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You are here: Home1 / Arbitration
Arbitration, Attorneys, Contract Law, Insurance Law

IN THIS VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF ENTERED AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WHICH INDICATED THE AWARD WOULD BE BETWEEN $0 AND $50,000, BUT THE POLICY LIMITS WERE $100,000/300,000; THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY RE: THE POLICY LIMITS WAS NOT INDUCED BY DEFENDANT OR DEFENDANT’S CARRIER, THEREFORE RESCISSION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in this vehicle-accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff wanted the agreement to arbitrate rescinded because it did not reflect the actual policy limits. But the unilateral mistake by plaintiff’s attorney was not induced by the defendant because defendant’s insurance carrier had twice notified plaintiff’s attorney of the policy limits. The agreement to arbitrate set the award at between $0 and $50,000, but the policy limits were $100,000/300,000:

“Generally, a party’s unilateral mistake is a ground for rescission of a contract only where it was induced by fraud or other wrongful conduct by the other party” … . Moreover, “the equitable remedy of rescission is not available to relieve an allegedly mistaken party of the consequences of their failure to exercise ordinary care” … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, he failed to establish that the arbitration agreement was subject to the equitable remedy of rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake by his attorney regarding the policy limits … . The purported mistake in the high-low agreement at issue arose not from any fraudulent inducement by the defendant, but from the failure of the plaintiff’s attorney to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances … . Maynard v Smith, 2022 NY Slip Op 04017, Second Dept 6-22-22

Practice Point: A unilateral mistake by one party which was not induced by the other party is not a ground for rescission of a contract.

 

June 22, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-22 14:40:452022-06-25 15:02:16IN THIS VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF ENTERED AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WHICH INDICATED THE AWARD WOULD BE BETWEEN $0 AND $50,000, BUT THE POLICY LIMITS WERE $100,000/300,000; THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY RE: THE POLICY LIMITS WAS NOT INDUCED BY DEFENDANT OR DEFENDANT’S CARRIER, THEREFORE RESCISSION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration, Education-School Law, Employment Law, Evidence

THE HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL WAS CHARGED WITH GIVING STUDENTS UNAUTHORIZED CREDITS TO INCREASE GRADUATION RATES; THE CHARGES REQUIRED INTENTIONAL CONDUCT; THE HEARING OFFICER DETERMINED THE PRINCIPAL DID NOT ACT INTENTIONALLY BUT WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES; THE INCONSISTENCY RENDERED THE RULING ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the hearing officer’s ruling terminating petitioner’s employment as a high school principal, determined the hearing officer’s finding that petitioner did not act intentionally was inconsistent with finding petitioner guilty of any of the charges. Petitioner allegedly gave unauthorized credits to students in an effort to increase graduation rates:

… [T]he hearing officer’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the petitioner acted intentionally is inconsistent with a finding that the petitioner was guilty of any of the charges. Each of the 41 charges against the petitioner alleged that she knowingly and willfully approved the conferral of credits with full knowledge that such credit was unlawful, as part of an intentional scheme to accelerate credit acquisition in order to artificially inflate graduation rates. Because there was no allegation that the petitioner’s conduct was anything other than knowing and intentional, and because the hearing officer found that there was insufficient evidence that the petitioner acted intentionally, the hearing officer’s determination that the petitioner was guilty of all charges was arbitrary and capricious and without evidentiary support. At the hearing, the petitioner admitted to conduct that was, at most, negligent. There was no evidence to contradict the petitioner’s testimony that she did not act intentionally. Matter of Simpson v Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 2022 NY Slip Op 03730, Second Dept 6-8-22

Practice Point: The high school principal was charged with giving students unauthorized credits to increase graduation rates. All the charges alleged intentional conduct. The hearing officer (correctly) found the principal did not act intentionally, but sustained the charges and terminated her employment. The inconsistency rendered the hearing officer’s ruling in the arbitration arbitrary and capricious.

 

June 8, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-08 14:31:292022-06-12 12:11:18THE HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL WAS CHARGED WITH GIVING STUDENTS UNAUTHORIZED CREDITS TO INCREASE GRADUATION RATES; THE CHARGES REQUIRED INTENTIONAL CONDUCT; THE HEARING OFFICER DETERMINED THE PRINCIPAL DID NOT ACT INTENTIONALLY BUT WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES; THE INCONSISTENCY RENDERED THE RULING ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (SECOND DEPT). ​
Arbitration, Contract Law, Employment Law, Municipal Law

