Criminal Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

NEW JERSEY CONVICTION FOR LEWDNESS, ALTHOUGH NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE IN NEW JERSEY, IS THE EQUIVALENT OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD; IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER THE CONDUCT UNDERLYING THE FOREIGN OFFENSE IN ADDITION TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE; 30 POINT ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE NEW JERSEY CONVICTION WAS CORRECT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, over a concurrence and a two-judge dissent, determined defendant was properly assessed 30 points based upon his prior New Jersey conviction for lewdness. The New Jersey offense, based upon defendant’s repeatedly exposing himself to the 12-year-old victim, was deemed the equivalent of New York’s endangering the welfare of a child:

At the SORA court hearing, defendant challenged the assessment of 30 points under risk factor 9, asserting that his New Jersey lewdness conviction was neither a registrable offense in New Jersey nor did the comparable offense under New York law—public lewdness (a misdemeanor)—subject defendant to SORA registration in New York … . * * *

At the outset, we must resolve whether reliance on the underlying conduct of a prior foreign conviction is appropriate as a matter of law for purposes of assessing points under risk factor 9 when conducting a SORA risk-level determination. Under these circumstances, we hold that it is. * * *

Our analysis of the New Jersey conviction starts with North v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of New York, wherein we considered whether the defendant was required to register as a sex offender as a result of his federal conviction for possession of child pornography (8 NY3d 745 [2007]). That question turned on the “essential elements” provision in SORA, which defines “sex offense,” in relevant part, as “a conviction of an offense in any other jurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any [registrable sex offense in New York listed in section 168-a (2) of the Correction Law]” … . We concluded that, with respect to registrable offenses, the “essential elements” provision “requires registration whenever an individual is convicted of criminal conduct in a foreign jurisdiction that, if committed in New York, would have amounted to a registrable New York offense” … . …

In the SORA registration context … we [have held] that the strict equivalency standard was “not the optimal vehicle to effectuate SORA’s remedial purposes” and it was thus appropriate to utilize a more flexible approach that allowed consideration of the underlying conduct of a foreign conviction in addition to comparing the essential elements of the foreign and New York offense … . People v Perez, 2020 NY Slip Op 02096, CtApp 3-26-20

March 26, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence

TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE ADMISSION OF DNA PROFILES WAS HEARSAY WHICH VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a concurrence, determined the testimony which formed the basis for the admission in evidence of DNA profiles was hearsay which violated the Confrontation Clause:

In People v John, we held that, when confronted with testimonial DNA evidence at trial, a defendant is entitled to cross-examine “an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of defendant’s DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data” (27 NY3d 294, 315 [2016]). In People v Austin, we reiterated that a testifying analyst who did not participate in the generation of a testimonial DNA profile satisfies the Confrontation Clause’s requirements only if the analyst “used his or her independent analysis on the raw data to arrive at his or her own conclusions” (30 NY3d 98, 105 [2017] … ). The records before us do not establish that the testifying analyst had such a role in either case. Accordingly, because the analyst’s hearsay testimony as to the DNA profiles developed from the post-arrest buccal swabs “easily satisfies the primary purpose test” for determining whether evidence is testimonial … , we conclude that her testimony and the admission of those DNA profiles into evidence, over defendants’ objections, violated defendants’ confrontation rights. People v Tsintzelis, 2020 NY Slip Op 02026, CtApp 3-24-20

March 24, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

AN ENTRY IN THE CASE SUMMARY ALONE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF POINTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reducing defendant’s risk level, determined that an entry in the case summary alone is not sufficient to justify an assessment of points:

We agree with defendant that the People failed to prove by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that he had committed a continuing course of sexual misconduct, i.e., risk factor 4 on the risk assessment instrument (RAI) … . The sole evidence presented by the People in support of that risk factor was the case summary prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders. At the SORA hearing, however, defendant specifically denied the allegation within the case summary that he engaged in a continuing course of sexual misconduct, and instead testified that he engaged in one instance only. Indeed, it is undisputed that defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of rape in the third degree … stemming from a specific instance of intercourse that occurred on one specified day. We conclude that “the case summary alone is not sufficient to satisfy the People’s burden of proving the risk level assessment by clear and convincing evidence where, as here, defendant contested the factual allegations related to [the] risk factor” … . People v Maund, 2020 NY Slip Op 02011, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

March 20, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Criminal Law

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS WAS PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; THE TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE PRO SE MOTION WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A HEARING, DESPITE THE TECHNICAL DEFECTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant’s pro se motion to vacate his conviction by guilty plea, on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, was properly denied without a hearing. The dissenters argued defendant raised the issue sufficiently to warrant a hearing:

Defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to advise defendant, prior to the guilty plea, of a potentially viable affirmative defense concerning the operability of the firearm used in the robberies … . Defendant did not submit, however, the statutorily-required “sworn allegations” of “the existence or occurrence of facts” in support of his motion to warrant such a hearing … . The rule that a CPL 440.10 motion must be predicated on sworn allegations is a fundamental statutory requirement that a defendant must satisfy to be entitled to a hearing … . Absent sworn allegations substantiating defendant’s contentions, the court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying the motion … .

