Toxic Torts Archives - New York Appellate Digest

DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZARDOUS LEAD PAINT CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint exposure case should have been granted. Defendant was a co-owner of the subject property but he was able to demonstrate his connection to the property was such that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition:

… [D]efendant owned the subject property, as a tenant in common, with his father during the period of plaintiffs’ tenancy from 1992 to 1994. In support of his motions, defendant submitted his affidavit, wherein he averred, among other things, that he was a co-owner of the property “on paper only,” that his father handled all day-to-day maintenance of the property, and that defendant never entered plaintiffs’ apartments or hired anyone to make repairs thereto during plaintiffs’ tenancy. Defendant further averred that he did not have a key to the apartments and that he never spoke to or received complaints from plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ mother. Defendant’s submissions also established that he had no knowledge of inspections for or the existence of lead paint at the property during plaintiffs’ tenancy and that he was unaware that the property was constructed at a time before lead paint was banned, that paint was peeling at the property, that lead paint posed a danger to young children, and that young children lived on the property.

Regardless of whether defendant’s father had actual or constructive notice through his own involvement with the property, that notice cannot be imputed to defendant absent evidence of defendant’s own actual or constructive notice … . McDowell v Maldovan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01748, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

March 13, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Negligence, Real Estate, Toxic Torts

FOUR CLASSES PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUITS BASED UPON THE CONTAMINATION OF AIR, WATER, REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLE WITH TOXIC CHEMICALS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, determined that Supreme Court properly certified four classes bring class action suits against a manufacturer alleging the contamination of water, air, real property and people with toxic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS:

Plaintiffs, residents of the Town, commenced this action as a proposed class action, alleging that defendant’s use and improper disposal of PFOA and PFOS caused personal injury and property damage. In their complaint, plaintiffs proposed four classes: (1) a public water property damage class; (2) a private well water property damage class; (3) a private well nuisance class; and (4) a PFOA invasion injury class. Generally, the putative class members were individuals who owned or leased property in the Town or who ingested contaminated municipal or well water or inhaled PFOA or PFOS particulates in the Town and had demonstrable evidence of elevated levels of the chemical in their blood system. * * *

We agree with Supreme Court’s determination that, in addition to those questions common to the property classes, the answers to certain additional common questions will be applicable to all members of the invasion injury class, for example: (1) whether medical monitoring is an available remedy; (2) the extent of the health hazard presented by exposure to PFOA; and (3) whether the members of the class are at significant increased risk for disease based on the excess accumulation of PFOA in their bodies. Although defendant contends that there are myriad factual questions that are not common to the class, we do not agree that those predominate. Importantly, this is not a case where there is an issue of fact regarding exposure — rather, each class member must establish exposure and accumulation through blood work … . Burdick v Tonoga, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08461, Third Dept 11-21-19

November 21, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Environmental Law, Nuisance, Public Nuisance, Real Property Law, Toxic Torts

ACTION AGAINST GAS COMPANY FOR CONTAMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY ACCRUED WHEN INJURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND WAS TIME BARRED; ACTION FOR NUISANCE RELATING TO REMEDIATION EFFORTS, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO A DIFFERENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION AND WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action against a gas company to recover damages for contamination of real property were time-barred, but the nuisance actions stemming from remediation efforts were not time-barred:

“Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property must be commenced within three years of the injury” … . “[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances,” however, “shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier” (CPLR 214-c[2] …). “For purposes of CPLR 214-c, discovery occurs when, based upon an objective level of awareness of the dangers and consequences of the particular substance, the injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based'” … . …

… [T]he defendants here demonstrated that they undertook extensive efforts beginning in 1999 to inform and engage with property owners potentially affected by the contamination and remediation by conducting, among other things, door-to-door canvassing, direct mailings of newsletters and fact sheets, numerous public meetings, and highly visible and disruptive remediation work. The defendants also inspected the subject property twice in 2005 to determine whether certain remediation work between those inspections caused any damage, and mailed the results of their inspections to the plaintiff in 2006. … The defendants … established, prima facie, that the plaintiff should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the primary condition upon which its exposure-related claims were based prior to January 22, 2007 … . …

