but are not obligated to speak with defendant’s attorney:

Defendant offered … to accept revised authorizations that included the following language:

“the purpose of the requested interview with the physician is solely to assist defense counsel at trial. The physician is not obligated to speak with defense counsel prior to trial. The interview is voluntary.”

… [D]efendant moved … to compel plaintiff to provide revised authorizations. The court granted the motion … , directing plaintiff … to provide revised HIPAA-compliant authorizations containing defendant’s proposed language, unemphasized and in the same size font as the rest of the authorization. * * *

Here, the wording that was approved by the court is identical to the wording that previously met with the approval of the Second Department in Porcelli v Northern Westchester Hosp. Ctr. (65 AD3d 176, 178 [2d Dept 2009]), it is similar to the language contained in the [Office of Court Administration’s] standard form, and there is no dispute that it is consistent with the applicable law. Sims v Reyes, 2021 NY Slip Op 02971, Fourth Dept 5-7-21

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS TAKEN TO THE DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S EMERGENCY ROOM AND WAS OPERATED ON BY AN INDEPENDENT SURGEON; PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE EMERGENCY ROOM EXCEPTION APPLIED AND THE HOSPITAL WAS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE SURGEON’S ALLEGED MALPRACTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff demonstrated the emergency room exception applied and defendant hospital could be held vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice an independent surgeon:

In general, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the negligence or malpractice of its employees acting within the scope of employment, but not for the negligence or malpractice of an independent physician, as when the physician is retained by the patient himself or herself … . However, as an exception to this rule, a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the acts of independent physicians if the patient enters the hospital through the emergency room and seeks treatment from the hospital, not from a particular physician … .

Here, the plaintiff satisfied her prima facie burden of demonstrating that the emergency room exception applies by producing evidence that the decedent was brought to the Hospital’s emergency room by ambulance, did not request treatment by a particular physician, and was assigned to Reichman’s care by the Hospital … . Goffredo v St. Luke’s Cornwall Hosp., 2021 NY Slip Op 02788, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

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PLAINTIFFS’ MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SEEKING RECOVERY OF THE COSTS OF CARING FOR A SEVERELY DISABLED CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PROOF REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiffs’ medical malpractice action seeking recovery of the expenses of caring for their severely disable child should not have been dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to properly diagnose the child’s conditions in utero and failed to advise plaintiffs of their options:

Parents may maintain a cause of action on their own behalf for the extraordinary costs incurred in raising a child with a disability … . “To succeed on such a cause of action, which ‘sound[s] essentially in negligence or medical malpractice,’ [a plaintiff] ‘must demonstrate the existence of a duty, the breach of which may be considered the proximate cause of the damages suffered by’ [the injured party]” … . “Specifically, the parents must establish that malpractice by a defendant physician deprived them of the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy within the legally permissible time period, or that the child would not have been conceived but for the defendant’s malpractice” … . “[T]he claimed damages cannot be based on mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise, and, when sought in the form of extraordinary expenses related to caring for a disabled child, must be necessitated by and causally connected to the child’s condition” … . “Since the plaintiffs’ recovery is limited to their personal pecuniary loss, expenses covered by other sources such as private insurance or public programs are not recoverable” … . Vasiu v Berg, 2021 NY Slip Op 01798, Second Dept 3-24-21

 

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GALLBLADDER SURGERY WAS PERFORMED ON PLAINTIFF, BUT HER GALLBLADDER HAD BEEN REMOVED YEARS BEFORE; THE DOCTORS APPARENTLY DID NOT REVIEW THE AVAIABLE MEDICAL RECORDS; THE RADIOLOGIST DID NOT DISCOVER THAT THE GALLBLADDER WAS ABSENT; THE DOCTORS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined questions of fact precluded summary judgment which had been awarded to an internist (Patil), a surgeon (Jung), and a radiologist (Opsha). Plaintiff underwent gallbladder surgery, but her gallbladder had already been removed. The medical record reflected the prior removal:

The plaintiff’s expert opined that Patil departed from the accepted standard of care and contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries by failing to review the plaintiff’s medical records maintained by SIPP, which indicated that the plaintiff previously had her gallbladder removed. …

