Criminal Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ACTING IN BAD FAITH IN SEEKING THE TESTIMONY OF CERTAIN WITNESSES; THE TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED; CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s scheme to defraud conviction, determined defendant should not have been precluded from calling witnesses in good faith:

“Pursuant to Penal Law § 155.15(1) [i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith'” … . In this case, the defendant claimed that the money from the grant from OCFS [Office of Children & Family Service] was appropriated mistakenly but in good faith as reimbursement for expenses he personally paid for events occurring in 2008 and 2009, after the grant was awarded but in a time period not covered by the grant. The defendant intended to call as witnesses, a videographer who would attest to the fact that he “got paid” for services at a 2009 event, and others who would testify as to other expenses at that event. …

The record does not establish that the defendant was acting in bad faith in seeking to present the testimony of these witnesses at the trial. The proposed testimony did not deal with a collateral issue … , but, rather, went to the heart of the defendant’s claim of right defense. Thus, it was error for the Supreme Court to have prospectively precluded the defendant’s witnesses from testifying, and, under the facts of this case, that error cannot be deemed harmless. People v Wills, 2020 NY Slip Op 04976, Second Dept 9-16-20

September 16, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

THREE OF THE FOUR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE COUNTS WERE MULTIPLICITOUS EVEN THOUGH THEY INVOLVED DIFFERENT SUBDIVISIONS OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192; THE DWI AND DWAI COUNTS WERE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE SECOND DEGREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined three counts of vehicular homicide were multiplicitous and the DWI and DWAI counts were inclusory concurrent counts of vehicular homicide second degree:

While the People contend that each count of vehicular manslaughter required them to prove additional facts that the others did not, in fact, the People were only required to prove that the defendant violated one subdivision of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 in order to prove his guilt under Penal Law § 125.12(1). The People’s election to proceed on a theory that the defendant had violated more than one such subdivision by presenting evidence of his multiple, distinct manners of intoxication was not necessary to establish his guilt … . Thus, a conviction on one count of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree would have been inconsistent with an acquittal on any other count charging the same offense predicated upon a different manner of intoxication … . Accordingly, we agree with the defendant that counts 5, 6, and 7 of the indictment were multiplicitous of count 4 … . Although the dismissal of the multiplicitous counts will not affect the duration of the defendant’s sentence of imprisonment, it is nevertheless appropriate to dismiss these counts in consideration of the stigma attached to the redundant convictions … .

As the People concede, the defendant’s convictions of driving while intoxicated in violation of subdivisions (2) and (3) of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 and driving while ability impaired under subdivisions (4) and (4-a) of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 are inclusory concurrent counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree … . Accordingly, those convictions must also be reversed … . People v O’Brien 2020 NY Slip Op 04971, Second Dept 9-16-20

September 16, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Mental Hygiene Law

ALTHOUGH KERRY K WAS ORDERED RELEASED UNDER STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT PURSUANT TO THE FIRST MENTAL HYGIENE LAW CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL, AFTER KERRY K’S SUCCESSFUL APPEAL HE WAS PROPERLY ORDERED RE-CONFINED PENDING THE SECOND TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined Kerry K was properly ordered re-confined pending a retrial in this Mental Hygiene Law civil commitment proceeding. In the first trial Kerry K was not found to be a dangerous sex offender and was ordered released under strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST). Kerry K appealed the finding that he suffered from a mental abnormality. The Second Department reversed and ordered and new trial. The issue here was whether Kerry K could be re-confined while awaiting re-trial:

On appeal, Kerry K. contends that since the Supreme Court has already found, after a dispositional hearing held in 2015, that he was not a “dangerous sex offender requiring confinement” (Mental Hygiene Law §§ 10.03[e]; 10.07[f]), there is no statutory requirement—and no logical reason—for him to be re-confined pending his retrial based on the stale 2013 probable cause determination, and that he is, in effect, being punished for having successfully prosecuted his prior appeal. Alternatively, to the extent pretrial confinement is statutorily mandated, Kerry K. contends that the statute, as applied to him, violates his constitutional right to due process of law.

