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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO CERTIFICATION AS A SEX OFFENDER WAS FIRST RAISED IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE ILLEGAL SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE SORA CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF THE SENTENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, determined the challenge to the legality of defendant’s certification as a sex offender, first raised on appeal to the Appellate Division, was not preserved and the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement did not apply:

Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to … burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony … . … [T]he court … advised defendant that he would have to register pursuant to SORA upon his release from prison. * * *

On appeal to the Appellate Division, defendant argued for the first time that his certification as a sex offender was unlawful because his crime of conviction is not an enumerated registerable sex offense under Correction Law § 168-a (2) (a). * * *

The Appellate Division agreed with defendant that under the “clear and unambiguous” language of Correction Law § 168-a (2) (a) “burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony is not a registerable sex offense under SORA” … . * * *

“We have recognized ‘a narrow exception to the preservation rule’ where a court exceeds its powers and imposes a sentence that is illegal in a respect that is readily discernible from the trial record” … . However, “not all claims arising during a sentencing proceeding fall within the exception” … . * * *

… [S]ex offender certification is effectuated by the court pursuant to Correction Law § 168-d and is not addressed in either the Criminal Procedure Law or Title E of the Penal Law. … SORA certification is not part of a sentence and the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement does not apply to challenges to certification as a sex offender. People v Buyund, 2021 NY Slip Op 06529, CtApp 11-23-21

 

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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE CORRECTION LAW BY ALLEGING HIS APPLICATION FOR REEMPLOYMENT AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE (60 DAYS INCARCERATION) WAS DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a concurring opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action for discrimination under the Correction Law, which prohibits discrimination based upon criminal convictions in the context of applications for employment. Plaintiff had kept his employer informed of a criminal charge against him which had not yet gone to trial and was told he would not lose his job if he was sentenced to incarceration. Plaintiff was sentenced to 60 days and his employment was terminated:

The statutes do not categorically preclude consideration of a prospective employee’s criminal history and expressly permit the denial of employment or licensing if there is (1) a “direct relationship” between the previous criminal offense and the specific employment or license, or (2) if granting the request for employment or a license “would involve an unreasonable risk” to the property, safety, or welfare “of specific individuals or the general public” (Correction Law § 752). Thus, under the statutory scheme, reliance on a previous criminal offense when denying an application for employment or a license is not necessarily unlawful … . Whether an exception applies depends on factors identified in Correction Law § 753 such as, among other things, the relationship between the specific employment duties and the criminal offense as well as the amount of time that has elapsed since the offense occurred … . Under these provisions, when filling positions, public and private employers must treat job applicants with prior convictions equitably “while also protecting society’s interest in assuring performance [of job duties] by reliable and trustworthy persons” … . * * *

… [P]laintiff alleged that he was terminated for job abandonment soon after he was incarcerated. Applying our liberal standard, the complaint … may be read to allege that, after he completed his sentence, he applied for reemployment … and [defendant] denied the application solely because of the prior conviction. Sassi v Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 05449, CtApp 10-12-21

 

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THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICYHOLDERS (DOCTORS), NOT THE POLICYHOLDERS’ EMPLOYER WHICH PAID THE PREMIUMS, ARE ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONVERSION OF THE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY TO A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged decision by Justice Scheinkman, reversing Supreme Court, determined the policyholders (doctors), not the policyholders’ employer which paid the professional liability insurance premiums, were entitled the payments associated with the conversion of a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company. The Second Department further held that the doctors were not unjustly enriched from the standpoint of their employer because the payments to the doctors were not being made by the employer:

We agree with the Third and Fourth Departments that Insurance Law § 7307 makes clear that the policyholder is entitled to the consideration … . Thus, the defendants [doctors] are “legally entitled to receive the cash consideration” … .

