Corporation Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF LABOR LAW 196-d AGAINST A CORPORATE OFFICER AND A SHAREHOLDER INDIVIDUALLY FOR FAILING TO REMIT SERVICE CHARGES AND GRATUITIES TO THEIR WAITSTAFF EMPLOYEES; REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION TO SEEK CLASS CERTIFICATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY DEMANDS WERE PALPABLY IMPROPER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined: (1) plaintiff banquet server had stated a cause of action against the Cortses (an officer and a shareholder in the corporation, Falkirk Management, sued by plaintiff) individually alleging the Cortses were plaintiff’s employers within the meaning of Labor Law 196-d and did not remit service charges and gratuities to the waitstaff; (2) corporate shareholders and officers like the Cortes can be liable for corporate violations of the Labor Law; plaintiff’s discovery demands were burdensome or immaterial and therefore improper (CPLR 3101(a)); (3) plaintiff’s request for an extension to move for class certification should have been granted (CPLR 901(a); 902); and (4) plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint should have been granted:

… [T]he complaint alleged that the Cortses exercised control over the “day-to-day operations” of “[the Country Club],” including “authority regarding the pay practices” of Falkirk Management. * * *

… [T]he information sought by the plaintiff in her first set of interrogatories and first request for the production of documents was largely burdensome or immaterial, and consequently, palpably improper … . * * *

A plaintiff’s need to conduct pre-class certification discovery to determine whether the prerequisites of a class action set forth in CPLR 901(a) can be satisfied constitutes good cause for the extension of the 60-day time period fixed by CPLR 902 … . * * *

[Re: the motion to amend the complaint:] the defendants alleged no surprise or prejudice … . Moreover, the proposed amendments are not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit … . Lomeli v Falkirk Mgt. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 00115, Second Dept 1-8-20

January 8, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Environmental Law, Limited Liability Company Law

MEMBER OF LLC WHICH OWNED A MOBILE HOME PARK IS PERSONALLY LIABLE, PURSUANT TO THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE, FOR AN $800,000 PENALTY IMPOSED FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REQUIRING SEWAGE-TREATMENT MEASURES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Burr, one of two members of a limited liability company, C & J, was properly held personally liable for the violation of an administrative order issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEP). C & J owned a mobile home park and the administrative order concerned the treatment of waste from the park. The penalty was more than $800,000.00:

Under Limited Liability Company Law § 609, a member of a limited liability company is generally not liable for the contractual obligations of the company. The 2008 order on consent, however, is not merely a contractual obligation. It is also an administrative order, the violation of which is subject to statutory enforcement (see ECL 71-1929). This Court has recognized that a responsible corporate officer may be held personally liable for violations of consent orders issued by DEC that implicate public health and safety … . Individual liability may be imposed where the corporate officer has the knowledge of and ability to prevent or remedy a violation that presents a public health hazard … . …

There can be little dispute that Burr was well aware of the ongoing sewage violations at the park, and, as managing member, he held a position of authority to address the problem. … [T]he 2008 consent order, which Burr signed on C & J’s behalf, expressly provided for stipulated penalties in the event that C & J “fail[ed] to strictly and timely comply.” The order further specified that it was binding on C & J and its officers. …

… [W]e conclude that Supreme Court did not err in holding Burr personally liable under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. State of New York v C & J Enters., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 00024, Third Dept 1-2-20

January 2, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Landlord-Tenant, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

CORPORATE OFFICER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION PURSUANT TO REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 853 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the landlord’s (Huntress’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the tenant’s (Kingsbury’s) action for wrongful eviction (RPAPL 853) should not have been granted:

The sole contention raised by Huntress in support of his motion with respect to the first cross claim was that he could not be personally liable inasmuch as he was acting as an agent of a disclosed principal. We conclude that Huntress failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to that cross claim and, as a result, the burden never shifted to Kingsbury to raise a triable issue of fact … .