Specifically, defendant did not aver in his initial motion papers that he would have rejected the favorable plea deal and insisted on proceeding to trial had he been made aware of the potentially viable affirmative defense. Inasmuch as defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” … , his failure to swear that he would have done so is fatal to his motion, and thus the court did not err in denying it without a hearing … . People v Dogan, 2020 NY Slip Op 02021, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

March 20, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

BECAUSE DEFENDANT INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE WAS NOT IN CUSTODY HE COULD VALIDLY WITHDRAW HIS REQUEST WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant invoked his right to counsel when he was not in custody and therefore defendant could validly withdraw his request for counsel without the presence of counsel:

The Court of Appeals has stated that a defendant who asserts his or her right to counsel while out of custody may later withdraw that assertion without an attorney present and speak to law enforcement agents … . A hearing court may infer that a defendant has withdrawn a request for counsel when the defendant’s conduct unambiguously establishes such a withdrawal, which requires consideration of all relevant factors, including “whether defendant was fully advised of his or her constitutional rights before invoking the right to counsel and subsequently waiving it, whether the defendant who has requested assistance earlier has initiated the further communication or conversation with the police . . . , and whether there has been a break in the interrogation after the defendant has asserted the need for counsel with a reasonable opportunity during the break for the suspect to contact an attorney” … . Here, defendant was repeatedly advised of his rights, including twice immediately before he resumed speaking with the police. Moreover, after an overnight break in questioning, defendant initiated the conversation with the police to inquire about taking a polygraph examination, and he provided his own transportation to the investigators’ office. Consequently, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendant withdrew his assertion of his right to counsel … . We reject defendant’s contention that a different result is required because he did not cause the break in the interrogation. The relevant consideration is not which party caused the break in the questioning, rather it is whether there was “a reasonable opportunity during the break for the suspect to contact an attorney” … , and in this case defendant had such an opportunity during the overnight break in questioning. People v Brown, 2020 NY Slip Op 01981, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

March 20, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Criminal Law

THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY HAD BEGUN WORKING FOR THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE AT THE TIME DEFENDANT ENTERED HIS PLEA; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant was deprived of his right counsel because defense counsel had become employed by the district attorney’s office at the time of the plea:

It is well established that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel is violated when a defense attorney who actively participated in the preliminary stages of the defendant’s defense becomes employed as an assistant district attorney by the office that is prosecuting the defendant’s ongoing case … . In those circumstances, the defendant and the public are given “the unmistakable appearance of impropriety and [the situation] create[s] the continuing opportunity for abuse of confidences entrusted to the attorney during the [period] of his [or her] active representation of defendant” … . Disqualification is required when there is “the appearance of impropriety and the risk of prejudice attendant on abuse of confidence, however slight” … . “The rule is necessary to prevent situations in which [a] former client[] must depend on the good faith of [his or her] former [attorney] turned adversar[y] to protect and honor confidences shared during the now extinct relationship. In those situations the risk of abuse is obvious” … .

Here, we conclude that defendant’s right to counsel was violated … . The People concede that the attorney who had represented defendant with respect to the misdemeanor charges was employed by the District Attorney’s Office at the time defendant entered into the plea agreement that resolved those misdemeanor charges as well as the felony charges. Thus, on this record, we conclude that there is an “appearance of impropriety and . . . risk of prejudice attendant on abuse of confidence” … , and defendant should not have been required to “depend on the good faith of [his] former [attorney] turned adversar[y] to protect and honor confidences shared during the now extinct relationship” … . People v Sears, 2020 NY Slip Op 01974, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

March 20, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Criminal Law

BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPELLATE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL JUDGE’S PROHIBITING DEFENDANT FROM COMMUNICATING WITH HIS ATTORNEY DURING OVERNIGHT RECESSES WHEN DEFENDANT WAS ON THE STAND (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the defendant did not preserve for appeal his objection to the trial judge’s prohibiting defendant from communicating with his lawyer during overnight recesses when defendant was testifying. The legitimacy of the objection was not addressed:

Defendant … contends in his main brief that the court committed reversible error by depriving him of the constitutional right to counsel when it prohibited him from communicating with defense counsel about his testimony during overnight recesses while defendant was in the midst of testifying in his defense. Defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review inasmuch as defense counsel was ” present and available to register a protest’ to [the] restriction on communication that would [have] provide[d] the court with an opportunity to rectify its error” but did not make a timely protest … . Under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice … . Contrary to defendant’s related contention in his main brief, we conclude under the circumstances of this case that defense counsel’s failure to timely object to the prohibition on communication was not so “egregious and prejudicial as to compromise . . . defendant’s right to a fair trial” … . People v Tetro, 2020 NY Slip Op 01973, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

