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STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT CONSTITUTED NONACTIONABLE OPINION; TO THE EXTENT ANY OF THE STATEMENTS COULD BE REGARDED AS FACT RATHER THAN OPINION, THE STATEMENTS WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE; PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE WITH ACTUAL MALICE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, determined the statements attributed to defendant New York State Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz constituted nonactionable opinion and plaintiff (Verdi) did not demonstrate Dinowitz acted with actual malice. The facts are far too detailed to summarize here:

Given the history of the hyperbolic and public finger-pointing between the parties, a reasonable reader would conclude that Dinowitz’s statements were opinion and merely “the product of passionate advocacy,” especially considering that he was in the midst of litigation involving accusations of him manipulating student registration to advance a racist agenda … . Although Dinowitz’s status as an assemblyman may lead an average reader to interpret his statements as those of fact known to him through his involvement with the school and the community … , “[e]ven apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made in . . . circumstances in which an ‘audience may anticipate [the use] of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole’ ” … . * * *

Even if some of Dinowitz’s statements could be regarded as fact rather than opinion, we agree with the motion court’s finding that Dinowitz’s statements may be entitled to a qualified privilege, as an overcrowded public school is a matter of public concern … . We also agree with the motion court’s determination that the “actual malice” standard should be applied in the evaluation of whether Dinowitz’s conduct went beyond that protected by the qualified privilege … . Verdi v Dinowitz, 2024 NY Slip Op 04287, First Dept 8-22-24

Practice Point: The statements attributed to defendant in this defamation action were nonactionable opinion, criteria explained.​

Practice Point: To the extent any of the statements may be regarded as fact, as opposed to opinion, they were protected by qualified privilege because there was no showing the statements were made with actual malice.

 

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THE DEFAMATION ACTION AGAINST A REPORTER AND A MEDIA COMPANY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE SUIT HAD A “SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW;” CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gonzalez, over a two-justice concurrence, determined plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their defamation action against a reporter and a media company had a “substantial basis in law” under the anti-SLAPP law. Therefore the complaint was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 [g] [1] and defendants were entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. The articles published by defendants concerned plaintiff Karl Reeves’ divorce and custody dispute. The facts are too detailed to fairly summarize here:

… [T]he anti-SLAPP law creates an accelerated summary dismissal procedure, which applies when a defendant in a SLAPP suit moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint. Upon such a motion, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the action or claim is a SLAPP suit (see CPLR 3211[g][1]). Once the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the claim has a “substantial basis in law” (id.). If the claim is dismissed, the defendant recovers a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees.

This case presents the issue of what constitutes a “substantial basis in law” under the anti-SLAPP law. We hold, based on our reading of CPLR 3211(g) and (h), that “substantial basis” under the anti-SLAPP law means “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … , a phrase drawn from the relevant legislative history. We further find that, because the complaint in this case fails to survive ordinary CPLR 3211(a)(7) analysis, plaintiffs have failed to meet the higher burden under CPLR 3211(g) of showing that their SLAPP suit has a substantial basis in law. Accordingly, defendants — a media entity and a reporter — are entitled to mandatory costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a. We remand the case solely for calculation of those costs and fees.  Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 2024 NY Slip Op 04286, First Dept 8-22-24

Practice Point: To overcome a motion to dismiss a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff must demonstrate the action has a “substantial basis in law.” This decision fleshes out the meaning of that phrase.

 

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DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS RELATING TO ISSUES OF BROAD PUBLIC INTEREST POSTED ON FACEBOOK MAY BE ENCOMPASSED BY THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; HERE, HOWEVER, THE STATEMENTS (ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE) RELATED TO A PURELY PRIVATE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Love, determined (1) Facebook is a “public forum” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, and (2) the allegedly defamatory statements defendants posted on Facebook involved a “purely private matter,” not an issue of broad public interest, and therefore was not encompassed aby the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore plaintiff’s defamation per se cause of action properly survived dismissal:

