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You are here: Home1 / Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE SEX OFFENDER LEVEL ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK COUNTY REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE SORA PROCEEDING IN BRONX COUNTY WHICH WAS BASED ON THE SAME CONDUCT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Bronx County SORA proceeding should have been dismissed because New York County had entered a sex offender level adjudication based on the defendant’s conduct in both counties:

… [T]he proceeding in Bronx County should have been dismissed on defendant’s motion where Supreme Court, New York County had entered a sex offender level adjudication based on defendant’s criminal conduct in both counties, which constituted the “current offenses” under the risk assessment instrument … . People v Cisneros, 2022 NY Slip Op 03454, First Dept 5-26-22

Practice Point: The same conduct in two counties will not support more than one SORA sex offender level adjudication.

 

May 26, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-26 08:49:422022-05-28 09:10:41THE SEX OFFENDER LEVEL ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK COUNTY REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE SORA PROCEEDING IN BRONX COUNTY WHICH WAS BASED ON THE SAME CONDUCT (FIRST DEPT).
Correction Law, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

AT THE TIME DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE IN 2007, IT WAS NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEAL THE RECORD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DENIED; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the crime for which defendant was convicted, at the time of its commission in 2007, was not a registrable offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Therefore defendant’s motion to seal the record should not have been summarily denied. The matter was remitted for a hearing:

… [A]t the time of the defendant’s conviction for attempted promoting prostitution in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 230.25), the definition of “sex offense” in Correction Law § 168-a(2) did not include convictions of an attempt to commit Penal Law § 230.25 … . Further, the defendant has never been required to register under SORA for this conviction. Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the defendant has not been not convicted of “an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to article six-C of the correction law” (CPL 160.59[1][a] …). Thus, the Supreme Court should not have determined that the defendant’s conviction falls into the category of excluded offenses … . Likewise, although CPL 160.59(3)(a) provides that the reviewing court must summarily deny the defendant’s application when, inter alia, “the defendant is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to article six-C of the correction law,” here, the defendant is not required to do so.

As the defendant’s motion was not subject to mandatory denial under CPL 160.59(3) and the district attorney opposed the defendant’s motion, a hearing on the defendant’s motion was required … . People v Miranda, 2022 NY Slip Op 03009, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: If an offense is now a registrable offense pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act, but was not a registrable offense when committed (here in 2007), a defendant’s motion to seal the record cannot be summarily denied. The motion may still be denied after a hearing, however.

 

May 4, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-04 09:09:452022-05-10 09:12:20AT THE TIME DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE IN 2007, IT WAS NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEAL THE RECORD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DENIED; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​
Appeals, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF A SENTENCE AND THEREFORE IS NOT COVERED BY THE UNLAWFUL-SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; THEREFORE THE UNPRESERVED ISSUE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; HOWEVER, UPON REMITTAL, THE ISSUE CAN BE (AND WAS) CONSIDERED AT THE APPELLATE DIVISION LEVEL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, upon remittal from the Court of Appeals, adhered to its prior decision finding defendant’s certification as a sex offender unlawful. The Court of Appeals ruled that sex-offender certification is not part of a sentence and therefore is not covered by an exception to the preservation requirement. But, because the Appellate Division, unlike the Court of Appeal, has “interest-of-justice” jurisdiction, the prior decision was upheld in the interest of justice by the Second Department, despite the lack of preservation:

In an opinion dated November 23, 2021, the Court of Appeals concluded that sex offender certification is not part of a defendant’s sentence, and thus, a contention regarding sex offender certification does not fall within the exception to the preservation rule for challenges to unlawful sentences … . However, the Court of Appeals noted that although it does not have interest-of-justice jurisdiction to review unpreserved issues, the “Appellate Division may have authority to take corrective action in the interest of justice based upon defendant’s unpreserved challenge to the legality of his certification as a sex offender” … . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remitted the matter to this Court for further proceedings … .

