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Defamation

PLAINTIFF, AN EDITORIAL DIRECTOR AT GAWKER, DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE DAILY BEAST REPORTERS WHO WROTE AN ARTICLE ABOUT GAWKER VIOLATED THE “GROSS IRRESPONSIBILITY STANDARD” IN MAKING STATEMENTS ABOUT PLAINTIFF; THE DEFAMATION COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, an editor, did not sufficiently allege the reporters who wrote a story about the company where plaintiff worked acted in a “grossly irresponsible manner,” the standard for defamation in this context:

Plaintiff, who at the time of the article was employed by BDG Media as the editorial director of the digital media website Gawker, alleges that the article contained misleading excerpts of her communications with her colleagues at Gawker, omitting relevant context in order to inaccurately portray her as racist, homophobic, xenophobic, and transphobic. Plaintiff further alleges that the statements published in the article were false, misleading, or, to the extent they contained literal truth, taken out of context to place her in a defamatory light. Plaintiff maintains that … BDG Media terminated her employment as a result of the article.

… [P]laintiff’s defamation cause of action withstands dismissal only if she adequately alleges that defendants, all of whom are members of the media, “‘acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties'” in writing and publishing the article … The “gross irresponsibility standard demands no more than that a publisher utilize methods of verification that are reasonably calculated to produce accurate copy” and does not require “exhaustive research [or] painstaking judgments” … . Furthermore, the alleged falsity or defamatory meaning of certain statements is not probative of whether defendants acted with gross irresponsibility … . Griffith v Daily Beast, 2023 NY Slip Op 02614, First Dept 5-16-23

Practice Point: Where matters of legitimate public concern are implicated, a plaintiff alleging defamation by reporters must allege the reporters violated the “gross irresponsibility standard;” the complaint here failed to do so.

 

May 16, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-05-16 12:49:422023-05-19 13:13:23PLAINTIFF, AN EDITORIAL DIRECTOR AT GAWKER, DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE DAILY BEAST REPORTERS WHO WROTE AN ARTICLE ABOUT GAWKER VIOLATED THE “GROSS IRRESPONSIBILITY STANDARD” IN MAKING STATEMENTS ABOUT PLAINTIFF; THE DEFAMATION COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Rights Law, Defamation

THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION COMPLAINT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes (Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a) do not apply retroactively and therefore should not have been the basis for dismissal of plaintiff’s defamation complaint:

… [T]the presumption against retroactivity is not overcome because “[n]othing in the text ‘expressly or by necessary implication’ requires retroactive application of the [anti-SLAPP] statute as amended . . . Nor does the legislative history support such an interpretation” … . First, the text of the legislation does not contain an express statement requiring retroactive application … . Second, while the anti-SLAPP amendments took effect “immediately” (id.), that term “is equivocal in an analysis of retroactivity” … . Third, although the legislation is remedial in nature and such legislation is generally applied retroactively “to better achieve its beneficial purpose” … , simply classifying a statute as remedial “does not automatically overcome the strong presumption of prospectivity” … . Finally, the legislative history establishes that the rationale for the amendments was to better advance the purposes of speech protection for which the anti-SLAPP law was initially enacted and to remedy the courts’ failure to use their discretionary powers to award costs and fees in such cases. However, the legislative history does not offer any explicit or implicit support for retroactive application … . Therefore, we conclude that “the presumption of prospective application of the [anti-SLAPP] amendments has not been defeated” … . Hoi Trinh v Nguyen, 2022 NY Slip Op 07387, Fourth Dept 12-23-22

Practice Point: The recent amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes (Civil Rights Law 70-a, 76-a) do not apply retroactively.