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIREFIGHTER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A INJURY CLAIM SHOULD BE PROCESSED IS ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS ADDRESSED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGANING AGREEMENT (CBA); THE PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition to stay arbitration in this General Municipal Law 207-a injury claim by a firefighter should not have been granted. The manner in which a section 207-a claim is processed is an arbitrable matter:

… [T]he union filed a grievance alleging, inter alia, that the City was in violation of the CBA [collective bargaining agreement] and the negotiated General Municipal Law § 207-a policy by failing to adhere to the required procedures in processing a claim by one of the union’s members for General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits. . …

It is undisputed that there is no constitutional, statutory, or public policy provision prohibiting the arbitration of the dispute at issue in this matter…. [G]iven the breadth of the arbitration clause in this case, the dispute regarding the City’s processing of claims for General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits bore a reasonable relationship to the general subject matter of the CBA, since Article 10 of the CBA expressly refers to the negotiated policy for the provision of such benefits … . “[T]he question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA is a matter of contract interpretation and application reserved for the arbitrator” … . Matter of City of New Rochelle v Uniformed Fire Fighters Assn., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03722, Second Dept 6-8-22

Practice Point: Here the issue (how a firefighter’s General Municipal Law 207-a injury claim should be processed) was addressed in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was therefore arbitrable. The petition to stay arbitration should not have been granted.

 

June 8, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-08 14:09:062022-06-11 14:31:24THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIREFIGHTER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A INJURY CLAIM SHOULD BE PROCESSED IS ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS ADDRESSED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGANING AGREEMENT (CBA); THE PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration, Contract Law, Employment Law

TO BE ENFORCABLE, AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE MUST BE CLEAR, EXPLICIT AND UNEQUIVOCAL; HERE THE WORD “DISAGREEMENTS” IN THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE WAS TOO VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS OF UNPAID COMMISSIONS AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitration clause in the employment agreement was ambiguous and vague. The clause could not be the basis for forcing plaintiff to arbitrate her claims that she was not paid commissions owed to her and was wrongfully terminated:

… “[A] party will not be compelled to arbitrate and, thereby, to surrender the right to resort to the courts, absent ‘evidence which affirmatively establishes that the parties expressly agreed to arbitrate their disputes'” … . “The agreement must be clear, explicit and unequivocal and must not depend upon implication or subtlety” … .

Here, the provision, “[t]hird party in case of a disagreement: Rabbi Shlomo Gross (Belze Dayan) or Rabbi Meir Labin,” does not expressly and unequivocally establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate the plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid commissions or wrongful termination … . Moreover, this provision ambiguously refers to a disagreement, but does not specify the types of disagreements to which it applies … . Rubinstein v C & A Mktg., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03136, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff alleged the defendant employer did not pay her commissions she was owed and wrongfully terminated her. Although the employment contract called for the arbitration of “disagreements,” that term was not specific enough to serve as a basis for forcing plaintiff to arbitrate her unpaid-commission and wrongful-termination claims.

 

May 11, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-11 14:56:152022-05-14 15:15:25TO BE ENFORCABLE, AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE MUST BE CLEAR, EXPLICIT AND UNEQUIVOCAL; HERE THE WORD “DISAGREEMENTS” IN THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE WAS TOO VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS OF UNPAID COMMISSIONS AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration, Insurance Law

AN ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION WILL NOT BE REVERSED BECAUSE OF AN ERROR OF LAW, BUT WILL BE REVERSED WHERE, AS HERE, IT IS IRRATIONAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the arbitrator, noted that an arbitrator’s determination will not be reversed because of an error of law, but will be reversed if the determination is irrational. Here the arbitrator’s determinations with respect to no-fault insurance coverage were deemed irrational:

“[A] master arbitrator’s determination of the law need not be correct: mere errors of law are insufficient to set aside the award of a master arbitrator” … . “If the master arbitrator vacates the arbitrator’s award based upon an alleged error of ‘a rule of substantive law,’ the determination of the master arbitrator must be upheld unless it is irrational” … . …

The master arbitrator’s determination that a denial of liability based upon a failure to appear at an examination under oath constitutes a defense of lack of coverage, which is not subject to preclusion, is irrational … . Further, the master arbitrator’s application of 11 NYCRR 65-3.5(p) is irrational, as it effectively allows an insurer to avoid the statutory timeliness requirements set forth in 11 NYCRR 65-3.8(a). Where, as here, the initial request for an examination under oath is sent more than 30 days after receipt of the claim, the request is a nullity … , and the insurer’s failure to timely notice the examination under oath is not excused by 11 NYCRR 65-3.5(p) … . Matter of Advanced Orthopaedics, PLLC v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 02406, Second Dept 4-13-22

Practice Point: An arbitrator’s determination will not be reversed because the arbitrator made an error of law. Only an irrational determination will be reversed by a court.