“It is well established that [a] corporate officer may be held personally liable for a tort of the corporation if he or she committed or participated in its commission, whether or not his or her acts are also by or for the corporation’ ” … . A cause of action under RPAPL 853 sounds in tort … . Here, Huntress failed to establish that he did not participate in the eviction of Kingsbury, and he therefore failed to establish as a matter of law that he cannot be held personally liable if the eviction violated RPAPL 853 … . Canandaigua Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Acquest S. Park, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 09130, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

December 20, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Corporation Law, Real Estate

THE DEMAND FOR THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT UNDER A REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS AN ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF THE CONTRACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO KEEP THE DEPOSIT AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s demand for the return of its deposit in a real estate transaction was an anticipatory breach of the purchase agreement entitling plaintiff to retain the deposit as liquidated damages. Plaintiff, Lamarche Food, had represented that it was a New York corporation authorized to do business in New York. The corporation had been dissolved in 1992. For that reason defendant claimed plaintiff had breached the contract and demanded the return of the deposit. However, pursuant to Business Corporation Law 1006, a dissolved corporation may continue to function for the purpose of winding up affairs. Apparently defendant acknowledged the “winding up affairs” issue and argued only that its demand for a return of the deposit was not an anticipatory breach:

By letter dated June 23, 2017, a new attorney for the defendant informed the plaintiffs’ attorney that Lamarche Food had defaulted on its obligations under the contract of sale inasmuch as it had represented therein that it was a New York corporation authorized to carry on its business in New York, with all the power and authority to enter into and perform the contract, and yet Lamarche Food was dissolved on June 24, 1992, and, therefore, was not a registered corporation in New York capable of engaging in new business. The defendant’s attorney further stated that in light of the breach, the defendant demanded a refund of its deposit within 10 days. * * *

On appeal, the defendant does not dispute that Lamarche Food could continue to function for the purpose of selling the subject property as part of its winding up of the corporation’s affairs. Rather, the defendant contends that its June 23, 2017, letter to the plaintiffs’ attorney did not constitute an anticipatory breach of the contract of sale. “An anticipatory breach of contract by a promisor is a repudiation of [a] contractual duty before the time fixed in the contract for . . . performance has arrived” … . “For an anticipatory repudiation to be deemed to have occurred, the expression of intent not to perform by the repudiator must be positive and unequivocal'” … . We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the June 23, 2017, letter reflected a positive and unequivocal repudiation of the contract by the defendant … , thereby, under the terms of the contract, entitling the plaintiffs to retain the deposit as liquidated damages for the defendant’s anticipatory breach. Lamarche Food Prods. Corp. v 438 Union, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 08995, Second Dept 12-18-19

December 18, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Attorneys, Corporation Law, Environmental Law, Municipal Law

AN ATTORNEY, A PRINCIPAL IN THE CORPORATIONS OWNING SEVERAL BUILDINGS, WAS PROPERLY FOUND TO BE IN THE “OUTDOOR ADVERTISING BUSINESS” WITHOUT A LICENSE BECAUSE HE ADVERTISED HIS LAW PRACTICE IN SIGNS ON THE BUILDINGS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the corporations which owned the buildings were separate from the attorney, a principal in the corporations, who advertised his law office in signs on the buildings. Therefore the attorney was making space available for outdoor advertising to “others” within the meaning of the NYC Administrative Code regulating outdoor advertising. The code requires “outdoor advertising companies” engaged in the :outdoor advertising business” to be licensed. The attorney (Ciafone) was fined for outdoor advertising without a license:

Contrary to the position of the Appellate Division dissent, preserving the distinction between the corporate entities and Mr. Ciafone does not “penalize him for forming corporate entities to own the buildings for tax and liability purposes”… . Myriad statutes and regulations apply to corporations, but not natural persons; those are not “penalties” for creating a corporate legal entity, but consequences of choosing that form of ownership. The New York City Council could rationally conclude that a corporation engaged in the provision of advertising to others, even others who have an ownership interest in the corporation, should be subjected to greater financial disincentives for violating signage laws than natural persons who are advertising themselves. Matter of Franklin St. Realty Corp. v NYC Envtl. Control Bd., 2019 NY Slip Op 08976, CtApp 12-17-19

