Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) Archives

THE INTERIM DECISION ISSUED BY SUPREME COURT WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ORDER; THE FIRST DEPARTMENT, THEREFORE, DISMISSED THE APPEAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, dismissing the appeal in this Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) case, determined the “interim decision” was not an appealable paper, depriving the First Department of jurisdiction:

This proceeding stems from Spectrum News NY1’s (Spectrum) attempts to gain access to video files from the voluntary body camera experiment. Specifically, Spectrum filed a FOIL request for unredacted videos from the NYPD’s voluntary body camera program begun in 2014. NYPD denied the request, claiming that unredacted files were exempt from disclosure under FOIL. Spectrum then commenced this article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment compelling respondent NYPD to comply with its request. …

… [T]he parties stipulated that out of a disputed 328 videos, only 30 would be the subject of the hearing. Supreme Court then issued “an interim decision,” which was not the product of a motion for relief. Instead, the “interim decision,” among other things, permitted respondents to redact the faces of persons other than officers from any video footage recorded by the body cameras and to redact certain communications between officers … . …Supreme Court granted petitioner leave to appeal from the “interim decision.”

This appeal is thus taken from an “interim decision,” which is not an appealable paper. The lack of an appealable paper here deprives the Court of jurisdiction and requires dismissal of Spectrum’s appeal, albeit without prejudice. Where, as here, a party brings an appeal from a nonappealable paper, this Court regularly dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction … . While there are instances where this Court has deemed a paper denominated as a “decision” to nonetheless be appealable because it contained all the hallmarks of an order … , that is not the situation here. Matter of Spectrum News NY1 v New York City Police Dept., 2020 NY Slip Op 00521, First Dept 1-28-20

January 28, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

REPORTS BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S CONVICTION REVIEW UNIT (CRU) EXONERATING CONVICTED PERSONS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL); AN EXONERATED PERSON MAY WAIVE THE SEALING REQUIREMENT (CPL 160.50) AND CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE OF A REPORT; THE RELEASED REPORT HERE IS SUBJECT TO REDACTION DETERMINED IN AN IN CAMERA REVIEW BY A JUDGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, determined: (1) the redacted report of the District Attorney’s Conviction Review Unit (CRU) concerning the exoneration of Jabbar Washington was properly made available to the New York Times because Washington consented to the unsealing of the document (CPL 160.50(a)(d)); (2) absent such consent, the CRU reports are exempt from disclosure under FOIL; and (3) the redaction of the Washington report should be reviewed by a judge (in camerao review):

CPL 160.50 does not define what constitutes an official record relating to an arrest or prosecution, and the Court of Appeals has held that “bright line rules are not wholly appropriate in this area” … . …

… [ T]he CRU’s final reports constitute official records created in connection with the arrest and prosecution of the persons whose convictions were ultimately vacated through the conviction review process. At the time the reports were created, the subjects of the reports stood convicted as the result of prosecutorial action. The reports are “official records” in that they were created by the DA’s office itself for the purpose of scrutinizing the propriety of each of the subject convictions. …

… [T]hat the CRU’s reports might serve a broader public purpose in leading to reform of police agencies or prosecutors’ offices, is not a basis to overlook the protections endowed by CPL 160.50 to the individuals exonerated through the CRU’s work. Matter of New York Times Co. v District Attorney of Kings County, 2019 NY Slip Op 08410, Second Dept 11-20-19

November 20, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Consumer Law, Debtor-Creditor, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

REFERENCES TO JUDGMENTS IN A LICENSE APPLICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REDACTED IN THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE COUNTY CONSUMER AFFAIRS OFFICE IN RESPONSE TO A FOIL REQUEST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the response of the Nassau County Office for Consumer Affairs to a request for documents relating to licenses held by Home Beyond Center, LLC should not have had the references to judgments redacted:

FOIL requires government agencies to “make available for public inspection and copying all records,” subject to a number of exemptions (Public Officers Law § 87[2]). One such exemption permits an agency to deny access to records that “if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” … . Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b) provides that “[a]n unwarranted invasion of personal privacy includes, but shall not be limited to” seven specified kinds of disclosure … . Where none of the seven specifications is applicable, a court “must decide whether any invasion of privacy . . . is unwarranted’ by balancing the privacy interests at stake against the public interest in disclosure of the information” … .

