The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s lack-of-informed-consent cause of action in this medical malpractice case should have been dismissed. Plaintiff had alleged a new theory in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment which should not have been considered because the theory was not discernable from the pleadings:
… [T]he Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for lack of informed consent insofar as asserted against him. The defendant made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing that cause of action insofar as asserted against him through the affidavit of his expert, the deposition testimony, and the written consent form signed by the plaintiff, which demonstrated that the defendant disclosed to the plaintiff the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the procedure … .
In opposition, the plaintiff alleged, for the first time, a new theory that the procedure performed by the defendant exceeded the scope of her consent in specific respects, a theory that was not referred to when the plaintiff’s counsel questioned the defendant at his deposition. The general rule is that ” [a] plaintiff cannot, for the first time in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, raise a new or materially different theory of recovery against a party from those pleaded in the complaint and the bill of particulars'” … . If the theory is discernable from the pleadings, it may be considered … , especially if the theory is referred to in the depositions … . In this case, the assertion of the new theory was not discernable from the pleadings, nor alluded to by the plaintiff’s counsel when deposing the defendant … . Therefore, that theory should not have been considered. Larcy v Kamler, 2020 NY Slip Op 03652, Second Dept 7-1-20