… [T]he defendants … posted a series of responses to a post on the personal Facebook page of the plaintiff … alleging that the plaintiff had sexually abused [one of the defendants] approximately 17 years prior when she was 4 years old … . * * *

Based upon the intent of the Legislature to redefine New York’s anti-SLAPP statute as broadly as possible, and the interpretation in decisions by other state courts of their similar state anti-SLAPP statutes defining Facebook and other social media applications as public forums, we conclude that Facebook is a public forum within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a(1). …

… [T]his action is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because the defendants’ statements published on the plaintiff’s Facebook page concerned “a purely private matter” … and were “directed only to a limited, private audience” … . Although the defendants made generic reference to issues of broad public interest, their primary focus was not an issue of broad public interest. Nelson v Ardrey, 2024 NY Slip Op 04147, Second Dept 8-7-24

Practice Point: Facebook is a “public forum” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Practice Point: Statements which relate to purely private matters, here Facebook posts alleging sexual abuse, as opposed to statements relating to a broad public interest, are not encompassed by the anti-SLAPP statute.

 

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A DEFAMATION COMPLAINT DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION LACKS A “SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ANTI-SLAPP LAW (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gonzalez, over a two-justice concurrence, determined the defendants were entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP law (see Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a; CPLR 3211[g]-[h]). The plaintiffs sued defendant newspaper (The Daily Mail) alleging defamation and several related causes of action. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The defendants argued they were entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP law because the action did not have a “substantial basis in law.” The question on appeal was whether a complaint which was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action could still be said to have a “substantial basis in law” such that the defendants would not be able to recover their attorney’s fees.  The First Department answered “no:”

… [T]he “substantial basis” standard applicable under CPLR 3211(g) is more exacting than the liberal pleading standard applicable to ordinary CPLR 3211(a)(7) motions. Under the CPLR 3211(a)(7) standard, the question is whether a cognizable cause of action is manifested, presuming the complaint’s factual allegations to be true, and according the pleading the benefit of every possible favorable inference … . By contrast, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a pleading under CPLR 3211(g) must look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether the claim alleged is supported by substantial evidence … .

… [A] complaint which fails to state a claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7) necessarily lacks a “substantial basis in law” for purposes of CPLR 3211(g) … . * * *

… [Plaintiffs’] failure to meet the CPLR 3211(a) standard necessarily establishes their failure to meet the higher CPLR 3211(g) standard. Karl Reeves, C.E.I.N.Y. Corp. v Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 2024 NY Slip Op 01898, First Dept 4-9-24

Practice Point: A complaint which does not state a cause of action lacks a “substantial basis in law” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP law. Therefore the defendants here were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees.

 

TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION THE COMPLAINT MUST ALLEGE THE ACTUAL WORDS, WHEN THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE AND TO WHOM THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE; ALLEGING THE “GENERAL CONTENT” OF THE STATEMENTS WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHEN AND TO WHOM THEY WERE MADE IS NOT ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this defamation action was deficient in that the actual words alleged to have been defamatory, the dates the statements were made, and the persons to whom the statements were made were not described.

…[T]he complaint fails to state a viable defamation claim, since it does not set forth, inter alia, the actual words complained of, the dates of the alleged statements, or the persons to whom the statements were allegedly made. Rather, the complaint sets forth only the general content of the alleged defamatory statements, which were made at unspecified times to unnamed members of the community and unnamed persons at a business entity. Under such circumstances, the allegations failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(a) … . Sternberg v Wiederman, 2024 NY Slip Op 01576, Second Dept 3-20-24

Practice Point: A complaint sounding in defamation must allege the actual words, when the statements were made and to whom they were made. A description of the “general content” of the statements is not enough.