At his deposition, Jung testified that, before the surgery, he was not aware that the plaintiff had a previous cholecystectomy and became aware that “[t]here was no gallbladder” … surgery. He admitted that he “looked at” Patil’s notes and reviewed the ultrasound report. Further, although he had access to [the] medical records, he did not recall if he reviewed the plaintiff’s medical chart prior to the surgery, but “might have looked at something.” Jung admitted that, other than the primary care physician’s report and the radiological report, it was “not routine” for him to “look into other documents and charts for a patient.” …

Opsha’s expert failed to explain the basis for his conclusion as to how Opsha detected a gallbladder in his review of the ultrasound and made findings in his report regarding the plaintiff’s gallbladder when that organ had been removed years earlier … . Ruiz v Opsha, 2021 NY Slip Op 01796, Second Dept 3-24-21

 

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MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT PROVIDERS, WHO WERE TREATING MOTHER, DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO HER SON, WHO WAS STABBED AND KILLED BY MOTHER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant medical/mental health facilities and psychiatrist, who were treating plaintiff’s wife, did not owe a duty to plaintiff’s son, who was killed by plaintiff’s wife. Plaintiff had called defendant Unity Mental Health (UMH) several times seeking additional care because his wife’s condition was worsening. Plaintiff was told his wife should keep her psychiatric appointment which was two weeks away. Two days later plaintiff’s wife stabbed their son (decedent):

Generally, medical providers owe a duty of care only to their patients, and courts have been reluctant to expand that duty to encompass nonpatients because doing so would render such providers liable “to a prohibitive number of possible plaintiffs” … .The scope of that duty of care has, on occasion, been expanded to include nonpatients where the defendants’ relationship to the tortfeasor ” ‘place[d] [them] in the best position to protect against the risk of harm,’ ” and “the balancing of factors such as the expectations of the parties and society in general, the proliferation of claims, and public policies affecting the duty proposed herein . . . tilt[ed] in favor of establishing a duty running from defendants to plaintiffs under the facts alleged” … . Under the circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that those factors do not favor establishing a duty running from defendants to decedent. The complaint herein does not allege that plaintiff’s wife sought treatment specifically in order to prevent physical injury to decedent or her family, that defendants were aware whether she had threatened or displayed violence towards her family in the past, or that defendants directly put in motion the danger posed by the patient … . Cardenas v Rochester Regional Health, 2021 NY Slip Op 01641, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT AFFIDAVIT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT LAY A FOUNDATION FOR AN OPINION OUTSIDE THE EXPERT’S FIELD AND DID NOT REBUT THE OPINIONS OF DEFENDANT’S EXPERT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice case should have been granted. Plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit did not raise a question of fact because there was no foundation for the expert’s opining outside the expert’s field of emergency medicine:

The affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert, a physician with training in emergency medicine, lacked probative value as it failed to specify that the expert had any specific training or expertise in neurology or in the diagnosis and treatment of strokes, or how she became familiar with the applicable standards of care … . Moreover, the plaintiff’s expert failed to rebut the opinions of the defendant’s expert or articulate how the defendant’s alleged deviations from the accepted standard of care were a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries … . Laughtman v Long Is. Jewish Val. Stream, 2021 NY Slip Op 01251, Second Dept 3-3-21

 

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ALLEGED ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT DID NOT WARRANT SETTING ASIDE THE OVER $21 MILLION VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based upon the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel should not have been granted in this medical malpractice action. Plaintiff suffered a brain injury rendering him unable to take care of himself and was awarded over $21 million:

… [W]e conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in ordering a new trial in the interest of justice based upon attorney misconduct. Some of the challenged conduct was improper, and we do not condone it … . However, “where counsel, in summing up, exceeds the bounds of legal propriety, it is the duty of the opposing counsel to make a specific objection and for the court to rule on the objection, to direct the jury to disregard any improper remarks, and to admonish counsel from repetition of improper remarks” … . Here, defense counsel did not object to the challenged remarks during summation or request a curative instruction, thus depriving the court of the opportunity to direct the jury to disregard improper remarks or give other curative instructions, and to avoid further error … . “Where no objection is interposed, a new trial may be directed only where the remarks are so prejudicial as to have caused a gross injustice, and where the comments are so pervasive, prejudicial, or inflammatory as to deprive a party of a fair trial” … . The misconduct of the plaintiff’s counsel in the instant case was not so pervasive or prejudicial as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial, or to have affected the verdict, particularly in light of the strength of the plaintiff’s case … .  Accordingly, we deny that branch of the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the verdict and for a new trial in the interest of justice, and reinstate the verdict. Yu v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 08215, Second Dept 2-24-21

