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Labor Law-Construction Law

WHETHER “CLEANING” IS A COVERED ACTIVITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE CLEANING WORK IS “ROUTINE;” “ROUTINE” CLEANING WORK IS NOT COVERED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determine plaintiff should not have been awarded summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action and defendant’s summary judgment motion should have been granted. The issue was whether plaintiff was injured doing “cleaning” work covered by the Labor Law. The Court of Appeals held plaintiff was doing “routine” work, which therefore did not qualify as “cleaning” under Labor Law 240(1). The facts were not explained:

Labor Law § 240 (1) requires certain contractors and property owners to provide adequate safety devices when workers engage in particular tasks involving elevation-related risks. To recover under section 240 (1) for an injury caused by a failure to provide such safety devices, plaintiffs must first show that they were engaged in one of that section’s enumerated activities including, among others, “cleaning.” To determine whether an activity is “cleaning” within the meaning of the statute, courts apply a four-factor analysis (see Soto v J. Crew Inc., 21 NY3d 562, 568 [2013]). The first factor considers whether the work is “routine, in the sense that it is the type of job that occurs on a daily, weekly or other relatively-frequent and recurring basis as part of the ordinary maintenance and care of commercial premises” (id. [emphasis added]). This factor does not involve a fact-specific assessment of a plaintiff’s regular tasks—it instead asks whether the type of work would be expected to recur with relative frequency as part of the ordinary maintenance and care of a commercial property (see id. at 569).

Here, plaintiff’s work was “routine” within the meaning of the first factor, which therefore weighs against concluding that he was “cleaning.” “[V]iewed in totality,” the Soto factors do not “militate in favor of placing the task” in the category of “cleaning” (id. at 568-569). Healy v EST Downtown, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 02836, CtApp 4-28-22

​Practice Point: Injury while “cleaning” is not covered under Labor Law 240(1) if it is “routine.”

 

April 28, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-28 09:51:512022-04-29 10:10:29WHETHER “CLEANING” IS A COVERED ACTIVITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE CLEANING WORK IS “ROUTINE;” “ROUTINE” CLEANING WORK IS NOT COVERED (CT APP). ​
Appeals, Civil Procedure, Labor Law-Construction Law

THE APPELLATE DIVISION INITIALLY REVERSED SUPREME COURT AND HELD PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE; THERE WAS A DEFENSE VERDICT AFTER TRIAL; THE ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined the Appellate Division order denying summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) ladder-fall case did not “affect the final judgment” after trial. Therefore the order was not appealable to the Court of Appeals:

The 2018 Appellate Division order may be reviewed on appeal from a final paper only if, pursuant to CPLR 5501 (a), the nonfinal order “necessarily affects” the final judgment. “It is difficult to distill a rule of general applicability regarding the ‘necessarily affects’ requirement” … and “[w]e have never attempted, and we do not now attempt, a generally applicable definition” … . That said, to determine whether a nonfinal order “necessarily affects” the final judgment, in cases where the prior order “str[uck] at the foundation on which the final judgment was predicated” we have inquired whether “reversal would inescapably have led to a vacatur of the judgment” … . This is not such a case. In other cases, we have asked whether the nonfinal order “necessarily removed [a] legal issue from the case” so that “there was no further opportunity during the litigation to raise the question decided by the prior non-final order” … .

In resolving plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the Appellate Division held that factual questions existed as to whether a statutory violation occurred and as to proximate cause, or more specifically as to whether plaintiff’s own acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of the accident … . That nonfinal order did not remove any issues from the case. Rather, the question of proximate cause and liability was left undecided. The parties had further opportunity to litigate those issues and in fact did so during the jury trial. Bonczar v American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 02835, CtApp 4-28-22

Practice Point: A nonfinal order is not appealable to the Court of Appeal unless it “affects the final judgment.” If questions of fact remain after the nonfinal order is issued, the order does not “affect the final judgment” and is not appealable. Here the nonfinal order was the Appellate Division’s denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The order left open factual questions resolved at trial. Therefore the order did not “affect the final judgment.”

