Appeals – New York Appellate Digest

Appeals, Attorneys, Criminal Law, Judges

AT SENTENCING THE PROSECUTOR REFERENCED EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT BUT, WHEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY, NEITHER DEFENDANT NOR DEFENSE COUNSEL ADDRESSED THE ISSUE; NOTWITHSTANDING THE SILENCE OF THE DEFENSE THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED INTO WHETHER THE GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY; THERE WAS NO NEED TO PRESERVE THE ERROR FOR APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singh, determined the prosecutor’s mention of defendant’s (Dupree’s) exculpatory statements in the presentence report (PSR) required the judge to conduct an inquiry to ensure the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite the defendant’s and defense counsel’s failure to address the statements at sentencing. Defendant and defense counsel were asked by the judge whether they wished to address the court and both said “no.” The issue need not be preserved and was properly raised on appeal:

Before sentencing, Dupree was interviewed by the Department of Probation. He made the following statement: “I admitted to shooting someone in the leg and back and the bullet went through his chest. I was fighting with him (stranger) and was defending myself. I was drinking at the club and someone slipped something in my drink and I was leaving the club to get home. He saw me staggering and wanted to rob me.” This statement was included in the presentence report (PSR).

At sentencing, Supreme Court asked whether the parties had any factual difficulties with the PSR. The prosecution replied, “I do have some factual difficulty relating to the defendant’s statement which I do not believe there was a valid self-defense claim. In fact, it is not a valid self-defense claim. . . . So I do take issue with that part of his statement as well as his claimed intoxication.” The court then asked, “and anything for the defense?” to which defense counsel replied, “no.” The court later asked whether the defense would like to be heard as to the promised sentence and, finally, asked Dupree himself if there was anything he would like to add. Neither Dupree nor his attorney addressed the statement in the PSR or the prosecution’s comment made in open court. * * *

The prosecution … argues that if Supreme Court had to inquire further, it did so by asking if defense counsel had anything to say. Yet the Court of Appeals has never held that a court may satisfy its obligation merely by allowing the defense to speak. Neither have we. Rather, the law is clear that “the trial court has a duty to inquire further to ensure that defendant’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary” … . People v Dupree, 2025 NY Slip Op 00199, First Dept 1-14-25

Practice Point: Here the prosecutor, at sentencing, expressed disagreement with exculpatory statements attributed to defendant in the presentence report but neither defendant nor defense counsel chose to address the issue when given the opportunity by the judge. The prosecutor’s reference to the statements triggered the need for an inquiry by the judge into whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, notwithstanding the silence of the defense. There was no need to preserve the issue for appeal.

January 14, 2025

Appeals, Criminal Law

THE STANDARD FOR AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT’S REVIEW OF A SENTENCE CLARIFIED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, remitted the matter to the Appellate Division for a determination whether a sentence reduction is warranted using the correct standard. The defendant need not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court to warrant a review of the sentence by the intermediate appellate court:

The intermediate appellate courts are empowered to reduce a sentence that, though legal, is “unduly harsh or severe” (CPL 470.15 [6] [b]). The decisions whether a sentence warrants reduction under that standard, and the extent to which the sentence should be reduced, are committed to the discretion of the intermediate appellate court, which has “broad, plenary power” to reduce the sentence “without deference to the sentencing court” … . A defendant need not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion by the sentencing court in order to obtain a sentence reduction … . People v Brisman, 2025 NY Slip Op 00123, CtApp 1-9-25

Practice Point: The correct standard for review of a sentence in an intermediate appellate court is whether the sentence is “unduly harsh or severe.” The decision to reduce a sentence is committed to the discretion of the intermediate court without deference to the sentencing court. The defendant need not show extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court.

January 9, 2025

Appeals, Criminal Law, Judges

THE PROBATION CONDITION PROHIBITING DEFENDANT FROM USING PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION WAS NOT WARRANTED BY THE UNDERLYING CONVICTION; THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the probation condition prohibiting defendant from using the subway, trains or buses for three years was not warranted because defendant did not commit the underlying crime on public transportation. The issue need not be preserved for appeal and survives a waiver of appeal:

The court improperly imposed, as a condition of probation, a requirement that defendant “[r]efrain from using or entering any Metropolitan Transportation Authority subway, train, bus, or other conveyance or facility for a period of up to three years.” Defendant did not commit the instant crime, or have a history of misconduct, on public transportation. Accordingly, the prohibition from using or entering any public transportation conveyance or facility was not reasonably related to defendant’s rehabilitation, or necessary to ensure that he will lead a law-abiding life … . Because this issue implicates the legality of the sentence imposed, it survives defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal and does not require preservation for appellate review … . People v Alvarez, 2024 NY Slip Op 06662, First Dept 12-31-24

Practice Point: A probation condition which is not warranted by the underlying conviction or by defendant’s prior record may be reversed even if the issue has not been preserved and and/or appeal has been waived.