 

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OVERRULING PRECEDENT, THE FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A CERTIFICATE OF MERIT IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION; IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACTION HAS MERIT OR AN EXCUSE FOR THE FAILURE TO FILE IN SEEKING AN EXTENSION TO FILE THE CERTIFICATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kennedy, overruling precedent, determined that the failure to timely file a certificate of merit pursuant to CPLR 3012-a in a medical malpractice action does not require dismissal of the action. In addition, a showing that the action has merit and an excuse for failing to file are not necessary when seeking an extension for filing:

Had the legislature intended to permit dismissal for failure to comply with CPLR 3012-a, the statute would empower the court to do so … . Accordingly, the sanction of dismissal is not authorized and to the extent that this Court’s decisions in Blasoff v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (147 AD3d 481), Grad v Hafliger (68 AD3d 543), George v St. John’s Riverside Hosp. (162 AD2d 140), and Perez v Lenox Hill Hosp. (159 AD2d 251) are not in accord with the foregoing, they should no longer be followed.

Moreover, generally, a showing of a meritorious action and a reasonable excuse is required to vacate a pleading default and the failure to make this showing necessarily mandates dismissal of the pleading. However, since this sanction is improper in the context of a CPLR 3012-a violation, it follows that the failure to comply with this provision is not a pleading default and a plaintiff is not required to make this showing … .Accordingly, a showing of a meritorious action through the submission of an affidavit of merit and a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with CPLR 3012-a is not required to obtain an extension of time to comply with the statute. Fortune v New York City Health & Hosps. Corps., 2021 NY Slip Op 01122, First Dept 2-18-21

 

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CVS, A DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT DOCTORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT CVS’S PROVIDING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WITH THE WRONG DOSAGE OF MEDICINE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this medical malpractice case, determined the jury should not have heard evidence that CVS mistakenly gave plaintiff a double dose of a drug. CVS was a defendant but successfully moved for summary judgment prior to the trial:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in permitting the jury to hear evidence that CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (hereinafter CVS), mistakenly gave the decedent a double dose of digoxin, and testimony from [defendant] Manvar that the double dose of digoxin predisposed the decedent to an arrhythmia that caused his cardiac arrest. CVS, a defendant in this action, was awarded summary judgment based on its argument that its error in giving the decedent a double dose of digoxin was not a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s cardiac arrest. As summary judgment is the “functional equivalent” of a trial, the court should have precluded [defendants] Huppert and Manvar from presenting evidence at trial that CVS’s negligence may have been a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s cardiac arrest … . Raineri v Lalani, 2021 NY Slip Op 00890, Second Dept 2-10-21

 

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PLAINTIFF’S SIGNING A CONSENT FORM PRIOR TO SURGERY DID NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice, lack of informed consent and battery causes of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged defendant doctor operated on the wrong site. Defendant testified she removed a cyst from plaintiff’s left leg and plaintiff alleged defendant should have removed an abscess. The court noted that plaintiff’s signing a consent form did not require dismissal of the lack of informed consent cause of action:

As to the lack of informed consent cause of action, the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant and the generic consent form signed by the plaintiff presented triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant informed the plaintiff about the procedure, the alternatives thereto, and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits of the proposed treatment and the alternatives … . “[T]he fact that the plaintiff signed a consent form does not establish [the defendant’s] entitlement to judgment as a matter of law” where, as here, the form was generic, and beyond a barebones handwritten notation of the areas of the body, “Left Bartholin/Left Inguinal Abscess,” “did not contain any details about the operation” … . The consent form does not even indicate the procedure to be performed, but merely lists an area of the body, “Left Bartholin,” and a condition, “Left Inguinal Abscess.” Preciado v Ravins, 2021 NY Slip Op 00441, Second Dept 1-27-21

 

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