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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT ESTABLISH EITHER THE “GENERAL CAUSATION” OR “SPECIFIC CAUSATION” FRYE CRITERIA IN THIS MOLD-INJURY CASE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s expert did not offer sufficient proof plaintiff’s injuries were caused by exposure to mold. Neither the “general causation” nor “specific causation” criteria established by Frye v United States, 293 F 101, were met:

General causation cannot be established through studies showing only a “risk” or “association” between mold exposure and the development of certain medical conditions … . The defendants’ expert relied on a position paper of the American Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology published in 2006 … , that controverts the plaintiff’s expert’s theory of causation … . The scientific literature and testimony proffered by the plaintiff’s expert was insufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s expert’s theory of general causation has gained general acceptance in the scientific community … . …

… [T]he method used by [plaintiff’s] expert to establish specific causation did not satisfy Frye. … [I]t is not enough for a plaintiff’s expert to testify that “exposure to a toxin is ‘excessive’ or ‘far more’ than others,” or to offer testimony “that merely links a toxin to a disease or ‘work[s] backwards from reported symptoms to divine an otherwise unknown concentration’ of a toxin” … . “… [W]e have never dispensed with a plaintiff’s burden to establish sufficient exposure to a substance to cause the claimed adverse health effect” … . “At a minimum, . . . there must be evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of th[e] agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered” … . Buist v Bromley Co., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 01904, Second Dept 4–10-24

Practice Point: Here the expert evidence purporting to demonstrate plaintiff’s injuries were caused by exposure to mold did not satisfy the “general causation” or “specific causation” criteria established by Frye v United States, 293 F 101, criteria explained.

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INSURER WAS TIMELY NOTIFIED OF THE ASBESTOS-EXPOSURE CLAIM AND WHEN THE INJURY-IN-FACT OCCURRED PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there are questions of fact whether the defendant insurer was timely notified of the claim in this asbestos-exposure case, and there are questions of fact, raised by conflicting expert evidence, about when the injury-in-fact occurred:

Defendant contends that the Meissners’ [plaintiffs’] delay of 68 days—from when they were first informed that Ridge Construction [defendant] had excess insurance policies issued by defendant to the date that the Meissners’ counsel wrote to provide defendant notice of the claim—was unreasonable as a matter of law. In response, plaintiff asserts that the delay was reasonable because the Meissners were not aware for the first 63 of those days that Ridge Construction had failed to provide defendant with notice. “The reasonableness of the delay in giving notice is ordinarily a question for the fact-finder” … .

* * * The parties … “dispute when an asbestos-related injury actually begins: plaintiff[ ] assert[s] that injury-in-fact occurs upon first exposure to asbestos, while defendant denies that assertion and instead maintains that injury-in-fact occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” … . Inasmuch as the parties here submitted conflicting expert opinions as to when the injury-in-fact occurs in an asbestos-related injury, summary judgment on that basis was not proper … . Meissner v Ridge Constr. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 01445, Fourth Dept 3-15-24

Practice Point: Whether the insurer was timely notified of the asbestos-exposure claim is a question of fact which should not have been determined as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage.

Practice Point: Here conflicting expert evidence was presented about when the injury-in-fact occurs in an asbestos-exposure case. The issue should not have been determined as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage.

 

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THE OWNER OF A COOPERATIVE BUILDING WAS PROPERLY FOUND LIABLE FOR FAILING TO REMEDIATE LEAD PAINT IN A SHAREHOLDER’S APARTMENT WHICH WAS SUBLET TO PLAINTIFF AND HER YOUNG DAUGHTER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Oing, determined the owner of the building (Windsor) in which a cooperative shareholder, Sersch, sublet her cooperative apartment to plaintiff, had constructive knowledge plaintiff’s young daughter was living with plaintiff. Plaintiff’s daughter was diagnosed with lead poisoning and peeling lead paint was found in the apartment. Summary judgment finding Windsor liable for failing to remediate the lead paint problem was affirmed:

Windsor’s agents’ frequent and consistent interactions with plaintiff and the infant plaintiff were sufficient to provide constructive notice to Windsor … . Windsor failed to proffer an affidavit from any of the doormen stating that they did not know plaintiff and the infant plaintiff or were unaware of their residence. Under these circumstances, Windsor failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the issue of constructive notice … . * * *

Windsor argues that section [NYC Administrative Code] 27-2056.15(c) exempts it from the duty to remediate and abate the lead paint in the apartment because Sersch “occupied” the apartment during plaintiffs’ subtenancy. Here, the terms of the sublease and the stipulation of settlement clearly indicate that the apartment was not “occupied” by Sersch during plaintiffs’ subtenancy. E.S. v Windsor Owners Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 00267, First Dept 1-23-24

Practice Point; Here the owner of a cooperative building was deemed liable under New York City law for failure to remediate lead paint in a shareholder’s apartment which had been sublet to plaintiff and her young daughter.

 

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UNDER THE JONES ACT OHIO HAD JURISDICTION TO APPOINT ADMINSTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT WHO ALLEGEDLY DIED OF EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS ON MERCHANT MARINE SHIPS; THE NEW YORK EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE WAS TIMELY AND PROPERLY SUBSTITUTED FOR THE OHIO ADMINISTRATORS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, in a complex decision which cannot be fairly summarized here, determined: (1) under the Jones Act Ohio had jurisdiction to appoint administrators for decedent who allegedly died from asbestos exposure on merchant marine ships where he was employed; and (2) substitution of a New York personal representative, executor of the estate, was proper and timely:

… [T]he Jones Act provides that when a seaman dies from an employment injury “the personal representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer” (46 USC § 30104).

The Jones Act grants a right of action to the personal representative “without other description” … . The Act does not require that the personal representative be either “a domiciliary or ancillary administrator” … . A domiciliary administrator has standing to file a Jones Act or FELA [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] lawsuit in another state … . However, nothing “explicitly clothes a domiciliary administrator with the exclusive right to maintain such an action” because such a requirement is inconsistent with “the remedial nature” of FELA and the “representative character” of such a suit … .

Notably, the personal representative’s authority under the Jones Act derives from “a federal statutory right and power given to carry out the policy of the federal statutes” and “is not limited to the confines of the State where he was appointed but is co-extensive with general federal jurisdiction” … . Bartel v Maersk Line, Ltd., 2023 NY Slip Op 02058, First Dept 4-20-23

Practice Point: Under the Jones Act, the estate of a merchant-marine employee who died from exposure to asbestos on the employer’s ships may sue the employer. Here the suit was deemed properly started by administrators appointed by an Ohio court and the New York executor was properly and timely substituted for the Ohio administrators.

See also the companion decision: Bartel v Farrell Lines, 2023 NY Slip Op 02057, First Dept 4-20-23

 

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DEFENDANT MANUFACTURED VALVES CONTAINING ASBESTOS; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HAD A SMALL OFFICE IN NYC THE VALVES WERE MANUFACTURED AND SOLD IN CONNECTICUT, WHERE PLAINTIFF LIVED AND WORKED; THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW YORK AND PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR NEW YORK JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s asbestos exposure action. Although the defendant manufacturer of valves containing asbestos had a small office in New York, defendant demonstrated that all the activity which related to the manufacture, sale and use of the valves took place in Connecticut. Plaintiff lived and worked exclusively in Connecticut as well:

… [T]here was no record evidence suggesting that defendant’s minimal activity in New York had an articulable nexus to plaintiff’s injury. … … [In addition] plaintiff did not offer a sufficient basis to justify jurisdictional discovery … . To the extent that defendant operated an executive and sales office out of the 100 Park Avenue office, this limited activity was not substantially related to plaintiff’s alleged exposure to asbestos while working with and around defendant’s valves in Connecticut and plaintiff does not identify any other activity by defendant in New York that could provide a sufficient nexus to his injury. Instead, all conduct giving rise to plaintiff’s claims occurred in Connecticut, as he was not a New York resident, did not purchase or work with defendant’s valves in New York, and does not claim to have suffered harm in this State … . Without an adequate relationship between New York and plaintiff’s claims, “specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State” … . Matter of New York Asbestos Litig., 2023 NY Slip Op 00402, First Dept 1-31-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff alleged exposure to asbestos in valves made by defendant caused his cancer. The valves were manufactured and sold in Connecticut where plaintiff lived and worked. Defendant’s small office in New York was not sufficiently connected with plaintiff’s claims to support New York jurisdiction.

