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THE ASSAULT AND BATTERY OF CLAIMANT-INMATE BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS OCCURRED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE OFFICERS’ EMPLOYMENT AND WAS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE; THEREFORE THE STATE, AS THE OFFICERS’ EMPLOYER, COULD BE LIABLE FOR THE ASSAULT AND BATTERY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the alleged assault and battery by corrections officers occurred within the scope of the officers’ employment at the correctional facility and was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore the state could be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court of Claims had held the assault was conduct outside the scope of the officers’ employment and the state therefore was not liable:

… [W]hile it is our view that the correction officers’ use of force was excessive, the ensuing investigations of the incident effectively condoned the conduct of the correction officers and tacitly found them to be engaged in actions that were within the scope of employment … . To this end, it was claimant that was found guilty of misbehavior for assaulting prison staff, and prison officials determined that the use of force was “consistent with Departmental Rules[,] and [that] the injuries received, both by staff and the involved [incarcerated individual] are accounted for.” This evidence reflects that prison officials determined that the conduct of the correction officers was appropriate under the circumstances and fell within the scope of employment. Finally, in light of claimant’s … report accusing Poupore [one of the corrections officers involved] of inappropriate contact with claimant, which preceded the incident, and Poupore’s knowledge of same, it was clearly foreseeable that a tense encounter could result during further interactions between Poupore and claimant in the context of normal employment-related activities in the prison … . Altogether, we find that the foregoing establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the assault occurred within the scope of the correction officers’ employment as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an employment-related activity and that the verdict in this case must be reversed on the facts and the law. Galloway v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 00137, Third Dept 1-12-23

Practice Point: The assault and battery of claimant-inmate was deemed to be within the scope of the corrections officers’ employment and foreseeable. Therefore the state, as the officers’ employer, could be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

 

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THE COUNTY HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER’S EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIM AGAINST THE POLICE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE FROM THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THAT PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE WAS NOT DETERMINATIVE; THE APPLICATION TO SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s application to file a late notice of claim in this “excessive force” action against the police should have been granted. The county had timely knowledge of the nature of the claim and the county did not demonstrate prejudice from the delay. The absence of an adequate excuse was not determinative:

… [T]he petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the County of Suffolk and the SCPD, alleging, inter alia, that he had sustained personal injuries due to the use of excessive force by the arresting officers. …

In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court is required to consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, whether the claimant has a reasonable excuse for the failure to timely serve a notice of claim, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining its defense … . …

… [T]he respondents had timely actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner’s claim, since their employees participated in the acts giving rise to the claim and filed reports and prepared other documentation with respect to the subject incident from which it could be readily inferred that the respondents had committed a potentially actionable wrong … . Matter of Romero v County of Suffolk, 2022 NY Slip Op 04966, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: Here the county had timely knowledge of the nature of petitioner’s excessive-force claim against the police and the county could not demonstrate any prejudice from petitioner’s late filing. The absence of an adequate excuse for failure to file on time was not determinative. Petitioner’s application to file a late notice of claim should have been granted.

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS DETAINED BY DEFENDANT HOME DEPOT’S EMPLOYEE BASED ON A FALSE ALLEGATION AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT ON HIS BATTERY AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT CAUSES OF ACTION UPHELD (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department upheld a jury verdict (reducing it however) in favor of plaintiff who was detained in defendant Home Depot’s store by a Home Depot employee based upon the false allegation plaintiff had assaulted a woman. Plaintiff was detained until the police arrived and then arrested. Plaintiff was a court attorney and was seeking a judicial nomination. Plaintiff was awarded $1.8 million, which the Second Department reduced to $500,000:

The jury, after a trial on the issue of liability, returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants on the causes of action alleging battery and false imprisonment. …

… False arrest and false imprisonment are two different names for the same common-law tort … . The elements of the tort are intent to confine the plaintiff, the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and the confinement was not otherwise privileged … . “Probable cause is a complete defense to an action alleging . . . false imprisonment” … .

The fact that the police had probable cause to detain the plaintiff based on what Marrugo [the Home Depot employee] told them does not mean that Marrugo had probable cause to detain the plaintiff. Although a civilian complainant generally cannot be found liable for false imprisonment merely for providing information to the police which turns out to be wrong … , a private person can be liable for false imprisonment for actively participating in the arrest such as “‘importuning the authorities to act'” … . The record indicates that the plaintiff would not have been arrested but for Marrugo’s detention of him, and importuning the police to arrest him. Marrugo instigated the arrest, making the police his agents in confining the plaintiff … . Marrugo did so based upon false information that the plaintiff assaulted the female customer with a shopping cart. Wieder v Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 04830, Second Dept 8-3-22

Practice Point: Here a Home Depot employee detained plaintiff until the police arrived based on the false allegation he had assaulted a woman. Plaintiff sued Home Depot and the verdict in plaintiff’s favor was upheld.

