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DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH CPLR 3216 OR 22 NYCRR 202.7, AND THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR A “SUA SPONTE” DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the prerequisites for the dismissal of the complaint in this foreclosure action were not met:

… [T]he Supreme Court failed to serve a written demand upon the plaintiff to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days of receipt of the demand (see CPLR 3216[b][3]). Since at least one precondition set forth in CPLR 3216 was not met here, the court was without power to direct dismissal of the complaint pursuant to that statute … .

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, a court has discretion to dismiss an action where a plaintiff fails to appear “[a]t any scheduled call of a calendar or at any conference” … . In this case, however, the court attorney referee did not recommend dismissal of the complaint based upon a failure to appear at a conference, but rather for failure to move for an order of reference by a date certain without good cause shown. Thus, the dismissal order, which confirmed the report of the court attorney referee, did not direct dismissal of the complaint based upon a default in appearing at a scheduled conference or calendar call, and 22 NYCRR 202.27 could not have provided the basis for dismissal of the complaint … .

Moreover, “‘[a] court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal'” … . Here, the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court conference order directing the plaintiff to move for an order of reference was not a sufficient ground upon which to direct dismissal of the complaint … . Bank of Am., N.A. v Banu, 2024 NY Slip Op 04940, Second Dept 10-9-24

Practice Point: The appellate courts will not affirm dismissals of complaints when the statutory and regulatory requirements for dismissal have not been met.

 

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THE QUESTION WHETHER THE SEXUAL ASSAULT OF PLAINTIFF IN DEFENDANT GYM’S STEAM ROOM WAS FORESEEABLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECIDED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF AS A MATTER OF LAW; THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SIMILAR ASSAULTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about the foreseeability of the underlying incident, an alleged sexual assault in the steam room at defendant Equinox’s gym, which precluded summary judgment. Although Equinox had no prior notice with respect to the person who allegedly assaulted plaintiff, there was evidence Equinox was aware of other similar incidents in the steam room:

The Court of Appeals has “repeatedly emphasized” that “[o]nly in rare cases” can questions concerning foreseeability be decided as a matter of law … . * * *

Here, the motion court determined that plaintiff’s alleged attack was not foreseeable because “the ‘notice’ plaintiff relies upon concerns other alleged incidents in the steam room, none of which involved plaintiff’s assailant” and that “some of the other incidents]appear to involve consensual behavior.” New York courts, however, have never required prior incidents to have been committed by the same assailant or even be of the same type of conduct to which the plaintiff was subjected … . … [A]t least three of the other gym members reported that they had been sexually harassed, including the member who complained mere weeks before the assault on plaintiff … .

The motion court additionally found that, even if defendants did have a duty to plaintiff to prevent his alleged assault, “they met their duty to implement reasonable policies to decrease the likelihood of such an incident” and plaintiff failed to present a material issue of fact “with respect to these policies and procedures.”  * * *

We find that whether plaintiff’s alleged assault was foreseeable to Equinox and whether Equinox implemented adequate security measures to decrease the likelihood of such incidents are questions of fact and plaintiff’s negligence claim should advance to a jury trial. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that another gym member allegedly assaulting plaintiff against the backdrop of multiple complaints of inappropriate sexual conduct inside the steam room was “extraordinary under the circumstances or not foreseeable in the normal course of events” … . Crandall v Equinox Holdings, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 04902, First Dept 10-8-24

Practice Point: Whether an injury to plaintiff was foreseeable from defendant’s perspective can rarely be decided as a matter of law.

 

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FAILURE TO PRESERVE VIDEO SHOWING THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL PRIOR TO THE FALL WARRANTED AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE; UNDER THE FACTS, STRIKING DEFENDANT’S ANSWER WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined striking defendant’s answer for destruction of video evidence in this slip and fall case was not warranted, an adverse inference jury instruction was a sufficient sanction. Defendant provided video of plaintiff’s fall in compliance with plaintiff’s attorney’s request. Nine months later plaintiff’s attorney requested video showing the area prior to the fall, but it had been overwritten by then:

Plaintiffs’ counsel sent defendants a preservation letter approximately seven days following the accident. Defendants responded by producing several minutes of video of the accident itself, which was reasonably compliant with plaintiffs’ request for video surveillance of “the incident.” However, there was no pre-fall video footage provided to aid plaintiffs in establishing defendants’ actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition on the floor. Defendants’ employee, who culled the video footage provided, was no longer in defendants’ employ and was not available to be deposed as to his or her reasons for selecting particular video footage. Plaintiff’s counsel did not alert defendants of a need for additional video footage depicting the pre-fall circumstances at the accident site until nine months after receipt of the initial video clip, which was well after the software that operated defendants’ surveillance cameras had overwritten the video surveillance from plaintiff’s accident date.