We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court’s determination that the causes of action to recover damages for public and private nuisance allegedly arising from the defendants’ remediation work were time-barred … . These causes of action are subject to the limitations period in CPLR 214(4) rather than CPLR 214-c(2) because they do not seek “to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure” … . Here, the papers submitted in support of the defendants’ motion demonstrated that there was no dispute that the defendants conducted remediation work in close proximity to the subject property shortly after new tenants signed a lease to occupy the space in 2008 … . Onder Realty, Inc. v Keyspan Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07406, Second Dept 10-16-19

October 16, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Environmental Law, Negligence, Toxic Torts

CLAIMANTS DID NOT ALLEGE WHEN THE ALLEGED INJURIES RELATED TO TOXIC CONTAMINATION WERE INCURRED, CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the action alleging negligence and inverse condemnation stemming from toxic contamination of the vicinity of a defunct factory was properly dismissed because the allegations did not specify when the alleged injuries occurred:

The State of New York is sovereign and has consented to be sued only in strict accordance with the requirements of the Court of Claims Act (see Court of Claims Act § 8 …). Among those requirements is the claimant’s duty to allege “the time when [the] claim arose” … . The requirements of section 11 (b) are jurisdictional in nature … , and the failure to satisfy them mandates dismissal of the claim without regard to whether the State was prejudiced … or had access to the requisite information from its own records … . As the Court of Appeals has explained, the State is not required “to ferret out or assemble information that section 11 (b) obligates the claimant to allege” … . …

Here, although claimants adequately specified when defendant’s negligent acts allegedly occurred, they failed to supply any dates or ranges of dates regarding their alleged injuries, such as when they were exposed to toxins, when they developed symptoms, when they sought treatment, or when they were diagnosed with an illness. Instead, claimants alleged only the dates of their residence in Geneva and the dates when news of the contamination became public. Claimants’ allegations are insufficient to enable defendant to adequately investigate the claims in order to ascertain its liability, if any. Given claimants’ failure to provide any dates regarding their alleged injuries, defendant could not realistically differentiate between those injuries attributable to toxic exposure and those injuries attributable to other causes. We therefore conclude that claimants failed to adequately plead when the claims arose for purposes of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b). Consequently, the court properly dismissed the claims as jurisdictionally defective … . Matter of Geneva Foundry Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 05271, Fourth Dept 6-28-19

June 28, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Evidence, Negligence, Products Liability, Toxic Torts

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT COKE OVENS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF STEEL WERE NOT PRODUCTS TRIGGERING THE DUTY TO WARN OF THE HAZARDS OF BREATHING EMISSIONS FROM THE OVENS, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the defendant (Wilputte), which sold coke ovens for steel production, did not demonstrate, as a matter of law, the ovens were not “products” triggering the duty to warn. Therefore defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted (by the Appellate Division). Plaintiff’s decedent worked on top of the coke ovens and alleged breathing the toxic substances caused lung cancer. Plaintiffs alleged defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff’s decedent to use a respirator when working on the ovens. The Appellate Division had determined the coke ovens, housed in so-called “batteries,” were akin to buildings and construction of the buildings was a service, not a product:

… [D]efendant has not met its burden in showing that the coke ovens at issue are not products as a matter of law. Regardless of the alterations Bethlehem [the steel manufacturer] may have made to the scale and specifications of the battery at large, the ovens themselves served one function: the production of coke. This process was standard across all variations of coke ovens that Wilputte sold, ultimately placing the hazardous thing at issue squarely within the category of products to which liability has attached in the failure-to-warn context. …

… Wilputte was responsible for placing the ovens into the stream of commerce and that it derived financial benefit from its role in the production process. Indeed, by the time decedent began working for Bethlehem, Wilputte had sold hundreds of coke ovens to plants … . Wilputte also marketed its ovens with informational brochures showing the completed ovens and their functionality, indicating that Wilputte, not Bethlehem, was the commercial source of the product. … Although the ovens were largely assembled and completed on-site, that merely speaks to the logistical realties of the market of which Wilputte had a considerable share. …

… [T]he record supports Supreme Court’s conclusion that Wilputte was in the best position to assess the safety of the coke ovens because of its superior knowledge regarding the ovens’ intended functionality … . “A major determinant of the existence of a duty to warn” is an assessment of “whether the manufacturer is in a superior position to know of and warn against those hazards” inherent to its product … . Matter of Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 04640, CtApp 6-11-19

June 11, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Negligence, Toxic Torts

DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LEAD-PAINT EXPOSURE ACCRUED, THEREFORE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON THE GROUND THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that defendant’s failed to demonstrate when the lead-paint-exposure cause of action accrued. Therefore the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations had passed should not have been granted:

