Consumer Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

PLAINTIFFS, ATTORNEYS PRACTICING LANDLORD-TENANT LAW, ALLEGED DEFENDANT PUBLISHER OF “NEW YORK LANDLORD-TENANT LAW” OMITTED OR INACCURATELY PRESENTED SOME OF THE RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS AND THEREFORE VIOLATED GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 (DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES); THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ALLEGE DEFENDANT’S ACT OR PRACTICE WAS MATERIALLY MISLEADING (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissent, determined plaintiffs did not state a cause of action for deceptive business practices (General Business Law (GBL) 349) against the defendant-publisher of a legal resource book, “New York Landlord-Tenant Law” (commonly called the “Tanbook”). Plaintiffs, attorneys who practice landlord-tenant law, alleged the Tanbook, which is published annually, purported to include all the relevant statutes and regulations but, in fact, omitted or inaccurately presented some statutes and regulations. The Court of Appeals found that the complaint adequately alleged a cause of action that was consumer-oriented, but did not adequately allege defendant’s act or practice was misleading in a material way:

… [P]laintiffs’ cause of action is based on purchases of yearly editions of the Tanbook, under a sales agreement that charged extra for any updates of the year’s materials contained in the corresponding edition. Plaintiffs’ allegations are limited to omissions and inaccuracies in a section of the Tanbook they knew was subject to legislative amendment, which they concede were corrected in the 2017 edition after the errors were brought to defendant’s attention, and which were specifically contemplated by defendant’s express disclaimer of the currentness of the Tanbook’s contents. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs, or any reasonable consumer, could not have been materially misled to believe that defendant guaranteed Part III of the Tanbook was complete and accurate at any given time. Thus, because plaintiffs failed to adequately plead this element, their GBL § 349 cause of action was properly dismissed. Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03485, CtApp 6-3-21

June 3, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Contract Law, Uniform Commercial Code

EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE ACCEPTED DEFECTIVE GOODS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UCC, THE UCC PROVIDES REMEDIES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BE MADE WHOLE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE ACCEPTANCE; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, reversing Supreme Court, determined the verdict should not have been set aside in this consumer law case. Plaintiff ordered kitchen cabinets. When they arrived one box was opened by defendant-seller’s representative to confirm the color. Plaintiff then signed a “Completion Certificate” which indicated the cabinets had been found satisfactory. In fact the cabinets were not satisfactory as revealed when they were installed. The Second Department noted that, although under the UCC plaintiff, based on the “Completion Certificate,” could not reject the goods, the UCC provides that she could be made whole, and, in fact, could revoke her acceptance, in addition to other available remedies. Therefore plaintiff’s verdict awarding $30,000 should not have been set aside:

“Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted” (UCC 2-607[2]; see Comment 2). However, “acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by [article 2 of the UCC] for non-conformity” (UCC 2-607[2] …). “Thus, ‘acceptance leaves unimpaired the buyer’s right to be made whole, and that right can be exercised by the buyer not only by way of cross-claim for damages, but also by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the [purchase] price'” … . …

Moreover, after the buyer has accepted allegedly non-conforming goods, the buyer may revoke acceptance of the goods under certain limited circumstances and “obtain the same remedies as are available upon rejection” … . …

… [E]ven if the jury found that the plaintiff did not properly revoke her acceptance of the cabinets, the jury could have found that the plaintiff was entitled to other remedies pursuant to UCC 2-607 … .

… [T]he jury’s verdict that … the defendant breached their contract with the plaintiff, breached the implied warranty of fitness, and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $30,000 was supported by a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from the evidence at trial … . Campbell v Bradco Supply Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 01745, Second Dept 3-24-21

March 24, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Consumer Law, Contract Law, Fraud

