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A DEFENSE WITNESS WHO WOULD HAVE TESTIFIED THAT A KEY PROSECUTION WITNESS HAD A POOR REPUTATION FOR TRUTHFULNESS AND VERACTIY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FROM TESTIFYING; CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the witness who would have testified that the complainant’s mother, a prosecution witness, had a poor reputation for truthfulness and veracity should not have been prohibited from testifying:

… [T]he defendant sought to introduce testimony from Marie Anisca-Oral, a friend of his older sister, on the subject of the reputation for truthfulness and veracity of the eight-year-old complainant’s mother (hereinafter the mother), who testified for the prosecution. In order to lay the foundation for such testimony, Anisca-Oral, a staff sergeant in the United States Army, described a community of seven or eight friends and acquaintances, predominantly of Haitian nationality, and predominantly living within certain neighborhoods in Brooklyn. Anisca-Oral testified that she had known the mother since 1999, that almost everyone she knew also knew the mother, and that every time she saw her acquaintances among this group, the mother’s reputation for truthfulness and veracity was discussed. “[T]he presentation of reputation evidence by a criminal defendant is a matter of right, not discretion, once a proper foundation has been laid”… . “A reputation may grow wherever an individual’s associations are of such quantity and quality as to permit him to be personally observed by a sufficient number of individuals to give reasonable assurance of reliability” … . “The trial court must allow such testimony, once a foundation has been laid, so long as it is relevant to contradict the testimony of a key witness and is limited to general reputation for truth and veracity in the community; the weight given to such evidence should be left in the hands of the jury” … . People v Lisene, 2022 NY Slip Op 00194, Second Dept 1-12-22

 

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DEFENDANT REFUSED TO SPEAK WITH HIS ATTORNEY; THE JUDGE DENIED REQUESTS FOR NEW COUNSEL WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE DEFENDANT, WHO WAS PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM; DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s right to counsel had not been adequately protected and returned the case to pre-suppression-hearing status. Defendant refused to speak with his attorney and the judge, despite defendant’s presence in the courtroom, never discussed the issue with the defendant before denying a request to assign new counsel:

… [W]e conclude that the defendant’s right to counsel was not adequately protected. The defendant’s request for new counsel, made through assigned counsel, contained serious factual allegations concerning the defendant’s complaints about his assigned counsel and the breakdown of communications between assigned counsel and the defendant … . Under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court failed to meet its ongoing duty to make inquiries to determine whether there was good cause for the requested substitution by denying the request without speaking directly with the defendant … . Thus, reversal is warranted. Further, on the record presented, the matter should be restored to pre-suppression-hearing status. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s suppression determination and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings on the indictment. People v English, 2022 NY Slip Op 00189, Second Dept 1-12-22

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE A MOTION FOR A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE IN THIS SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the level three SORA risk assessment, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion for a downward departure. The only arguments defense counsel made were without merit, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the facts, and would not have reduced the risk assessment to level two even if successful:

… [C]ounsel only challenged 35 of the 155 total points assessed against the defendant, and a resulting score of 120 would have still been within the range (between 110 and 300 points) of a presumptive level three (high) offender. Counsel did not seek a downward departure from the defendant’s presumptive risk level designation as a level three sex offender, and the record supports the defendant’s claim that his counsel failed to articulate any argument that would have had any effect on the outcome of the SORA proceeding … . … [T]he record does not demonstrate that counsel made a “strategic decision to attack the assessment of points, while foregoing any request for a downward departure.” Any such strategy in this case “would have made no sense” because it would not have had any effect on the outcome of the SORA proceeding … . Counsel’s failure to make any application for a downward departure, under the particular circumstances of this case, worked to deprive the defendant of his right to zealous advocacy, and amounted to less than meaningful representation … . People v Morancis, 2022 NY Slip Op 00202, Second Dept 1-12-22

 

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SEVERAL COUNTS CHARGING CONTEMPT WERE RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY THE TRIAL EVIDENCE, COUNTS DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined several counts charging contempt were rendered duplicitous by the trial evidence and therefore must be dismissed. The contempt charges alleged the violation of two orders of protection in favor of four people. Neither the jury instructions nor the verdict sheet allowed the jury to pinpoint which alleged violation applied to whom:

Here, counts 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17 of Indictment No. 5685/14 all charged the defendant with criminal contempt in the second degree, arising from his alleged violation of two orders of protection during two separate incidents that occurred on June 27, 2014. The first order of protection was in favor of a single individual; the second order was in favor of that same individual, as well as three others.