 

December 23, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-23 10:54:592022-12-26 11:12:18THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION COMPLAINT (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Defamation, Education-School Law

THE LETTER CRITICIZING THE FORMER DEAN OF THE FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT DEFAMATORY ON ITS FACE, BUT THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION BY IMPLICATION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s defamation-by-implication complaint should not have been dismissed:

… [P]laintiff, the former Dean of Graduate Studies at defendant Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT), was placed on leave following criticisms over culturally insensitive accessories presented in an FIT-sponsored alumni fashion show. Plaintiff alleges that a letter published by defendants contained defamatory remarks on its face, implied, or both, and impugned plaintiff’s reputation…. .

… [T]he letter implies that plaintiff was responsible for the show and failed to recognize the accessories as insensitive, even though she took no part in managing, directing, or approving the show. The complaint contains references to publications from other sources that interpret the letter as placing the blame on plaintiff and deeming her leadership inexcusable and irresponsible … . On a CPLR 3211 (a)(7) motion to dismiss, denial is warranted if taking the words used both in their ordinary meaning and in context make them susceptible to a defamatory connotation as occurs in this case … . The letter also contains statements of mixed opinion, “While a pure opinion cannot be the subject of a defamation claim, an opinion that ‘implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, . . . is a ‘mixed opinion’ and is actionable'” … .

The letter omitted plaintiff’s nonparticipation in the production, direction, and management of the fashion show; her unawareness as to the accessories the designers planned to present; the FIT policy precluding academic deans from evaluating, censoring, or approving student and alumni work; and plaintiff’s prompt response to student concerns and her proactive approach to address those concerns; and implied that plaintiff was responsible for the show, was aware of the accessories, could approve them, and failed to respond to student concerns. Davis v Brown, 2022 NY Slip Op 07147, First Dept 12-15-22

Practice Point: Here the writing was not defamatory on its face. But the complaint stated a cause of action for defamation by implication. The letter included actionable statements of “mixed opinion” and omitted important facts which relieved plaintiff of responsibility for the claimed misconduct.

 

December 15, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-15 17:35:162022-12-16 18:15:30THE LETTER CRITICIZING THE FORMER DEAN OF THE FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT DEFAMATORY ON ITS FACE, BUT THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION BY IMPLICATION (FIRST DEPT). ​
Attorneys, Civil Rights Law, Consumer Law, Defamation

DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT PLAINTIFFS WERE FACING SUSPENSION OF THEIR LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW WAS NOT PROTECTED AS FAIR AND TRUE LEGAL REPORTING PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 74; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE, DISPARAGEMENT AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LANHAM ACT AND GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 (FIRST DEPT).

The Fist Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Civil Rights Law 74 did not protect the statements in defendant’s online ad claiming that plaintiffs were facing suspension of their license to practice law because the litigation referred to in the ad did not mention anything about plaintiffs’ law license. Civil Rights Law 74 protects only “fair and true” reports on judicial proceedings. The complaint stated causes of action for defamation per se, disparagement and violations of the Lanham Act and General Business Law 349:

Civil Rights Law § 74 did not apply to the challenged statements in defendant’s online ads that, in linking to a news article about pending litigation against plaintiffs by a former client in California, asserted that plaintiffs were facing suspension of their license to practice law. The news article did not mention that plaintiffs’ law license was at risk nor did the complaint against plaintiffs seek suspension of their law license. Accordingly, this statement was not shielded from liability as defendant failed to demonstrate that it was a “fair and true” report of a judicial proceeding … . …

Based on defendant’s allegedly false statement that plaintiffs were facing a suspension of their license, plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for defamation per se … . …

… [T]he factual allegations in the complaint were sufficient to sustain causes of action for disparagement, and violations under the federal Lanham Act and General Business Law § 349, at the pleading stage … . Luo & Assoc. v NYIS Law Firm, A.P.C., 2022 NY Slip Op 07154, First Dept 12-15-22

Practice Point: Civil Rights Law 74 protects only “fair and true” reports on judicial proceedings. Here the statements plaintiffs were facing the suspension of their license to practice law was not mentioned in the article referencing the judicial proceedings, so the statements were actionable as defamation per se, disparagement and violations of the Lanham Act and General Business Law 349.

