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THE JUDGE WHO DISMISSED THE ACTION PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (a) FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DID NOT PLACE ON THE RECORD THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT CONSTITUTING NEGLECT; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action should not have been dismissed because the tolling provisions of CPLR 205 (a) applied. The judge who dismissed the action did not place on the record specific conduct constituting neglect to prosecute demonstrating a general pattern of delay:

… [T]he tolling provisions of CPLR 205 (a) apply inasmuch as the 2012 action was not dismissed for neglect to prosecute. CPLR 205 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by . . . a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action . . . , the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination,” even though the new action would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. “Where a dismissal is one for neglect to prosecute the action made pursuant to [CPLR 3216] or otherwise, the judge shall set forth on the record the specific conduct constituting the neglect, which conduct shall demonstrate a general pattern of delay in proceeding with the litigation” … .

Here, it is undisputed that the 2012 action was timely commenced and that the instant action was commenced within six months of the termination of the 2012 action. …

Here, the court did not outline a general pattern of delay by plaintiff in its order dismissing the 2012 complaint or in the attached decision … . Broadway Warehouse Co. v Buffalo Barn Bd., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 00963, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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THE FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA THAT HIS SENTENCE WOULD INCLUDE A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVSION REQUIRED VACATION OF THE PLEA; BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR WAS NOT NECESSARY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant should have been informed that postrelease supervision (PRS) would be part of his sentence. Under the circumstances preservation of the error for appeal was not necessary:

Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant entered his plea in exchange for a promise of youthful offender adjudication and a sentence of probation. Following the entry of the plea, the court informed defendant that, if he violated the terms of the plea agreement, the court would “not keep the promise [it] made regarding [his] sentence” and that it could “impose a much more significant or higher sentence.” The court did not specify what that higher sentence could entail, nor did it mention the possibility of postrelease supervision (PRS).

Prior to sentencing, defendant violated the terms of the plea agreement when he failed to cooperate with the probation department and was arrested on new felony charges. The court held a hearing pursuant to People v Outley (80 NY2d 702 [1993]) and determined that there was a valid basis on which to enhance the sentence. The prosecutor then requested that the court sentence defendant as an adult and impose a sentence of 15 years of incarceration with five years of PRS. The court imposed a determinate sentence of 7½ years of incarceration plus five years of PRS.

The court was required “to advise defendant that his enhanced sentence would include PRS, and was also required to specify the length of the term of PRS to be imposed” … . Although defendant did not object to the imposition of PRS or move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction, this case falls under an exception to the preservation rule inasmuch as “[t]he prosecutor’s mention of PRS immediately before sentencing was not the type of notice under People v Murray (15 NY3d 725 [2010]) that would require defendant to preserve the issue” … . People v Stanley, 2021 NY Slip Op 00924, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA PRIOR TO ENTERING THE PLEA; THEREFORE THE PLEA WAS VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant was not provided with sufficient information about the direct consequences of his guilty prior to entering the plea:

… Supreme Court failed to inform [defendant] that a fine would be imposed and failed to advise him that, following his indeterminate term of imprisonment, he would be subject to a mandatory three-year period of conditional discharge, during which he would be required to install and maintain an ignition interlock device in his vehicle … . …

“The direct consequences of a plea—those whose omission from a plea colloquy makes the plea per se invalid—are essentially the core components of a defendant’s sentence: a term of probation or imprisonment, a term of postrelease supervision, a fine”… , and the failure to advise a defendant at the time of his or her guilty plea of a direct consequence of that plea “requires that [the] plea be vacated” … . Here, defendant was advised of the fine and mandatory conditional discharge for the first time immediately prior to sentencing, when the prosecutor stated that defendant would be required to pay “all mandatory fines [and] surcharges” and that the period of incarceration “would be followed by a conditional discharge for the ignition interlock to be enforced.” We note that preservation of defendant’s contention was not required under the circumstances of this case inasmuch as “defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the terms of the plea at the plea allocution and, when later advised, did not have sufficient opportunity to move to withdraw [his] plea” … . People v Tung Nguyen, 2021 NY Slip Op 00724, Fourth Dept 2-5-21

 

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A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT RESPOND TO A NOTE FROM THE JURY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the judge committed a mode of proceedings error by not responding to a note from the jury:

… [A] new trial is required based upon the Supreme Court’s failure to comply with CPL 310.30, in accordance with the procedures set forth in People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270, 279). CPL 310.30 “imposes two responsibilities on trial courts upon receipt of a substantive note from a deliberating jury: the court must provide counsel with meaningful notice of the content of the note, and the court must provide a meaningful response to the jury” … . Where a trial court fails to fulfill its responsibility to provide meaningful notice of the content of the note, “a mode of proceedings error occurs, and reversal is . . . required even in the absence of an objection” … .

