Trespass Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Negligence, Private Nuisance, Trespass

PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION STEMMING FROM PFOA CONTAMINATION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DID NOT APPLY; QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, PRIVATE NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ complaint in this PFOA contamination case properly survived defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, defendant owed plaintiffs a duty of care, defendant did not demonstrate it did not proximately cause the alleged injuries, there was a question of fact on the private nuisance and trespass causes of action, and the punitive damages claim was proper. With respect to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the court wrote:

[The] doctrine “applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views”… . Defendant argues that the various regulatory agencies, who have the requisite expertise, have been investigating the matter at issue and that the recovery sought by plaintiffs is already being provided by these agencies. We disagree. Although defendant points to an announcement that the Department of Health will be providing medical monitoring, this announcement merely stated that a study was being proposed and that, if funded, the study would last for five years. Contrary to defendant’s representation, there was no definitive statement that the medical monitoring would be provided. As to the remediation of plaintiffs’ private wells, the consent order and other announcements, upon which defendant relies, do not address all of the relief requested by plaintiffs in the second amended complaint. Accordingly, defendant’s argument is without merit. Burdick v Tonoga, Inc, 2021 NY Slip Op 01178, Third Dept 2-25-21

February 25, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Real Property Law, Trespass

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR ADVERSE POSSESSION AND TRESPASS CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; A DEFENDANT’S MISTAKEN BELIEF HE OR SHE HAD A RIGHT TO ENTER DOES NOT DEFEAT LIABILITY FOR TRESPASS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this adverse possession and trespass action, determined plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their adverse possession and trespass actions. With regard to trespass, the court noted that liability is not defeated by a defendant’s belief he or she has a right to enter the property:

The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the trespass cause of action. To meet their prima facie burden, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally entered onto the land belonging to the plaintiffs without justification or permission … . “‘Liability may attach regardless of defendant’s mistaken belief that he or she had a right to enter'” … . Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the trespass cause of action by submitting the affidavit of the plaintiff Jamie Montanaro, who averred that, in December 2016, the defendant removed a portion of the retaining wall on the disputed property and built a garage which encroaches upon the disputed property … . The plaintiffs also submitted the affidavit of a land surveyor who averred that the new garage encroached upon the disputed property … . Montanaro v Rudchyk, 2020 NY Slip Op 07560, Second Dept 12-16-20

December 16, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Immunity, Municipal Law, Negligence, Nuisance, Trespass

MUNICIPALITIES AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN THIS WATER- DAMAGE LAWSUIT STEMMING FROM EXTINGUISHING A FIRE; NUISANCE AND TRESPASS ALSO PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the negligence, nuisance and trespass action against the municipalities and the municipal fire departments were properly dismissed. A fire in defendant paper mill was probably the result of arson. In the course of putting out the fire, the fire department returned water to a canal using a deck gun which shot a stream of water over plaintiff’s building. Apparently water seeped into the building causing damage. The negligence cause of action was precluded by governmental immunity, the nuisance action was precluded by the lack of evidence of intent, and firefighters doing their jobs are not deemed trespassers. With regard to governmental immunity, the court wrote:

To address the claims against the fire department defendants first, even accepting that questions of fact exist as to whether they had a special relationship with plaintiff that would give rise to a claim for negligence … , they are nevertheless protected by the governmental immunity doctrine, which “shield[s] public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions” … . Under the doctrine, “[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general” … . There is no question that fire protection, and obtaining the water necessary to provide it, is a purely governmental function … . The key issue is therefore whether the fire department defendants’ purportedly negligent acts — choosing to use the deck gun and aim it in a direction that caused a rain to fall around the powerhouse — were discretionary in that they arose from “the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results” … . Stevens & Thompson Paper Co. Inc. v Middle Falls Fire Dept., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06996, Third Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Nuisance, Real Property Law, Trespass

PLAINTIFF PRESENTED CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST A NEIGHBOR FOR TRESPASS, PRIVATE NUISANCE, AND VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW; THE MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in this dispute between neighbors should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged the neighbor repeatedly damaged and defaced plaintiff’s property and installed a surveillance camera aimed at plaintiff’s property. The Fourth Department went through the elements required for issuance of a preliminary injunction and described the proof offered in support of the trespass, private nuisance and Civil Rights Law causes of action:

Plaintiff’s supplemental affidavit and photographs submitted in support of the motion demonstrate that Nichols repeatedly drove across her lawn and blew snow with his snowblower onto the side of plaintiff’s house, allegedly causing damage to her awning and fence. Both events were intentional invasions of plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of her land. Furthermore, although “an action for trespass over the lands of one property owner may not be maintained where the purported trespasser has acquired an easement of way over the land in question” … , plaintiff established that the acts allegedly committed by Nichols on the easement exceeded the scope of the easement and did not constitute a reasonable use of his interest in the easement … . Thus, plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her trespass claim. …

The evidence submitted by plaintiff established that Nichols drove across plaintiff’s lawn, used a snowblower to blow snow onto her house, tampered with and removed her property markers, parked his vehicle so as to obstruct plaintiff’s driveway, drove on the freshly paved driveway and left tire tracks in the asphalt, and repeatedly painted a white line across the driveway. That conduct exceeds the scope of the easement and may fairly be characterized as a substantial interference with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property. Thus, plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her private nuisance claim.

Plaintiff’s affidavit and video evidence also submitted on the motion demonstrate that Nichols threatened to install a “150-foot night vision camera” in his backyard and to point it directly into plaintiff’s backyard and at her living room. As Nichols installed the surveillance camera, he stated to plaintiff, “It’s gonna look right in your fucking living room! . . . You’re on camera bitch! . . . Smile for the camera bitch!” Thus, plaintiff also demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim under Civil Rights Law § 52-a. Cangemi v Yeager, 2020 NY Slip Op 04023, Fourth Dept 7-17-20

July 17, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, Landlord-Tenant, Nuisance, Trespass

CAUSES OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION AND TRESPASS WERE PROPERLY ALLEGED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action against all but two of the defendants should have been dismissed. Defendant alleged she had an arrangement with the landlord which allowed her to stay in the basement of the premises rent-free in exchange for maintenance of the property. When the landlord died, the landlord’s wife (Brigitte) changed the locks. The Second Department held that the causes of action for wrongful eviction against the landlord’s wife and estate, and the trespass against the landlord’s wife, were sufficiently alleged. However, the causes of action for nuisance, invasion of privacy (Civil Rights Law), and false arrest were not sufficiently alleged. The court also noted that there is no civil cause of action for harassment in New York:

… [T]he plaintiff’s allegation that she performed maintenance on the building in exchange for the exclusive use and possession of the basement, yard, and two closets, and that this arrangement continued following the expiration of the lease … , indicated that a month-to-month tenancy was created and was in effect for as long as she remained in possession of the premises (see Real Property Law § 232-c …), which, according to the complaint, was until March 2017, when she allegedly was wrongfully evicted from the premises. The plaintiff’s allegation that in March 2017, Brigitte changed the locks on the door of the building and refused to provide keys to the plaintiff and permitted her entry into the basement through the cellar door only in response to the plaintiff contacting the police in May 2017, suggests that Brigitte, in effect, acting as agent for the estate, resorted to self-help measures to evict the plaintiff from the premises (see RPAPL 711, 853 …). The complaint, therefore, adequately stated a cause of action alleging wrongful eviction against Brigitte and the estate … . …

The plaintiff’s allegation that … Brigitte entered the basement and yard whenever she wanted for no reason and disturbed the plaintiff’s personal property in the basement sufficiently stated a cause of action alleging trespass … . Trec v Cazares, 2020 NY Slip Op 03941, Second Dept 7-15-20

July 15, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Nuisance, Private Nuisance, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Trespass

SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PASSAGE OF SIX YEARS SINCE THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED, THE COURT DOES NOT EXAMINE THE MERITS OF THE PLEADING UNLESS THE LACK OF MERIT IS CLEAR AND FREE FROM DOUBT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint, which originally stemmed from the alleged encroachment of defendant’s pipes (since removed), should have been granted, despite the passage of six years (during which a default judgment was vacated):

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was for leave to amend the complaint. Permission to amend a pleading should be “freely given” (CPLR 3025[b] …), where the proposed amendment is neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit, and there is no evidence that the amendment would prejudice or surprise the opposing party … . Mere lateness is not a basis for denying an amendment; ” [i]t must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine'” … . The burden of establishing prejudice is on the party opposing the amendment … .