Neither the verdict sheet nor the jury charge, however, explained how the testimony and evidence adduced at trial applied to the seven counts—i.e., which counts pertained to which of the two orders of protection and which of the four alleged victims. Therefore, as the People effectively concede, the challenged counts were duplicitous because it is impossible to determine the particular acts upon which the jury reached its verdict with respect to each of the counts … . People v Woodley, 2022 NY Slip Op 00201, Second Dept 1-12-22

 

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DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED AND INDICTED WHILE OUT ON BAIL; THE COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING BEFORE REVOKING THE ORDER RELEASING DEFENDANT ON BAIL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the courts was required to hold a hearing before revoking the order releasing defendant on bail. Defendant was out on bail when he was arrested three times and indicted on one set of charges:

… CPL 530.60(2)(a) states that “[w]henever in the course of a criminal action or proceeding a defendant charged with the commission of a felony is at liberty as a result of an order of recognizance, release under non-monetary conditions or bail issued pursuant to this article it shall be grounds for revoking such order that the court finds reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed one or more . . . violent felony offenses.” By its express terms, this statutory section applies to situations where a principal is accused of committing violent felony offenses while he or she was “at liberty as a result of . . . bail” on a pending felony charge (id.). A principal charged with a felony who was out on bail on that charge necessarily includes individuals charged with qualifying offenses since the setting of bail is not initially authorized for nonqualifying offenses (see CPL 510.10[1], [3], [4]). … CPL 530.60(2)(a) clearly applies to the circumstances here. Since the People applied for remand on the sole basis that the principal was accused of committing violent felony offenses while at liberty on the underlying felony charges, the court was required to apply the standard in CPL 530.60(2)(a) and to conduct the hearing mandated in CPL 530.60(2)(c). People ex rel. Rankin v Brann, 2022 NY Slip Op 00153, Second Dept 1-11-22

 

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CRIMINAL SALE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FIRST DEGREE AND THE RELATED CONSPIRACY CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the criminal sale of a controlled substance first degree and the related conspiracy convictions were against the weight of the evidence:

In a weight of the evidence review, we first determine whether, based on all of the credible evidence, a different finding would have been unreasonable, and, if not, we then “weigh the relative probative force of the conflicting testimony and the relative strength of the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony” to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence … . . * * *

Although the jury may have been able to infer from the intercepted communications that defendant sold cocaine to Henry on October 28, 2017, the evidence failed to satisfy the two ounce or more weight element of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree … . Under these circumstances, the evidence falls short of establishing the elements of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree when viewed in a neutral light … . As defendant’s conspiracy conviction is premised upon the criminal sale in the first degree charge, it too must fall based upon a review of the weight of the evidence … . People v Adams, 2022 NY Slip Op 00076, Third Dept 1-6-22

 

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THE UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE CONVICTION DID NOT INVOLVE “SEXUAL CONTACT” AS DEFINED BY THE PENAL LAW; THEREFORE THE 20 POINT ASSESSMENT FOR “SEXUAL CONTACT” WAS ERROR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, determined the risk factors requiring “sexual contact” and a “prior felony or sex crime” were not supported:

County Court erred in assessing points under risk factors 4 and 10. The assessment of points under risk factor 4 is warranted where a defendant has engaged in “either (i) two or more acts of sexual contact, at least one of which is an act of sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, or aggravated sexual contact, which acts are separated in time by at least 24 hours, or (ii) three or more acts of sexual contact over a period of at least two weeks” … . For purposes of risk classification, the Penal Law definition of terms is used … . The record does not reflect that defendant’s crimes of conviction, for unlawful surveillance in the second degree … , involved any form of sexual contact … . In the absence of any record evidence that defendant engaged in sexual contact with any victim, 20 points should not have been assessed under risk factor 4 … . Likewise, the record lacks any evidence that defendant had a “prior felony or sex crime” within three years of the unlawful surveillance sex offenses and, thus, the court erred in assessing 10 points under risk factor 10 … . People v Wassilie, 2022 NY Slip Op 00103, Third Dept 1-6-22