 

December 15, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-15 16:24:062022-12-16 17:33:14DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT PLAINTIFFS WERE FACING SUSPENSION OF THEIR LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW WAS NOT PROTECTED AS FAIR AND TRUE LEGAL REPORTING PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 74; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE, DISPARAGEMENT AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LANHAM ACT AND GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 (FIRST DEPT).
Defamation, Privilege

THE ALLEGEDLY DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS MADE IN A KOREAN-LANGUAGE CHAT ROOM WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the statements alleged to be defamatory were protected by qualified privilege. Plaintiff is an organization established to act as a liaison between the Korean-American community and the NYC Police Department. The statements were made in a Korean language chat group where the management of the organization was discussed:

The defendant established, prima facie, that his alleged statements are subject to a qualified privilege. Qualified privilege applies to a statement “when it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in a matter where his [or her] interest is concerned” … . Application of the privilege depends on whether “the relation of the parties [is] such as to afford reasonable ground for supposing an innocent motive for giving the information, and to deprive the act of an appearance of officious intermeddling with the affairs of others” … . Here, the alleged statements were made in a password-controlled, members-only chat group, and involved the management of the members’ organization. Such circumstances fall within the scope of the qualified privilege … .

A plaintiff may defeat the qualified privilege with a showing of either common-law malice (spite or ill will), or actual malice (knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless disregard for the truth) … . Here, the plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence that the defendant was motivated by malice alone in making the alleged statements … . They similarly failed to submit any evidence that the defendant knew the alleged statements were false or acted with a reckless disregard for their truth … . Joo Tae Yoo v Choi, 2022 NY Slip Op 06791, Second Dept 11-30-22

Practice Point:  Qualified privilege applies to  an allegedly defamatory statement “when it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in a matter where his [or her] interest is concerned” … . Qualified privilege will be defeated if is demonstrated the statements were made with “common law malice” (ill will or spite) or “actual malice (knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless disregard for the truth).

 

November 30, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-30 17:23:172022-12-03 17:49:43THE ALLEGEDLY DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS MADE IN A KOREAN-LANGUAGE CHAT ROOM WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
Defamation

AN UNFAVORABLE ANONYMOUS GOOGLE REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF ORTHODONTIST, ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDED BOTH FACT AND OPINION, WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY A READER TO BE PURE OPINION; THE REVIEW IS NOT ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that an unfavorable Google review of plaintiff orthodontist by a former minor patient did not constitute actionable defamation:

Plaintiffs, an orthodontist and his professional corporation, allege that defendants — a former minor patient and that patient’s parents — defamed them in an unfavorable review posted on Google. Contrary to Supreme Court’s holding, we find that, although defendants’ Google review contains elements of both fact and opinion, it nevertheless is not actionable … , and it was not the motion court’s province to “sift[] through [the] communication for the purpose of isolating and identifying assertions of fact” … . Rather, the court should have considered the overall context in which the communication was made, an anonymous online review of plaintiff’s services … .

Here, a reasonable reader of defendants’ Google review would understand it to be pure opinion based on the context in which it was posted and its arguably “[l]oose, figurative, or hyperbolic” tone … . Furthermore, defendants’ Google review was posted anonymously online and, as we have recognized, “‘[R]eaders give less credence to allegedly defamatory remarks published on the Internet than to similar remarks made in other contexts'” … . DeRicco v Maidman, 2022 NY Slip Op 05921, First Dept 10-20-22

Practice Point: An unfavorable, anonymous Google review of plaintiff orthodontist, although it included both fact and opinion, would be understood by readers to be pure opinion. The review therefore did not constitute actionable defamation.

