Contempt – New York Appellate Digest

CIVIL CONTEMPT AIMS TO COMPENSATE THE OTHER PARTY FOR ANY LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTEMPT (FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER); CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AIMS TO PUNISH; THEREFORE A $250 A DAY FINE, ALTHOUGH APPROPRIATE FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE CIVL CONTEMPT AT ISSUE HERE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined fining defendants $250 a day for civil contempt was not appropriate. Civil contempt, unlike criminal contempt, is designed to compensate the other party for any loss, not to punish. The matter was remitted for a determination of any losses to plaintiffs associated with defendants’ contempt. Defendants had ignored a court order requiring that the contested reservation fee (over $700,000) be placed in escrow to prevent defendants from dissipating it:

“Unlike criminal contempt sanctions which are intended to punish, civil contempt fines are intended to compensate victims for their actual losses” … . Plaintiff did not establish an actual loss or injury as a result of the contempt … , and therefore Judiciary Law § 773 authorized the court to impose “a fine . . . not exceeding the amount of the complainant’s costs and expenses, and two hundred and fifty dollars in addition thereto.” Under these circumstances, the fine of $250 per day until the contempt was purged is not authorized by the statute and improperly sought to punish defendants for their continuing contempt, rather than to compensate plaintiff for an amount of damages suffered … . Rpower, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 03598, Fourth Dept 7-3-24

Practice Point: Civil contempt aims to address the contempt of the opposing party by compensating for the loss caused by the contempt. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is designed to punish a party for failing to obey a court order. A fine is therefore appropriate for criminal contempt, but not for civil contempt.

July 3, 2024

Attorneys, Contempt, Family Law, Judges

DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN THIS CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDING STEMMING FROM DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED AN INQUIRY TO SEE IF DEFENDANT QUALIFIED FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL PRIOR TO ISSUING THE ORDER OF COMMITMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the order of commitment in this matrimonial case, noted that defendant faced possible jail time for civil contempt stemming from a failure to pay child support. Therefore defendant had a right to assigned counsel if found indigent. The judge should have have ascertained defendant’s financial condition:

“In general, the respondent in a civil contempt proceeding who faces the possibility of the imposition of a term of imprisonment, however short, has the right to the assignment of counsel upon a finding of indigence” … . “Moreover, a parent has the statutory right to counsel in a proceeding in which it is alleged that he or she has willfully failed to comply with a prior child support order” … .

Here, the defendant informed the Supreme Court on multiple occasions that he could not afford to retain an attorney. Therefore, prior to issuing an order of commitment, the court should have inquired into the defendant’s current financial circumstances to determine whether he had become eligible for assigned counsel … . Hoffman v Hoffman, 2023 NY Slip Op 04959, Second Dept 10-4-23

Practice Point: Here defendant was found in civil contempt for failure to pay child support. Because the judge was going to order jail-time, defendant had the right to assigned counsel if he could not afford an attorney. The judge should have conducted an inquest to determine defendant’s financial condition before issuing the order of commitment.

October 4, 2023

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Contempt, Judges, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE MOTION SEEKING A CIVIL CONTEMPT DETERMINATION COULD NOT BE HEARD BECAUSE THE UNDERLYING SUIT HAD BEEN SETTLED BY STIPULATION WITH PREJUDICE, STRIPPING SUPREME COURT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; A SUBJECT-MATTER-JURISDICTION ISSUE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the civil contempt action should have been dismissed because the underlying lawsuit had been settled with prejudice by stipulation. Because the issue relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction it can be raised on appeal at any time. The underlying lawsuit was a property dispute and concerned the location of a fence. After the stipulation settling the suit, defendants refused to sign a fence location agreement. Because the underlying suit was discontinued with prejudice the plaintiffs only option is to commence a plenary action:

… [T]he defendants’ assertion, raised for the first time on appeal, that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ motion, is properly before this Court, as a defect in subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time … .