 

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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE INTERVENTION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; STRONG TW0-JUSTICE DISSENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, affirmed defendant’s murder conviction. The majority noted that some of the trial judge’s remarks would have been better left unsaid, but held the judge did not intervene excessively. The dissent disagreed:

… [W]hile many of the Supreme Court’s interventions were proper attempts to clarify testimony and facilitate the progress of the trial, we agree with our dissenting colleagues that other remarks would better have been left unsaid. Nevertheless, when the record is viewed as a whole, the court’s conduct, to the extent it was improper, did not prevent the jury from arriving at an impartial verdict on the merits … . * * *

From the dissent:

Viewing the record as a whole, the Supreme Court’s conduct, taken together with, inter alia, its disparate treatment of the two experts … , its efforts to point out inconsistencies in the testimony of the defendant’s wife … , and its assistance in eliciting testimony from the People’s witnesses … , “demonstrated apparent bias in favor of the People” … . This improper interference deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and thus, a new trial is warranted before a different Justice … . People v Martinez, 2022 NY Slip Op 00037, Second Dept 1-5-22

 

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THE JUROR’S SIMULATION OF THE STABBING IN THE JURY ROOM DID NOT CONSTITUTE JUROR MISCONDUCT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined a juror’s use of a piece of cardboard to simulate a stabbing motion with a knife (during deliberations) did not constitute juror misconduct:

… [T]he juror … used a piece of cardboard to simulate a knife and briefly made a stabbing motion in an effort to demonstrate or reenact the crime at issue. Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, this conduct likewise did not constitute “improper conduct” within the meaning of CPL 330.30(2). “It is well recognized that jurors may conduct a jury room crime reenactment or demonstration provided it involves no more that the jurors’ application of everyday experiences, perceptions and common sense to the evidence” … . In light of the trial evidence and the nature of the demonstration, the juror did not become an unsworn witness, or introduce new facts into the deliberations … . Given the location, simplicity, and brief duration of the demonstration … , as well as the hearing testimony of the jurors who testified that the demonstration had no effect on their deliberations … , the demonstration did not prejudice a substantial right of defendant …. People v Hubbard, 2022 NY Slip Op 00017, First Dept 1-4-22

 

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PURSUANT TO A MOLINEUX ANALYSIS, THE WEAPON-POSSESSION COUNT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED FROM THE MENACING AND ASSAULT COUNTS, IN WHICH DISPLAY OF A WEAPON WAS ALLEGED; THE SIROIS HEARING DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT CAUSED THE VICTIM TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY, THEREFORE THE VICTIM’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, over a partial dissent, determined: (1) the weapon-possession count should have been severed from the assault and menacing counts under a Molineux analysis; (2) the Sirois hearing did not demonstrate that the alleged victim refused to testify because of intimidation by the defendant, therefore the victim’s grand jury testimony should not have been read to the jury; and (3) under Molineux, evidence of the defendant’s possession of marijuana and defendant’s participation in a program related to the police department’s “Crime Analysis Center” should not have been admitted:

… [B]y refusing to sever the assault and menacing charges from the weapon charge, County Court permitted highly prejudicial evidence to be placed before the jury. Proof that a handgun was recovered from defendant’s residence could lend credence to the victim’s claim that a handgun — albeit a different one — was displayed during the course of the assault and menacing. Similarly, if the jury credited the victim’s grand jury testimony relative to defendant displaying a weapon during her encounter with him, the jury could be more likely to believe that the handgun recovered from defendant’s residence did indeed belong to him.  * * *

Although the proof adduced [at the Sirois hearing] certainly established that the victim felt threatened and did not wish to testify, such proof fell short of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant — or someone acting at his behest — orchestrated the victim’s unavailability for trial. People v Bryant, 2021 NY Slip Op 07582, Third Dept 12-30-21

 

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