December 31, 2024

Appeals, Criminal Law, Judges

THE PROBATION CONDITION REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO AGREE TO SEARCHES OF HIS PERSON, VEHICLE AND RESIDENCE WAS NOT WARRANTED BY THE CONVICTION (LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT); THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the probation condition requiring defendant to agree to searches of his person, residence and vehicle for drugs, weapons or contraband was not warranted by his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. The issue need not be preserved for appeal:

… [T]he court improperly imposed, as a condition of probation, a requirement that defendant consent to a search by a probation officer of his person, vehicle, or residence for illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, or contraband … . “Defendant was not under the influence of any substance or armed with a weapon when he committed the crime of which he was convicted” … , and he “had no history of violence or use of weapons” (People v Hall, 228 AD3d at 467). His single misdemeanor conviction for marijuana possession preceded the instant offense by nearly a decade … . Thus, the consent to search condition was not “‘reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so'” … . We note that defendant’s challenge to the conditions of his probation did not require preservation … and would not be foreclosed even if the appeal waiver were valid … . People v Fernandez, 2024 NY Slip Op 06671, First Dept 12-31-24

Practice Point: A probation condition requiring that defendant agree to searches of his person, vehicle and residence must be warranted by the nature of the underlying conviction. The condition was not warranted for “leaving the scene of an accident.”

December 31, 2024

Appeals, Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Trusts and Estates

THE DEATH OF A PARTY DIVESTS THE COURT OF JURISDICTION, STAYS THE PROCEEDINGS AND TERMINATES THE REPRESENTATION OF THE DECEASED’S ATTORNEY; ANY ORDERS ISSUED OR APPEALS TAKEN ARE VACATED OR DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that the death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and terminates the representation of the attorney for the deceased person:

“The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made pursuant to CPLR 1015 (a)[, and] any determination rendered without such substitution will generally be deemed a nullity” … . Here, the Supreme Court erred in considering the separate motions of the LMB defendants and Bear Stearns pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them because the motions were made after [plaintiff] Roe’s death and prior to any substitution of a personal representative of his estate (see id. § 1015 …). Accordingly, so much of the order … as granted the separate motions of the LMB defendants … to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them must be vacated as a nullity (see CPLR 1015 …), and the appeal taken by the plaintiff Cheryl Lee from so much of the order … granting those branches of the LMB defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first, third, and sixth causes of action must be dismissed.

Furthermore, the death of a party also terminates an attorney’s authority to act on behalf of the deceased party … . Thus, Roe’s former attorneys lacked the authority to file either the cross-motion or this appeal on his behalf. Accordingly the appeal purportedly taken on Roe’s behalf must be dismissed … . Lee v Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., 2024 NY Slip Op 06624, Second Dept 12-24-24

Practice Point: The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction, stays the proceedings until a substitution is made, and terminates the representation of the attorney for the deceased. Any orders issued or appeals taken after the party’s death and before substitution must be vacated or dismissed.

December 24, 2024

Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

ON THE PEOPLE’S APPEAL, THE TRIAL COURT’S VACATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE WAS REVERSED; THE NEW EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE SHOOTER, DEFENDANT WAS AN ACCOMPLICE TO THE SHOOTER; AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT CAN ONLY CONSIDER THE TRIAL COURT’S GROUNDS FOR ITS RULINGS, OR RULINGS ADVERSE TO THE APPELLANT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and denying the motion to vacate the criminal possession of a weapon conviction, determined new evidence which indicated defendant was not the shooter but had provided the machine gun to the shooter (Scott) would not have resulted in a more favorable verdict. Defendant would have been convicted as an accomplice. In rejecting an argument on appeal that was not part of the ruling below, the Fourth Department explained that its appellate jurisdiction is limited to grounds relied on by the trial court which were adverse to the appellant:

… [W]e conclude that the evidence in question is not “of such character as to create a probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant” (CPL 440.10 [1] [g] …). Scott’s deposition testimony establishes that defendant possessed the loaded machine gun, provided it to Scott, transported Scott to the vicinity of the crime, and had a motive to harm the victims because his family had “beef” with theirs, thus providing sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty as an accomplice to the weapons possession of which he was convicted … . ” ‘[W]hether one is the actual perpetrator of the offense or an accomplice is, with respect to criminal liability for the offense, irrelevant’ ” … .