Here, notwithstanding the lengthy gap in time between the commencement of the action and the plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to amend the complaint, the defendant has made no showing that it was surprised by the new allegations or would be significantly prejudiced … . Moreover, some portion of that delay is attributable to the defendant’s effort to vacate its default and the parties’ subsequent motion practice and negotiations, and there is no contention that discovery has been concluded … .

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the proposed amendment is not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. “No evidentiary showing of merit is required under CPLR 3025(b)'” … , and “a court shall not examine the legal sufficiency or merits of a pleading unless [the] insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt” … . The allegations of the proposed amendment and the submissions in support of it adequately set forth the requisite elements for causes of action alleging private nuisance and trespass … . Krakovski v Stavros Assoc., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 05112, Second Dept 6-26-19

June 26, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Municipal Law, Negligence, Trespass

NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the negligence and trespass action against the town in this lawsuit stemming from a landslide should have been dismissed. The town had issued a permit for the placement of fill. Plaintiff’s alleged the landslide blocked a stream and flooded plaintiff’s land:

… [T]o hold a municipality liable for negligence in the exercise of a governmental function, a plaintiff must show that the municipality owed it a special duty beyond that owed to the public at large … . As a basis for the Town’s negligence, the complaint in this action alleges … that plaintiff owned land near the … property that was affected by the landslide and resulting flooding. However, the complaint does not allege that the Town had assumed any duty to act on plaintiff’s behalf or that the Town made any representations upon which plaintiff justifiably relied. …

… “[A] trespass claim represents an injury to the right of possession, and the elements of a trespass cause of action are an intentional entry onto the land of another without permission. Regarding intent, the defendant ‘must intend the act which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion, and the intrusion must at least be the immediate or inevitable consequence of what he or she willfully does, or which he or she does so negligently as to amount to willfulness'” … .

Plaintiff alleged that the Town issued the permit for the performance of work, including grading and other land disturbance activities and placement of fill, notwithstanding its knowledge that significant slope failures resulting in landslides had previously occurred in the immediate vicinity, which the complaint alleges constituted a “dangerous recurring condition.” Plaintiff further alleged that the Town failed to properly supervise the work that was conducted pursuant to the permit; however, it did not allege that the Town directly participated in placement of the fill that caused the landslide. City of Albany v Normanskill Cr., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 07020, Third Dept 10-18-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/TRESPASS (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/LANDSLIDE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/FLOODING (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS AGAINST THE TOWN BASED UPON A LANDSLIDE WHICH CAUSED FLOODING OF PLAINTIFF’S LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))

October 18, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Indian Law, Trespass

SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT CONCERNING CONTROL OF CERTAIN CAYUGA NATION PROPERTY ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION GROUNDS, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that Supreme Court properly refused to dismiss the complaint on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. The complaint asserts one faction of the Cayuga Nation, defendants, are improperly in control of and trespassing on certain Nation property. Supreme Court granted to plaintiffs a preliminary injunction based upon a ruling by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The dissenting justices argued that the New York courts do not have jurisdiction over tribal affairs and the complaint should have been dismissed on that ground:

Defendants contend that the court erred in denying their motion because the courts of New York have no power to determine who controls the Nation. Although we agree with defendants that we may not resolve the Nation’s leadership dispute, we are not required to do so in this appeal. Rather, we accord due deference to the BIA’s conclusion that the Nation, at least with respect to that issue, has resolved the dispute in favor of plaintiff. * * *

We caution that we do not determine which party is the proper governing body of the Nation, nor does our determination prevent the Nation from resolving that dispute differently according to its law in the future. The Nation, as a sovereign body, retains full authority to reconcile its own internal governance disputes according to its laws. Until such action occurs, however, we accord deference to the BIA’s determination that plaintiff is the proper body to enforce the Nation’s rights, including its rights to control the property at issue in this action. Cayuga Nation v Campbell, 2018 NY Slip Op 05427, Fourth Dept 7-25-18

INDIAN LAW (SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT CONCERNING CONTROL OF CERTAIN CAYUGA NATION PROPERTY ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION GROUNDS, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INDIAN LAW, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT CONCERNING CONTROL OF CERTAIN CAYUGA NATION PROPERTY ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION GROUNDS, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT))/CAYUGA NATION (CIVIL PROCEDURE, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT CONCERNING CONTROL OF CERTAIN CAYUGA NATION PROPERTY ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION GROUNDS, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT)