Here, the respondent failed to demonstrate that the redactions of information contained in the license application file of Home Beyond Center, LLC, relating to “judgments” should be exempt from disclosure as an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” … . Matter of Liang v Nassau County Off. of Consumer Affairs, 2019 NY Slip Op 07251, Second Dept 10-9-19

October 9, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Election Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

ELECTION LAW 3-222 WHICH PROHIBITS DISCLOSURE OF VOTED BALLOTS FOR TWO YEARS AFTER AN ELECTION APPLIES BOTH TO PAPER BALLOTS AND ELECTRONIC BALLOTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeal, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over two dissenting opinions (three dissenting judges), reversing the Appellate Division, determined that Election Law 3-222 (2), which prohibits, for two years, the disclosure of “voted ballots” absent a court order of legislative committee direction, prohibits the disclosure of the electronic form of the ballots:

Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a), the FOIL exemption at issue, provides that an agency may deny access to records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.” While an applicable “state or federal statute” need not “expressly state it is intended to establish a FOIL exemption, we have required a showing of clear legislative intent to establish and preserve that confidentiality which one resisting a FOIL disclosure claims as protection” … . Respondents assert that Election Law § 3-222 creates such an exemption. To determine whether Election Law § 3-222 reflects the requisite legislative interest in confidentiality, we must interpret the statute. * * *

… . [T]he rule in Election Law § 3-222(2) that “voted ballots” are protected from examination during the first two years after an election absent court order or direction from a relevant legislative committee extends to electronic copies of those ballots. The same is true of absentee and military ballots, which are “voted ballots” under subsection (2) and, along with their envelopes, are also specifically protected in subsection (3). Matter of Kosmider v Whitney, 2019 NY Slip Op 04757, CtApp 6-13-19

June 13, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORTS, USE OF FORCE REPORTS, AND MISBEHAVIOR REPORTS KEPT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SERVICES (DOCCS) RE: INCIDENTS IN PRISONS ARE NOT PERSONNEL RECORDS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50-a, THEREFORE PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO UNREDACTED COPIES PURSUANT TO HIS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, in a matter of first impression, determined that records kept by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) regarding incidents in prisons were not personnel records pursuant to Civil Rights Law 50-a. Therefore petitioner was entitled to unredacted copies pursuant to his Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request:

… [U]nusual incident reports, use of force reports and misbehavior reports have distinct characteristics. However, they share several important commonalities. To begin with, each category of report is, at its core, a written memorialization of an event that occurred at a DOCCS facility. Additionally, and significantly, each type of report is authored, as a mandatory component of their job duties, by staff members with knowledge of the underlying event. The reports do not arise out of inmate allegations or grievances … . Nor are they written documentation of disciplinary proceedings or disciplinary action taken against a correction officer … . Given their factual nature and that each is written by a witness or witnesses with knowledge of the underlying facility event, we find unusual incident reports, use of force reports and misbehavior reports to be more akin to arrest reports, stop reports, summonses, accident reports and body-worn camera footage, none of which is quintessentially “personnel records” … . * * *

… [W]hile it is relevant that unusual incident reports and use of force reports may be used in employee performance evaluations, that factor alone is not determinative. Otherwise, any employee work product or record documenting an employee’s on-duty actions would classify as a personnel record with the justification that it could be used to evaluate work performance and would, thus, result in a situation in which the exception swallows the rule … .