Defendant requests that we affirm on the ground, which he asserted in the court below, that consideration of the new evidence in light of a theory of accessorial liability requires an impermissible amendment to the indictment. We agree with the People that we have no authority to affirm on that basis … .

Under CPL 470.15 (1), “[u]pon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment, sentence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected the appellant.” * * * The Appellate Division engages in “the type of appellate overreaching prohibited by CPL 470.15 (1)” when it “renders a decision on grounds explicitly different from those of the trial court, or on grounds that were clearly resolved in [the appellant’s] favor” … .

Here, the court determined that “the accessorial liability theory, if presented at a new trial, would not constitute an impermissible amendment to the indictment in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights,” clearly resolving that issue in the People’s favor. People v Dixon, 2024 NY Slip Op 06473, Fourth Dept 12-20-24

Practice Point: New evidence indicated defendant was not the shooter but had provided the weapon to the shooter with the requisite intent. Because the new evidence would not have resulted in a more favorable verdict on the criminal possession of a weapon charge, defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction should have been denied.

Practice Point: An intermediate appellate court can only consider grounds for rulings relied on by the trial court or rulings adverse to the appellant.

December 20, 2024

Appeals, Criminal Law

A WAIVER OF APPEAL DOES NOT PRECLUDE A CHALLENGE TO A PROBATION CONDITION REQUIRING CONSENT TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES; IN THE PLEA PROCEEDINGS, DEFENDANT ADMITTED PUNCHING THE VICTIM; THE PROBATION CONDITION ALLOWING SEARCHES FOR DRUGS AND WEAPONS HAD NO CONNECTION TO THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) a waiver of appeal does not preclude challenging a condition of probation requiring warrantless searches, and (2) there was no basis for requiring defendant to consent to warrantless searches:

… [D]efendant’s challenge to the condition of probation requiring that he consent to warrantless searches survives even a valid waiver … . Here, during the plea proceedings, defendant admitted that he intentionally caused injury to the victim by punching him with a closed fist. The Department of Probation recommended that, as a condition of probation, defendant consent to warrantless searches for illegal drugs and weapons to help ensure the safety of the public and probation officers. We find that the condition of probation was not reasonably related to defendant’s rehabilitation, given that defendant’s conviction did not involve the use of a weapon and did not appear connected to the sale or use of drugs … . People v Thomas, 2024 NY Slip Op 06427, First Dept 12-19-24

Practice Point: A waiver of appeal does not preclude a challenge to a probation condition requiring consent to warrantless searches.

Practice Point: The probation condition requiring consent to warrantless searches must have some connection to the underlying offense. Searches for drugs and weapons had no connection to the underlying offense in this case where defendant admitted punching the victim with his fist.

December 19, 2024

Appeals, Civil Procedure

UNLIKE THE APPELLATE DIVISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT CONSIDER UNPRESERVED ISSUES IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; THE FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT PRECLUDED REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a three-judge dissent, determined the preservation requirement precluded consideration of the appeal. The underlying question concerned when the period for calculation of prejudgment interest should begin to run:

“As we have many times repeated, this Court with rare exception does not review questions raised for the first time on appeal. Unlike the Appellate Division, we lack jurisdiction to review unpreserved issues in the interest of justice” … . “To demonstrate that a question of law is preserved for this Court’s review, a party must show that it raised the specific argument in [the trial court] and asked the court to conduct that analysis in the first instance” … . …

Among the many salutary reasons for our preservation rule is that “in making and shaping the common law . . . this Court best serves the litigants and the law by limiting its review to issues that have first been presented to and carefully considered by the trial and intermediate appellate courts” … . In considering whether to disturb well-settled Appellate Division precedent, this Court should only act where it has the benefit of a full record, including a reasoned trial court decision

