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Appeals, Civil Procedure, Family Law, Judges

SUA SPONTE DISPOSITIONAL ORDERS ISSUED BY FAMILY COURT ARE APPEALABLE; THE FAMILY COURT ACT, NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS (THIRD DEPT)

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined a sua sponte dismissal of a petition in Family Court is appealable:

… [T]he sua sponte dismissal of the petition is appealable. Pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1112 (a), “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from any order of disposition under the Family Ct Act, which includes an order issued sua sponte that dismisses a petition in its entirety” … . To the extent that this Court’s prior cases, specifically Matter of Casey Q. v Jeffrey O. (244 AD3d at 1521) and Matter of Donald QQ. v Stephanie RR. (198 AD3d 1155, 1156 n 1 [3d Dept 2021]), can be read as holding that an ex parte or sua sponte Family Court dispositional order is not appealable as of right, they should not be followed. Indeed, the decisive issue when determining whether a Family Court order is appealable as of right is whether the order is dispositional (see Family Ct Act § 1112 [a]). Moreover, because Family Ct Act § 1112 (a) specifically addresses appealability of Family Court orders, it is improper to resort to CPLR provisions addressing appealability by way of Family Ct Act §§ 165 and/or 1118 … .. Matter of Jeffrey O. v Casey Q., 2026 NY Slip Op 06363, Second Dept 10-29-26

Practice Point: Dispositional orders issued by Family Court are appealable; the Family Court Act, not the CPLR controls.

 

October 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-29 20:01:272026-11-09 19:59:17SUA SPONTE DISPOSITIONAL ORDERS ISSUED BY FAMILY COURT ARE APPEALABLE; THE FAMILY COURT ACT, NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS (THIRD DEPT)
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

HERE IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PRECLUDE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS ABOUT HER DRUG USE AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge should not have precluded cross-examination of the complaining witness about drug use and psychiatric condition:

​In general, evidence of a witness’s substance abuse “is admissible to impeach [the] witness’ credibility if tending to show that [the witness] was under the influence of drugs while testifying, or at the time of the events to which [the witness] testified, or that [the witness’s] powers of perception or recollection, were actually impaired by the habit” … . Under the circumstances of this case, where the People disclosed that the complaining witness was in drug treatment at the time of her testimony and may have been using drugs when she first made allegations against the defendant, the County Court should not have precluded cross-examination as to the complaining witness’s drug use … .

Further, “[w]here a primary prosecution witness is shown to suffer from a psychiatric condition, the defense is entitled to show that the witness’s capacity to perceive and recall events was impaired by that condition” … . Here, the County Court should not have, in effect, granted the People’s application to preclude cross-examination of the complaining witness with respect to her mental health diagnosis, particularly since the People’s case primarily rested upon the complaining witness’s testimony … .People v Romero-Lopez, 2026 NY Slip Op 06331, Second Dept 10-28-26

​Practice Point: If there is evidence the complaining witness was using drugs at the time the allegations were made, it is reversible error to preclude cross-examination about drug use.

Practice Point: If the People disclose the complaining witness has a psychiatric condition, it is reversible error to preclude cross-examination about the condition.

 

October 28, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-28 14:40:032026-11-05 14:58:11HERE IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PRECLUDE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS ABOUT HER DRUG USE AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Judges, Mental Hygiene Law

THE DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING TO DISSOLVE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF HER PERSON (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, considering matters of first impression, determined the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in a proceeding to dissolve the guardianship of her person:

The right of an individual to select counsel “implicates both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public interest” … .

Contrary to the determination of the Surrogate’s Court, the record demonstrates that, under the circumstances present here, the petitioner freely and independently retained counsel of her own choosing. At the hearing, the petitioner articulated her purpose in retaining counsel and demonstrated an understanding of the nature and consequences of having counsel. The record shows, inter alia, that the petitioner had contacted more than one legal organization and spoke personally to the attorney whom she retained, and continued to communicate and work with that attorney. During the court’s inquiry, the petitioner was able to articulate a clear understanding of the purpose and goals of the proceeding and why counsel was sought to be retained. Matter of Jessica L.M. (Deborah M.), 2026 NY Slip Op 06306, Second Dept 10-28-26

Practice Point: Here the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in this dissolution-of-guardianship proceeding.