“A motion must be addressed to a pending action” … , and a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion after the action has been “‘unequivocally terminated . . . [by the execution of] an express, unconditional stipulation of discontinuance'” … , “or actual entry of judgment in accordance with the terms of the settlement” … .

Here, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to hold the defendants in civil contempt, since the action was unconditionally discontinued with prejudice by the parties’ stipulation, as memorialized in the settlement order … . Thus, the relief requested by the plaintiffs was not available by way of a motion, and could only be obtained by commencing a plenary action … . Riccio v Kukaj, 2023 NY Slip Op 04785, Second Dept 9-27-23

Practice Point: A stipulation settling a suit with prejudice strips the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore a subsequent motion cannot be heard by the court and any further proceedings require a plenary action. A subject-matter-jurisdiction issue can be raised for the first time on appeal.

September 27, 2023

Contempt, Mental Hygiene Law, Trusts and Estates

THE PARTY SEEKING A CONTEMPT FINDING DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE FROM THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ONE COURT ORDER AND THE OTHER COURT ORDER DID NOT EXPRESS AN UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE; CONTEMPT FINDING REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the evidence did not support a contempt finding against the trustee of a special needs trust (Wiltshire). The guardian of the incapacitated person (Daniels) demonstrated that Wiltshire failed to provide an accounting and failed to promptly pay certain expenses, but the proof of Wiltshire’s alleged failure to comply with a court order was not sufficient to support a contempt finding. For instance, it was not demonstrated that Daniels was prejudiced by Wiltshire’s inaction:

“In order to find that contempt has occurred in a given case, it must be determined that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect. It must appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed. Moreover, the party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the court’s order. . . . Finally, prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation must be demonstrated” . “The burden of proof is on the proponent of a contempt motion, and the contempt must be established by clear and convincing evidence” … .

Here, Daniels did not establish that she was prejudiced in any way by Wiltshire’s failure to furnish an accounting of the SNT in violation of the … so-ordered stipulation … . Moreover, the [other] order directed Wiltshire to pay Daniels’s guardianship fees from the SNT, but did not provide a deadline for the payment. That order thus did not clearly express an unequivocal mandate which would support holding Wiltshire in contempt of court … . Matter of Serena W., 2023 NY Slip Op 03797, Second Dept 7-12-23

Practice Point: A party seeking a contempt finding must demonstrate prejudice from the failure to comply with a court order.

Practice Point: In order to support a contempt finding, the subject order must include an unequivocal mandate which was not obeyed.

July 12, 2023

Contempt, Evidence, Family Law, Social Services Law

FATHER MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THE NYC ADMINISTRATION OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE UNREDACTED REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT WHICH WERE DEEMED UNFOUNDED; MATTER REMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court and remitting the matter, determined father made a prima facie showing that the NYC Administration of Children’s Services (ACS) should be held in contempt for failing to provide unredacted reports of child abuse or neglect which were deemed unfounded. Father’s request for the unredacted documents should not have been denied absent a finding by Family Court the safety of the person(s) who made the report or cooperated with the investigation would be jeopardized by revealing the name(s):

As the subject of the unfounded reports, the father is a person entitled to receive access to the otherwise sealed reports (Social Services Law § 422 [5][a][iv]). * * *

… [F]ather made a prima facie showing of the elements necessary to hold ACS in contempt for its failure to fully comply with a lawful judicial subpoena … The subpoena was a valid order expressing an unequivocal mandate, requiring ACS to produce “complete” investigation and unfounded reports of suspected child abuse concerning the children. ACS does not deny that it was aware of the order. Further, ACS did not comply with the subpoena, as it produced reports that redacted the names of sources, not complete reports. Finally, the father suffered prejudice, because his modification petition alleges that the mother was causing false abuse reports to be filed with the authorities, and the unredacted unfounded reports may be admissible in such a proceeding … .