 

April 28, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-28 09:23:222022-04-29 09:48:04THE APPELLATE DIVISION INITIALLY REVERSED SUPREME COURT AND HELD PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE; THERE WAS A DEFENSE VERDICT AFTER TRIAL; THE ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).
Labor Law-Construction Law

QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE; APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED; EXTENSIVE THREE-JUDGE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff in this Labor Law 240(1) ladder-fall case should not have been awarded summary judgment. Plaintiff used an A-frame ladder in a closed position because of limited space. While rerouting pipes in the ceiling, plaintiff received an electric shock and fell to the floor. The majority found questions of fact were raised about whether the ladder failed to protect plaintiff and whether other safety devices should have been provided:

An “accident alone” is insufficient to establish a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) or causation … . Moreover, Labor Law § 240 (1) is designed to protect against “harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” … . We agree with the dissent below that plaintiff was not entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim … . Indeed, questions of fact exist as to whether “the ladder failed to provide proper protection,” whether “plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices,” and whether the ladder’s purported inadequacy or the absence of additional safety devices was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident … . Cutaia v Board of Mgrs. of the 160/170 Varick St. Condominium, 2022 NY Slip Op 02834, CtApp 4-28-22

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was apparently electrocuted while standing on a closed A-frame ladder and fell to the floor. The happening of the accident alone did not establish that the ladder failed to protect plaintiff or that other safety equipment should have been provided to plaintiff. Therefore plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. There was a three-judge dissenting opinion.

 

April 28, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-28 08:54:382022-04-29 09:51:45QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE; APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED; EXTENSIVE THREE-JUDGE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP). ​
Constitutional Law, Election Law

THE 2022 CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE SENATE REDISTRICTING MAPS DECLARED VOID BECAUSE THEY WERE DRAWN WITH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN INTENT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals declared the 2022 congressional and state senate redistricting maps void, finding they were drawn with “an unconstitutional partisan intent.” “Opinion by Chief Judge DiFiore. Judges Garcia, Singas and Cannataro concur. Judge Troutman dissents in part in an opinion, in which Judge Wilson concurs in part in a dissenting opinion, in which Judge Rivera concurs in part. Judge Rivera dissents in a separate dissenting opinion, in which Judge Wilson concurs:”

In 2014, the People of the State of New York amended the State Constitution to adopt historic reforms of the redistricting process by requiring, in a carefully structured process, the creation of electoral maps by an Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) and by declaring unconstitutional certain undemocratic practices such as partisan and racial gerrymandering. No one disputes that this year, during the first redistricting cycle to follow adoption of the 2014 amendments, the IRC and the legislature failed to follow the procedure commanded by the State Constitution. A stalemate within the IRC resulted in a breakdown in the mandatory process for submission of electoral maps to the legislature. The legislature responded by creating and enacting maps in a nontransparent manner controlled exclusively by the dominant political party — doing exactly what they would have done had the 2014 constitutional reforms never been passed. On these appeals, the primary questions before us are whether this failure to follow the prescribed constitutional procedure warrants invalidation of the legislature’s congressional and state senate maps and whether there is record support for the determination of both courts below that the district lines for congressional [*2]races were drawn with an unconstitutional partisan intent. We answer both questions in the affirmative and therefore declare the congressional and senate maps void. As a result, judicial oversight is required to facilitate the expeditious creation of constitutionally conforming maps for use in the 2022 election and to safeguard the constitutionally protected right of New Yorkers to a fair election. Matter of Harkenrider v Hochul, 2022 NY Slip Op 02833, CtApp 4-27-22

Practice Point: The Fourth Department’s determination the 2022 redistricting maps unconstitutionally favored democrats was here upheld by a divided Court of Appeals.

 

April 27, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-27 10:27:542022-04-29 10:28:57THE 2022 CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE SENATE REDISTRICTING MAPS DECLARED VOID BECAUSE THEY WERE DRAWN WITH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN INTENT (CT APP). ​
Appeals, Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED (1) THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL, AND (2) WHETHER A REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS UNEQUIVOCAL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge extensive dissenting opinion, determined (1) the record supported the finding that the defendant’s request for counsel was not unequivocal and (2) whether the request was unequivocal presents a mixed question of law and fact which is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals:

Once a defendant in custody unequivocally requests the assistance of counsel, the right to counsel may not be waived outside the presence of counsel … . But “[a] suggestion that counsel might be desired; a notification that counsel exists; or a query as to whether counsel ought to be obtained will not suffice” to unequivocally invoke the indelible right to counsel … . Furthermore, “[w]hether a particular request is or is not unequivocal is a mixed question of law and fact that must be determined with reference to the circumstances surrounding the request including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression and the particular words found to have been used by the defendant” … .