We now reach the defendant’s unpreserved contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15[3][c]; [6][a]). For the reasons stated in our prior opinion and order, the defendant’s certification as a sex offender was unlawful … .People v Buyund, 2022 NY Slip Op 03004, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: The Court of Appeals does not have interest-of-justice jurisdiction and therefore cannot consider appellate issues that are not preserved. The Appellate Division, however, can invoke interest-of-justice jurisdiction to consider unpreserved appellate issues.

 

May 4, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-04 09:07:292022-05-10 09:09:39SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF A SENTENCE AND THEREFORE IS NOT COVERED BY THE UNLAWFUL-SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; THEREFORE THE UNPRESERVED ISSUE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; HOWEVER, UPON REMITTAL, THE ISSUE CAN BE (AND WAS) CONSIDERED AT THE APPELLATE DIVISION LEVEL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE ALLEGED ACTS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED AT LEAST 24 HOURS APART; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PRESENT PROOF SUPPORTING A 20 POINT ASSESSMENT FOR A “CONTINUOUS COURSE OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT:” LEVEL THREE REDUCED TO LEVEL TWO (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reducing the defendant’s risk level from three to two, determined the People did not prove defendant engaged in a “continuous course of sexual misconduct” which requires that the acts be at least 24 hours apart:

The court erred … in assessing 20 points under risk factor 4 for having engaged in a continuous course of sexual misconduct. Points may be assessed under risk factor 4 if, as relevant here, the People establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant engaged in “two or more acts of sexual contact, at least one of which is an act of sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, or aggravated sexual contact, which acts are separated in time by at least 24 hours” … . Here, “[a]lthough the People presented evidence that defendant engaged in acts of sexual contact with the victim on more than one occasion, they failed to establish ‘when these acts occurred relative to each other’ ” … , and thus failed “to demonstrate that such instances were separated in time by at least 24 hours” … . People v Ellis, 2022 NY Slip Op 02654, Fourth Dept 4-22-22

Practice Point: A 20-point SORA assessment for a continuous course of sexual misconduct requires proof the acts took place at least 24 hours apart. Here there was no proof of when the acts occurred relative to each other, therefore the 20-point assessment was struck.

 

April 22, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-22 13:11:092022-04-26 12:19:51THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE ALLEGED ACTS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED AT LEAST 24 HOURS APART; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PRESENT PROOF SUPPORTING A 20 POINT ASSESSMENT FOR A “CONTINUOUS COURSE OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT:” LEVEL THREE REDUCED TO LEVEL TWO (FOURTH DEPT).
Correction Law, Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE AN INMATE RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY (RTF) TO PROVIDE SEX OFFENDERS WHO ARE ABOUT TO BE RELEASED WITH REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS IN THE OUTSIDE COMMUNITY, AS OPPOSED TO WITHIN THE PRISON (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the “residential treatment facility” (RTF) within the Fishkill Correctional Facility complied with the Correction Law. Plaintiffs alleged Fishkill did not provide sufficient opportunities outside the prison facility for reintegrating inmates into the community. Supreme Court agreed. The Third Department held that the Correction Law does not indicate the programs for reintegrating inmates must be offered outside the facility:

A resident in an RTF “may be permitted to leave such facility in accordance with the provisions of [Correction Law § 73]” …. To that end, DOCCS “shall be responsible for securing appropriate education, on-the-job training and employment” for RTF residents (Correction Law § 73 [2]). Furthermore, “[p]rograms directed toward the rehabilitation and total reintegration into the community of persons transferred to a residential treatment facility shall be established” (Correction Law § 73 [3]). That said, nothing in Correction Law § 73 (2) or (3) states specifically where the opportunities provided in a rehabilitative program established by DOCCS or where the education, training or employment to be secured by DOCCS must be located. In other words, there is no statutory mandate providing that DOCCS’s obligations under Correction Law § 73 be outside the confines of Fishkill. Alcantara v Annucci, 2022 NY Slip Op 02163, Third Dept 3-31-22

 