Plaintiff’s proof established that defendants had control over the relevant surveillance and preserved it to the extent requested, but absent deposition testimony from defendant’s former employee who prepared the video clip as to his reasons for selecting the footage he or she did, the culpability issue cannot be definitively resolved. Nevertheless, the destroyed evidence video compromised the fairness of the litigation so as to warrant an adverse inference sanction … . Lev v Eataly USA LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 04910, First Dept 10-8-24

Practice Point: Plaintiff’s counsel requested video of “the incident” in this slip and fall case, which was provided. Nine months later plaintiff’s counsel requested video showing the area prior to the fall re: the issue of defendant’s notice of the condition. By that time the video had been overwritten. Plaintiff was entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction. Striking the defendant’s answer was deemed too severe a sanction.

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS DEEMED INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S REPEATED PREJUDICIAL REMARKS MADE TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS (TO THE EFFECT “I CAN SLEEP AT NIGHT BECAUSE I AM NO LONGER A DEFENSE ATTORNEY”), AND FOR AGREEING TO THE JUDGE’S REQUEST TO HAVE THE TWO SIDES ALTERNATE GOING FIRST IN EXERCISING PEREMPTORY JUROR CHALLENGES (IN VIOLATION OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW) (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, reversed defendant’s conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s repeated statements to prospective jurors that he can sleep at night because he is a prosecutor and no longer a defense attorney. Defense counsel agreed to alter the statutory peremptory juror-challenge procedure, which requires that the People must exercise their peremptory challenges first. Defense counsel agreed to alternate which side went first:

The first error occurred during voir dire when defense counsel failed to object to patently improper comments from the prosecutor regarding his ability to sleep at night now that he is a prosecutor and no longer a defense attorney. Perhaps it was a legitimate strategy for defense counsel not to object to the first improper comment of that nature given that defense counsel may not have wanted to draw more attention to the prejudicial comment. For the same reason, defense counsel might be excused for not objecting when the prosecutor repeated the comment to the same group of prospective jurors. We can discern no legitimate strategy, however, for defense counsel to remain quiet when the prosecutor made the same comment for the third, fourth and fifth times during voir dire. At some point, defense counsel was obligated to protect defendant from the prejudice arising from the repeated acts of prosecutorial misconduct and, at the very least, request a curative instruction from the court.

Defense counsel also erred in not objecting—and, indeed, consenting—to the court’s unlawful procedure of having the parties alternate which side went first in declaring whether they wished to exercise a peremptory challenge to a particular prospective juror. CPL 270.15 (2) provides that the People “must exercise their peremptory challenges first and may not, after the defendant has exercised [the defendant’s] peremptory challenges, make such a challenge to any remaining prospective juror who is then in the jury box.” After the court stated that its practice was to have parties alternate their exercise of peremptory challenges, defense counsel, evidently unaware of the statute’s mandate, said, “I’ll go first. He can go first. I don’t care.” As a result, on numerous occasions during voir dire defense counsel stated whether or not she was peremptorily challenging a prospective juror before the prosecutor was required to state his position.

Although the court’s violation of CPL 270.15 (2) does not constitute a mode of proceedings error, it was certainly prejudicial to defendant and we can conceive of no legitimate strategy for defense counsel’s acquiescence to the unlawful procedure. Viewing the evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case in totality and as of the time of the representation, “[o]ur review of this record indicates that defendant was not afforded meaningful representation and was therefore deprived of a fair trial” … . People v Stewart, 2024 NY Slip Op 04863, Fourth Dept 10-4-24

Practice Point: Although it is not a mode of proceedings error to alternate which side goes first in exercising peremptory challenges to prospective jurors in violation of the criminal procedure law, here defense counsel’s agreement to the procedure was deemed ineffective assistance of counsel and a new trial was ordered.

 

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THE ARBITRATOR’S INTERPRETATION OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WAS NOT IRRATIONAL; THE AWARD MUST BE CONFIRMED EVEN WHERE THE COURT DISAGREES WITH THE INTERPRETATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitrator’s ruling that petitioner firefighters were entitled to paid emergency leave should have been confirmed. In recent weeks, the appellate courts across the state have been emphasizing the finality of an arbitrator’s award, even where the court might have decided the matter differently:

“[J]udicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited” … . “The court must vacate an arbitration award where the arbitrator exceeds a limitation on his or her power as set forth in the CBA [collective bargaining agreement]” … . The court, however, lacks the authority to “examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one” … .