Here, there is support in the record for the lower courts’ determination that defendant—whose inquiries and demeanor suggested a conditional interest in speaking with an attorney only if it would not otherwise delay his clearly-expressed wish to speak to the police—did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel while in custody. That mixed question of law and fact is therefore beyond further review by this Court … .

From the dissent:

Here, Mr. Dawson [defendant] unequivocally invoked his right to counsel — the record supports no other conclusion. As is clear from the quoted portion of the colloquy with the detective, he twice said he wanted to call his lawyer, and the detective twice expressly stated that he understood Mr. Dawson had asked to call counsel and therefore the detective could no longer speak to Mr. Dawson. Additionally, the detective then told Mr. Dawson to wait while the detective retrieved Mr. Dawson’s phone so he could call counsel. People v Dawson, 2022 NY Slip Op 02772, CtApp 4-26-22

​Practice Point: Whether a defendant’s request for counsel in “unequivocal,” thereby requiring police interrogation to cease, is a mixed question of law and fact. As long as there is support in the record for the lower court’s finding the request was not unequivocal, the issue cannot be reviewed by the Court of Appeals.

 

April 26, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-26 12:25:202022-04-29 12:53:46THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED (1) THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL, AND (2) WHETHER A REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS UNEQUIVOCAL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP). ​
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE DNA EVIDENCE GENERATED BY THE TRUEALLELE CASEWORK SYSTEM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE; THE DEFENSE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE TRUEALLELE SOFTWARE CODE EITHER IN CONNECTION WITH THE FRYE HEARING OR TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST DEFENDANT; THE CONCURRENCE STATED WHETHER THE CODE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE DEFENSE UNDER A PROTECTIVE ORDER REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a three-judge concurring opinion, determined that the trial judge, after a Frye hearing, properly admitted DNA evidence generated by the TrueAllele Casework System. The arguments that the defense was entitled to the TrueAllele software source code in connection with the Frye hearing and in order to confront the witnesses against the defendant were rejected. The concurrence stated that  it remains an open question whether a protective order could be used to supply the defense with the source code:

This appeal primarily concerns the admissibility of DNA mixture interpretation evidence generated by the TrueAllele Casework System. We conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in finding, following a Frye hearing, that TrueAllele’s use of the continuous probabilistic genotyping approach to generate a statistical likelihood ratio—including the use of peak data below the stochastic threshold—of a DNA genotype is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. We also hold that there was no error in the court’s denial of defendant’s request for discovery of the TrueAllele software source code in connection with the Frye hearing or for the purpose of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him at trial.

From the concurring opinion:

Although the prosecutor failed to establish that, at the time of the Frye hearing, TrueAllele’s methodology was properly validated by disinterested parties with access to the source code, and defendant was denied an opportunity to review the source code because of the developer’s proprietary claims, the error, considered alone or with the other alleged constitutional error, was harmless on the facts of this case.

Even though the majority rejects defendant’s claim to the source code on the facts of this case, it remains an open question in this Court whether a defendant should be granted access to a proprietary source code under a protective order. This familiar method of ensuring a defendant’s right to present a defense would safeguard commercial interests. It provides no help to this defendant, but it is squarely within a court’s authority to grant such an order in an appropriate future case. People v Wakefield, 2022 NY Slip Op 02771, CtApp 4-26-22

​Practice Point: The Court of Appeal holds that DNA evidence generated by the TrueAllele Casework System is admissible. The defense was not entitled to the TrueAllele software code either for the Frye hearing or in order the confront the witnesses against the defendant. It is an open question whether the defense could gain access to the software code by way of a protective order (suggested by the concurring opinion).

 

April 26, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-26 11:53:192022-04-29 12:25:07THE DNA EVIDENCE GENERATED BY THE TRUEALLELE CASEWORK SYSTEM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE; THE DEFENSE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE TRUEALLELE SOFTWARE CODE EITHER IN CONNECTION WITH THE FRYE HEARING OR TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST DEFENDANT; THE CONCURRENCE STATED WHETHER THE CODE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE DEFENSE UNDER A PROTECTIVE ORDER REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION (CT APP).
Criminal Law, Evidence

ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT A FRYE HEARING TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ANALYSIS OF DNA EVIDENCE USING THE FORENSIC STATISTICAL TOOL WAS ERROR, THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR BECAUSE OF VIDEO EVIDENCE CIRCUMSTANTIALLY CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE GUN FOUND BY THE POLICE; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT ON WHETHER THE ADMISSION OF THE DNA EVIDENVE CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE GUN WAS HARMLESS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, held the acknowledged DNA-evidence error was harmless. All the judges agreed that a Frye hearing should have been held to determine the admissibility of the DNA analysis using the Forensic Statistical Tool. The issue was whether the defendant or others at the scene of the assault (a deli store) possessed a gun which was found on a display shelf by a police officer. DNA evidence connected the gun to the defendant. The majority concluded the video footage which showed defendant placing an item on the shelf where the gun was found rendered the DNA-evidence error harmless:​

It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the results of DNA analysis conducted using the Forensic Statistical Tool without first holding a Frye hearing … . Here, however, this error was harmless. The evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Video footage from a security camera inside the store was entered into evidence at trial, including footage from one camera trained on a display shelf which captured a group of men holding defendant against the shelf. The other men then scatter, leaving the video frame, at which point defendant places an item on the shelf directly in front of him before he too runs out of the frame. After approximately two minutes and fifteen seconds, during which no one approaches the shelf or the area where defendant placed the item, a police officer looks at the space on the shelf where the item was placed, walks over, and removes a gun. Rather than “mere physical proximity,” the video shows that only defendant could have placed the item—the gun recovered minutes later—on the shelf, not “any of the several others in the same area” (dissenting op at 8). Therefore, there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant had it not been for this error … . People v Easley, 2022 NY Slip Op 02770 CtApp 4-26-22

Practice Point: All the judges at the Court of Appeals agreed the admissibility of DNA evidence gathered using the Forensic Statistical Tool should have been determined in a Frye hearing. But the judges disagreed on whether the error in admitting the DNA evidence was harmless. The DNA evidence apparently connected the defendant to a gun found by the police. The majority concluded video evidence which demonstrated defendant placed an object in the area where the gun was found rendered the DNA error harmless. Three judges disagreed in an extensive opinion.

 

April 26, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-26 11:03:102022-04-29 11:53:12ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT A FRYE HEARING TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ANALYSIS OF DNA EVIDENCE USING THE FORENSIC STATISTICAL TOOL WAS ERROR, THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR BECAUSE OF VIDEO EVIDENCE CIRCUMSTANTIALLY CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE GUN FOUND BY THE POLICE; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT ON WHETHER THE ADMISSION OF THE DNA EVIDENVE CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE GUN WAS HARMLESS (CT APP).
Negligence, Toxic Torts

THE OVER $3,000,000 VERDICT IN THIS TOXIC TORT CASE REVERSED; THE PROOF THAT DEFENDANT’S TALCUM POWDER, WHICH ALLEGEDLY CONTAINED ASBESTOS, CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S LUNG CANCER WAS DEEMED INSUFFICIENT; THE STANDARD FOR PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT CASES DISCUSSED IN DEPTH (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the proof of plaintiff’s decedent’s exposure to asbestos in defendant’s talcum powder was not sufficient to demonstrate the powder caused decedent’s mesothelioma (lung cancer). The opinion reviews the toxic-tort caselaw with respect to the sufficiency of proof of causation. That discussion is too comprehensive to fairly summarize here:

Although we have recognized that in any given case it may be “difficult, if not impossible, to quantify a plaintiff’s past exposure” to a toxin … , our standard itself is not “impossible” for plaintiffs to meet … . We must, as always, strike a balance between the need to exclude “unreliable or speculative information” as to causation with our obligation to ensure that we have not set “an insurmountable standard that would effectively deprive toxic tort plaintiffs of their day in court” … . The requirement that plaintiff establish, using expert testimony based on generally accepted methodologies, sufficient exposure to a toxin to cause the claimed illness strikes the appropriate balance … . The fault here is not in our standard, but in plaintiff’s proof. Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am.. 2022 NY Slip Op 02769, CtApp 4-26, 2022

Practice Point: This Court of Appeals opinion reviews and analyzes the causation proof-requirements for toxic tort cases. Here the proof that asbestos in talcum powder caused plaintiff’s decedent’s lung cancer was deemed insufficient.