 

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THE 2020 AMENDMENTS BROADENING THE REACH OF THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE DO NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM BASED UPON THE AMENDED STATUTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s counterclaim under the anti-SLAPP statute should have been dismissed. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought this action for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on letters and emails written by defendant which allegedly were intended to damage plaintiff’s reputation in the legal profession. The counterclaim alleged the defendant’s letters and emails were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute in the Civil Rights Law. The Second Department determined the 2020 amendments to that statute, which expanded its reach, do not apply retroactively and defendant, therefore, could not take advantage of those amendments: The counterclaim should have been dismissed:

The first counterclaim alleged that this action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (hereinafter SLAPP) and sought, among other things, attorney’s fees, costs, and damages pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a. * * *

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the broadened definition of public petition and participation in the amended section 76-a does not apply retroactively to this action … . The complaint, therefore, is governed by the prior statutory definition of an action involving public petition and participation … . Burton v Porcelain, 2024 NY Slip Op 00291, Second Dept 1-24-24

Practice Point: The 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute do not apply retroactively. Lawsuits started before the amendments cannot take advantage of the broader reach of the amendments.

 

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THE 2020 AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE DO NOT APPLY AS A DEFENSE TO THIS DEFAMATION ACTION BASED UPON DEFENDANTS’ CRITICISM OF PLAINTIFF DOG-GROOMER POSTED ON SOCIAL MEDIA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, in a matter of first impression in the Second Department, determined the 2020 anti-SLAPP amendments, which expanded the scope of the statute to some defamatory statements made on social media, did not apply retroactively. Therefore the defendants in the defamation action (the Sproules) were not entitled to dismissal of the defamation complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The Sproules had left their puppy at plaintiff VIP’s dog-grooming facility. The dog allegedly had trouble breathing when the Sproules picked him up. They took him to a veterinarian who concluded the dog had water in his lungs. When the dog failed to improve on a ventilator he was put to sleep. Robert Sproule posted a description of the incident on Yelp and Google urging readers to avoid using VIP:

The 2020 amendments to the Civil Rights Law expanded the pool of parties that may raise anti-SLAPP defenses, counterclaims, and cross-claims in their actions, now including journalists, consumer advocates, survivors of sexual abuse, and others. The expansion will naturally lead to an increase in the occasions where anti-SLAPP statutes shall be litigated in the courts. In fact, some upswing is already noted in this developing area of law. * * *

… [T]he Sproules did not establish that this action constitutes an action involving public petition and participation under the anti-SLAPP statute in the form that existed when this action was commenced … . Thus, to decide whether the standards under CPLR 3211(g) and Civil Rights Law § 76-a(2) apply, we must address whether the 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute apply retroactively or prospectively…. * * *

We hold that the presumption of prospective application has not been overcome here. Indeed, the remedial nature of a statutory amendment, which is generally at play with many amendments, is not a basis, in and of itself, for ignoring the long-standing legal presumption that new enactments be prospective, particularly where there is no expressed provision that a new law be given retroactive effect … . VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 2024 NY Slip Op 00205, Second Dept 1-17-24

Practice Point: The 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute, which expanded the scope of the statute to include some critical social media posts, do not apply retroactively. Here defendants in a defamation action based on their social media posts alleging plaintiff dog-groomer’s incompetence and negligence could not take advantage of the 2020 amendments as a defense to the action.

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THE COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A DEFAMATION CAUSE OF ACTION; THE DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY TOLD PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICIAN THAT PLAINTIFF WAS BANNED FROM DEFENDANT’S PHARMACY FOR STEALING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had alleged a defamation cause of action and the motion to dismiss should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged defendant falsely accused him of stealing newspapers from a pharmacy:

The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that in November 2020, he was a customer at a CVS store in Jericho, where the defendant Martin was employed as a pharmacist. The plaintiff further alleged that, on December 3, 2020, Martin informed his physician, inter alia, that the plaintiff was banned from the pharmacy for stealing newspapers on multiple occasions and that she had reported the plaintiff to the police. * * *

… [T]he complaint alleged that the statement that the plaintiff was banned from the pharmacy in question for stealing was made on December 3, 2020. The complaint also set forth the statement allegedly made and to whom the statement was made … . Contrary to the defendants’ contention, “the words need not be set in quotation marks” to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation … . Moreover, the allegation that the plaintiff “was stealing” “constitutes an allegation of a ‘serious crime’ so as to qualify as slander per se” … . Jesberger v CVS Health Solutions, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06515, Second Dept 12-20-23

Practice Point: The allegation that defendant told plaintiff’s physician that plaintiff was banned from defendant’s pharmacy for stealing sufficiently stated a cause of action for defamation.