December 17, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Corporation Law, Privilege, Replevin

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DID NOT PASS TO THE FOREIGN (DELAWARE) CORPORATION AFTER A MERGER AND ACQUISITION OF NEW YORK BUSINESS ENTITIES; THEREFORE THE NEW YORK PARTIES, IN THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST THE ATTORNEYS WHO REPRESENTED THEM IN THE TRANSACTION, CAN SEEK ACCESS TO THE ATTORNEYS’ PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE TRANSACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Austin, reversing Supreme Court, determined that New York law applied to a party’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege for documents associated with a corporate acquisition and merger involving New York and Delaware business entities. The opinion is fact-based and far too complex and comprehensive to summarize here. The Second Department, disagreeing with Supreme Court, held that the choice of law was governed by public policy, and the proper theory for access to the privileged documents is New York’s law of replevin. In a nutshell, the Second Department held that the attorney-client privilege did not pass to the foreign corporation after the merger and acquisition, but rather remained with the the New York parties (Sina and Askari) and allowed the New York parties to pursue claims against the attorneys (McDermott) who represented them in the transaction:

In a situation where documents are sought, New York will apply the law of the forum where the evidence will be introduced at trial or the location of the proceeding seeking discovery of those documents … . Here, the privileged communications being sought by the plaintiffs in this New York replevin action were made in New York between New York-based attorneys at McDermott and Sina, a New York corporation, involving its then-majority shareholder and president, Askari, a New York resident. The sole nexus that Delaware has to this action is that Specialty is a limited liability company formed under the laws of that state. Consequently, New York law applies in this action sounding in replevin seeking the disclosure of McDermott’s files … . …

It would indeed be incongruous to enforce a law which effectively forecloses New York corporations merging with foreign corporations from having the ability to pursue their claims against their counsel or the newly formed, post-merger entities based on the post-merger entities’ control of the documents needed by the former entities to prosecute potential claims. Here, Delaware law gives the new corporation, a putative defendant, sole access to and control of the merger-related documents by the exercise of the attorney-client privilege. This is contrary to New York public policy … . * * *

Here, Business Corporation Law § 1006 specifically provides that a dissolved corporation, like Sina, may commence an action in any court under its corporate name. Sina’s dissolution does not affect Sina’s right or capacity to maintain this replevin action since the claim arose from McDermott’s representation of Sina which began before Sina’s dissolution. … Thus, the plaintiffs demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action for replevin since the plaintiffs submitted evidence, through Askari’s affidavit, that McDermott represented Sina and Askari during the “transactions.” As a result, the plaintiffs demonstrated, prima facie, their superior possessory right to McDermott’s files. Askari v McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, 2019 NY Slip Op 08547, Second Dept 11-27-19

November 27, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Corporation Law, Evidence

FORMAL ADMISSIONS, INFORMAL ADMISSIONS AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department Department explained the nature of an admission and the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this action to determine whether defendant, Weber, was a shareholder of plaintiff RMNY:

Weber’s prior admissions made in other actions that he was not a shareholder of RMNY did not constitute formal judicial admissions entitling RMNY to summary judgment. Formal judicial admissions are facts admitted by a party’s pleadings … , and are conclusive of the facts admitted in the action in which they are made … . The admissions relied upon here were not made in this action.

Furthermore, RMNY failed to establish that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, also known as estoppel against inconsistent positions, a party may not take a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position he or she took in a prior proceeding, simply because his or her interests have changed … . The doctrine applies only where the party secured a judgment in his or her favor in the prior proceeding … . This doctrine “rests upon the principle that a litigant should not be permitted . . . to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise'” … . “The doctrine is invoked to estop parties from adopting such contrary positions because the judicial system cannot tolerate this playing fast and loose with the courts” … .Here, since RMNY failed to show that Weber secured any formal grant of relief in the other actions based upon his prior statements, they do not implicate the doctrine of inconsistent positions … . Rather, the statements constitute informal judicial admissions that are not conclusive but are “merely evidence of the fact or facts admitted” … , “the circumstances of which may be explained at trial” … . Re/Max of N.Y., Inc. v Weber, 2019 NY Slip Op 08432, Second Dept 11-20-19