 

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DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF’S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHEN MAINTAINING DEFENDANT’S PRODUCTS DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO PLAINTIFF’S ASBESTOS-INJURIES; AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR DEFENDANT TO ARGUE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT PROVE CAUSATION (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department determined there were questions of fact whether plaintiff (Howard) was exposed to asbestos in his maintenance of defendant’s pumps on Navy submarines: Defendant failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that its products did not contribute to plaintiff’s asbestos-injuries:

“In order to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, defendant[] bore the initial burden of demonstrating that [its] respective products ‘could not have contributed to the causation’ of [Howard]’s asbestos-related injuries” … . Defendant could not prevail on its motion for summary judgment by “merely pointing to gaps in . . . plaintiff[s’] proof” … . In other words, “[defendant] could not simply argue that plaintiff[s] could not affirmatively prove causation, but rather it had to affirmatively prove, as a matter of law, that there was no causation” … .

… According to Howard [plaintiff], his duties aboard these various vessels required, among other things, that he directly supervise maintenance on defendant’s pumps, which included asbestos-containing gaskets, packing and insulation. Howard stated that he would work in the immediate vicinity of the pumps when the gaskets were removed and scraped from the pumps, and when packing and insulation on the pumps was removed and replaced. Howard v A.O. Smith Water Prods., 2023 NY Slip Op 00017, Third Dept 1-5-23

Practice Point: In a toxic tort case, in order to prevail on a summary judgment motion, defendant must demonstrate as a matter of law that defendant’s products did not cause plaintiff’s injuries. The defendant will not win a summary judgment motion in this context by arguing plaintiff could not prove causation.

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT EXPERT OPINION TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION HE INHALED SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF ASBESTOS TO HAVE CAUSED HIS CANCER; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this asbestos-exposure case did not raise a question of fact about whether his exposure to asbestos was sufficient to have caused his cancer. Plaintiff alleged he was exposed to asbestos when he installed defendant ABI’s vinyl floor tiles. Defendant presented evidence from simulation studies and plaintiff offered no expert evidence in opposition:

In Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am. (___ NY3d ___, 2022 NY Slip Op 02769 [2022]), the Court of Appeals, while recognizing its conclusion in Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. (7 NY3d 434 [2006]) that precise qualification of exposure to a toxin is not always required, stated that causation nonetheless requires plaintiff to provide proof of “sufficient exposure to a substance to cause the claimed adverse health effect” … . …

Plaintiff challenges the opinion proffered by ABI’s expert, who relied upon calculations arising from experiments funded by defendants, in determining that decedent was exposed, if at all, to asbestos in amounts similar to those in ambient air, an exposure insufficient to cause cancer. While the reliability of those calculations could pose an issue of credibility, the fact that they were performed by a paid expert does not automatically invalidate their conclusions. Plaintiff offered no expert to counter ABI’s calculation of decedent’s cumulative lifetime exposure, and thus no question of fact was raised as to its validity … . Killian v A.C. & S., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 04610, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: Here defendant presented evidence of simulation studies to show that plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos was not sufficient to have caused his cancer and plaintiff presented no expert evidence in opposition. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

 

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THE PROOF AT TRIAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF INHALED SUFFICIENT LEVELS OF ASBESTOS WHEN USING DEFENDANT’S TALCUM POWDER TO HAVE CAUSED HER MESOTHELIOMA; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant J & J’s motion to set aside the verdict in the asbestos-exposure trial should have been granted. Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate the exposure to asbestos in defendant’s talcum powder caused plaintiff’s mesothelioma:

At trial, plaintiffs failed, as a matter of law, to carry their burden “to establish sufficient exposure to a substance to cause the claimed adverse health effect” … . To make such a showing, a plaintiff must present expert testimony providing a “scientific expression of the level of exposure to toxins in defendant’s products that was sufficient to have caused the disease” … . Even if it is assumed that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support their mineral expert’s estimate of the amount of asbestos to which plaintiff Donna Olson was exposed each time she used J&J’s talcum powder products, plaintiffs’ medical expert never set forth a scientific expression of the minimum lifetime exposure to asbestos that would have been sufficient to cause mesothelioma, the disease in question … . Thus, the medical expert’s testimony that mesothelioma could have resulted from “a significant exposure above normal background levels” was insufficient. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 2022 NY Slip Op 04611, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: This is another decision in a group of four decisions released on the same day by the First Department finding plaintiff’s expert evidence failed, as a matter of law, to demonstrate plaintiff had inhaled enough asbestos to have caused lung disease.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGHT ASBESTOS FIBERS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not present sufficient expert evidence that his exposure to asbestos from defendant ABI’s vinyl floor tiles and sheet flooring caused his cancer. Plaintiff was an electrician and he alleged he worked in close proximity to workers installing ABI’s flooring:

[I]n asbestos exposure and other toxic tort cases, “an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)” …  As to specific causation, “there must be evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of th[e] agent that are known to cause the [relevant] harm” … .

… “[B]ecause there are times that ‘a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin will be difficult or impossible to quantify by pinpointing an exact numerical value,’ ‘it is not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation are generally accepted in the scientific community'” … . …

Plaintiff’s opposition failed to raise any issue of fact as to specific causation. A showing that the decedent “work[ed] in dust laden with asbestos generated from products containing asbestos” accompanied by “expert testimony that dust raised from manipulating asbestos products ‘necessarily’ contains enough asbestos to cause mesothelioma” is not enough … . Plaintiff’s medical expert did point to simulation studies measuring an average level of airborne asbestos as high as 0.27 f/cc during the cutting, sanding, and snapping of asbestos-containing floor tile. He did not, however, provide any correlation between the asbestos fiber levels to which plaintiff may have been exposed and the amount of inhaled asbestos that would have caused decedent’s lung cancer … .Pomponi v A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 04612, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: The general evidentiary requirements for a plaintiff’s prima facie case in an asbestos-exposure care are clearly explained. Plaintiff’s expert evidence was not sufficient to raise a question of fact about whether the exposure caused his cancer.

 

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WHETHER PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGH ASBESTOS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER WAS THE SUBJECT OF COMPETING SIMULATION STUDIES; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant ABI’s motion for summary judgment in this asbestos-exposure case should have been granted. Plaintiff sold vinyl floor tiles made by ABI. Plaintiff alleged when he cut, manipulated and broke the tiles in demonstrations for customers, he inhaled asbestos fibers which were embedded in the vinyl tiles. The Fist Department found the expert evidence did not demonstrate plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of asbestos to cause lung cancer:

ABI had the burden to tender sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact as to causation … . Once this burden was met, it would fall to plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof, in admissible form, establishing that there were disputed material issues of fact … . * * *

The dispute based upon the competing simulation studies about whether the decedent was exposed to asbestos in an amount that exceeded ambient levels typically found in non-occupational settings is not enough to avoid summary judgment. … [S]imply showing that exposures to a toxin were “‘excessive'” or “‘far more'” a certain threshold (ambient) is not enough … . … [P]laintiff had the “‘difficult, if not impossible,'” task of establishing that his decedent had a sufficient exposure to asbestos to have caused his lung cancer … . [Plaintiff’s expert] does not provide any reliable correlation between the presence of asbestos fiber concentrations found in the studies and how much in haled asbestos would have caused lung cancer generally and the decedent’s lung cancer in particular. Dyer v Amchem Prods. Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 04609, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: This decision includes a useful discussion of the proof requirements in an asbestos-exposure case. The decision characterized the plaintiff’s task of demonstrating sufficient exposure to cause cancer as “difficult, if not impossible.”

 

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