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AT THE TIME DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE IN 2007, IT WAS NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEAL THE RECORD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DENIED; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the crime for which defendant was convicted, at the time of its commission in 2007, was not a registrable offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Therefore defendant’s motion to seal the record should not have been summarily denied. The matter was remitted for a hearing:

… [A]t the time of the defendant’s conviction for attempted promoting prostitution in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 230.25), the definition of “sex offense” in Correction Law § 168-a(2) did not include convictions of an attempt to commit Penal Law § 230.25 … . Further, the defendant has never been required to register under SORA for this conviction. Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the defendant has not been not convicted of “an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to article six-C of the correction law” (CPL 160.59[1][a] …). Thus, the Supreme Court should not have determined that the defendant’s conviction falls into the category of excluded offenses … . Likewise, although CPL 160.59(3)(a) provides that the reviewing court must summarily deny the defendant’s application when, inter alia, “the defendant is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to article six-C of the correction law,” here, the defendant is not required to do so.

As the defendant’s motion was not subject to mandatory denial under CPL 160.59(3) and the district attorney opposed the defendant’s motion, a hearing on the defendant’s motion was required … . People v Miranda, 2022 NY Slip Op 03009, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: If an offense is now a registrable offense pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act, but was not a registrable offense when committed (here in 2007), a defendant’s motion to seal the record cannot be summarily denied. The motion may still be denied after a hearing, however.

 

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THE CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE AN INMATE RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY (RTF) TO PROVIDE SEX OFFENDERS WHO ARE ABOUT TO BE RELEASED WITH REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS IN THE OUTSIDE COMMUNITY, AS OPPOSED TO WITHIN THE PRISON (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the “residential treatment facility” (RTF) within the Fishkill Correctional Facility complied with the Correction Law. Plaintiffs alleged Fishkill did not provide sufficient opportunities outside the prison facility for reintegrating inmates into the community. Supreme Court agreed. The Third Department held that the Correction Law does not indicate the programs for reintegrating inmates must be offered outside the facility:

A resident in an RTF “may be permitted to leave such facility in accordance with the provisions of [Correction Law § 73]” …. To that end, DOCCS “shall be responsible for securing appropriate education, on-the-job training and employment” for RTF residents (Correction Law § 73 [2]). Furthermore, “[p]rograms directed toward the rehabilitation and total reintegration into the community of persons transferred to a residential treatment facility shall be established” (Correction Law § 73 [3]). That said, nothing in Correction Law § 73 (2) or (3) states specifically where the opportunities provided in a rehabilitative program established by DOCCS or where the education, training or employment to be secured by DOCCS must be located. In other words, there is no statutory mandate providing that DOCCS’s obligations under Correction Law § 73 be outside the confines of Fishkill. Alcantara v Annucci, 2022 NY Slip Op 02163, Third Dept 3-31-22

 

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THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (DOCCS) DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE STATUTORY FACTORS SUPPORTING ITS DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR A CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING, WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE FORMER INMATE TO WORK AS A SCHOOL BUS DRIVER; THEREFORE THE DENIAL WAS ARBITRARY; MATTER REMITTED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s (DOCCS’s) denial of petitioner’s application for a certificate of good conduct (CGC) was not supported by the agency’s cursory rulings, rendering the denial arbitrary and requiring remittal for further proceedings. Petitioner, a former inmate with a sexual-offense conviction, sought the certificate of good standing in order to work as a school bus driver:

… [T]he challenged determination is a form letter with blanks to be filled in, and the Assistant Commissioner made no effort to explain his reasoning beyond checking a box next to a sentence stating that petitioner’s application was being denied because “[t]he relief to be granted by the [CGC] is inconsistent with public interest.” There is no question that such a “cursory letter decision,” which mentions only one of the statutory factors set forth in Correction Law § 703-b and offers no discussion of the “grounds for the denial[,] precludes meaningful review of the rationality of the decision” … .

… Correction Law article 23 requires more than a naked reliance on the crime of conviction, and the Assistant Commissioner’s affidavit … reflects that DOCCS “failed to comply with the statute and acted in an arbitrary manner” … . Although the record contains other information regarding the circumstances of petitioner’s conviction and his subsequent history that might render the denial of his application rational, a “court is powerless to sanction the determination by substituting what it deems a more appropriate or proper basis” … . Matter of Streety v Annucci, 2022 NY Slip Op 02170, Third Dept 3-31-22

​Practice Point: If an administrative agency issues a ruling which does adequately explain the statutory factors upon which the ruling is based, making a review of the bases of the ruling impossible, the ruling may be characterized as “arbitrary” and annulled.