 

October 28, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-28 14:24:022026-11-05 14:39:24THE DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING TO DISSOLVE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF HER PERSON (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

WHERE AN ENDANGERING-THE-WELFARE-OF-A-CHILD CHARGE IS BASED UPON THE USE OF FORCE, THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IS AVAILABLE IF SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, with a concurring opinion, determined the defendant was entitled to the justification jury instruction in this endangering-the -welfare-of-a-child prosecution:

The relevant statutory text and our precedent confirm that a justification instruction pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 may be available for a charge of endangering the welfare of a child that is premised on the use of force. We also conclude that there is a reasonable view of the evidence here in support of the defense, and the refusal to charge the justification defense was not harmless. * * *

… [T]he defendant shared a home with his girlfriend, J.L., and her fifteen-year-old son, R.T. During a night out, the defendant and J.L. argued and returned home. Each went back out to a bar, and they eventually returned home again, still quarreling. A physical altercation between the defendant and R.T. ensued, leaving R.T. on the floor, seemingly unconscious. * * *

Article 35 instructs that, “[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense” … . And the self-defense justification defense, set forth in section 35.15, includes no limiting or qualifying language regarding the availability of the defense. We thus see no basis in Article 35’s broad language for denying a section 35.15 justification defense in a prosecution involving a charge of endangering the welfare of a child. * * *

When a prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child is based on the use of force, a charge of justification pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 is available if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support it. To the extent that [Varela (164 AD2d 924), and Williams (102 AD3d 566)] are inconsistent with that holding, they should not be followed. People v Mears, 2026 NY Slip Op 06237, CtApp 10-27-26

 

October 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-27 21:50:252026-11-06 23:04:29WHERE AN ENDANGERING-THE-WELFARE-OF-A-CHILD CHARGE IS BASED UPON THE USE OF FORCE, THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IS AVAILABLE IF SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Judges

THE JUDGE RESPONDED TO A NOTE FROM ONE OF THE JURORS WHO EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH ANOTHER JUROR; THE JUDGE SPOKE TO HER ALONE AND APPARENTLY REVIEWED THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD GIVEN THE JURY ABOUT MEANINGFUL AND GOOD FAITH DELIBERATIONS; THAT WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, on writ of error coram nobis alleging ineffective appellate counsel, determined the trial judge committed a mode of proceedings error by instructing a single juror in the absence of the remaining jurors:​

On the fifth day of deliberations, the trial judge placed on the record that he had received a note from one of the jurors asking to speak with him and that, “with the consent of the attorneys,” he engaged in an off-the-record discussion with the juror in his chambers. Although the discussion was not transcribed, the trial judge explained that the juror had vented her frustration about the manner in which another juror was deliberating with her, revealing that “she was taking her role as a juror seriously” and that she was “being confronted” by another juror “when she voiced an opinion on issues” and “ask[ed] specific questions.” In response, the trial judge informed the juror that she “ha[d] a right to ask questions, and [the other jurors] ha[d] an obligation to deliberate with her and to respond to her in a civil manner.” The trial judge further revealed that, during the discussion with this juror, he “substantially reviewed with her the instructions that [he had given] to all the jurors regarding the requirement of meaningful and in-good-faith deliberations.” After the trial judge placed such exchange on the record, defendant’s counsel revealed that he was contemplating requesting that the court charge the entire jury on civility. However, he ultimately declined to do so.

… [W]e disagree with the People’s assertion that County Court’s off-the-record discussion with the juror was ministerial in nature. Although the juror’s note was ambiguous and the discussion in chambers was not transcribed — making it impossible to know the precise nature of the conversation — County Court revealed that it had “substantially reviewed” with the juror the instructions it had previously provided to the entire jury panel regarding meaningful and good faith deliberations. As noted by the Court of Appeals, ” ‘there are few moments in a criminal trial more critical to its outcome than when the court responds to a deliberating jury’s request for clarification of the law or further guidance on the process of deliberations'” … . Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that the court’s conversation with the juror — which included providing a substantive instruction on the jurors’ obligations during the deliberative process — was not ministerial in nature, violated defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial and constituted a mode of proceedings error … . People v Anderson, 2026 NY Slip Op 06169, Third Dept 1-22-26

Practice Point: Here the judge’s meeting with a juror alone and reviewing some of the jury instructions outside the presence of the other jurors was deemed a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal.​

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 16:40:462026-10-30 17:54:23THE JUDGE RESPONDED TO A NOTE FROM ONE OF THE JURORS WHO EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH ANOTHER JUROR; THE JUDGE SPOKE TO HER ALONE AND APPARENTLY REVIEWED THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD GIVEN THE JURY ABOUT MEANINGFUL AND GOOD FAITH DELIBERATIONS; THAT WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).
Judges, Negligence, Products Liability

HERE THE JURY WAS PRESENTED WITH SEPARATE INTERROGATORIES FOR “STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY” AND “NEGLIGENT DESIGN” RESULTING IN AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT; THE JURY FOUND THE DESIGN DEFECTIVE AND NOT REASONABLY SAFE BUT ALSO FOUND THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN SELECTING THE DESIGN; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial, determined the jury interrogatories in this products liability case led to an inconsistent verdict. Based on the interrogatories, the jury found the product (an automobile air bag system) was negligently designed and not safe but further found defendant (BMW) was not negligent in selecting that design:

… BMW contends that the verdict sheet is internally inconsistent and fatally flawed because it failed to combine plaintiff’s three causes of action into a single set of interrogatories, despite each cause of action being legally synonymous with the others. We find this contention to have merit. Under CPLR 4111 (c), “when the answers on a verdict sheet ‘are inconsistent with each other and one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall require the jury to further consider its answers and verdict or it shall order a new trial’ ” … . An inconsistency occurs “only when a verdict on one claim necessarily negates an element of another cause of action” … . Where, like here, a plaintiff “has pleaded both strict liability and negligent design causes of action, the standards set forth” for resolving a strict products liability claim “apply to both” … — and a verdict sheet which purports to inquire separately into whether a design was “negligent” or “not reasonably safe” is essentially “redundant” … . …

Here, plaintiff’s strict products liability and negligent design claims were both premised upon BMW’s use of an untethered, deflector-equipped driver-side airbag rather than a tethered design, and the same evidence concerning the risks and utility of that design and the feasibility of the proposed alternative was offered to support both theories. BMW objected to separate interrogatories, warning that they could produce inconsistent findings, and proposed a single interrogatory asking whether the airbag was “defectively or negligently designed.” Plaintiff opposed that request, expressly stating that he was “willing to accept the risk of an inconsistent verdict.” Supreme Court submitted the claims separately, resulting in a jury verdict finding that the airbag was defectively designed because it was not reasonably safe, but that BMW was not negligent in selecting that same design. Janof v Auto Warehouse, 2026 NY Slip Op 06189, Third Dept 10-22-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the overlap between strict products liability and negligent design theories and how separate jury interrogatories for each can result in an inconsistent verdict requiring a new trial.

​

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 08:35:512026-10-31 09:05:44HERE THE JURY WAS PRESENTED WITH SEPARATE INTERROGATORIES FOR “STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY” AND “NEGLIGENT DESIGN” RESULTING IN AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT; THE JURY FOUND THE DESIGN DEFECTIVE AND NOT REASONABLY SAFE BUT ALSO FOUND THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN SELECTING THE DESIGN; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Judges

THE JUDGE ENGAGED IN EXCESSIVE AND PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONING OF TRIAL WITNESSES DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; THE “ERROR” WAS NOT PRESERVED; THE COURT EXERCISED ITS “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE AND REVERSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the judgments of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge engaged in excessive and prejudicial questioning of witness depriving defendant of a fair trial. The “error” was not preserved but the Second Department exercised their interest of justice jurisdiction:

… [T]here must be a new trial, before a different Justice, because the Supreme Court conducted excessive and prejudicial questioning of trial witnesses. Here, the court interjected itself into the questioning of multiple witnesses and generally created the impression that it was an advocate for the People … . Although the defendant failed to preserve his claim that he was deprived of a fair trial because the court interfered with the questioning of witnesses (see CPL 470.05[2]), based on the circumstances of this case, we reach this contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction … . People v Chimborazo, 2026 NY Slip Op 06132, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: Appellate courts will reverse a conviction if the judge intervenes too much with prejudicial questioning of witnesses, even where the issue is not preserved.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 22:10:232026-10-29 22:12:19THE JUDGE ENGAGED IN EXCESSIVE AND PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONING OF TRIAL WITNESSES DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; THE “ERROR” WAS NOT PRESERVED; THE COURT EXERCISED ITS “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE AND REVERSE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Judges

DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SERVE A LATE ANSWER WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; THE DELAY WAS SHORT (18 DAYS), CREATED NO PREJUDICE, AND THE LAW OFFICE FAILURE WAS REASONABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s (Husain’s) motion to serve a late answer should have been granted:

The 18-day delay in answering the complaint was relatively short and plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the delay; indeed, Husain has already been deposed by the wife’s counsel … . In addition, the law office failure that occasioned the delay was reasonable, and there is no evidence that it was due to willfulness. Husain’s counsel explained that he inadvertently missed the deadline for answering the amended complaint because of work obligations related to this action — namely, preparing for and participating in an April 10, 2025 arbitration hearing concerning related claims, as well as preparing for a June 2025 trial in this action — and because of a break for a religious holiday … . Given the surrounding circumstances, Supreme Court should have granted the motion, especially in light of the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits … .Dalessandro v Dalessandro, 2026 NY Slip Op 06000, First Dept 10-15-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the factors a court should consider when ruling on a motion to serve a late answer.