Once the father met his prima facie burden, it was incumbent on ACS to refute the showing or to offer evidence of a defense … . ACS asserted that Social Services Law §422(7) permits the commissioner “to prohibit the release of data that would identify the person who made the report or who cooperated in a subsequent investigation . . . which he reasonably finds will be detrimental to the safety or interests of such person.” However, there was no indication that any such determination had actually been made. Matter of Michael Y. v Dawn S., 2023 NY Slip Op 00193, First Dept 1-17-23

Practice Point: Under the Social Services Law, the NYC Administration of Children’s Services (ACS), in response to a judicial subpoena, must provide unredacted reports of child abuse or neglect which were deemed unfounded, unless ACS can demonstrate revealing the names of the sources of the reports jeopardizes the safety of those sources.

January 17, 2023

Contempt, Criminal Law

PHONE CALLS TO THE PROTECTED PERSON SUPPORTED CRIMINAL CONTEMPT SECOND DEGREE BUT NOT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FIRST DEGREE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined phone calls, as opposed to “contact with the protected person,” did not support the contempt first degree convictions. However the phone calls did support contempt second degree:

The … five counts of criminal contempt in the first degree … are based on evidence establishing that an order of protection had been issued against defendant for the benefit of a person and that on five occasions defendant made telephone calls from the Monroe County Jail to that person. … … With respect to those counts, the People were required to establish that defendant committed the crime of criminal contempt in the second degree … , and that he did so “by violating that part of a duly served order of protection . . . which requires the . . . defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued” … . Here, defendant was in jail when the calls at issue were made and the People failed to “prove[], beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant had any contact with the protected person during the charged incident[s]” … . People v Caldwell, 2022 NY Slip Op 07325, Fourth Dept 12-23-22

Practice Point: Here criminal contempt first degree required proof defendant failed to “stay away” from the protected person. That portion of the order was not violated by defendant’s phone calls to the protected person (which supported convictions for criminal contempt second degree).

December 23, 2022

Appeals, Contempt, Family Law, Judges

DIRECT APPEAL, AS OPPOSED TO AN ARTICLE 78, WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CONTEMPT PROCEEDING; MOTHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE AGAINST THE CONTEMPT ADJUDICATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined direct appeal of the contempt adjudications in this custody matter, as opposed to an Article 78 action, was appropriate under the circumstances. The contempt adjudications were vacated because mother was not given the opportunity to argue she should not be held in contempt:

… [T]he mother’s challenge to the summary contempt adjudications is properly raised via direct appeal from the order under the circumstances of this case. Although a direct appeal from an order punishing a person summarily for contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court ordinarily does not lie and a challenge must generally be brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 to allow for development of the record (see Judiciary Law §§ 752, 755 …), an appeal from such an order is appropriately entertained where, as here, there exists an adequate record for appellate review … .

With respect to the merits, “[b]ecause contempt is a drastic remedy, . . . strict adherence to procedural requirements is mandated” … . Here, we conclude that the court committed reversible error by failing to afford the mother the requisite “opportunity, after being ‘advised that [she] was in peril of being adjudged in contempt, to offer any reason in law or fact why that judgment should not be pronounced’ ” … . S.P. v M.P., 2022 NY Slip Op 06377, Fourth Dept 11-10-22

Practice Point: A contempt adjudication based upon actions in the court’s presence are usually properly contested in an Article 78 proceeding. Under the circumstances here, direct appeal was appropriate. The contempt adjudications were vacated because mother (in this custody proceeding) was not given the opportunity to contest them.

November 10, 2022

Attorneys, Contempt

PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD IN CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FOR ISSUING SUBPOENAS IN DEFIANCE OF AN ORDER STAYING THE PROCEEDINGS; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINIAL CONTEMPT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s counsel should have been found in criminal contempt for issuing subpoenas in defiance of Supreme Court’s order staying any further action in the case:

In contrast to civil contempt, because the purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court, no showing of prejudice is required … . Instead, “[a]llegations of willful disobedience of a proper judicial order strike at the core of the judicial process and implicate weighty public and institutional concerns regarding the integrity of and respect for judicial orders” … . …