Here, the arbitrator merely interpreted and applied the provisions of the relevant CBA, as he had the authority to do … . We are powerless to set aside that interpretation even if we disagree with it … . Contrary to respondent’s urging, the arbitrator’s determination was not irrational; nothing in the CBA suggests that a request for emergency leave may not be made prior to the start of a tour of duty, and the arbitrator provided a justification for his determination … . Matter of Local 32, Intl. Assn. of Fire Fighters, A.F.L.-C.I.O.-C.L.C. (City of Utica), 2024 NY Slip Op 04878, Fourth Dept 10-4-24

Practice Point: The appellate courts are making it clear that an arbitrator’s award should not be tampered with by the courts as long as the arbitrator has not exceeded his or her powers.

 

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SUPREME COURT’S VACATION OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD AS “IRRATIONAL” REVERSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitrator’s award should not have been vacated as “irrational.” Petitioner, a registered nurse, did not take her first dose of the COVID vaccine by the deadline imposed by her employer. She was suspended and requested an arbitration in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The arbitrator found that failure to take the vaccine was misconduct and petitioner’s employment was terminated:

A court’s authority to vacate an arbitrator’s award is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511 (b), which permits vacatur of an award where the arbitrator, as relevant here, “exceed[s] [their] power” … by issuing an ” ‘award [that] violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power’ ” … .

Where … the parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, “[c]ourts are bound by an arbitrator’s factual findings, interpretation of the contract and judgment concerning remedies. A court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one. Indeed, even in circumstances where an arbitrator makes errors of law or fact, courts will not assume the role of overseers to conform the award to their sense of justice” … . * * *

… [T]he court erred in vacating the award on the ground that it was irrational. ” ‘An award is irrational if there is no proof whatever to justify the award’ ” … . Where, however, “an arbitrator ‘offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached,’ the arbitration award must be upheld” … . Here, inasmuch as it was undisputed that SUNY Upstate directed petitioner to receive the vaccine by a date certain, that it apprised her that her continued employment was dependent upon her compliance, and that petitioner refused to be vaccinated by the required date, the court erred in concluding that the arbitrator’s award was irrational. Matter of Spence (State Univ. of N.Y.), 2024 NY Slip Op 04677, Fourth Dept 9-27-24

Practice Point: If there is “even a barely colorable justification” for an arbitrator’s award, the courts won’t tamper with it. Here a nurse lost her job because she wouldn’t take the COVID vaccine. The COVID vaccine regulation which was the basis for the misconduct charge against petitioner was repealed just before the arbitrator decided the matter, but the repeal was not considered by the arbitrator. Because there was a valid basis for the arbitrator’s award, it could not be vacated as “irrational.”

 

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THE SENTENCING JUDGE MUST “PRONOUNCE SENTENCE ON EACH COUNT;” MATTER REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department affirmed defendant’s conviction but noted that the judge should have “pronounced sentence on each count” and remitted the matter for resentencing:

… [T]he court erred in failing to “pronounce sentence on each count” of the conviction (CPL 380.20 …).  Although the uniform sentence and commitment form states that defendant was sentenced on each count to concurrent terms of incarceration of five years with three years of postrelease supervision, the court in fact did not “impose a sentence for each count of which defendant was convicted” … . We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the sentence, and we remit the matter to County Court for resentencing.  People v Gause, 2024 NY Slip Op 04686, Fourth Dept 9-27-24

Practice Point: Sentence must be “pronounced on each count.”

 

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THE APPELLATE COURTS HAVE THE “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” POWER TO REDUCE AN OTHERWISE LEGAL AND APPROPRIATE SENTENCE WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL; HERE THE MAJORITY CHOSE NOT TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE; A STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED FOR A REDUCTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Shulman, over an extensive two-justice dissent, affirmed defendant’s conviction by guilty plea to attempted murder and declined to reduce the eight-year sentence in the interest of justice. Defendant is seriously mentally ill and has endured almost indescribable hardships throughout his life, which are detailed in the dissent. The underlying question here is, given the prison system’s inability to properly care for the seriously mentally ill, should the appellate court exercise its power to reduce this defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. The majority answered “no” and the dissent argued “yes.” The opinion is far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

From the dissent:

… [R]esearch … demonstrates that people with serious psychiatric needs are more likely to be violently victimized and housed in segregation while in prison. That research also shows that the vast majority of people with mental illness in jails and prisons do not receive care, and for those that do, the care is generally inadequate.… This is of particular concern given [defendant’s] history of suicide attempts … .