In moving to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, each defendant had “the initial burden of establishing prima facie that the time in which to sue ha[d] expired . . . and thus was required to establish, inter alia, when the plaintiff[s’] cause of action accrued” … Here, neither defendant established the relevant accrual date of plaintiffs’ claims for injury caused by the latent effects of lead paint exposure and, in the absence of such evidence, neither defendant made a prima facie showing that the applicable limitations period had expired on those claims … . Supreme Court thus erred in granting defendants’ respective motions to that extent. We note that, at oral argument in these appeals, plaintiffs conceded that their claims for patent injuries arising from such exposure were properly dismissed as time-barred. Chaplin v Tompkins, 2019 NY Slip Op 04562, Fourth Dept 6-7-19

June 7, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Negligence, Toxic Torts

DEFENDANT’S SUBCONTRACTOR USED A PAINT STRIPPING PRODUCT DURING AN OFFICE BUILDING RENOVATION, PLAINTIFF, AN EVENING OFFICE CLEANER, ALLEGED INJURY FROM BREATHING TOXIC FUMES, THERE IS EVIDENCE DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO WARN, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this toxic tort case was properly denied. Plaintiff, an evening cleaner in an office building, allege she was injured by inhaling toxic fumes from a paint stripping product used by a defendant’s subcontractor (Island Painting):

Defendant failed to establish prima facie that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition of the premises in time to take corrective measures … . Defendant submitted no evidence with respect to notice. However, there is evidence in the record that defendant had superintendents on site who oversaw the subcontractors’ work and that defendant had a duty to notify and warn the building owner and its occupants of hazardous work undertaken on the project site so as to safeguard the building’s occupants against exposure to such hazards. Thus, issues of fact exist as to whether defendant knew of the scheduled use of the paint stripper and of the product’s toxicity and yet failed to warn the building owner and occupants to prevent harm to them. These issues of fact as to negligence also preclude summary judgment in defendant’s favor on its claim for contractual indemnification by Island Painting … . Arias v Recife Realty Co., N.V., 2019 NY Slip Op 04269, First Dept 5-30-1 9

May 30, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence, Toxic Torts

IN THIS ASBESTOS EXPOSURE CASE, A WITNESS’S VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY FROM PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER STATES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S DIRECT CASE OR IN THE DEFENSE CASE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, ordering a new trial, determined that videotaped deposition testimony from proceedings in other states was not admissible in the New York action. It was alleged that plaintiff’s decedent died from exposure to asbestos in a joint compound made by Georgia-Pacific. An employee of Georgia-Pacific, Charles Lehnert, who was familiar with the formula for the joint compound, gave the videotaped deposition testimony:

CPLR 3117 (a) (3) provides, in relevant part, that “any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used . . . by any party for any purpose against any other party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had the notice required under these rules.” Here, defendant was permitted to introduce deposition testimony given by Lehnert in the 2007 Texas state court action for the purpose of demonstrating that it contradicted the 2001 and 2003 testimony that plaintiff had been permitted to introduce as part of its case-in-chief. However, although defendant was a party to the 2007 Texas action, plaintiff was not, and he had no opportunity to be present and cross-examine Lehnert. Thus, this testimony was not admissible under CPLR 3117 (a) (3) … . …

Although defendant did not cross-appeal, our holding reversing Supreme Court’s ruling regarding Lehnert’s 2007 testimony necessarily brings up for review Supreme Court’s denial of defendant’s motion to preclude Lehnert’s 2001 and 2003 testimony (seeCPLR 5501 [a] [1] …). Upon review, we find that none of Lehnert’s deposition testimony should have been admitted into evidence at this trial. Although a live witness may be impeached with prior inconsistent testimony, Lehnert never testified for any party in this action, either at the trial itself or at any pretrial deposition. He was merely a witness who had testified years ago in multiple other states on the subject of the content of Georgia-Pacific joint compound. Rather than calling him (or any other witness) to testify on this topic, both parties resorted to retrieving video of Lehnert’s testimony in those earlier actions and selectively playing those portions they believed supported their respective contentions. The jury was essentially asked to determine whether Lehnert, an empty chair in New York, testified more credibly in Illinois or Texas. In this scenario, CPLR 3117 (a) (2) did not permit plaintiff to introduce the 2001 and 2003 depositions on his case-in-chief, and CPLR 3117 (c) did not permit defendant to impeach those depositions with another deposition. Billok v Union Carbide Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 02185, Third Dept 3-21-19