In reaching this conclusion, we also note that the First Department … did not express any contrary views as to the import of the statute, the conversion plan, and the DFS [New York Department of Financial Services] approval decision. Rather, the First Department’s determination to award the cash consideration to the employer medical group was predicated entirely upon the theory of unjust enrichment … . Maple Med., LLP v Scott, 2020 NY Slip Op 07366, Second Dept 12-9-20

 

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SEX OFFENDERS SUBJECT TO POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION MAY BE HOUSED IN A RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY BEYOND THE SIX-MONTH STATUTORY PERIOD BEFORE COMPLIANT HOUSING HAS BEEN FOUND (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a three-judge dissent, determined that sex offenders under a period of postrelease supervision (PRS) maybe housed in a residential treatment facility (RTF) after the statutory six-month period has expired and before compliant housing has been found:

This appeal presents us with a question of statutory interpretation. Penal Law § 70.45 (3) provides that, “notwithstanding any other provision of law, the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from the underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of a residential treatment facility (RTF).” Correction Law § 73 (10), in turn, authorizes the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) “to use any [RTF] as a residence for persons who are on community supervision,” which includes those on PRS (see Correction Law § 2 [31]). The question before us is whether Correction Law § 73 (10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) (see Executive Law § 259—c [14]) after the six-month period specified in Penal Law § 70.45 (3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. We conclude that it does. People ex rel. McCurdy v Warden, Westchester County Corr. Facility, 2020 NY Slip Op 06933, Ct App 11-23-20

 

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ORDER ADJUDICATING DEFENDANT A LEVEL TWO SEX OFFENDER WAS DEFECTIVE; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the order adjudicating defendant a level two sex offender was defective:

County Court failed to comply with Correction Law § 168-n (3), pursuant to which the court was required to set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which it based its determination. The standardized form order—which the court merely read into the record when rendering its oral decision—indicated without elaboration that the court was entirely adopting the case summary and risk assessment instrument prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, listed the risk factor point assessments contained therein, and denied in conclusory fashion defendant’s request for a downward departure. That was inadequate to fulfill the statutory mandate … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for compliance with Correction Law § 168-n (3). People v Gatling, 2020 NY Slip Op 06921, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

 

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A CORRECTION LAW PROVISION INSULATED THE PETITIONER-INMATE FROM DISCIPLINE FOR SENDING A LETTER REQUESTING AN INSTITUTIONAL POLICY CHANGE REGARDING VENDORS WHICH SUPPLY PACKAGES TO PRISONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner-inmate should not have been disciplined for a letter to vendors which supply packages to prisons. Petitioner was opposed to a pilot program awarding eight vendors the exclusive right to supply packages to prisons. Petitioner sent a letter urging excluded vendors to “fight back” and was disciplined under a provision of the Institutional Rules of Conduct which prohibits inmates from soliciting goods or services from businesses. The Second Department held that the letter was subject a Correction Law provision which prohibits discipline for requests for policy changes:

… [B]ecause the letter did not solicit goods or services from any business, the record does not support the hearing officer’s determination that rule 103.20 (7 NYCRR 270.2[B][4][ii]) was violated. Moreover, even if construed to violate the rule, the petitioner’s conduct was insulated from discipline by Correction Law § 138, which provides that “[i]nmates shall not be disciplined for making written . . . requests involving a change of institutional conditions, policies, rules, regulations, or laws affecting an institution” (Correction Law § 138[4]). The petitioner’s December 15, 2017, letter was a “request[ ] involving a change of institutional . . . policies” (id. ) in that he invited certain organizations adversely affected by the DOCCS’s [NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s] new policy to undertake action in opposition to that new policy. The respondents thus disciplined the petitioner in contravention of Correction Law § 138(4). Matter of Miller v Annucci, 2020 NY Slip Op 04167, Second Dept 7-22-20

 

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PLEA ALLOCUTION NEGATED AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED VIOLATION OF THE CORRECTION LAW, THE ISSUE SURVIVES THE FAILURE TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA AND THE WAIVER OF APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction for a violation of the Correction Law, determined that the plea allocution negated an essential element of the offense. Because the voluntariness of the plea was called into question the issue survived the failure to move to withdraw the plea and the waiver of appeal:

A sex offender is required to register with the Division “no later than ten calendar days after any change of address” and to pay a fee of ten dollars “each time such offender registers any change of address” (Correction Law § 168-f[4]). A sex offender who fails to so register within the required time period is guilty of a felony (seeCorrection Law § 168-t).