 

October 20, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-10-20 16:58:162022-10-21 17:22:43AN UNFAVORABLE ANONYMOUS GOOGLE REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF ORTHODONTIST, ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDED BOTH FACT AND OPINION, WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY A READER TO BE PURE OPINION; THE REVIEW IS NOT ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION (FIRST DEPT). ​
Defamation, Municipal Law

PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SCHEDULE A 50-H HEARING AFTER ADJOURNING IT TWICE REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS DEFAMATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY EXECUTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s failure to schedule a 50-h hearing after adjourning it twice required dismissal (without prejudice) of certain causes of action in this defamation suit against a county executive:

Supreme Court erred in denying the motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with defendant’s demand for an oral examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h (1), and we therefore modify the order accordingly. “[A] plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50—h (1) is precluded from maintaining an action against a municipality” … . Here, plaintiff adjourned the examination on two separate occasions and failed to respond to defendant’s subsequent request that she choose from a list of dates when she would be available for examination. Under the circumstances, plaintiff bore the burden of rescheduling the examination … , and because plaintiff failed to reschedule, she was barred by statute from commencing an action … .

“Although compliance with General Municipal Law § 50—h (1) may be excused in ‘exceptional circumstances’ ” … , there were no such circumstances here. Contrary to defendant’s contention, however, the first through fourth causes of action should be dismissed without prejudice … .Landa v Poloncarz, 2022 NY Slip Op 04490, Fourth Dept 7-8-22

Practice Point: Here plaintiff twice adjourned the 50-h hearing and then did not respond to defendant’s attempt to schedule a third. Under those circumstances it was plaintiff’s responsibility to schedule a hearing. Failure to do so required dismissal of the relevant causes of action (without prejudice).

 

July 8, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-07-08 13:54:212022-07-10 14:14:58PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SCHEDULE A 50-H HEARING AFTER ADJOURNING IT TWICE REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS DEFAMATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY EXECUTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Rights Law, Defamation

THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW PROTECTED DEFENDANT AGAINST A DEFAMATION ACTION BY THE PLASTIC SURGEON ABOUT WHOM DEFENDANT POSTED NEGATIVE ONLINE REVIEWS; THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AND DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, in a matter of first impression, determined the Civil Rights Law anti-SLAPP statutes protected defendant’s negative online reviews of plaintiff Aristocrat Plastic Surgery and Dr. Kevin Tehrani. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint but did not award defendant attorney’s fees or damages because the anti-SLAPP statutes were deemed not to apply. The First Department held that the anti-SLAPP statutes applied and defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees and damages:

… [D]efendant posted her reviews on two public internet forums, one of which has a stated purpose of being a key advisor for people considering plastic surgery, and the purpose of defendant’s reviews was to provide information to potential patients, including reasons not to book an appointment with Dr. Tehrani. Defendant’s posts concerning the plastic surgery performed upon her by Dr. Tehrani qualify as an exercise of her constitutional right of free speech and a comment on a matter of legitimate public concern and public interest—namely, medical treatment rendered by a physician’s professional corporation and the physician performing surgery under its auspices … . We therefore find that defendant’s negative website reviews of plaintiffs’ services constitute a matter of “public interest” as set forth in Civil Rights Law § 76-a(1)(d).

Since defendant’s posts fall under the ambit of the amended anti-SLAPP law, defendant is entitled to seek damages and attorneys’ fees under Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a(1)(a)(1). Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, P.C. v Silva, 2022 NY Slip Op 03311, First Dept 5-19-22

Practice Point: The anti-SLAPP statutes in the Civil Rights Law protected defendant from a defamation action by the plastic surgeon about whom defendant posted negative online reviews. The doctor’s complaint was dismissed and defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees and damages. Business reviews are matters of public interest and concern.