As it relates to the proceedings below, claimant never raised the question of the accrual date of prejudgment interest in the trial court. Further, when a party objects to a provision contained in a judgment, they generally have the ability to seek relief pursuant to CPLR 5015 and 5019, as plaintiff was invited to do here. Had plaintiff made such a motion, arguments in favor of and against earlier accrual of prejudgment interest could have been made, thereby providing a fully developed record for appeal, an essential step for parties seeking review from the Court of Appeals. But, plaintiff did not preserve an objection to the imposition of prejudgment interest on the record before the trial court. As plaintiff had an opportunity to raise his objections in the trial court but failed to do so, the issue is unreviewable on appeal to this Court. Sabine v State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 06288, CtApp 12-17-24

Practice Point: Unlike the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals cannot consider an unpreserved issue “in the interest of justice.” If the issue was not raised and preserved in the trial court, the Court of Appeals will not consider it.

December 17, 2024

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Debtor-Creditor, Foreclosure, Real Property Law

DEFENDANT BOUGHT THE FORECLOSED PROPERTY WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE HAD BEEN APPEALED; DEFENDANT WAS A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE AND WAS THEREFORE INSULATED FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE APPELLATE REVERSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant (Bartlett) was a purchaser in good faith and for value of the foreclosed property. The foreclosure was reversed on appeal. Defendant, as the fee owner of the property, was insulated from the effects of the reversal:

Where a judgment of foreclosure and sale is reversed on appeal, the successful appellant may seek restitution of the real property lost by the judgment (see CPLR 5015[d]; 5523). However, where the real property was sold pursuant to the judgment of foreclosure and sale, and the title is held by “a purchaser in good faith and for value,” recovery is limited to the value of the real property (id. § 5523). In the absence of a stay of the sale or an outstanding notice of pendency, title of the purchaser in good faith and for value “is . . . insulate[d] . . . from the effects of an appellate reversal” … .

Here, in support of its cross-motion, Bartlett established, through an affidavit of its member, that Bartlett acquired title to the property subsequent to a foreclosure sale, without actual knowledge of a successful appeal by the plaintiffs in the underlying action that resulted in a vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure and sale … . The affidavit also demonstrated that the plaintiffs had not obtained a stay of the foreclosure sale in the underlying action. Under these circumstances, Bartlett established … that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value entitled to the protection of CPLR 5523 … . Puretz v Mae, 2024 NY Slip Op 06227, Second Dept 12-11-24

Practice Point: A buyer of foreclosed property who had no knowledge the judgment of foreclosure had been appealed is insulated from the effects of a reversal on appeal. The buyer, as a purchaser in good faith for value, is the fee owner of the property.

December 11, 2024

Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

NO APPEAL LIES FROM COUNTY COURT’S DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Powers, affirming County Court, determined no appeal lies from the dismissal-without-prejudice of defendant’s application for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA):

… [County Court] dismissed the application without prejudice finding that, although she met the step one eligibility criteria for an alternative sentence, “there [was] no [corroborating] evidence nor even allegations presented that [d]efendant was, at the time of the offense, a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial abuse inflicted by a member of her family or household” as required by CPL 440.47 (2) (c) … . * * *

Where, as here, the Legislature specifically provides for appealability of certain orders but not others, “an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded” … . “[S]ince the Legislature failed to provide for an appeal from the [dismissal] of an application for resentencing pursuant to [Penal Law § 60.12 and CPL 440.47 (2) (c)], no appeal was intended” … . “Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used” … . Here, the Legislature intended a different result as to the appealability of orders dismissing without prejudice under step one or step two and an order denying an application on the merits after a hearing under step three, and this Court must give effect to that intention … . Had an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice been intended under step one or step two of the DVSJA, “the [L]egislature could easily have so stated” … . Rather, the language utilized by the Legislature — specifically that dismissal is without prejudice — mandates that the appropriate remedy in this situation is for a defendant to file a new application satisfying the evidentiary requirements of CPL 440.47. Thus, as “[a]ppeals in criminal cases are strictly limited to those authorized by statute,” this appeal is not properly before this Court and must be dismissed … . People v Melissa OO., 2024 NY Slip Op 05920, Third Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: Criminal appeals are creatures of statutes. Here the DVSJA did not provide for an appeal of the dismissal-without-prejudice of defendant’s application for resentencing. County Court dismissed the application because defendant did not submit evidence she was a victim of domestic abuse.

November 27, 2024