March 21, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Negligence, Toxic Torts

RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 DID NOT ENTITLE CHEVRON TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ASBESTOS-MESOTHELIOMA CASE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three-judge dissent, determined that defendant Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment in this asbestos-mesothelioma action. Plaintiff’s decedent [Mr. South] signed a release in 1997 and Chevron argued the release precluded the subsequent lawsuit:

Like Supreme Court, the Appellate Division concluded that the record did not demonstrate Chevron’s entitlement to summary judgment, because the release did not specifically mention mesothelioma, which then required the court to determine whether extrinsic evidence entitled Chevron to summary judgment. Pointing to the “meager consideration” [$1,750] and the lack of any diagnosis of mesothelioma as to Mr. South at the time he settled, the Appellate Division concluded that the record left open the question of whether the release pertained to an existing pulmonary condition and the fear of some future asbestos-related disease, or if it was intended to release all future asbestos-related diseases arising from Mr. South’s employment by Texaco. The parties agree that, at the time he executed the release, Mr. South suffered from a nonmalignant pulmonary disease but not from mesothelioma or cancer. …

The sole question presented to us on this appeal is whether Chevron has established that the release, coupled with the 1997 complaint, eliminates all material questions of fact and proves that the release bars the claims here as a matter of law. Answering that question requires us to consider the protections afforded to Mr. South by admiralty law and Section 5 of FELA [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] (45 USC § 55), which is incorporated into the Jones Act by 46 USC § 30104. …

… [W]e conclude that Chevron has not met its burden to demonstrate the absence of any material question of fact. The 1997 release does not unambiguously extinguish a future claim for mesothelioma … . The release itself does not mention mesothelioma. It does say that Mr. South “is giving up the right to bring an action against the Released Parties, or any of them, in the future for any new or different diagnosis that may be made about Claimant’s condition as a result of exposure to any product[.]” But “claimant’s condition” may cabin the “new or different diagnosis” to ones that related to his nonmalignant asbestos-related pulmonary disease—the “condition” both parties agree was the only one he suffered at the time. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 01259, CtApp 2-19-19

February 21, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Municipal Law, Negligence, Toxic Torts

STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE PAINT CONTAINED LEAD DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE INTERIOR OF THE BUILDING WAS PAINTED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1960; HOWEVER QUESTIONS OF FACT WERE RAISED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF LEAD PAINT AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PAINT AND INFANT PLAINTIFF’S LEAD POISONING, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, reversing Supreme Court, determined that questions of fact were raised about the landlord’s (New York City Housing Authority’s, NYCHA’s) responsibility for the lead poisoning of infant plaintiff (A.L.). Successive blood tests revealed increasing lead levels as the child aged, and a decrease after the apartment was repainted. The first issue the court dealt with was whether Local Law 1, which creates a presumption that the paint in the apartment contains more than .5 percent lead for buildings “erected” prior to January 1, 1960, applied. The certificate of occupancy for the building was issued in March, 1961, but there was evidence the building was under construction in 1959. “Erected” was (apparently) interpreted to mean when the apartment was painted, so the statutory presumption did not apply:

Here, A.L.’s elevated blood lead level suggests … a hazardous condition may have existed in the apartment during the relevant period. While there are other sources of lead poisoning, housing is a prime source … The circumstantial evidence of a hazardous lead-based paint condition is also supported by an affirmation by Dr. Douglas B. Savino and an affidavit by lead paint expert William Savarese. Dr. Savino concluded that the apartment contained a hazardous level of lead-based paint, given the “chronology of the infant plaintiff’s blood lead levels,” which was “environmentally and temporally related to the infant plaintiff’s residence.” He noted that A.L.’s blood levels increased over time until he was diagnosed with 16 ug/dl on March 19, 2003, coinciding with the repainting of the apartment on March 5-6, 2003. Dr. Savino attributed the lead spike in A.L.’s blood to A.L. ingesting an excessive amount of lead dust. Dr. Savino further pointed out that A.L.’s blood lead levels declined gradually after the 2003 apartment repair and the 2004 removal of the chipped and peeling interior doors. William Savarese echoed Dr. Savino’s statements and conclusions. A.L. v New York City Hous. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 00702, First Dept 1-31-19

January 31, 2019/by Bruce Freeman