March 20, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, ASSESSED POINTS ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SEX OFFENDERS OR THE PEOPLE; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, assessed points on a theory not raised by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders or the People:

… [D]efendant contends, and the People correctly concede, that County Court violated his right to due process by sua sponte assessing points on a theory not raised by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders or the People … . The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment … . Here, no allegations were made either in the risk assessment instrument (RAI) or by the People at the SORA hearing that defendant should be assessed 30 points under risk factor 3, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points under that risk factor for the first time when the court issued its decision … . …

The court stated that, if defendant were a presumptive level one risk, an upward departure to level two would be warranted based on certain aggravating factors stemming from the nature of the crimes. Because those factors were not presented as bases for departure in the RAI or by the People at the hearing, defendant was not afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond to them … . People v Wilke, 2020 NY Slip Op 02002, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

March 20, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Criminal Law

FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POST RELEASE SUPERVISION REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE; PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR NOT NECESSARY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant should have been informed his sentence would include a period of post release supervision (PRS). Because defendant was not put on notice, there was not need to preserve the issue for appeal:

At the plea proceeding, the court advised defendant that under the plea agreement, he would plead guilty to third-degree possession, a class B felony, and fifth-degree possession, a class D felony, with the understanding that if he complied with the terms of the plea agreement, he would be allowed to withdraw his plea to the B felony, and be sentenced, solely on the D felony, to 3½ years in prison, followed by two years of postrelease supervision. The court stated that if defendant violated the terms of the plea agreement, he could be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison on the B felony, but it neglected to state that any enhanced sentence would include a period of PRS. Defendant violated the plea agreement by, among other things, failing to appear for sentencing, and the court imposed an enhanced sentence that included two years of post release supervision concurrent on the B and D felonies.

The court was required to advise defendant that his potential sentence in the event he violated the plea conditions would include PRS, and it was also required to specify the length of the term of PRS … . The prosecutor’s brief reference to PRS immediately before sentencing was not the type of notice under People v Murray (15 NY3d 725 [2010]) that would require defendant to preserve the issue … . People v Jamison, 2020 NY Slip Op 01955, First Dept 3-19-20

March 19, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DWI ARREST EVEN THOUGH NO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS WERE CONDUCTED; BETTER PRACTICE WOULD BE FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO PLACE THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S GUILT ON THE RECORD AT THE TIME OF AN ALFORD PLEA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming defendant’s DWI conviction by guilty plea, determined the waiver of appeal was insufficient. The Third Department noted that the better practice would have been to place the evidence of defendant’s guilt on the record at the time of the Alford plea, and found the arresting officer had probable cause without conducting field sobriety tests. With regard to the waiver of appeal, the court wrote:

During the brief colloquy with defendant, County Court did not sufficiently distinguish the waiver of the right to appeal from the trial-related rights that defendant was forfeiting by virtue of his guilty plea, and the record does not reflect that defendant executed a written waiver. Additionally, in response to County Court’s inquiry regarding defendant’s willingness to waive his right to appeal, defendant replied, “Yes, if that’s what I gotta do, yes. If that’s what you’re making me do, I’ll do it.” Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. People v Crandall, 2020 NY Slip Op 01857, Third Dept 3-16-20

March 16, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE ADMISSION OF DNA PROFILES WAS HEARSAY WHICH VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (CT APP).

AN ENTRY IN THE CASE SUMMARY ALONE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF POINTS (FOURTH DEPT).

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS WAS PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; THE TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE PRO SE MOTION WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A HEARING, DESPITE THE TECHNICAL DEFECTS (FOURTH DEPT).

BECAUSE DEFENDANT INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE WAS NOT IN CUSTODY HE COULD VALIDLY WITHDRAW HIS REQUEST WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL (FOURTH DEPT).

THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY HAD BEGUN WORKING FOR THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE AT THE TIME DEFENDANT ENTERED HIS PLEA; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).

BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPELLATE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL JUDGE’S PROHIBITING DEFENDANT FROM COMMUNICATING WITH HIS ATTORNEY DURING OVERNIGHT RECESSES WHEN DEFENDANT WAS ON THE STAND (FOURTH DEPT).

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, ASSESSED POINTS ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SEX OFFENDERS OR THE PEOPLE; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POST RELEASE SUPERVISION REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE; PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR NOT NECESSARY (FIRST DEPT).

WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DWI ARREST EVEN THOUGH NO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS WERE CONDUCTED; BETTER PRACTICE WOULD BE FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO PLACE THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S GUILT ON THE RECORD AT THE TIME OF AN ALFORD PLEA (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.