Here, the jury submitted a note requesting to view a specific portion of surveillance video taken from the victim’s building. The Supreme Court failed to notify the parties regarding the existence of the note, failed to read the contents of the note into the record, and failed to respond to the note. People v Everett, 2021 NY Slip Op 00575, Second Dept 2-3-21

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED JURISDICTION OVER THIS CUSTODY AND NEGLECT PROCEEDING STEMMING FROM AN INCIDENT DURING A BRIEF VISIT TO TENNESSEE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Family Court and ordering new proceedings in front of a different judge, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined Family Court completely mishandled this custody matter which involved neglect proceedings in Tennessee stemming from an incident during the family’s brief visit there. Family Court had refused to exercise jurisdiction over the matter on inconvenient-forum grounds. On appeal, all parties agreed Family Court had committed reversible errors:

… [T]here was no dispute that the children and their respective parents/custodian had lived in New York for at least six consecutive months prior to the April 2019 commencement of the neglect proceeding in Tennessee, thereby making New York the children’s home state … . Thus, pursuant to the UCCJEA, Family Court had jurisdiction over the neglect proceeding commenced in Tennessee … . * * *

The record irrefutably reflects that the children came into emergency care in Tennessee during a brief visit to the state and that, prior to entering care, they had not resided in Tennessee. The children’s respective parents/legal custodian reside in New York, as does a half sibling of one of the children. Roughly 850 miles separate the Tennessee court and Chemung County, and the parties have limited financial means to travel to Tennessee to participate in court proceedings or to visit with the children. Additionally, with the exception of DSS, which did not provide an appropriate basis in law for its objection, all parties and the Tennessee court agreed that Family Court should exercise jurisdiction over the dispositional phase of the neglect proceeding. Significantly, evidence regarding the children’s best interests and the feasibility of reunifying them with their respective parents and/or petitioner is in New York, including proof relating to any remedial and rehabilitative services offered to and engaged in by the mother and Jamie A. Any testimony required from witnesses located in Tennessee can be taken by phone. Matter of Diana XX v Nicole YY, 2021 NY Slip Op 00352, Third Dept 1-21-21

 

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MOTHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother should have been advised of her right to counsel in this custody proceeding:

“Family Court Act § 262 provides certain parties to particular Family Court proceedings with a statutory right to counsel. If the party in question falls within one of the enumerated subdivisions thereto, he or she must be advised by the court, before proceeding, that he or she has the right to representation, the right to seek an adjournment to confer with counsel and the right to assigned counsel if he or she cannot afford to retain counsel” … . The deprivation of a party’s fundamental right to counsel in a custody or visitation proceeding requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the unrepresented party’s position … .

Here, the mother clearly fell within one of the enumerated subdivisions of Family Court Act § 262 because she was the respondent in a custody modification proceeding. Therefore, the Family Court should have advised the mother of her right to counsel. Matter of Follini v Currie, 2020 NY Slip Op 08062, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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MOTHER’S PETITION TO MODIFY THE PARENTAL ACCESS SCHEDULE SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should not have ruled in this custody proceeding without holding a hearing. Mother had filed a petition seeking modification of the parental access schedule:

“Custody determinations . . . require a careful and comprehensive evaluation of the material facts and circumstances in order to permit the court to ascertain the optimal result for the child” … . Accordingly, “custody determinations should ‘[g]enerally’ be made ‘only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry'” … . This rule “furthers the substantial interest, shared by the State, the children, and the parents, in ensuring that custody proceedings generate a just and enduring result that, above all else, serves the best interest of a child” … .

Although the Court of Appeals has “decline[d] . . . to fashion a ‘one size fits all’ rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide,” it has cautioned that a court “opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision” … . The Court of Appeals has, therefore, criticized the “undefined and imprecise ‘adequate relevant information’ standard” as entailing “an unacceptably-high risk” of resulting in custody determinations that neither “conform to the best interest of a child” nor “adequately protect” a parent’s “fundamental right . . . ‘to control the upbringing of a child'”… . Accordingly, “[w]here . . . facts material to the best interest analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a custody hearing is required” … .