PETITIONERS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DETERMINATION IN THIS EXECUTIVE LAW 63 SPECIAL PROCEEDING SOUNDING IN FRAUD STEMMING FROM UNCONSCIONABLE EQUIPMENT FINANCE LEASES AND OPPRESSIVE DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES; RESPONDENTS’ REQUEST FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY, WHICH IS DISFAVORED IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Webber, determined the respondents in this Executive Law 63 special proceeding were not entitled to additional discovery, including depositions, and petitioners were entitled to summary determination in this fraud and deceptive business practices action. The petition, brought by the NYS Attorney General, alleged respondents engaged in fraud and deception in having small businesses sign unconscionable equipment finance leases (EFLs) for credit card processing equipment leading to oppressive debt collection practices. The court noted that discovery in a special proceeding is disfavored and is permitted only on leave of court upon a showing of “ample need:”

Supreme Court correctly found that petitioners demonstrated respondents’ liability under Executive Law § 63(12). Under Executive Law § 63(12), “the test for fraud is whether the targeted act has the capacity or tendency to deceive or creates [*5]an atmosphere conducive to fraud” … . “Executive Law § 63(12) was meant to protect not only the average consumer, but also the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous” … . “[P]ublic reports and lawsuits of alleged fraud are sufficient to put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of fraud” … . * * *

We held in our prior decision that allegations that the [respondents] created legal obligations through misrepresentations and fraud and then attempted to enforce those obligations through abusive pre-litigation and litigation practices sufficiently demonstrated that the [respondents’] debt collection activities and procuring of default judgments were “objectively baseless” … . Matter of People of the State of New York v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 00914, First Dept 2-11-21

February 11, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Consumer Law, Contract Law, Insurance Law

DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; INSURANCE LAW 2601 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION; A GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES CAUSE OF ACTION WILL SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined emotional-distress damages are not available for breach of contract and Insurance Law 2601 does not create a private right of action. Plaintiff’s property was damaged by Hurricane Sandy. Plaintiff and defendant insurers reached a settlement agreement in which defendants agreed to pay plaintiff $1.6 million within 21 days. Defendants paid only about $400,000, claiming that the over $1 million already paid, together with the $400,000, satisfied the $1.6 million agreed to. Supreme Court and the Second Department disagreed finding that the settlement agreement was unambiguous. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract cause of action (the defendants’ mutual and unilateral mistake arguments were rejected). The deceptive business practices (General Business Law 349) cause of action, together with the related punitive damages claim, survived defendants’ motion to dismiss. With respect to damages for emotional distress, the court wrote:

… Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was to dismiss the plaintiff’s demand for damages for emotional distress. A breach of a contractual duty does not create a right of recovery for damages for emotional distress … . Here, the plaintiff alleges no facts giving rise to a relationship between him and the defendants apart from the insurance contract and settlement agreement. An alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not support an award of damages for emotional distress … . Inasmuch as Insurance Law § 2601 serves to regulate insurers’ performance of their contractual obligations rather than to create a separate duty of care and does not give rise to a private cause of action … , the defendants’ alleged violation of their obligations under Insurance Law § 2601 does not support a claim for damages for emotional distress. Perlbinder v Vigilant Ins. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 00439, Second Dept 1-27-21

January 27, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Consumer Law, Fraud

GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 (DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND THE GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 340 (RESTRAINT OF TRADE) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED IN THIS FRAUD ACTION INVOLVING DIAMOND APPRAISALS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the General Business Law 349 (deceptive business practices) cause of action properly survived a motion to dismiss and the General Business Law 340 (restraint of trade) cause of action should have survived in this fraud action involving diamond appraisals:

Plaintiff has alleged that IGI Defendants engaged in deceptive “consumer-oriented” conduct, as the alleged fraud scheme, which involved the issuance of false appraisal certificates for over-graded diamonds, were ultimately directed at misleading consumers into buying diamonds at artificially inflated prices. Indeed, the gravamen of the amended complaint is harm to the public interest … . Plaintiff has standing to bring a claim despite not being a consumer, as courts have permitted business competitors to bring claims under GBL 349 so long as there has been harm done to the public at large … . * * *