 

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DEFENDANT SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT’S DISCUSSION OF PLAINTIFF CROSS-COUNTY COACH’S TERMINATION WITH STUDENTS WAS ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant school superintendent’s (Brantner’s) statements to students about plaintiff cross-country coach (who was terminated) were absolutely privileged:

“The absolute privilege defense affords complete immunity from liability for defamation to an official [who] is a principal executive of State or local government . . . with respect to statements made during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties” … . Here, plaintiff does not dispute that Brantner, as superintendent, is a government official to whom the absolute privilege would apply … . The question presented is whether Brantner was acting within the scope of her duties as superintendent when she met with members of the cross-country team in a classroom before school to discuss plaintiff’s termination.

We conclude that … Brantner’s statements were made during the course of the performance of her duties as a school superintendent and were about matters within the ambit of those responsibilities.  Brantner testified at her deposition that the school board asked her to speak with the students, who had appeared at school board meetings demanding to know why plaintiff had been fired …  In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that Brantner decided on her own to meet with the students, we conclude that she was acting within the scope of her duties when making the statements. Although Education Law § 1711 … does not specifically authorize superintendents to meet with students, the statute is not an exhaustive list delineating every action that a school superintendent is permitted to engage in, and the absence from the statute of a reference to a particular category of action does not mean that it is unauthorized. In our view, a school superintendent does not act ultra vires when speaking to students in a school setting about a matter related to their education or extracurricular activities. Panek v Brantner, 2023 NY Slip Op 03636, Fourth Dept 6-30-23

Practice Point: Because the defendant school superintendent was acting within the scope of her duties when she discussed plaintiff cross-country coach’s termination with students, her statements were absolutely privileged and will not support a defamation action.

 

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AN ATTORNEY’S REFERENCE IN AN EMAIL TO A NONPARTY AS A “WIFE BEATER” WAS ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED AS PERTINENT TO THE DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a statement in an email written by an attorney in a divorce action, referring to plaintiff as a wife beater, was pertinent to the divorce action and was absolutely privileged:

The defendant Dina S. Kaplan is an attorney who represented the defendant Eric Dorfman in a divorce action (hereinafter the divorce action). Kaplan allegedly represented to the court in the divorce action, including court personnel, that the plaintiff, an attorney and a nonparty to the divorce action, was the boyfriend of Dorfman’s wife. In an email exchange between Kaplan and Herbert Adler, an attorney representing Dorfman’s wife in the divorce action, Kaplan allegedly made a defamatory statement about the plaintiff, referring to him as a “wife beater . . . who is in criminal prosecution.” In addition to Adler, the email was sent to court personnel and other attorneys. * * *

… [U]nder the extremely liberal test of pertinency, Kaplan’s statement allegedly referring to the plaintiff as a “wife beater . . . who is in criminal prosecution” was pertinent to the divorce action and, thus, is absolutely privileged. The email exchange between Kaplan and Adler was initially focused on a dispute over Dorfman’s financial ability to pay his wife maintenance and child support. The conversation turned, however, to the behavior of the parties to the divorce action while caring for their children, and Kaplan’s statement that the plaintiff is a “wife beater . . . who is in criminal prosecution” was responsive and therefore relevant to the issue of the parties’ behavior … . Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the statement was “so outrageously out of context as to permit one to conclude, from the mere fact that the statement was uttered, that it was motivated by no other desire than to defame” the plaintiff, who was not among the participants in the conversation, was not otherwise mentioned in the email exchange, and was not even directly identified in the statement … . Davidoff v Kaplan, 2023 NY Slip Op 03450, Second Dept 6-28-23

Practice Point: If a defamatory statement made by a divorce attorney is pertinent to the divorce action, the statement is absolutely privileged.

 

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