Criminal Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM PROSECUTING THE DEFENDANT FOR ALLEGED SEX OFFENSES ON THE GROUND THAT, AS A FAMILY COURT JUDGE, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY HAD PRESIDED OVER FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE DEFENDANT AND THE ALLEGED VICTIM OF THE CHARGED SEX OFFENSES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined petitioner, the county district attorney, should not have been disqualified from prosecuting Jamel Brandow for sex offense charges on the ground that, as a Family Court judge, the district attorney had presided over Family Court proceedings against Brandow which also involved the alleged victim of the current charges:

Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 17, a former judge “shall not act as attorney or counsellor in any action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding, which has been before him [or her] in his [or her] official character” … . Here, contrary to respondent’s determination, the underlying criminal matter was not in any way before petitioner in his former judicial capacity. Although petitioner presided over proceedings brought against Brandow in Family Court in 2008, the matters litigated in those proceedings bear no similarity to the allegations of sexual misconduct charged in the indictment … . Further, although petitioner determined that Brandow violated an order of protection issued in favor of the victim and others, the violation did not arise out of any contact between Brandow and the victim. Accordingly, as the underlying criminal matter was not previously before petitioner in his judicial capacity, Judiciary Law § 17 does not prohibit petitioner’s prosecution of the subject criminal charges … . Matter of Czajka v Koweek, 2020 NY Slip Op 07009, Third Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Battery, Civil Rights Law, Criminal Law, Evidence, False Arrest, Immunity

UNDER THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI ANALYSIS, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 42 USC 1983, FALSE ARREST, ASSAULT AND BATTERY CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city’s motion for summary judgment on the 42 USC 1983, false arrest, assault and battery causes of action should not have been granted. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, there were questions of fact about the existence of probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest:

“The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to a cause of action alleging false arrest, including a cause of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that is the federal-law equivalent of a state common-law false arrest cause of action” … . “However, [w]hen an arrest is made without a warrant, as here, a presumption arises that it was unlawful, and the burden of proving justification is cast upon the defendant” … . Where the arrest was made without a prior judicial determination of probable cause, and where the arresting officer’s alleged probable cause is based on hearsay, probable cause is properly evaluated under the Aguilar-Spinelli test … . Under the Aguilar-Spinelli rule, where, as here, probable cause is predicated upon the hearsay statement of an informant, the proponent of the hearsay statement “must demonstrate that the informant is reliable and that the informant had a sufficient basis for his or her knowledge” … . Here the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to the existence of probable cause for the arrest. The existence of triable issues of fact with respect to whether the police evaluations at issue, such as the evaluation of probable cause to arrest and requisite suspicion to perform a strip search, were objectively reasonable precludes an award of summary judgment … on the ground of qualified immunity … .

“To sustain a cause of action to recover damages for assault, there must be proof of physical conduct placing the plaintiff in imminent apprehension of harmful contact” … . “To recover damages for battery, a plaintiff must prove that there was bodily contact, made with intent, and offensive in nature” … . A claim predicated on assault and battery may be based upon contact during an unlawful arrest … . Here, the defendants’ failure to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s arrest was lawful precluded an award of summary judgment dismissing the sixth cause of action, which alleged assault and battery … . Cayruth v City of Mount Vernon, 2020 NY Slip Op 07027, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Immigration Law

THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCITIZENS; MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE HER GUILTY PLEA, DESPITE THE FACT DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JUDGE THAT DEFENDANT SAID SHE WAS A CITIZEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department remitted the matter to allow defendant the opportunity to move to vacate her plea of guilty based upon the sentencing court’s failure to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences for noncitizens. Defense counsel had informed the court that defendant had informed him she was a citizen:

… [D]efense counsel’s statement during the plea proceeding that the defendant had informed him that she was a citizen of the United States did not absolve the court of its obligations pursuant to Peque [22 NY3d 168]. As we explained in People v Williams, “a trial court should not ask a defendant whether he or she is a United States citizen and decide whether to advise the defendant of the plea’s deportation consequence based on the defendant’s answer. Instead, a trial court should advise all defendants pleading guilty to felonies that, if they are not United States citizens, their felony guilty plea may expose them to deportation” … .

… [I]n the present case … the presentence investigation report explained that an “immigration record check” had revealed, among other things, that the defendant was not in the United States “legally.”