 

April 13, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-13 19:01:232022-04-15 21:12:00AN ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION WILL NOT BE REVERSED BECAUSE OF AN ERROR OF LAW, BUT WILL BE REVERSED WHERE, AS HERE, IT IS IRRATIONAL (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration, Contract Law, Employment Law, Municipal Law

THE CITY FIREFIGHTERS WHO, AS ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES, WERE REQUIRED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER TO WORK DURING THE PANDEMIC, SOUGHT TIME-OFF OR MONETARY COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT TO THE TIME-OFF AFFORDED THE NONESSENTIAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES WHO WERE SENT HOME DURING THE PANDEMIC PURSUANT TO THE SAME THE EXECUTIVE ORDER; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT DETERMINED ARBITRATION OF THE ISSUE WAS PRECLUDED BY PUBLIC POLICY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city firefighters’ claim to entitlement to time off from work or monetary compensation equivalent to the time-off afforded the civilian employees ordered to stay home (due to COVID) was prohibited by public policy. The firefighters were deemed essential employees and were required to report to work by Executive Order. The “nonessential” civilian employees were ordered to stay home by the same Executive Order:

… [W]e cannot agree that petitioner breached the CBA [collective bargaining agreement] by responsibly implementing the Governor’s directives. To hold otherwise would create an untenable result — i.e., it would sanction a finding that petitioner breached the CBA based upon its required compliance with state public policy. Based on the very nature of the pandemic, requiring extreme public health measures as implemented through the executive orders, we conclude that arbitration of the resulting impact on respondent’s members is precluded as a matter of public policy. Matter of City of Troy (Troy Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 86 IAFF, AFL-CIO), 2022 NY Slip Op 02174, Third Dept 3-31-22

Practice Point: Here is a rare example of the preclusion of the arbitration of an employment issue by public policy. The firefighters were ordered to work during COVID as essential employees. The nonessential civilian employees were ordered to stay home. Public policy prohibited arbitration of the question whether the firefighters were entitled to equivalent time-off or monetary compensation.

 

March 31, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-31 19:27:252022-04-02 19:56:36THE CITY FIREFIGHTERS WHO, AS ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES, WERE REQUIRED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER TO WORK DURING THE PANDEMIC, SOUGHT TIME-OFF OR MONETARY COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT TO THE TIME-OFF AFFORDED THE NONESSENTIAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES WHO WERE SENT HOME DURING THE PANDEMIC PURSUANT TO THE SAME THE EXECUTIVE ORDER; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT DETERMINED ARBITRATION OF THE ISSUE WAS PRECLUDED BY PUBLIC POLICY (THIRD DEPT).
Arbitration, Civil Procedure, Condominiums

RESPONDENTS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE PORTION OF THE ARBITRATION WHICH DEALT WITH THE USE OF ESCROW FUNDS TO REPAIR CONDOMINIUM SWIMMING POOLS WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE ARBITRABILITY OF THE ISSUE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined respondents waived the ability to challenge the arbitrability of damage to swimming pools in this action seeking to use escrow funds for condominium repairs. The swimming pools were not on the “punch list” of items to be repaired using the escrow funds. But respondent Katz participated in the portion of the arbitration which focused on the repair of the pools:

It is well settled that “[a] party who actively participates in arbitration without seeking a stay pursuant to CPLR 7503 (b) waives the right to a judicial determination of the arbitrability of the dispute” … . There is no dispute that Katz participated in the first three arbitration hearings, at the second of which he attempted to submit Fuller’s report to address the issue regarding the swimming pools and, after the rejection of the report, he orally argued his position. The record is devoid of any request for a stay of any kind. Thus, Katz’s participation foreclosed respondents’ attack on the arbitrability of the pool repairs … . Matter of Kohn (Waverly Homes Dev. LLC), 2022 NY Slip Op 02177, Third Dept 3-31-22

​Practice Point: A party’s participation in the arbitration of an issue waives any right to a judicial determination the issue was not arbitrable.