 

October 15, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-15 14:12:582026-10-21 14:26:49DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SERVE A LATE ANSWER WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; THE DELAY WAS SHORT (18 DAYS), CREATED NO PREJUDICE, AND THE LAW OFFICE FAILURE WAS REASONABLE (FIRST DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

ONE PROSPECTIVE JUROR TESTIFIED THE DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE WITH HER; THE JUDGE GRANTED THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ENTIRE JURY PANEL; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FIRST QUESTION THE REMAINING JURORS ON THE PANEL ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL BEFORE DISMISSING THEM, THE JUDGE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PARTICULAR JURY CHOSEN ACCORDING TO LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge should not have dismissed the entire jury panel without conducting an inquiry. One prospective juror on the panel alleged the defendant tried to communicate with her. The People moved to dismiss the panel which the judge granted without questioning the remaining jurors about their ability to be fair and impartial:

“A defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law, in whose selection [the defendant] has had a voice” … . Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law article 270, the first 12 members of the jury panel who are not excluded as prescribed by the statute constitute the trial jury … . Where a jury panel is “properly drawn and sworn to answer questions truthfully, there must be legal cause or a peremptory challenge to exclude a [prospective] juror” ( … see CPLR 270.15 … ). “A defendant ‘is . . . entitled to insist that the jury shall be selected according to methods established with a view to secure a just and impartial administration of the jury system . . . The court cannot arbitrarily, and without cause, set aside a competent juror. Neither the court nor the parties can select the jury, except in the way pointed out by the statute'” … . * * *

By dismissing the entire jury panel without questioning the ability of the individual prospective jurors to be fair and impartial …, the court deprived defendant of a jury chosen “at random from a fair cross-section of the community” … . People v Gaston, 2026 NY Slip Op 05971, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: A judge cannot arbitrarily and without cause dismiss a competent juror. Here the judge dismissed an entire panel of prospective jurors because one prospective juror alleged the defendant tried to communicate with her. In that situation, the judge should have questioned the remaining prospective jurors about their ability to be fair and impartial to determine if there was cause for dismissal.​

 

October 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-14 17:35:412026-10-23 21:56:45ONE PROSPECTIVE JUROR TESTIFIED THE DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE WITH HER; THE JUDGE GRANTED THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ENTIRE JURY PANEL; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FIRST QUESTION THE REMAINING JURORS ON THE PANEL ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL BEFORE DISMISSING THEM, THE JUDGE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PARTICULAR JURY CHOSEN ACCORDING TO LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE PROSECUTOR’S REASON FOR STRIKING A JUROR, I.E., THAT THE JUROR “SPOKE BROKEN ENGLISH;” DEFENDANT’S BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE STRIKING OF THE JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the defendant’s “Batson” challenge to the striking of a juror (juror No. 95] should have been granted. The record indicates the prosecutor’s reason for striking the juror, i.e., the juror’s “broken English,” was pretextual:

Evaluating the record … becomes problematic in instances where, like here, the nature of the race-neutral explanation given by a prosecutor pertains to a trait — i.e., speech and the ability to communicate — which is not easily captured by the record. Indeed, traits such as accent, dialect, tone, cadence, fluency or manner of speech are not typically represented on a transcript, but nonetheless remain part of the overall calculus as to whether an individual is perceived by others as being able to communicate effectively. This is why it is essential for trial courts, which are in a “unique position to verify . . . [what] is not clearly established in the appellate record” … , to create meaningful records for a reviewing court to uphold its determinations … .

Consequently, we are constrained to agree with defendant that County Court erred in denying his Batson challenge at step three. …[T]he record reflects that neither County Court nor defense counsel indicated any trouble understanding juror No. 95. Rather, County Court and defense counsel expressly disagreed with that characterization during voir dire … . Thus, there is nothing in the record to otherwise suggest that juror No. 95 had difficulty understanding or answering the limited questions posed by County Court, and the trial prosecutor did not ask any questions of this juror. In view of the sparseness of the record at trial and on remittal, as well as the comments and conduct of the trial prosecutor, a determination at step three that juror No. 95 did have difficulty communicating would, at best, be speculative … . Accordingly, since County Court’s determination was unsupported by the voir dire transcript, not based on its recalled observations or the assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility, and is otherwise without a basis in the record, we must reverse and remit the matter for a new trial … . People v Duplessis, 2026 NY Slip Op 05830, Third Dept 10-8-26

​Practice Point: The Third Department stressed the importance of creating a record during a Batson challenge to striking a juror, “particularly where innate traits such as language are at issue.” Here the prosecutor’s “race-neutral” reason for striking a juror, i.e., that the juror spoke “broken English,” had no support in the record. The appellate court, therefore, was “constrained” to find the reason “pretextual.”

 

October 8, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-08 19:09:542026-10-21 20:23:30NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE PROSECUTOR’S REASON FOR STRIKING A JUROR, I.E., THAT THE JUROR “SPOKE BROKEN ENGLISH;” DEFENDANT’S BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE STRIKING OF THE JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
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