March 31, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-31 15:53:172022-04-03 18:17:31THE CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE AN INMATE RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY (RTF) TO PROVIDE SEX OFFENDERS WHO ARE ABOUT TO BE RELEASED WITH REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS IN THE OUTSIDE COMMUNITY, AS OPPOSED TO WITHIN THE PRISON (THIRD DEPT). ​
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT (SARA), PROHIIBITING CERTAIN SEX OFFENDERS FROM RESIDING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, APPLIES TO SEX OFFENDERS WHO ARE UNDER POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS); THE DISSENT ARGUED SARA, BY ITS TERMS, APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE ON PAROLE OR CONDITIONALLY RELEASED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined the residency requirement of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) is a mandatory condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) for sex offenders subject to SARA. The dissent argued the applicable statutes do not mention postrelease supervision (PRS) and, by their terms, apply only to defendants who are on parole or conditionally released:

In 1998, the legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, amending the Penal Law to largely “abolish parole” for most felony offenses, including serious sexual offenses, and institute determinate terms of imprisonment to be followed by periods of postrelease supervision … . …[T]the legislature added Penal Law § 70.45 (3)—entitled “[c]onditions of post-release supervision”—which provides that the Board of Parole “shall establish and impose conditions of post-release supervision in the same manner and to the same extent as it may establish and impose conditions in accordance with the executive law upon persons who are granted parole or conditional release.” Further, Penal Law § 70.40 was amended to add references to postrelease supervision; namely Penal Law § 70.40 (1) (b) provides that “conditions of release including those governing postrelease supervision, shall be such as may be imposed by the [Parole Board] in accordance with the provisions of the executive law.” … . …

The SARA residency restriction bars offenders convicted of certain sex offenses from residing within 1,000 feet of a school (see Executive Law § 259-c [14] …). Specifically, it provides that, when certain offenders are “released on parole or conditionally released pursuant to subdivision one or two of this section,” the Parole Board “shall require, as a mandatory condition of such release, that such sentenced offender shall refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds … . …

Penal Law §§ 70.45 (3) and 70.40 (1) (b), when read together with SARA, mandate that the SARA residency restriction be applied equally to offenders released on parole, conditional release, or subject to a period of postrelease supervision. Matter of Alvarez v Annucci, 2022 NY Slip Op 01957 Ct App 3-22-22

Practice Point: The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA), which prohibits certain sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of a school, does not apply to those under postrelease supervision (PRS).

 

March 22, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-22 12:01:162022-03-26 12:31:41THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT (SARA), PROHIIBITING CERTAIN SEX OFFENDERS FROM RESIDING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, APPLIES TO SEX OFFENDERS WHO ARE UNDER POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS); THE DISSENT ARGUED SARA, BY ITS TERMS, APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE ON PAROLE OR CONDITIONALLY RELEASED (CT APP).
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT, ASSESSED 12 POINTS FOR FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY; DEFENDANT ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY BY PLEADING GUILTY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, without prior notice to the defendant, assessed 12 points for failure to accept responsibility in this SORA risk level proceeding. The Fourth Department noted defendant pled guilty to statutory rape. Although defendant stated he thought the 16-year-old victim was 18, the guilty plea was an adequate acceptance of responsibility:

… [I]t is well established that ” ‘[a] defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to notice of points sought to be assigned to him or her so as to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to that assessment’ ” … . As a result, “a court’s sua sponte departure from the Board’s recommendation at the hearing, without prior notice, deprives the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to respond” … . …

… [T]he court erred in assessing him 10 points under risk factor 12, for failure to accept responsibility, given that he pleaded guilty and admitted his guilt … . …

… [D]efendant was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to argue against the override [recommended by the board] or in favor of a downward departure … . People v Ritchie, 2022 NY Slip Op 01635, Fourth Dept 3-10-22

Practice Point: In a SORA risk assessment proceeding, the judge cannot, sua sponte, without notice to the defendant, assess points in a category not recommended by the board.