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BECAUSE OF UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTORY LANGUAGE, DEFENDANT’S MICHIGAN CONVICTION WAS DEEMED A “SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE” EVEN THOUGH THE SAME CONDUCT IN NEW YORK WOULD NOT QUALIFY AS A “SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE;” STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the result, while admittedly unfair, is required by unambiguous statutory language. For predicate felony purposes, a Michigan conviction was deemed a “sexually violent offense,” even though the same conduct would not constitute a “sexually violent offense” if committed in New York:

A ” ‘[s]exually violent offender’ means a sex offender who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense” (Correction Law § 168-a [7] [b]). A ” ‘[s]exually violent offense,’ ” among other things, is “a conviction of an offense in any other jurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any [New York] felony [enumerated in section 168-a (3) (a)] or conviction of a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred” (§ 168-a [3] [b] [emphasis added]). It is undisputed that defendant was convicted of a felony in Michigan “for which [he] is required to register as a sex offender in [that] jurisdiction” (id.). Defendant’s Michigan conviction thus constitutes a ” ‘[s]exually violent offense’ ” as defined by the second of the two disjunctive clauses that comprise section 168-a (3) (b). It follows that defendant was properly designated a sexually violent offender, even though he would not qualify as such had he committed the same conduct in New York … . People v Talluto, 2022 NY Slip Op 00575, Fourth Dept 1-28-22

 

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CONVCTION OF ASSAULT FIRST DEGREE AS A SEXUALLY MOTIVATED OFFENSE DOES NOT REQUIRE REGISTRATION AS A SEX OFFENDER PURSUANT TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kern, reversing Supreme Court, agreeing with the Second Department in a matter of first impression, determined conviction of assault in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony does not require registration as a sexual offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA):

The main issue on appeal is whether defendant was properly certified and required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) based on his conviction of assault in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony. We find that the certification was improper and therefore vacate that part of the judgment. * * *

The question before us now is whether the definition of “sex offense” under Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a) includes all the sexually motivated felony offenses listed in Penal Law § 130.91 or only those sexually motivated felony offenses that are based on offenses listed in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Correction Law §168-a(2)(a). Based on the clear and unambiguous text of Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a), we find that the only sexually motivated felony offenses that are included in the definition of “sex offense,” and therefore registerable under SORA, are those based on offenses listed in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of that provision. …

We find that, based on the clear and unambiguous text of Correction Law § 168-a (2)(a), first-degree assault as a sexually motivated felony is not a registerable offense under SORA because first-degree assault is not one of the enumerated offenses in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of that provision. People v Simmons, 2022 NY Slip Op 00284, First Dept 1-18-22

 

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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO CERTIFICATION AS A SEX OFFENDER WAS FIRST RAISED IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE ILLEGAL SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE SORA CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF THE SENTENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, determined the challenge to the legality of defendant’s certification as a sex offender, first raised on appeal to the Appellate Division, was not preserved and the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement did not apply:

Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to … burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony … . … [T]he court … advised defendant that he would have to register pursuant to SORA upon his release from prison. * * *

On appeal to the Appellate Division, defendant argued for the first time that his certification as a sex offender was unlawful because his crime of conviction is not an enumerated registerable sex offense under Correction Law § 168-a (2) (a). * * *

The Appellate Division agreed with defendant that under the “clear and unambiguous” language of Correction Law § 168-a (2) (a) “burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony is not a registerable sex offense under SORA” … . * * *

“We have recognized ‘a narrow exception to the preservation rule’ where a court exceeds its powers and imposes a sentence that is illegal in a respect that is readily discernible from the trial record” … . However, “not all claims arising during a sentencing proceeding fall within the exception” … . * * *

… [S]ex offender certification is effectuated by the court pursuant to Correction Law § 168-d and is not addressed in either the Criminal Procedure Law or Title E of the Penal Law. … SORA certification is not part of a sentence and the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement does not apply to challenges to certification as a sex offender. People v Buyund, 2021 NY Slip Op 06529, CtApp 11-23-21

 