July 25, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Trespass

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR TREBLE DAMAGES IN THIS TIMBER TRESPASS ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, THERE EXIST QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE ADEQUATE EFFORTS TO ENSURE IT HAD THE LEGAL RIGHT TO HARVEST THE TIMBER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s claim for treble damages in this timber trespass claim should not have been dismissed. There was a question of fact whether defendant made adequate efforts to ensure the timber was not taken from plaintiff’s land:

Defendant concedes that it trespassed upon the subject property and cleared trees, rendering it liable (see RPAPL 861 … . Accordingly, in order to avoid an award of treble damages, defendant was obliged to show by clear and convincing evidence that it “had cause to believe . . . [that it had] a legal right to harvest” timber from the subject property (RPAPL 861 [2]…). Defendant endeavored to do so with the deposition of its vice-president, who stated that D’Assy represented that he had obtained permission from plaintiff to remove trees from the subject property. The vice-president acknowledged, however, that no efforts were made to confirm that D’Assy’s account was correct. He further admitted that he did not recall if this conversation with D’Assy occurred before or after the actual trespass. The foregoing proof, particularly in view of the aim of RPAPL 861 to encourage timber harvesters to be more diligent in preventing inadvertent timber trespass … , is not at all clear as to whether defendant had a good faith basis for believing that it had permission from plaintiff to remove timber from the subject property at the time it did so. Defendant therefore failed to meet its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of “factual questions with regard to whether plaintiff is entitled to treble damages pursuant to RPAPL 861” … .

Finally, plaintiff correctly points out that he is entitled not only to “‘the stumpage value or $250 per tree, or both’ for an unlawful taking” … , but also reparations for “any permanent and substantial damage caused to the land or the improvements thereon as a result of such violation” … . Supreme Court, upon remittal, should consider all of those items in calculating its award of damages. DiSanto v D’Assy, 2018 NY Slip Op 05007, Third Dept 7-5-18

REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (TIMBER TRESPASS, PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR TREBLE DAMAGES IN THIS TIMBER TRESPASS ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, THERE EXIST QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE ADEQUATE EFFORTS TO ENSURE IT HAD THE LEGAL RIGHT TO HARVEST THE TIMBER (THIRD DEPT))/TIMBER TRESPASS (REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR TREBLE DAMAGES IN THIS TIMBER TRESPASS ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, THERE EXIST QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE ADEQUATE EFFORTS TO ENSURE IT HAD THE LEGAL RIGHT TO HARVEST THE TIMBER (THIRD DEPT))

July 5, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Nuisance, Private Nuisance, Real Property Law, Trespass

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for leave to replead a private nuisance and trespass action should have been granted. Plaintiffs alleged defendants had negligently planted and watered on their side of plaintiffs’ retaining wall, damaging the wall:

… [T]he court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion, in effect, for leave to replead … . The standard to be applied on such a motion “is consistent with the standard governing motions for leave to amend pursuant to CPLR 3025″… . In particular, such motions “should be freely granted absent prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, unless the proposed amendment is devoid of merit or palpably insufficient”… .

The proposed amended complaint alleged that the defendants had (1) engaged in “digging, excavating, grading and altering the soil, past the property line with [the] plaintiffs’ property and abutting [the plaintiffs’] property and wall,” (2) planted bushes, shrubs, and trees, and added significant amounts of mulch on the plaintiffs’ property, near the property line, and along the plaintiffs’ wall, and (3) excessively watered the location where the work was performed. The amended complaint further alleged that the “lateral load and pressure has been increased as a result of the planting of trees, bushes, shrubs and plants and the lack of drainage” so as to damage the plaintiffs’ retaining wall. The complaint alleges that this conduct was negligent, and that it constituted a private nuisance and trespass. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, these amended causes of action were neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit … , and no unfair prejudice or surprise to the defendants would arise from permitting the amendment … . Chaikin v Karipas, 2018 NY Slip Op 04525, Second Dept 6-20-18

REAL PROPERTY (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3025 (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRESPASS (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NUISANCE (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/RETAINING WALL (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD WITH AN AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ PLANTING AND WATERING ON DEFENDANTS’ SIDE OF PLAINTIFFS’ RETAINING WALL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE, TRESPASS AND A PRIVATE NUISANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

June 20, 2018/by Bruce Freeman