 

April 26, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-26 10:29:032022-04-29 11:02:21THE OVER $3,000,000 VERDICT IN THIS TOXIC TORT CASE REVERSED; THE PROOF THAT DEFENDANT’S TALCUM POWDER, WHICH ALLEGEDLY CONTAINED ASBESTOS, CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S LUNG CANCER WAS DEEMED INSUFFICIENT; THE STANDARD FOR PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT CASES DISCUSSED IN DEPTH (CT APP).
Workers' Compensation

A SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE SAME BODY “MEMBER” WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF A PRIOR SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD NEED NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PERCENTAGE LOSS OF THE PRIOR AWARD (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion addressing two cases by Judge Cannataro, over an extensive dissent in each case, determined that, under Workers’ Compensation Law section 15, a subsequent injury to the same body “member” may be fully compensable, notwithstanding a prior injury involving the same body “member:”

The common issue in these appeals is whether, under Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) § 15, a claimant’s schedule loss of use (SLU) award must always be reduced by the percentage loss determined for a prior SLU award to a different subpart of the same body “member” enumerated in section 15. We hold that separate SLU awards for different injuries to the same statutory member are contemplated by section 15 and, when a claimant proves that the second injury, “considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability” (WCL § 15 [7]), has caused an increased loss of use, the claimant is entitled to an SLU award commensurate with that increased loss of use. .Matter of Johnson v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 02579, CtApp 4-21-22

​Practice Point: A schedule loss of use (SLU) award for injury to a body “member” need not be reduced based on a prior SLU award for injury to the same body “member” if the claimant proves the second injury has caused an increased loss of use.

 

April 21, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-21 10:31:412022-04-22 10:56:18A SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE SAME BODY “MEMBER” WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF A PRIOR SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD NEED NOT BE REDUCED BY THE PERCENTAGE LOSS OF THE PRIOR AWARD (CT APP).
Appeals, Mental Hygiene Law

BECAUSE OF A LACK OF PLACEMENT OPTIONS, A CHILD REMOVED FROM SCHOOL WHEN SHE BECAME UNMANAGEABLE REMAINED IN A HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM FOR WEEKS; THE PETITION SOUGHT HER RELEASE FROM THE EMERGENCY ROOM; THE APPEAL WAS DEEMED MOOT BECAUSE THE NYS OFFICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES HAD FOUND SUITABLE PLACEMENT AND INSTITUTED A PROGRAM TO ENSURE THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT RECUR (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal as moot, over an extensive dissent, determined the exception to the mootness doctrine should not be applied because the problem at the heart of the petition had been adequately addressed by the NYS Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD). The subject child had been removed from school and sent to a hospital emergency room because she had become unmanageable. The child ended up staying in the emergency room for weeks because suitable placement was not available. The habeas corpus petition sough her release from the emergency room. During the weeks the child was in the emergency room programs were instituted to facilitate prompt suitable placement of children facing similar circumstances:

… [D]uring the pendency of petitioner’s appeal to this Court, OPWDD developed a new program, Crisis Services for Individuals with Intellectual and/or Developmental Disabilities ([CSIDD] 14 NYCRR 635-16.1 et seq.), aimed at preventing persons with developmental disabilities from experiencing a crisis that may result in hospitalization and thereby reducing the likelihood of these issues recurring. At oral argument before this Court, counsel for OPWDD and DOH represented that the services provided by CSIDD are now available throughout the entirety of the State of New York, and particularly in the region where the child resided. Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Delaney, 2022 NY Slip Op 02578, CtApp 4-21-22

Practice Point: An appeal may be dismissed as moot if the appellate court is presented with evidence the underlying issue has been adequately addressed while the appeal was pending. Here a child removed from school because she became unmanageable had been held in a hospital emergency room for weeks because suitable placement was not available. At the time of oral argument, the child had been placed and a program to prevent recurrence of the problem had been instituted.

 

April 21, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-21 09:57:552022-04-22 10:31:32BECAUSE OF A LACK OF PLACEMENT OPTIONS, A CHILD REMOVED FROM SCHOOL WHEN SHE BECAME UNMANAGEABLE REMAINED IN A HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM FOR WEEKS; THE PETITION SOUGHT HER RELEASE FROM THE EMERGENCY ROOM; THE APPEAL WAS DEEMED MOOT BECAUSE THE NYS OFFICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES HAD FOUND SUITABLE PLACEMENT AND INSTITUTED A PROGRAM TO ENSURE THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT RECUR (CT APP).
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