The State counters that Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06(k) requires pretrial detention upon a finding of probable cause, and since this Court’s decision on the prior appeal merely reversed the June 25, 2015 order and underlying finding of mental abnormality and ordered a new trial, without disturbing the Supreme Court’s 2013 probable cause finding, it follows that Kerry K. must be re-confined pending retrial. Moreover, the State contends that Kerry K.’s claim that the pretrial detention provision of the Mental Hygiene Law is unconstitutional as applied to him lacks merit … . We find that the State’s contentions have merit. Matter of State of New York v Kerry K.,2020 NY Slip Op 04844, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

AN AUTOMATIC OVERRIDE ALLOWING A LEVEL THREE RISK ASSESSMENT WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO A PSYCHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE SORA RISK LEVEL GUIDELINES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Maltese, determined the automatic override justifying a level three risk level was properly based upon a psychological abnormality not specifically mentioned in the risk assessment guidelines, but included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:

In the Guidelines, the Board explained that it “chose to require a clinical assessment of an abnormality so that loose language in a pre-sentence report would not become the basis for an override. Examples of a clinical assessment that would support an override are pedophilia and sexual sadism” (Guidelines at 19 …). The Guidelines do not contain any language limiting the application of the fourth override to these two examples, and there is no requirement that a psychological abnormality must be inherently sex-related in order for the fourth override to apply … . * * *

The People submitted, among other things, a psychologist’s report in which the psychologist concluded, based on a clinical assessment, that the defendant suffered from schizoaffective disorder, that he experienced “periods of agitation and disorganized behavior,” and “presents as hypersexual with low impulse control when decompensated.” The psychologist further concluded that the nature of the defendant’s illness placed him at an elevated risk of violence, which would likely take the form of inappropriate sexual conduct. This evidence established that there has been a clinical assessment that the defendant has a psychological, physical, or organic abnormality that decreases his ability to control impulsive sexual behavior. People v Odiari, 2020 NY Slip Op 04882, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence

ALTHOUGH HARMLESS, IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS WITHOUT AUTHENTICATING THE ACCOUNTS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined it was (harmless) error to admit in evidence the content of social media accounts which was not authenticated:

We disagree … with the Supreme Court’s determination admitting into evidence certain content from various social media accounts … . The People failed to present sufficient evidence that the subject social media accounts belonged to the defendant, that the photographs on the accounts were accurate and authentic, or that the statements found on one of the accounts were made by the defendant … . People v Upson, 2020 NY Slip Op 04876, Second Dept 9-2-2020

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law

THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED; NO MENTION OF THE WAIVER WAS MADE UNTIL AFTER THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE RIGHTS AT STAKE WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the waiver of appeal was invalid because it was first mentioned after the guilty plea and the explanation of the purportedly waived appellate rights was insufficient:

… [T]he appeal waiver was not mentioned by the Supreme Court prior to the defendant’s plea of guilty, but only afterward. Accordingly, “the defendant received no material benefit from his appeal waiver, as the court had already accepted the defendant’s plea and made its sentence promise” … . Under such circumstances and in the absence of a request by the People, “the court’s insistence upon the execution of an appeal waiver was a gratuitous, after-the-fact additional demand asserted after the bargain had already been struck” … . In addition, the court’s colloquy on this issue, conducted after the plea had already been accepted, “mischaracterized the appellate rights waived as encompassing an absolute bar to the taking of a direct appeal” … . Contrary to the People’s contention, “these defects were not cured by the terms of the standard written appeal waiver form, which not only lacked detail and repeated many of the mischaracterizations contained in the court’s colloquy, but further misstated that the defendant was giving up the right to all postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal” … . People v Eduardo S., 2020 NY Slip Op 04873, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Immigration Law

THE APPELLATE COURT, OVER A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT, REFUSED TO LOWER DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE BY ONE DAY TO AVOID DEPORTATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant’s one-year sentence for assault, which had already been served at the time of the appeal, should not be reduced by one-day to avoid the immigration consequences of the one-year sentence (deportation):

On this record, even taking into specific consideration the potential immigration consequences of the jury’s verdict and the court’s sentence thereon, and recognizing that the trial judge has the best first-hand knowledge of the case and of the defendant, it cannot be said that the definite term of imprisonment of one year was unduly was harsh or excessive, or that any reduction of one day is warranted to further the interest of justice. …

We have rejected requests for one-day sentence reductions in cases with immigration consequences where the defendants used physical force or violence in the commission of their crimes against others … . …

Here, the defendant’s conduct involved violence against two assault victims, so that a one-day sentence reduction would be an outlier measured against our existing precedents. In any event, to reduce the defendant’s sentence by one day for the purpose of circumventing the normal application of U.S. immigration laws and procedures, in an appeal involving a) physical violence, b) against duly authorized peace officers, c) working in the line of duty, d) causing permanent physical injury to one of the officers, e) and inconsistent with this Court’s prior precedents, builds a bridge that is too far for us to traverse. People v Janvier, 2020 NY Slip Op 04861, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence

THE SENTENCES FOR ASSAULT AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the evidence did not support consecutive sentences for assault second and criminal possession of a weapon second:

… [T]he sentence imposed on the conviction of assault in the second degree should not run consecutively to the sentence imposed on the conviction of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. There were no facts adduced at the defendant’s plea allocution to establish that the defendant attempted to possess ” a loaded firearm before forming the intent to cause a crime with that weapon'” … . People v Goodman, 2020 NY Slip Op 04857, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law

THE FEDERAL FELONY DID NOT QUALIFY AS A NEW YORK PREDICATE FELONY, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should not have been sentenced as a second felony offender because the federal conviction did not qualify as the equivalent of the New York felony:

… [T]he defendant was improperly adjudicated a second felony offender on the basis of a prior federal conviction for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (see 18 USC § 922[k]). “An out-of-state felony conviction qualifies as a predicate felony under Penal Law § 70.06 only if it is for a crime whose elements are equivalent to those of a felony in New York” … . Here, the defendant’s predicate crime does not require as one of its elements that the firearm be operable (see 18 USC § 922[k] … ) and, thus, does not constitute a felony in New York for the purpose of enhanced sentencing … . People v Dyce, 2020 NY Slip Op 04853, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Criminal Law, Judges

ONCE SUPREME COURT FOUND DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE IT WAS REQUIRED TO VACATE THE CONVICTION; DEFENDANT MOVED TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE HE REJECTED A PLEA OFFER WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE COULD BE SUBJECT TO LIFE IN PRISON AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER AFTER TRIAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REINSTATED THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE AFTER FINDING DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined, once the motion court found defendant’s counsel ineffective for failing to inform defendant he risked being sentenced to life in prison as a persistent felony offender after trial, the motion court could not reinstate the original sentence. Defendant had been offered a plea offer with a sentence of 4 1/2 to 9 years which he rejected and moved to vacate the guilty plea pursuant to CPL 440.10. The statute does not authorize reinstating the original sentence after granting the motion to vacate:

CPL 440.10(4) provides that “[i]f the court grants [a defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440], it must, except as provided in subdivision five or six of this section, vacate the judgment, and must dismiss the accusatory instrument, or order a new trial, or take such other action as is appropriate in the circumstances” (emphasis added). Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the plain language of CPL 440.10(4) requires that, upon a finding that a defendant’s CPL 440 motion is meritorious, a court must, in the first instance (absent the exceptions in subdivisions five or six of CPL 440.10 which are not relevant here), vacate the judgment … , and upon so doing, must then select one of three options: (1) “dismiss the accusatory instrument,” (2) “order a new trial,” or (3) “take such other action as is appropriate in the circumstances” (CPL 440.10[4]). Since the court found that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, it should have granted the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion by vacating the judgment of conviction prior to directing the People to reoffer the plea agreement … . People v Brown, 2020 NY Slip Op 04849, Second Dept 9-2-20

September 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ACTING IN BAD FAITH IN SEEKING THE TESTIMONY OF CERTAIN WITNESSES; THE TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED; CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

THREE OF THE FOUR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE COUNTS WERE MULTIPLICITOUS EVEN THOUGH THEY INVOLVED DIFFERENT SUBDIVISIONS OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192; THE DWI AND DWAI COUNTS WERE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE SECOND DEGREE (SECOND DEPT).

ALTHOUGH KERRY K WAS ORDERED RELEASED UNDER STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT PURSUANT TO THE FIRST MENTAL HYGIENE LAW CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL, AFTER KERRY K’S SUCCESSFUL APPEAL HE WAS PROPERLY ORDERED RE-CONFINED PENDING THE SECOND TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

AN AUTOMATIC OVERRIDE ALLOWING A LEVEL THREE RISK ASSESSMENT WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO A PSYCHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE SORA RISK LEVEL GUIDELINES (SECOND DEPT).

ALTHOUGH HARMLESS, IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS WITHOUT AUTHENTICATING THE ACCOUNTS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT).

THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED; NO MENTION OF THE WAIVER WAS MADE UNTIL AFTER THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE RIGHTS AT STAKE WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

THE APPELLATE COURT, OVER A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT, REFUSED TO LOWER DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE BY ONE DAY TO AVOID DEPORTATION (SECOND DEPT).

THE SENTENCES FOR ASSAULT AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY (SECOND DEPT).

THE FEDERAL FELONY DID NOT QUALIFY AS A NEW YORK PREDICATE FELONY, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT).

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