The defendant’s due process claim is thus properly presented on the defendant’s direct appeal, and in the absence of the warning required under Peque, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to move to vacate her plea, and for a report by the Supreme Court thereafter … . People v Ulanov, 2020 NY Slip Op 07108, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant was eligible for youthful offender status because criminal possession of a weapon third degree is not an armed felony:

The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for youthful offender status based upon its mistaken belief that he had been convicted of an armed felony, which required the court to find either mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed or that the defendant was only a minor participant in the crime (see CPL 720.10[3]). The People correctly concede that the court erred in finding that the defendant had been convicted of an armed felony, since criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree pursuant to Penal Law 265.02(7) does not require proof that the firearm was loaded (see CPL 1.20[41] …). Thus, the defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment without any finding of mitigation (see CPL 720.10[2]). Accordingly, we remit the matter … for a new determination of the defendant’s application for youthful offender status and resentencing thereafter. People v Javon L., 2020 NY Slip Op 07094, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence

EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE SIMILARITIES WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s attempted rape conviction, determined the evidence of a 1990 robbery and sexual assault should not have been admitted as evidence of the identity of the perpetrator. But the burglary, robbery and sexual abuse convictions, apparently stemming from the same incident, were not disturbed:

… [T]he similarities between the alleged 1990 robbery and sexual assault and the attack on the complainant were not sufficiently unique or unusual and did not establish a distinctive modus operandi relevant to establishing the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator in this case. While both incidents involved robberies and sexual assaults of unaccompanied Caucasian women, during daytime hours, in the lobbies of residential buildings, these similarities were not so unique as to give rise to an inference that the perpetrator of each crime was the same individual … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in permitting the People to present evidence regarding the 1990 robbery and assault in order to establish the defendant’s identity … .

The error was harmless as to all of the charges except the attempted rape in the first degree since the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the erroneously admitted Molineux evidence, was overwhelming as to those other charges, and there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant on those charges had it not been for the error … . Furthermore, the erroneous admission of the Molineux evidence did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial … . We reach a different conclusion with respect to the defendant’s conviction of attempted rape in the first degree. Because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of that charge was not overwhelming, the error cannot be deemed harmless, and the defendant’s conviction of that charge must be vacated and a new trial ordered as to that charge … . People v Duncan, 2020 NY Slip Op 07090, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law

THE DE BOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, NOT THE TRAFFIC STOP REQUIREMENTS, APPLY TO THE APPROACH OF A PERSON IN A STATIONARY CAR WITH THE ENGINE RUNNING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department noted that a police officer (Meskill) approaching a person in a parked car is subject to the De Bour requirements for a street stop, not a traffic stop:

With respect to the initial encounter, unlike a stop of a moving vehicle — which must be based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity … or probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred … — “[a] police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis” and is justified if “supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality” … . There is no dispute here that Meskill was authorized to approach defendant’s vehicle in response to a citizen-requested welfare check upon observing him slumped over with the engine running. People v Spradlin, 2020 NY Slip Op 06982, Third Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law

A DEFENDANT MAY PLEAD GUILTY TO A CRIME WHICH IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OR FOR WHICH THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS AS LONG AS IT IS SUBJECT TO A LESSER PENALTY THAN THE CHARGED OFFENSE(S) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department noted that a defendant may plead guilty to a crime which is a legal impossibility and for which there is no factual basis, as long as it is a reduced charge:

Assuming without deciding that defendant is correct in claiming that his incarceration rendered any attempt to possess the pills recovered from his residence a legal impossibility, that was no bar to him “plead[ing] guilty to a nonexistent crime in satisfaction of an [accusatory instrument] charging a crime for which a greater penalty may be imposed” … . To the extent that defendant’s argument may also be construed as a claim that it was factually impossible for him to commit the crime, and assuming that such an argument survives his appeal waiver … , a factual basis is not required for a guilty plea to a reduced charge … . People v Bonacci, 2020 NY Slip Op 06980, Third Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

AN ALLEGED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WAS NOT IN PLAIN VIEW IN THE VEHICLE; THEREFORE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A CLOSED CONTAINER IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH REVEALED A WEAPON, WAS NOT JUSTIFIED; WEAPONS CHARGES DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, dismissing the weapons charges, determined the search of defendant’s vehicle was not justified. The officer (Chowdhury) saw the top of a prescription bottle, pulled the bottle out of a pouch, determined it contained a controlled substance, a searched a closed container to find the weapon:

Chowdhury observed “two clear cups of brown liquid, alcohol” in the cup holders in the vehicle’s front console and smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. Chowdhury asked the defendant and an individual in the front passenger seat to exit the vehicle, and they complied. Chowdhury further testified that the rear passenger side door was open and that, with the aid of a flashlight, he observed the “white top” of a prescription bottle sticking out of the pouch on the back of the front passenger seat. Chowdhury then entered the vehicle, pulled the bottle out, and observed that it was clear, with no prescription label, and had unlabeled white pills inside that Chowdhury and [officer] Carrieri identified as Oxycodone. Carrieri then began searching the vehicle for any weapons or other contraband and found a handgun inside of a closed compartment under the rug behind the driver’s seat. The defendant was arrested, and later made a statement to the police regarding the gun. …

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress the gun and his statement. The officers’ observations of the brown liquid in the cups in the front console and the smell emanating from the vehicle gave them probable cause to suspect a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1227, which prohibits the possession of open containers containing alcohol in a vehicle located upon a public highway, and would have justified their entry into the vehicle to seize the cups of liquid and search for additional open containers … . However, since there was nothing from Officer Chowdhury’s observation of the top of the prescription bottle located in the seat pocket that indicated that the bottle contained contraband, there was no justification for his removal of the bottle and detailed inspection of it and its contents or for the subsequent search of the car for weapons or other contraband. Chowdhury testified that it was only after he pulled the bottle out of the pouch and pulled upward on the top of it that he was able to see that it was unlabeled and contained what he identified as Oxycodone. Thus, contrary to the People’s contention, it cannot be said that a suspected controlled substance was in plain sight … . People v Boykin, 2020 NY Slip Op 07085, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Criminal Law

THE APPLICATION FOR A WARRANT FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE DID NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, ordering a new trial, determined the application for a warrant to search defendant’s cell phone did not provide probable cause for the search:

At the time of the arrest, a cell phone was recovered from the defendant’s person. Shortly thereafter, the arresting officer submitted an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to search the cell phone. In relevant part, the officer averred that individuals involved in robberies and other crimes “utilize mobile telephones to facilitate their illegal activities,” and opined, without further elaboration or factual support, that the cell phone recovered on the defendant’s person “possesses information concerning the communications related to the instant robbery,” “had been utilized to speak with co-conspirators, suppliers and/or customers in furthering illegal activities,” and contained “information that would lead to further apprehensions.” …

… [T]he arresting officer’s conclusory statement that the cell phone contained information relevant to the robbery was bereft of any supporting factual allegations—hearsay or otherwise—and, therefore, plainly insufficient to establish probable cause … . Although the arresting officer later testified, at trial, that he had observed photographs of a gun on the cell phone at the time of the defendant’s arrest, such information—which arguably could have established probable cause provided it had been lawfully obtained … —was never included in the officer’s supporting affidavit. Under these circumstances, the warrant application did not provide a reasonable factual basis for the issuance of the warrant … . People v Boothe, 2020 NY Slip Op 07084, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION VACATED; UNPRESERVED ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating the assault second conviction, considering the issue in the interest of justice, determined the evidence of physical injury was legally insufficient:

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution … , it was legally insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child complainant sustained a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9). Physical injury is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain”… . The several witnesses described only a minor injury, stated variously that they saw “a redness” on the child’s cheek, or a slight swelling under his eye and cheek, or a bruise to the right cheek, which was treated with a cold pack. Nor did the record support a finding that the child complainant experienced substantial pain because he experienced only tenderness for one to two hours after the incident. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence that the child complainant suffered a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9) … . People v Bernazard, 2020 NY Slip Op 07083, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

UNDER THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI ANALYSIS, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 42 USC 1983, FALSE ARREST, ASSAULT AND BATTERY CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCITIZENS; MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE HER GUILTY PLEA, DESPITE THE FACT DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JUDGE THAT DEFENDANT SAID SHE WAS A CITIZEN (SECOND DEPT).

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE SIMILARITIES WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

THE DE BOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, NOT THE TRAFFIC STOP REQUIREMENTS, APPLY TO THE APPROACH OF A PERSON IN A STATIONARY CAR WITH THE ENGINE RUNNING (THIRD DEPT).

A DEFENDANT MAY PLEAD GUILTY TO A CRIME WHICH IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OR FOR WHICH THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS AS LONG AS IT IS SUBJECT TO A LESSER PENALTY THAN THE CHARGED OFFENSE(S) (THIRD DEPT).

AN ALLEGED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WAS NOT IN PLAIN VIEW IN THE VEHICLE; THEREFORE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A CLOSED CONTAINER IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH REVEALED A WEAPON, WAS NOT JUSTIFIED; WEAPONS CHARGES DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

THE APPLICATION FOR A WARRANT FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE DID NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

THE EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION VACATED; UNPRESERVED ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

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