Here, the record demonstrates disputed factual issues so as to require a hearing on the issue of the father’s parental access … . Moreover, the Family Court, in making its determinations without a hearing, relied upon the hearsay statements and conclusions of the forensic evaluator, whose opinions and credibility were untested by the parties. Contrary to the contention of the mother and the attorneys for the children, “the court’s mere reliance upon ‘adequate relevant information,’ as opposed to admissible evidence, was erroneous” … . Matter of Corcoran v Liebowitz, 2020 NY Slip Op 08058, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE RIGHTS HE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY IMPOSED AN ENHANCED SENTENCE AND CHANGED THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT; GUILTY PLEA VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea in the interest of justice, determined: (1) defendant was not informed of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty; (2) the judge improperly enhanced defendant’s sentence; and (3) the judge improperly changed the terms of the plea agreement:

County Court advised defendant that, by pleading guilty, he would be giving up “all of [his] constitutional rights, [his] presumption of innocence, [his] rights to a jury trial, suppression hearings, also all of [his] appellate rights.” There was no mention of defendant’s right to be confronted by witnesses or the privilege against self-incrimination … . Furthermore, the record fails to disclose that the court ascertained whether defendant conferred with his counsel regarding the trial-related rights that were being forfeited upon his guilty plea … . Rather, the court merely asked him whether he had enough time to talk with his counsel about “the facts of [the] drug charges, going to trial, not going to trial[] and things like that” and “[his] jury trial rights, all [his] other rights.” In the absence of any affirmative showing that defendant fully comprehended and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, the plea must be vacated as invalid … . … “A sentencing court may not impose an enhanced sentence unless it has informed the defendant of specific conditions that the defendant must abide by or risk such enhancement, or give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea before the enhanced sentence is imposed” … . The plea colloquy reflects that, by pleading guilty, the People would recommend that defendant be sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3½ years … . … [T]he court abruptly sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of nine years … and directed that the sentence be served under the supervision of Willard. County Court abused its authority by changing the terms of the plea agreement … . … [T]he court, without any discussion with the parties, unilaterally conditioned defendant’s opportunity to participate in the Willard program on accepting the maximum nine-year sentence. Additionally, the record does not indicate that defendant was given the opportunity to withdraw his plea … . Because defendant was not informed of, or actually understood, the ramifications of the sentencing change nor was provided with the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, the plea was invalid …”. People v Drayton, 2020 NY Slip Op 07952, Third Dept 12-24-20

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FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO JAIL FOR NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT BECAUSE HE HAD PAID THE ARREARS BEFORE THE ORDER OF COMMITMENT WAS ISSUED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined it was an abuse of discretion to sentence father to jail for failure to pay child support after father paid the arrears:

The father contends that Family Court abused its discretion by imposing a 90-day jail sentence for the father’s willful violation of the prior support order. We agree. Where a willful violation has been found, Family Court may “commit the respondent to jail for a term not to exceed six months” … .  “Such a sentence is in the nature of a civil contempt, which may only continue until such time as the offender, if it is within his or her power, complies with the support order” … . Here, the father presented payment at the hearing for the full amount of arrears owed and, therefore, Family Court abused its discretion when it issued the order of commitment … . Matter of Rondeau v Jerome, 2020 NY Slip Op 07960, Third Dept 12-24-20

 

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THE APPELLATE DIVISION REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE, IN PART BECAUSE THE SENTENCING JUDGE MAY HAVE BEEN REACTING TO CRITICISM OF HOW THE TRIAL WAS HANDLED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing defendant’s sentence, over a dissent, determined the sentencing judge reacted to criticism of how the trial was conducted:

The Supreme Court imposed the maximum period of imprisonment of 4½ years’ incarceration …  and 2 years postrelease supervision … , apparently based upon the defendant’s claim during the presentence interview that the judge, the prosecutor, and the jury showed favoritism to the arresting officer, and the defendant did not like how the trial was conducted. At sentencing, when the court asked the defendant to explain that statement, the defendant stated that, although he thought the jury showed “favoritism,” he wanted “to move on from this” and he”learned [his] lesson.” The court, in response, stated that although “[o]bviously this is not the crime of the century,” and “you’re entitled to your opinion,” that opinion demonstrated a “willingness not to accept any responsibility.”

“An intermediate appellate court has broad, plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe under the circumstances” … . Contrary to the conclusion of our dissenting colleague, that power “may be exercised, if the interest of justice warrants, without deference to the sentence court” … , especially where, as here, the sentencing court acted, at least in part, out of umbrage to criticism as to how the trial was conducted. In this case, considering the nonviolent nature of the crime involving a relatively small amount of drugs in the defendant’s possession, the defendant’s reported substance abuse issues, and the fact that the defendant is married and has a young child, the sentence was excessive to the extent indicated herein … . People v Morales, 2020 NY Slip Op 07919, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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