This case raises an important question: What is the utility of extended incarceration under the present circumstances? Specifically, where, among other things, the offense occurred during a time when [defendant] had been unmedicated for five days and, moreover, the record suggests—as evidenced by [defendant’s] comments to the police when arrested and a subsequent mental examination—that his severe mental illness contributed to what is his first and only criminal conviction. People v Paulino, 2024 NY Slip Op 04625, First Dept 9-26-24

Practice Point: The appellate courts have the “interest of justice” power to reduce an otherwise appropriate sentence based upon a defendant’s mental illness.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE COUNTY COURT INTENDED TO RELY ON FAMILY COURT RECORDS WHEN CONSIDERING DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR RECLASSIFICATION AS A LEVEL-ONE SEX OFFENDER; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT NOTED THAT THE PROPER INQUIRY IS WHETHER RECLASSIFICATION IS WARRANTED BY A CHANGE IN CONDITIONS, NOT WHETHER THERE IS SUPPORT FOR THE INITIAL LEVEL-TWO CLASSIFICATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant was entitled to be notified of County Court’s intention to rely on Family Court records in considering defendant’s application to be reclassified as a level one sex offender. The matter was remitted for a new hearing:

Upon his release from incarceration in 2003, defendant was classified as a risk level two sex offender and designated a sexually violent offender. In 2020, defendant applied, for the fifth time, for a modification of his risk level classification pursuant to Correction Law § 168-o (2), seeking to be reclassified as a risk level one sex offender as his conditions have changed subsequent to the initial risk level classification given, among other things, that he has remained arrest free, successfully completed sex offender treatment while incarcerated and gained custody of his daughter, which helped him understand the impact of his underlying criminal actions. * * *

In discrediting defendant’s sworn statements in support of his application and in finding his statements to be misleading, County Court relied heavily upon various Family Court proceedings, including neglect proceedings as far back as 2012, and a family offense petition containing allegations against defendant [*2]that were subsequently withdrawn. The court detailed the allegations in the petitions, finding that the allegations contradicted defendant’s sworn statements in his application and that, by excluding such information from his sworn affidavit, defendant attempted to mislead the court. Defendant was not given an opportunity to respond to or defend himself against consideration of such information. * * *

… Contrary to County Court’s finding here, the proper level of review is not whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support defendant’s initial risk level classification, but rather, whether defendant has met his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that a modification of his risk assessment level is warranted based upon a change in conditions. People v Johns, 2024 NY Slip Op 04640, Third Dept 9-26-24

Practice Point: In a SORA risk-level assessment proceeding, a defendant is entitled to timely notice of the court’s intention to rely on additional information of which defendant had not been made aware, here Family Court records.

Practice Point: When a defendant applies for reclassification of his sex offender risk level status (here from level two to level one), the court’s inquiry should be confined to whether a change in conditions warrants reclassification, not whether the original classification was justified.

 

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COUNTY COURT, SUA SPONTE, IN GRANTING THE PEOPLE’S REQUEST FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE, RELIED ON FACTORS ABOUT WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NOTIFIED BEFORE THE SORA HEARING; MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW HEARING AFTER PROPER NOTICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined the SORA court should not have, sua sponte, relied on factors for which defendant was not provided notice in granting the People’s request for an upward department. The matter was remitted:

County Court sua sponte relied upon certain additional factors for which defendant was not provided any notice — namely, that the points assessed under factor 4 did not adequately account for defendant’s prolonged course of conduct that continued over 21 months; that defendant was not scored any points under factor 7, which did not take into account defendant’s relationship with the mother of the victim that was arguably established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimizing the mother’s child; and that defendant’s psychiatric conditions and history increase his risk of reoffending.

With regard to these three additional areas of concern noted by County Court, “defendant was entitled to a sufficient opportunity to consider and muster evidence in opposition to the request for an upward departure” on the specific bases upon which County Court would rely in considering that relief … . “As defendant did not have notice or a fair opportunity to present arguments and evidence pertaining to those factors in the context of whether upward departure from the presumptive classification was warranted, the matter must be remanded for a new hearing, upon proper notice to defendant of the justifications relied upon by the People [and/or court] specific to their request for such relief” … . People v Furgeson, 2024 NY Slip Op 04644, Third Dept 9-26-24

Practice Point: A defendant is entitled to prior notice of the factors which will be considered by the court during a SORA risk-level assessment proceeding.​

 

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