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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE CORRECTION LAW BY ALLEGING HIS APPLICATION FOR REEMPLOYMENT AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE (60 DAYS INCARCERATION) WAS DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a concurring opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action for discrimination under the Correction Law, which prohibits discrimination based upon criminal convictions in the context of applications for employment. Plaintiff had kept his employer informed of a criminal charge against him which had not yet gone to trial and was told he would not lose his job if he was sentenced to incarceration. Plaintiff was sentenced to 60 days and his employment was terminated:

The statutes do not categorically preclude consideration of a prospective employee’s criminal history and expressly permit the denial of employment or licensing if there is (1) a “direct relationship” between the previous criminal offense and the specific employment or license, or (2) if granting the request for employment or a license “would involve an unreasonable risk” to the property, safety, or welfare “of specific individuals or the general public” (Correction Law § 752). Thus, under the statutory scheme, reliance on a previous criminal offense when denying an application for employment or a license is not necessarily unlawful … . Whether an exception applies depends on factors identified in Correction Law § 753 such as, among other things, the relationship between the specific employment duties and the criminal offense as well as the amount of time that has elapsed since the offense occurred … . Under these provisions, when filling positions, public and private employers must treat job applicants with prior convictions equitably “while also protecting society’s interest in assuring performance [of job duties] by reliable and trustworthy persons” … . * * *

… [P]laintiff alleged that he was terminated for job abandonment soon after he was incarcerated. Applying our liberal standard, the complaint … may be read to allege that, after he completed his sentence, he applied for reemployment … and [defendant] denied the application solely because of the prior conviction. Sassi v Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 05449, CtApp 10-12-21

 

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THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICYHOLDERS (DOCTORS), NOT THE POLICYHOLDERS’ EMPLOYER WHICH PAID THE PREMIUMS, ARE ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONVERSION OF THE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY TO A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged decision by Justice Scheinkman, reversing Supreme Court, determined the policyholders (doctors), not the policyholders’ employer which paid the professional liability insurance premiums, were entitled the payments associated with the conversion of a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company. The Second Department further held that the doctors were not unjustly enriched from the standpoint of their employer because the payments to the doctors were not being made by the employer:

We agree with the Third and Fourth Departments that Insurance Law § 7307 makes clear that the policyholder is entitled to the consideration … . Thus, the defendants [doctors] are “legally entitled to receive the cash consideration” … .

In reaching this conclusion, we also note that the First Department … did not express any contrary views as to the import of the statute, the conversion plan, and the DFS [New York Department of Financial Services] approval decision. Rather, the First Department’s determination to award the cash consideration to the employer medical group was predicated entirely upon the theory of unjust enrichment … . Maple Med., LLP v Scott, 2020 NY Slip Op 07366, Second Dept 12-9-20

 

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SEX OFFENDERS SUBJECT TO POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION MAY BE HOUSED IN A RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY BEYOND THE SIX-MONTH STATUTORY PERIOD BEFORE COMPLIANT HOUSING HAS BEEN FOUND (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a three-judge dissent, determined that sex offenders under a period of postrelease supervision (PRS) maybe housed in a residential treatment facility (RTF) after the statutory six-month period has expired and before compliant housing has been found:

This appeal presents us with a question of statutory interpretation. Penal Law § 70.45 (3) provides that, “notwithstanding any other provision of law, the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from the underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of a residential treatment facility (RTF).” Correction Law § 73 (10), in turn, authorizes the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) “to use any [RTF] as a residence for persons who are on community supervision,” which includes those on PRS (see Correction Law § 2 [31]). The question before us is whether Correction Law § 73 (10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) (see Executive Law § 259—c [14]) after the six-month period specified in Penal Law § 70.45 (3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. We conclude that it does. People ex rel. McCurdy v Warden, Westchester County Corr. Facility, 2020 NY Slip Op 06933, Ct App 11-23-20

 

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ORDER ADJUDICATING DEFENDANT A LEVEL TWO SEX OFFENDER WAS DEFECTIVE; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the order adjudicating defendant a level two sex offender was defective:

County Court failed to comply with Correction Law § 168-n (3), pursuant to which the court was required to set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which it based its determination. The standardized form order—which the court merely read into the record when rendering its oral decision—indicated without elaboration that the court was entirely adopting the case summary and risk assessment instrument prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, listed the risk factor point assessments contained therein, and denied in conclusory fashion defendant’s request for a downward departure. That was inadequate to fulfill the statutory mandate … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for compliance with Correction Law § 168-n (3). People v Gatling, 2020 NY Slip Op 06921, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

 

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