Notwithstanding [the court’s order], the plaintiff’s counsel issued subpoenas on six separate occasions. When … the Supreme Court reiterated the terms of the stay, both via interim relief granted in the order to show cause and in a separate order, the plaintiff’s counsel did not desist but instead served four more subpoenas and moved to compel the production of subpoenaed documents. This conduct evidences a lack of “respect for judicial orders” and warranted holding the plaintiff’s counsel in criminal contempt … . Under the circumstances of this case, we deem the statutory maximum sanction of $1,000 per offense warranted and therefore impose a total sanction of $10,000. Madigan v Berkeley Capital, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03237, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: Criminal contempt seeks to vindicate the authority of the court. Therefore no showing of prejudice is required. Here plaintiff’s counsel issued subpoenas in defiance of an order of the court. A $10,000 sanction for criminal contempt was imposed on the attorney by the appellate court.

May 18, 2022

Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Contempt

A SUBPOENA ISSUED BY AN ATTORNEY IS A “JUDICIAL” SUBPOENA SUBJECT TO A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WITHOUT THE NEED TO FIRST SEEK A COURT ORDER COMPELLING COMPLIANCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a subpoena issued by an attorney was a “judicial” subpoena and defendant Patterson’s failure to appear for a deposition and produce documents was punishable by contempt without the need to first obtain a court order compelling compliance:

Critical to the resolution of this appeal is whether this type of subpoena is a “judicial” subpoena, as defined by CPLR 2308(a), or a “non-judicial” subpoena, as defined by CPLR 2308(b). … [T]he disobedience of a judicial subpoena is punishable by contempt of court, while a person served with a non-judicial subpoena cannot be held in contempt unless the court first issues an order compelling compliance with the subpoena that is then disobeyed … .

We find that the subpoena is a “judicial” subpoena, the disobedience of which is punishable by contempt … . CPLR 2308(a) embraces subpoenas issued by an officer of the court (such as an attorney) at any stage of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the subpoena was specifically returnable in court … . Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v Patterson, 2021 NY Slip Op 06535, First Dept 11-23-21

November 23, 2021

Contempt, Contract Law, Education-School Law, Family Law

THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT PROVIDED THAT THE PARTIES “SHALL” CONSULT EACH OTHER ON HEALTH DECISIONS FOR THE CHILD BUT FATHER HAD THE CHILD INOCULATED WITHOUT CONSULTING MOTHER; BECAUSE THE PARTIES AGREED THE CHILD WOULD ATTEND PUBLIC SCHOOL, AND INOCULATION IS REQUIRED BY THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, MOTHER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE BREACH OF THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT; THEREFORE MOTHER’S MOTION TO HOLD HUSBAND IN CONTEMPT WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied defendant-mother’s motion to hold plaintiff-father in contempt for having the child inoculated for common childhood diseases. The separation agreement required that the parties consult each other on health decisions for the child. Father did not consult with mother before having the child inoculated. The separation agreement did not unequivocally prohibit plaintiff from having the child inoculated and the parties agreed the child would attend public school, for which inoculation is required. Therefore defendant was unable to demonstrate a violation of the separation agreement which prejudiced her:

The separation agreement provided that “[t]he parties shall continue to cooperate and consult with one another to arrive at decisions which they believe are in the best interest of the [c]hild with respect to health.” Despite this language, on two occasions, the plaintiff, without first consulting with the defendant, took the child, who had not received any vaccinations since the age of two, to get vaccinated.

However, the parties’ separation agreement did not unequivocally prohibit the plaintiff from having the child inoculated. Moreover, in light of the parties’ express intention to maintain the child’s enrollment in public education, and New York State’s then newly enacted public school vaccine mandate requiring such inoculations in order for the child to continue to attend public school (see Public Health Law § 2164; C.F. v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 191 AD3d 52, 70), the defendant cannot demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the failure of the plaintiff to consult with her prior to having the child inoculated. Heffer v Krebs, 2021 NY Slip Op 04542, Second Dept 7-29-21

July 28, 2021