As the defendant contends, his factual allocution during the plea proceeding negated an essential element of the offense charged, thereby casting significant doubt upon his guilt. Specifically, the defendant indicated that he provided the Division with the address of a homeless shelter that he was using, although he acknowledged that there were some nights when he could not stay in the shelter. He explained “sometimes if you don’t get there in time all the beds are taken, so sometimes you get turned away.” On those days, the defendant asserted, he stayed at a friend’s house instead. These statements tended to demonstrate that the defendant did not, in fact, change his address and thus, was not required to notify the Division … . People v Wright, 2019 NY Slip Op 05428, Second Dept 7-3-19

 

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VIRGINIA MURDER CONVICTION WHICH REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER IN VIRGINIA DID NOT QUALIFY DEFENDANT AS A SEX OFFENDER IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should not have been adjudicated a sex offender in New York based upon a murder conviction in Virginia, where he was required to register as a sex offender under Virginia law. The defendant was convicted of murdering a three year old child who had suffered trauma to his genitalia:

The defendant subsequently relocated to New York in November 2017. Following a hearing pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C, the Supreme Court adjudicated the defendant a level three sex offender. Insofar as relevant to this appeal, the court determined that the defendant’s mandatory registration under Virginia law made him a “sex offender” under Correction Law § 168-a(2)(d)(ii). The defendant appeals.

The victim’s extensive injuries in this case included “significant traumatic injuries to [his] scrotum and penis,” which were described at trial by the prosecution’s expert medical witness as having been inflicted “within hours to one day from the time of [the infant’s] death” and were “caused by blunt force trauma, probably squeezing” … . Nevertheless, as the People correctly concede, the order appealed from must be reversed in light of the Court of Appeals’ recent opinion in People v Diaz (32 NY3d 538), which held that mandatory registration as a murderer under Virginia Code § 9.1-902(D) does not qualify the defendant as a “sex offender” within the meaning of Correction Law § 168-a(2)(d)(ii). People v Covington, 2019 NY Slip Op 05429, Second Dept 7-3-19

 

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A FACEBOOK ACCOUNT IS NOT AN ‘INTERNET IDENTIFIER’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CORRECTION LAW, THEREFORE DEFENDANT SEX OFFENDER’S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IT TO THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES IS NOT A CRIME (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, affirming the Appellate Division, determined defendant, a sex offender, did not violate the Correction Law by failing to disclose his Facebook account. The Facebook account was not an “internet identifier” which must be disclosed under the Correction Law:

… [T]he Appellate Division correctly concluded that Facebook is not an “internet identifier,” and that the existence of a Facebook account—as opposed to the internet identifiers a sex offender may use to access Facebook or interact with other users on Facebook—need not be disclosed to DCJS [Division of Criminal Justice Services] pursuant to Correction Law § 168-f (4). As the People concede, this was the legal theory upon which the indictment was based. The indictment therefore accuses defendant of performing acts that “simply do not constitute a crime” and is jurisdictionally defective … . People v Ellis, 2019 NY Slip Op 05183, CtApp 6-27-19

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER IN VIRGINIA, THERE WAS NO SEX-RELATED ELEMENT IN THE VIRGINIA OFFENSE, DEFENDANT NEED NOT REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER IN NEW YORK (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined that defendant need not register as a sex offender in New York based upon a murder conviction in Virginia, even though Virginia law required such registration. There was no sex-related element in the offense. Defendant, in 1989, at age 19, murdered his half-sister because she was harassing him. At the time, he said he was “hearing voices telling him to kill people:”

Blind deference to another jurisdiction’s registry without asking, fundamentally, whether that jurisdiction considers its own registrant a sex offender would contravene the plain and limiting language of section 168-a (2) (d) (ii) and could subject an entire class of defendants with no relation to SORA’s purpose to its strict requirements. * * *

In concluding that SORA does not require defendant’s registration because Virginia does not consider defendant a sex offender, we reserve weightier issues of a foreign registry’s potential conflict with New York’s due process guarantees or public policy for another day. …

… Our holding today merely requires a court or the Board to determine—not based on “intuition,” but rather on the offense of conviction and its relation to the foreign registry statute—whether the out-of-state defendant is considered a sex offender before requiring registration under SORA. …

Defendant’s out-of-state felony conviction did not require him to “register as a sex offender” in Virginia under Correction Law § 168-a (2) (d) (ii) and, thus, he should not be required to register as a sex offender in New York. People v Diaz, 2018 NY Slip Op 08424, CtApp 12-11-18

 

 

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