Plaintiff has demonstrated a per se restraint of trade by pleading a conspiracy in the form of horizontal price-fixing. As alleged, the conspiracy permits diamond dealers and jewelry manufacturers who participate in the scheme to buy over-graded diamonds at lower prices, and then re-sell them to retailers and consumers at artificially inflated prices. At the same time, dealers and manufacturers who are not part of the conspiracy can only purchase accurately graded stones, or over-grades stones, at a higher price, preventing them from competing with the conspirators. The complaint also alleged an unreasonable restraint of trade under the “rule of reason” standard. Plaintiff has pleaded a conspiracy among [the defendants] and others, and facts showing that the conspirators possessed market power to produce a market-wide anticompetitive effect … . KS Trade LLC v International Gemological Inst., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 00259, First Dept 1-19-21

January 19, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Municipal Law

A GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SOUNDS IN TORT TRIGGERING THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a deceptive business practice cause of action pursuant to General Business Law 349 sounds in tort. The GBL 349 cause of action against the city did not state a cause of action because no notice of claim was filed:

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 and General Municipal Law § 50-e together require a plaintiff, in order to bring an action sounding in tort against the City of New York, to serve a notice of claim within ninety days after the date the claim arises … . Failure to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement is a ground for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action … .

General Business Law § 349(a) prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state” … . We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ first cause of action, which sought to recover damages for violations of General Business Law § 349, was a claim sounding in tort, and therefore was subject to the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, as a cause of action sounding in fraud … . Accordingly, we agree with the court’s determination granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action due to the plaintiffs’ failure to serve a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arose … . Singh v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 08123, Second Dept 12-30-20

December 30, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Consumer Law, Debtor-Creditor, Fraud, Usury

THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS USURY, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACTION FINANCED THE SALE OF JEWELRY OVER MANY MONTHS, MARKETING THE SALES AS A WAY FOR CONSUMERS TO IMPROVE THEIR CREDIT; THE MAJORITY HELD THE BUSINESS MET THE DEFINITION OF A “CREDIT SERVICES BUSINESS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 458-H (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the cause of action which alleged defendants operated a “credit services business” within the meaning of General Business Law 458-h. The defendants financed the purchase of jewelry, claiming that such financing was a means of improving consumers’ credit record:

Plaintiff commenced this action alleging various claims for usury, common-law and statutory fraud, and deceptive business practices. …

A “credit services business” is defined as “any person who sells, provides, or performs, or represents that he can or will sell, provide or perform, a service for the express or implied purpose of improving a consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or providing advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to the consumer’s credit record history or rating in return for the payment of a fee” (§ 458-b [1]). According to the complaint, defendants “represent[]” that they “provide” a “service” to consumers—specifically, financing the purchase of jewelry—and defendants market such financing as a means “of improving [the] consumer’s credit record.” Put simply, defendants allegedly offer consumers the option of paying for jewelry over many months, and defendants allegedly advertise that financing option as a mechanism to improve the consumer’s credit. In exchange for that financing—i.e., the “service” contemplated by section 458-b (1)—defendants allegedly charge interest. Such interest, we conclude, constitutes a “fee” within the meaning of section 458-b (1). Thus, contrary to the court’s determination and the view of our dissenting colleague, the complaint sufficiently alleges that defendants’ business satisfies the statutory definition of a “credit services business” … . People v Harris Originals of Ny, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06883, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

November 20, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Fraud

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PROPERLY SERVED VALID SUBPOENAS ON THE VIRTUAL CURRENCY COMPANIES PURSUANT TO GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 352 (MARTIN ACT) IN A FRAUD INVESTIGATION; ONCE THE MOTIONS TO VACATE OR MODIFY THE EX PARTE ORDER RE: THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBPOENAS WAS DETERMINED, THE COURT NO LONGER HAD ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATION; THEREFORE THE VIRTUAL CURRENCY COMPANIES’ SUBSEQUENT MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE SUPREME COURT OR THE APPELLATE DIVISION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined that the Attorney General (petitioner) properly served subpoenas on the virtual currency companies (respondents) pursuant to General Business Law (GBL) 352 (Martin Act) in a fraud investigation. The subpoenas were attacked on several grounds, all of which were rejected: (1) subject matter jurisdiction (arguing the virtual currency is not a commodity or a security): (2) long-arm jurisdiction (arguing insufficient contacts with New York); (3) ex parte order was not certified as required by GBL 352 (court found this a technical not jurisdictional defect). But before addressing the issues raised on appeal, the Second Department held that the court did not have statutory authority under the GBL to address the respondents’ motion to dismiss (which was the basis of the appeal). Under the GBL, once the motions to vacate or modify the subpoenas were determined, the court has no authority over the Attorney General’s investigation:

… [U]nder the Martin Act’s statutory scheme, once Supreme Court has issued an order responding to a GBL 354 application, it has no further role in the Attorney General’s investigation, except to rule on a motion by either party to vacate or modify the order, as respondents made here. Accordingly, once the court issued the order authorized by GBL 354 on April 24, 2019, and modified it by order dated May 16, 2019, the proceeding before it was concluded and there was no action or proceeding for Supreme Court to “dismiss” on May 21, 2019 when respondents filed their motion that resulted in the order now before the court. All that remained was the Attorney General’s ongoing investigation, in which, by statute, the courts have no further role at this stage. Indeed, neither party cites to, and this Court is unaware of, any prior case in which the subject of a Martin Act investigation has moved to “dismiss” an application by the Attorney General for an order pursuant to GBL 354. Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03880, First Dept 7-9-20

July 9, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Arbitration, Consumer Law

ARBITRATOR’S AWARD OF $63,000 UNDER THE LEMON LAW BASED UPON NOISES FROM THE VEHICLE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitration award in this Lemon Law case was not supported by adequate evidence. Respondent Leonidou leased a BMW and brought an action under the Lemon Law (General Obligations Law 198-a) alleging noises impaired the value of the vehicle. The arbitrator awarded Leonidou nearly $63,000:

The Lemon Law applies to defects in car parts and workmanship that are expressly warrantied from defect by the manufacturer/dealer (see General Business Law § 198-a[b][1]). Under the statute, when a manufacturer is unable to correct a defect or condition that “substantially impairs” the value of the motor vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer, at the option of the consumer, is required either to (1) replace the motor vehicle with a comparable motor vehicle or (2) accept return of the vehicle and refund the full purchase price to the consumer (General Business Law § 198-a[c][1]). It is undisputed that Leonidou was offered a replacement vehicle by BMW and the dealership in accordance with General Business Law § 198-a (c)(1). Leonidou exercised his option not to replace his vehicle.

Leonidou failed to present any evidence to show a defect in materials or workmanship that was covered by an express warranty … . Leonidou acknowledged that the noise issues did not affect the car’s safety or operation. He admitted that other drivers he knew, driving the same vehicle type, experienced similar noises, and BMW’s witnesses, who testified to their technical experience in repairing such vehicles, attested that the noises at issue were inherent in the SUV design due to its, inter alia, stiffer suspension for off-road conditions. There was no basis in this record to find that the noises otherwise substantially impaired the value of the vehicle to Leonidou … . Matter of BMW of N. Am., LLC v Leonidou, 2020 NY Slip Op 02858, First Dept 5-14-20

May 14, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF A RENT STABILIZATION LAW (RSL) RENT-OVERCHARGE SUIT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a partial dissent, determined the General Business Law 349 cause of action alleging deceptive business practices in the context of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) rent-overcharge suit was properly dismissed:

… General Business Law … , section 349 prohibits “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state” … . We have held that this statute “cannot fairly be understood to mean that everyone who acts unlawfully, and does not admit the transgression, is being deceptive'” within the meaning of section 349 … . For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that a claim may lie under General Business Law § 349 based upon a landlord’s alleged misrepresentation to the public that an apartment was exempt from rent regulation following deregulation in violation of the Rent Stabilization Law. Here, however, plaintiffs alleged only that defendants failed to admit that they violated the Rent Stabilization Law in deregulating plaintiffs’ apartments—three of which were, in fact, never deregulated—rather than any affirmative conduct that would tend to deceive consumers. Inasmuch as plaintiffs failed to allege more than “bare legal conclusions” … regarding the existence of consumer-oriented, deceptive acts … , their General Business Law claim was properly dismissed. Collazo v Netherland Prop. Assets LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 02128, CtApp 4-2-20

April 2, 2020/by Bruce Freeman