March 31, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-31 18:28:562022-04-02 19:24:02RESPONDENTS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE PORTION OF THE ARBITRATION WHICH DEALT WITH THE USE OF ESCROW FUNDS TO REPAIR CONDOMINIUM SWIMMING POOLS WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE ARBITRABILITY OF THE ISSUE (THIRD DEPT).
Arbitration, Civil Procedure, Contract Law

WHETHER THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IS VALID IS A THRESHOLD ISSUE FOR THE COURT, NOT THE ARBITRATOR (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that the validity of an agreement to arbitrate is a threshold issue which must be determined by the court, not the arbitrator:

… [T]he petitioners raised a threshold issue regarding the validity of the purported agreement to arbitrate, as they contended that they did not sign, and that neither Graves nor AMF had the authority to sign, any contract on their behalf concerning the purported transaction involving the respondents. Thus, this threshold issue was for the Supreme Court, rather than an arbitrator, to determine … . Matter of Northeast & Cent. Contrs., Inc. v Quanto Capital, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 01791, Second Dept 3-16-22

 

March 16, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-16 10:45:072022-03-19 11:00:12WHETHER THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IS VALID IS A THRESHOLD ISSUE FOR THE COURT, NOT THE ARBITRATOR (SECOND DEPT). ​
Arbitration, Employment Law, Municipal Law

THE UNION’S CLAIM THAT THE COUNTY EMPLOYEE, A SEASONAL EMPLOYEE, SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS FULL-TIME BECAUSE HE WORKED 40 HOURS-A-WEEK WAS NOT ARBITRABLE BECAUSE CIVIL SERVICE LAW SECTION 22 PROVIDES THAT RECLASSIFICATION OF A CIVIL SERVICE POSITION CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE MUNICIPAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the grievance filed on behalf of a county employee was not arbitrable because the relief required reclassification of a civil service position:

The respondent Joseph W. Grzymalski began to work for the petitioner, the County of Nassau, on June 28, 2013. He was classified as a seasonal worker and allegedly worked 40 hours per week until his employment was terminated on July 3, 2018.

… [T]he respondent Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO, by its Local 830 (hereinafter CSEA), on behalf of Grzymalski, filed a grievance claiming that because Grzymalski worked 40 hours per week, he was entitled to “full time benefits and status.” …

In determining whether a dispute between a public sector employer and employee is arbitrable, a court must first determine whether “there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance” … . …

… [T]he respondents are essentially seeking a reclassification of Grzymalski’s position from seasonal to full time. Since the reclassification of a civil service position can only be accomplished by the municipal civil service commission (see Civil Service Law § 22), the subject grievance is nonarbitrable … . Matter of County of Nassau v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Civ. Serv. Empls. Assn., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO, 2022 NY Slip Op 01453, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: Civil Service Law section 22 requires that any reclassification of a public sector employee’s position be done by the municipal civil service commission. Therefore, because there was a statutory prohibition, the request to classify the “seasonal” county employee as a full-time employee was not arbitrable.

March 9, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-09 15:32:442022-03-12 18:07:08THE UNION’S CLAIM THAT THE COUNTY EMPLOYEE, A SEASONAL EMPLOYEE, SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS FULL-TIME BECAUSE HE WORKED 40 HOURS-A-WEEK WAS NOT ARBITRABLE BECAUSE CIVIL SERVICE LAW SECTION 22 PROVIDES THAT RECLASSIFICATION OF A CIVIL SERVICE POSITION CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE MUNICIPAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration

THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HER POWERS BY AWARDING RELIEF WHICH WAS NOT REQUESTED BY ALL THE PARTIES OR AUTHORIZED BY LAW; PUNITIVE DAMAGES, SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department vacated the arbitrator’s award of punitive damages, sanctions and attorney’s fees because that relief was not requested by the parties, therefore the arbitrator exceeded her power:

Although the American Arbitration Association (AAA) preprinted form petitioner used allows a claimant to seek other relief, including attorneys’ fees, interest, arbitration costs and punitive/exemplary damages, the only boxes that petitioner checked off were for interest and arbitration costs. It did not check the punitive damages box or attorneys’ fees box, nor indicate anywhere on its demand that it was seeking such relief. Petitioner never amended its demand for arbitration. Nor did it include a prayer for such relief in its subsequently filed post-arbitration memorandum. By granting unrequested relief, the arbitrator exceeded the expressly enumerated limits on her authority by deciding matters that were not before her … .

Although AAA commercial rule 47(d) empowers an arbitrator to award attorneys’ fees, this is only “if all parties have requested such an award or it is authorized by law or their arbitration agreement.” Here, neither party requested such an award and it is not authorized by law.  Matter of 544 Bloomrest, LLC v Harding, 2022 NY Slip Op 00936, First Dept 2-10-22​

 

February 10, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-02-10 11:28:372022-02-11 11:45:24THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HER POWERS BY AWARDING RELIEF WHICH WAS NOT REQUESTED BY ALL THE PARTIES OR AUTHORIZED BY LAW; PUNITIVE DAMAGES, SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS VACATED (FIRST DEPT).
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