… [W]ith regard to the legislative objective of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, respondents have not demonstrated a “substantial and realistic potential” for the unredacted reports to be used against the officers in a harassing or abusive manner … . Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2019 NY Slip Op 03421, Third Dept 5-2-19

May 2, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

CITY AGENCY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE REPORT SOUGHT BY PETITIONERS WAS SUBJECT TO THE INTRA-AGENCY EXEMPTION FROM THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) BECAUSE THE AGENCY DID NOT PRESENT PROOF THE PREPARER OF THE REPORT WAS RETAINED BY THE AGENCY, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AS MANDATED BY A 2017 AMENDMENT TO FOIL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court correctly held that the respondent, NYC Dept of Parks & Recreation, was not entitled to the intra-agency materials exemption from the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) because the respondent did not demonstrate that it retained a third party, “Owens Studio,” to prepare the report sought by petitioners. The First Department went on to find that the statute obligated Supreme Court to address their request for attorney’s fees:

… [R]espondent failed to establish that it retained Owens Studio for purposes of preparing the report, a necessary prerequisite for invocation of the intra-agency materials exemption for documents prepared by an outside consultant … . The affidavit submitted by respondent on this point is on its face conclusory. The fragmentary documents to which respondent’s affiant points demonstrate only that Owens Studio was retained to perform some work. They do not on their face establish that respondent retained Owens Studio to prepare the subject study and report, nor establish what Owens Studio was retained to do, nor, in particular, establish that respondent itself, as opposed to some other entity, retained Owens Studio to prepare the report … . …

The attorneys’ fees provision of FOIL was amended, effective December 13, 2017, to provide that the court “shall” award counsel fees where the agency has no basis for denying access to the material sought. The legislative history of the recent amendment notes that “[o]ften, people simply cannot afford to take a government agency to trial to exercise their right to access public information,” and that an award of attorney’s fees is intended to “encourage compliance with FOIL and to minimize the burdens of cost and time from bringing a judicial proceeding” … . Matter of Reiburn v New York City Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 2019 NY Slip Op 03295, First Dept 4-30-19

April 30, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, Criminal Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

MEDICAL RECORDS OF THE VICTIM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PETITIONER, WHO WAS CONVICTED OF THE SEXUAL ASSAULT, PURSUANT TO PETITIONER’S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST, THE RECORDS ARE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical records of the victim of sexual assault could not be disclosed to the petitioner, who was convicted of the sexual assault, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request. The medical records were protected from disclosure by the Public Health Law, the Civil Rights Law and the Public Officers Law:

“All government records are presumptively open for public inspection unless specifically exempt from disclosure” … . Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) provides that an agency may deny access to records that are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute … . Here, the medical records of the victim sought by the petitioner are exempted from disclosure by Public Health Law §§ 2803-c(3)(f) and 2805-g(3) … . Also, the medical records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 50-b, which, with exceptions not relevant here, prevents any public officer from disclosing documents that would identify the victim of a sex offense … . Further, the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e)(i) … . Matter of Crowe v Guccione, 2019 NY Slip Op 03044, Second Dept 4-24-19

April 24, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Corporation Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Municipal Law

RECORDS KEPT BY A VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION NOT SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) BECAUSE THE CORPORATION IS NOT A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, Volunteer Ambulance, a not-for-profit corporation, was not a government agency, and therefore was not subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Public Officers Law 86). “The petitioner, an emergency medical technician, made requests under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6; hereinafter FOIL) for the production of certain records pertaining to the rejection of her application to be reinstated as a member of the Cortlandt Community Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. (hereinafter Volunteer Ambulance):”