November 20, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Employment Law, False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution

FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ACTIONS AGAINST THE RESTAURANT FRANCHISOR PROPERLY DISMISSED IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF CONTROL OVER THE DAY TO DAY OPERATION OF THE RESTAURANT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this false arrest and malicious prosecution action, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because the video evidence raised questions of fact. The court noted that the action against the franchisor, Denny’s, where the confrontation between plaintiff and the restaurant security guards took place, was properly dismissed:

… [T]he court properly granted that part of the cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint against Denny’s. ” The mere existence of a franchise agreement is insufficient to impose vicarious liability on the franchisor for the acts of its franchisee; there must be a showing that the franchisor exercised control over the day-to-day operations of its franchisee’ ” … . Defendants established that Denny’s did not exercise control over the day-to-day operations of its franchisee or specifically maintain control over the security of the restaurant, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto … . Hernandez v Denny’s Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 08302, Fourth Dept 11-15-19

November 15, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Accountant Malpractice, Corporation Law, Fraud

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE ADVERSE INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE APPLIES IN THIS ACCOUNTANT MALPRACTICE CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined questions of fact were raised about whether the adverse interest exception bars the in pari delicto defense in this accountant malpractice case:

In this accounting malpractice action, plaintiffs, the liquidators of several hedge funds, allege that defendants failed to uncover fraudulent activity by the funds’ investment managers. The issue before us is whether the adverse interest exception to the equitable defense of in pari delicto bars the defense in this case (see Kirschner v KPMG LLP, 15 NY3d 446 [2010]). We find that plaintiffs raised issues of fact as to the adverse nature of their interests vis-a-vis those of their agents, the funds’ investment managers, that preclude summary dismissal of the complaint on the ground of the in pari delicto defense.

“To come within the exception, the agent must have totally abandoned his principal’s interests and be acting entirely for his own or another’s purposes” ,,, . The exception is applied only where the fraud is committed “against a corporation rather than on its behalf” … . “So long as the corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct enables the business to survive — to attract investors and customers and raise funds for corporate purposes — this test is not met” … . Thus, we conclude that the mere continuation of a corporate entity does not per se constitute a benefit that precludes application of the adverse interest exception. …

… [R]eliance on speculation about the benefits to be derived from the continued existence of an entity is inconsistent with the analysis of the adverse interest exception in Kirschner. It may be possible in every case to construct a hypothetical scenario where the company teetering on the brink of insolvency because of its agent’s fraud meets with an opportune circumstance that allows it to resume legitimate business operations. Permitting such speculation would render the adverse interest exception meaningless. Further, an ongoing fraud and a continued corporate existence may harm a corporate entity: The agent may prolong the company’s legal existence so that he can continue to loot from it, as appears to have been the case here. Conway v Marcum & Kliegman LLP, 2019 NY Slip Op 07338, First Dept 10-10-19

October 10, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Arbitration, Corporation Law, Insurance Law

MASTER ARBITRATOR’S AWARD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED, REVIEW POWERS OF MASTER ARBITRATOR AND COURT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the master arbitrator’s award in this no-fault insurance, fraudulent incorporation case should not have been vacated:

“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” … . A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis … . Notably, the master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law … . In contrast, the courts “generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur” … .

Here, since Country-Wide submitted evidence tending to support its fraudulent incorporation defense, it cannot be said that the determination of the master arbitrator affirming the original arbitrator’s award lacked evidentiary support. Nor can it be said that the determination to affirm the original arbitrator, who supported her determination with reasons based on the evidence, lacked a rational basis. Thus, even if it was an error of law to conclude that Country-Wide proved its defense as a matter of law … . Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 07246, Second Dept 10-9-19

October 9, 2019/by Bruce Freeman