 

May 19, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-19 19:59:202022-05-21 20:01:10THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW PROTECTED DEFENDANT AGAINST A DEFAMATION ACTION BY THE PLASTIC SURGEON ABOUT WHOM DEFENDANT POSTED NEGATIVE ONLINE REVIEWS; THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AND DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).
Defamation

EVEN CRIMINAL SLURS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE AS DEFAMATION IF THEY ARE PURE OPINION; HERE DEFENDANT’S TWEET ACCUSING PLAINTIFF OF MAKING “THREATS” WAS NOT ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined even communications which could be considered “criminal slurs” are not actionable as defamation if they are “pure opinion.” The defendant was a member of the NYC council representing Queens. When defendant opposed the construction of an Amazon corporate headquarters in Queens, plaintiff, a local restaurant owner, in text messages, indicated defendant’s career would be ended if defendant did not withdraw his opposition to the Amazon project: Defendant then put out a tweet accusing plaintiff of making “threats.” Plaintiff brought this defamation action based on that tweet.. Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and the Second Department reversed:

The defendant’s characterization of the plaintiff’s text as containing “several threats rolled into one” is not a statement which can be proved true or false but was, instead, an opinion … . Moreover, “there is simply no special rule of law making criminal slurs actionable regardless of whether they are asserted as opinion or fact” … . Instead, “accusations of criminality [can] be regarded as mere hypothesis and therefore not actionable if the facts on which they are based are fully and accurately set forth” … . Here, the defendant’s statement amounts to no more than “nonactionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole” … . Bowen v Van Bramer, 2022 NY Slip Op 02975, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: A tweet accusing plaintiff of making “threats” against defendant city council member (representing Queens) was not actionable as defamation. Plaintiff, a restaurant owner, had texted defendant saying that people would work to end defendant’s political career if he didn’t retract his opposition to Amazon’s building a corporate headquarters in Queens. Defendant then posted plaintiff’s comments in a tweet and accused plaintiff of making “threats.” Plaintiff sued for defamation based on that tweet. In dismissing the complaint, the Second Department noted that even “criminal slurs” are not actionable where, as here, they are “pure opinion.”

 

May 4, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-04 09:12:252022-05-10 09:14:08EVEN CRIMINAL SLURS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE AS DEFAMATION IF THEY ARE PURE OPINION; HERE DEFENDANT’S TWEET ACCUSING PLAINTIFF OF MAKING “THREATS” WAS NOT ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).
Defamation, Privilege

DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS TO THE UNITED STATES TENNIS ASSOCIATION (USTA) ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S BULLYING OF HER SON AT JUNIOR TOURNAMENTS WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE; ANY STATEMENTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN FALSE WERE NOT MOTIVATED BY MALICE; THE DEFAMATION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Zayas, determined that the defamation action should have been dismissed. Defendant’s son was a tennis player who participated in United State Tennis Association (USTA) junior tournaments. Defendant communicated with the USTA alleging that plaintiff, another tennis player, was bullying defendant’s son. The only statements attributed to defendant alleged to have been defamatory were allegations plaintiff had been “kicked out” of tennis programs because of his behavior. The Second Department held that the complaints about bullying were privileged and the statements alleged to have been defamatory were not demonstrated to have been made with malice:

… [T]he defendant established … that her email to [the USTA] was protected by a qualified privilege. The defendant unquestionably had an interest, as a parent, in complying with [USTA’s] request that she put her concerns in writing and thus reporting, in a more formal way, serious allegations of bullying—none of which, it bears emphasizing, were alleged to be defamatory—that, in her view, put her son’s physical and emotional well-being at risk … .* * *

[Re: malice:]The extensive submissions … make clear that no factfinder could reasonably conclude that the defendant was not motivated, at least in substantial part, by legitimate concerns for her son’s emotional well-being and physical safety. Porges v Weitz, 2022 NY Slip Op 01823, Second Dept 3-16-22

Practice Point: Defendant’s complaints to the United State Tennis Association about plaintiff’s bullying her son at junior tournaments were protected by qualified privilege. Any statements alleged to have been false were not motivated by malice. Therefore the defamation action should have been dismissed.

 

March 16, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-16 11:38:442022-03-19 12:07:34DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS TO THE UNITED STATES TENNIS ASSOCIATION (USTA) ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S BULLYING OF HER SON AT JUNIOR TOURNAMENTS WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE; ANY STATEMENTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN FALSE WERE NOT MOTIVATED BY MALICE; THE DEFAMATION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
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