Volunteer Ambulance was formed and incorporated without any participation or assistance of public officials in the Town. Neither the Town nor the District has the authority to select or appoint directors, officers, or members of Volunteer Ambulance. Volunteer Ambulance is not required to submit its budget to the Town or District for review, and neither the Town nor the District has authority to approve Volunteer Ambulance’s budget. Neither the Town nor the District has any authority to review or audit Volunteer Ambulance’s financial books and records. Volunteer Ambulance receives the majority of its funding from sources other than the payment it receives from the District pursuant to the contract, and purchases all of its equipment, supplies, and services from its own assets. Volunteer Ambulance receives no funding from the Town or District apart from the contract payment. Volunteer Ambulance is solely responsible for the maintenance and expenses related to its buildings. Volunteer Ambulance has the authority to hire staff, who are employees of Volunteer Ambulance, not of the District or Town, and it obtains its own workers’ compensation policy for coverage of its employees and members; these persons are not covered by the workers’ compensation policy maintained by the District or the Town for its employees or volunteers. Neither the District nor the Town has authority to review or approve contracts entered into by Volunteer Ambulance for professional or other services necessary for its operation.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Volunteer Ambulance is a “governmental entity performing a governmental . . . function” so as to render it an agency subject to the mandates of FOIL (Public Officers Law § 86[3] … . Matter of Outhouse v Cortlandt Community Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 02881, Second Dept 4-17-19

April 17, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

RECORDS OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT A FORMER DETECTIVE MADE TO THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD (CCRB) PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the records of complaints about a now-retired detective (Scarcella) made to the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) were protected by Civil Rights Law 50-a and not subject to disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Public Officers Law 87):

The CCRB’s records of civilian complaints, “regardless of where they are kept,” could be used to harass or embarrass police officers, which is exactly what Civil Rights Law § 50-a was intended to prevent … . Indeed, the Court of Appeals has recently held that disciplinary records arising from civilian complaints against police officers are the very sort of record presenting a potential for abusive exploitation and intended to be kept confidential under Civil Rights Law § 50-a … . …

A retired police officer might “still [be] involved in an open or pending case and . . . , in that context, the requested documents have the potential to be used to degrade, harass, embarrass or impeach his integrity” … . Here, the petitioner’s own submissions show that Scarcella has been called to testify numerous times since his retirement. The CCRB met its burden of showing a substantial and realistic potential for the abusive use of the requested material against Scarcella … . Matter of Hughes Hubbard & Reed, LLP v Civilian Complaint Review Bd., 2019 NY Slip Op 02875, Second Dept 4-17-19

April 17, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Privilege

DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY PETITIONER WERE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE BASED UPON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, THE ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT AND THE INTER-, INTRA-AGENCY COMMUNICATION EXEMPTIONS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined emails between the governor’s office, counsel and Department of Transportation (DOT) employees concerning a gas station sublease which had been held by petitioner, but which was terminated by DOT, were exempt from disclosure based upon attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product, and the inter-, intra-agency communication exemption:

In determining whether a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege, “the critical inquiry is whether, viewing the lawyer’s communication in its full content and context, it was made in order to render legal advice or services to the client” … . In that regard, inasmuch as facts are the foundation of legal advice, the attorney-client privilege protects communications between an attorney and his or her client that convey facts relevant to a legal issue under consideration, even if the information contained in the communication is not privileged … . Each of the emails at issue are communications between counsel in the Governor’s Office and DOT employees that contain or reference factual information relevant to counsel providing legal advice regarding the proposed termination of the sublease. Accordingly, we conclude that the emails are protected by the attorney-client privilege and, therefore, Supreme Court erred in ordering their disclosure.

Respondents further contend that preliminary drafts of the letter that was ultimately sent terminating the sublease are exempt from disclosure under FOIL as inter-agency or intra-agency materials and as attorney work product … . The letters are drafts of the final termination notice that incorporate counsel’s recommendations and that were circulated in furtherance of the decision-making process prior to a final determination; accordingly, they are exempt from disclosure under FOIL as inter-agency or intra-agency materials and as attorney work product … . Matter of Gilbert v Office of the Governor of the State of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op 02189, Third Dept 3-21-19

March 21, 2019/by Bruce Freeman