 

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DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF HER ESTRANGED HUSBAND WHO ALLEGEDLY ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN DEFENDANT’S HOME; THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WAS THE ESTRANGED HUSBAND’S ACT; DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant homeowner’s (Portelli’s) motion to dismiss the negligence action against her based upon an assault upon plaintiff by Portelli’s estranged husband at Portelli’s home should have been dismissed:

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as the result of an assault by the defendant Robert DiGesu that took place at a house owned by his estranged wife, the defendant Susan M. Portelli. * * *

Homeowners have a duty to act in a reasonable manner to prevent harm to those on their property … . This includes “the duty to control the conduct of third persons on their premises when the homeowners have the opportunity to control such persons and are reasonably aware of the need for such control” … .

Portelli did not have the opportunity to control DiGesu’s conduct … , nor would it have been reasonable for her to have known of the need to control DiGesu’s conduct so as to protect the plaintiff from DiGesu’s unexpected assault … . Portelli’s alleged acts or omissions were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries but “merely furnished the conditions for the event’s occurrence” … . The sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries was DiGesu’s assault … . Maruca v DiGesu, 2022 NY Slip Op 04719, Second Dept 7-29-22

Practice Point; Homeowners have a duty to act reasonably to prevent harm to those oh their property. Here, however, defendant homeowner did not have the opportunity to control her estranged husband’s conduct at the time he allegedly assaulted the plaintiff in defendant’s home. Therefore the sole proximate of plaintiff’s injuries was the estranged husband’s act and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY THAT HE DID NOT RECALL HOW OR WHERE HE SLIPPED AND FELL AND DID NOT RECALL A FIGHT OR BEING HIT WERE FATAL TO THE SLIP AND FALL AND ASSAULT CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he didn’t recall how or where he slipped and fell, and, with respect to his assault cause of action, did not recall the fight or being hit, was fatal to the complaint:

In a slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff’s inability to identify the cause of the fall is fatal to the cause of action, because a finding that the defendant’s negligence, if any, proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries would be based on speculation … . Here, with regard to that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging negligence, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff could not identify the cause of his alleged fall without engaging in speculation … . …

“To sustain a cause of action to recover damages for assault, there must be proof of physical conduct placing the plaintiff in imminent apprehension of harmful contact” … . Here, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he could not recall a physical altercation at the premises on the date of the alleged incident and did not “recall being hit.” Barnett v Fusco, 2022 NY Slip Op 04147, Second Dept 6-29-22

Practice Point: In a slip and fall case, the failure to recall the cause of the fall requires dismissal. In an assault and battery case, the failure to recall the fight or being hit requires dismissal.

 

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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST IS A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND BATTERY STEMMING FROM THE ARREST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court noted that probable cause for arrest is a complete defendant to causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment and battery association with the arrest:

The Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the municipal defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery insofar as asserted against them. The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment … . The existence of probable cause is also a complete defense to a cause of action alleging assault and battery based solely on bodily contact during an allegedly unlawful arrest … . Farquharson v United Parcel Serv., 2022 NY Slip Op 01007, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT THEATER MANAGER WAS NOT A SECURITY GUARD, HIS RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDED DEALING WITH UNRULY PATRONS AND KEEPING THE PREMISES SAFE; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HE WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE THREATENED A PATRON WITH A PELLET GUN; THEREBY RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE THEATER WAS LIABLE FOR THE MANAGER’S ACTIONS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the defendant movie- theater manager, Adams, may have been acting within the scope of his employment by the theater, AMC, when he threatened plaintiff, a theater patron, with a pellet gun. Therefore AMC’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

… [T]he general manager of the theater, Adams’s supervisor, stated, during his deposition, that managers, like Adams, have security-related responsibilities, including ensuring that the theater is safe for customers and dealing with unruly patrons. And the plaintiff, during his deposition, stated that he believed Adams was a security guard.

When a business employs security guards or bouncers to maintain order, the use of physical force may be within the scope of their employment … . Adams did not hold either of these job titles, but his responsibilities included maintaining order at the theater, ensuring the safety of customers and staff, and, if necessary, facilitating the removal from the theater of “disruptive or potentially violent” customers. The accomplishment of these ends by means prohibited by the AMC defendants’ policy was not necessarily unforeseeable. … Unquestionably, Adams’s response to the plaintiff and his friends was “in poor judgment” …  and contrary to the AMC defendants’ policy, but “this in itself does not absolve [the AMC] defendants of liability for his acts” … . Norwood v Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 07006, Second Dept 12-15-21

 