Practice Point: In a SORA risk assessment proceeding, where a defendant has pled guilty, an assessment of 12 points for failure to accept responsibility is not warranted.

 

March 11, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-11 11:14:472022-03-13 11:41:02THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT, ASSESSED 12 POINTS FOR FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY; DEFENDANT ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY BY PLEADING GUILTY (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE PEOPLE’S APPLICATION FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE IN THIS SORA RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) County Court determine the proof submitted by the People did not support the application for an upward departure in this SORA risk assessment proceeding:

… County Court erred in granting the People’s application for an upward departure. The People failed to prove the facts in support of their proffered aggravating factor, including that the defendant engaged in unprotected sexual conduct with the victim, by clear and convincing evidence … . People v Paterno, 2022 NY Slip Op 01470, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: Any application by the People for an upward departure in a SORA risk assessment proceeding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Here the People’s upward departure application alleged defendant had unprotected sex with the 15-year-old victim. The appellate court determined the allegation was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

 

March 9, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-09 18:17:582022-03-12 18:24:35THE PEOPLE’S APPLICATION FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE IN THIS SORA RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

A SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF A DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE; THEREFORE THE CERTIFICATION CANNOT BE SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SENTENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s certification as a sex offender was not part of his sentence. Therefore the certification could not be set aside pursuant to CPL 440.20:

Prior to the defendant’s release from prison, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPL 440.20 to vacate his certification as a sex offender on the ground that his certification was unlawful because the crime he was convicted of was not a sex offense or a sexually violent offense under Correction Law § 168-a. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant’s motion and set aside so much of the sentence as certified the defendant as a sex offender and required him to pay a sex offender registration fee. The court then resentenced the defendant to the originally-imposed term of imprisonment and post-release supervision. The People appeal.

While a defendant’s certification as a sex offender under SORA is part of the judgment of conviction … , “SORA certification is not part of a sentence” … . Thus, the relief sought by the defendant was not available to him under CPL 440.20(1), which only authorizes a motion to set aside a sentence … . People v David, 2022 NY Slip Op 01310, Second Dept 3-2-22

 

March 2, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-02 14:14:102022-03-05 14:27:34A SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF A DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE; THEREFORE THE CERTIFICATION CANNOT BE SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SENTENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Judges, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE 3RD DEPARTMENT, JOINING THE 2ND, HOLDS THAT A DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING, DESPITE ITS CIVIL NATURE; DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined: (1) defendant was entitled to and did not receive effective assistance of counsel at the SORA risk-level proceeding (which is civil in nature). despite his decision not to appear; and (2) the SORA judge did not make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring remittal:

Despite SORA proceedings being civil in nature, not criminal … , we now join the Second Department in explicitly holding that SORA defendants have the right to the effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Due Process Clauses contained in the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution and article I, § 6 of the NY Constitution, because the statutory right to counsel in such proceedings (see Correction Law § 168-n [3]) would otherwise be rendered meaningless, and because SORA determinations affect a defendant’s liberty interest … .

… Although defendant waived his right to be present at the SORA hearing, he did not waive his right to contest the Board’s risk level recommendation or the People’s arguments and proof … . Counsel — who acknowledged at the hearing that he had “had no contact” with defendant — made no arguments, essentially agreed to the Board’s recommendation, and failed to require the People to admit any proof at the hearing or County Court to provide any reasoning for its determination. … The record … reveals that counsel, who did not communicate with his client at all and “failed to litigate any aspect of the adjudication,” did not provide effective representation … . As defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, upon remittal he is entitled to a new hearing with different assigned counsel. People v VonRapacki, 2022 NY Slip Op 01071, Third Dept 2-17-22

 

February 17, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-02-17 12:44:262022-02-21 13:17:01THE 3RD DEPARTMENT, JOINING THE 2ND, HOLDS THAT A DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING, DESPITE ITS CIVIL NATURE; DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (THIRD DEPT).
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