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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR “GENDER-BIASED VERBAL ASSAULT, BATTERY AND HARASSMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 79-N” AGAINST HER FORMER ATTORNEY; THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO CPLR 214(2) APPLIES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark addressing several issues not summarized here, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for “gender-biased verbal assault, battery and harassment, Civil Rights Law 79-n” and the three-year statute of limitations applied to that cause of action. The lawsuit was brought by a former client against her former attorney, Benjamin:

In her third cause of action, labeled “Gender-Biased Verbal Assault, Battery and Harassment, Civil Rights Law § 79-n,” plaintiff alleges that Benjamin repeatedly subjected her to “cruel, unprovoked and unjustified verbal abuse, assault, battery and harassment,” that such conduct was “motivated, at least in part, by” Benjamin’s bias toward women, that Benjamin “regularly and consistently conducts himself in the same or similar manner toward” women and that plaintiff has suffered, among other things, physical harm as a result of Benjamin’s bias-related conduct. Although plaintiff does not specifically detail Benjamin’s bias-related conduct within the third cause of action, the facts alleged earlier in the complaint, which are incorporated by reference under the third cause of action, are replete with allegations that Benjamin forcibly subjected plaintiff to nonconsensual sexual contact, including one occasion when Benjamin forced plaintiff to perform oral sex on him and at least two occasions when he forcibly touched plaintiff’s genitals. In our view, the allegations of forcible, nonconsensual contact, together with plaintiff’s allegation that such conduct was motivated by Benjamin’s gender bias, could, if proven, demonstrate the bias-related violence or intimidation required to recover under Civil Rights Law § 79-n … . * * *

… [A]lthough plaintiff’s third cause of action is akin to common-law assault and battery claims, plaintiff’s claim of bias-related violence or intimidation would not exist but for Civil Rights Law § 79-n (2). To recover under common-law assault and battery causes of action, plaintiff would simply need to prove that defendants intentionally placed her “in apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact” and “intentionally engage[d] in offensive bodily contact without [her] consent” … . In contrast, to recover for Benjamin’s alleged forcible, nonconsensual sexual contact under Civil Rights Law § 79-n (2), plaintiff has to demonstrate that Benjamin intentionally selected her for harm or intentionally caused her physical injury in whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding her gender and that there was “actual or imminent physical harm” as a result of the gender bias-related violence or intimidation … . Given the substantive differences between claims asserted under Civil Rights Law § 79-n and common-law assault and battery claims, we are convinced that Civil Rights Law § 79-n (2) creates liability that would not exist but for the statute and that therefore the three-year statute of limitations period in CPLR 214 (2) applies to plaintiff’s third cause of action … . A.M.P. v Benjamin, 2021 NY Slip Op 06589, Third Dept 11-24-21

 

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ASSAULT AND BATTERY CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE DO NOT REQUIRE A SPECIAL DUTY OWED TO PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the assault and battery causes of action against the city did not require demonstration of a special duty owed plaintiffs by the police:

Plaintiff’s … causes of action sounded in assault and battery, and not negligence. Therefore, the question was not whether the police owed plaintiff a special duty … , but whether the force used against her was more than necessary under the circumstances … . Plaintiff’s deposition testimony concerning the police officers’ conduct toward her supported the elements of a claim for assault and battery … . While defendants did not specifically recall interacting with plaintiff, they described a situation where they were disbursing a large crowd that was gathering around three different fights going on at the same time. Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff may have been pushed or shoved during the course of that incident. “Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances is generally best left for a jury to decide” .. . Butler v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 05810, First Dept 10-26-21

 

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CLAIMANT-INMATE’S ACTION AGAINST THE STATE ALLEGING HE WAS BEATEN BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE OFFICERS WERE ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE BEATING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, reversing the Court of Claims, over a two-justice dissent, determined the claimant-inmate’s action alleging claimant was beaten by corrections officers after lodging a complaint against one of the officers (Poupore) should not have been dismissed. The Court of Claims ruled the state could not be liable for the beating because the officers were not acting within the scope of their employment:

… [T]he undisputed evidence demonstrated that the incident took place at Clinton Correctional Facility, that the correction officers involved were on duty and that claimant’s encounter with Poupore by the stairway was occasioned by claimant having been called downstairs for an interview with Wood [Poupre’s supervisor] … . … [T]estimony from defendant’s witnesses demonstrated that pat frisks are routinely conducted prior to inmate interviews and that Poupore was instructed to pat frisk claimant prior to his interview. Accepting claimant’s version of events as true, Poupore struck claimant during the course of that employer-sanctioned pat frisk, which then led to the involvement of additional correction officers. If claimant’s account is credited, Poupore’s intentional tortious act of punching claimant in the head was not so divorced from the performance of his pat-frisk duties so as to preclude a finding that he was acting within the scope of employment. Nor can we conclude as a matter of law that the ensuing altercation was wholly outside the scope of the additional correction officers’ duties. Galloway v State of N.Y., 2021 NY Slip Op 02855, Third Dept 5-6-21

 

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