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A POLICE OFFICER DESCRIBED STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VICTIMS BUT THE VICTIMS DID NOT TESTIFY; ALTHOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL MENTIONED THE LACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN A SUFFICIENCY-OF-EVIDENCE ARGUMENT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISED; THEREFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming defendant’s conviction, over a three-judge dissent, determined the constitutional “confrontation” issue first raised on appeal had not been preserved. A police officer testified about the identities and physical descriptions of the assailants provided by one of the victims while she was being treated in an ambulance. The victims were expected to testify but never did:

Defendant’s motion at the close of the People’s case did not invoke the Confrontation Clause and the colloquy that took place between defense counsel and the court makes clear that the motion to dismiss was neither intended nor understood to raise a constitutional issue.  Moreover, counsel did not invoke or rely on any caselaw dealing with constitutional protections. Instead, counsel made evidentiary arguments regarding the persuasive quality of the prosecution’s proof and, when asked by the court, confirmed that the motion was limited to the sufficiency of the evidence. Further, the timing of defendant’s motion at the close of the People’s case—which defense counsel specifically referred to as “a trial order of dismissal” …—suggests that defendant’s aim was not to challenge testimony of the victim’s statements as violative of his right to confrontation, but simply as failing to meet the evidentiary bar for a prima facie case … . Additionally, counsel repeatedly told the court that his motion was “focus[ed]” on the third-degree robbery charge, demonstrating that the argument was a legal insufficiency one, rather than a Confrontation Clause challenge, which would necessarily apply to all charges with equal force. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the mere reference to a lack of cross-examination was insufficient to alert the court that defendant was making a constitutional argument … . People v Bacon, 2025 NY Slip Op 03692, CtApp 6-18-25

Practice Point: Here the violation of defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was a viable issue because statements made by two witness were described by a police officer but the witnesses did not testify. Although defense counsel mentioned the inability to cross-examine the witnesses in a “sufficiency-of-evidence” argument before the trial court, the constitutional confrontation argument was not specifically raised. The majority, over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined the constitutional issue was not preserved for appeal.

 

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THE CITY OF KINGSTON PROPERLY OPTED IN TO A RENT STABILIZATION REGIME PURSUANT TO THE HOUSING STABILITY AND TENANT PROTECTION ACT (HSTPA), PROPERLY DECLARED A HOUSING EMERGENCY, AND PROPERLY PROMULGATED RELATED GUIDELINES (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined the City of Kingston properly opted in to a rent stabilization regime pursuant to the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA) and properly declared a housing emergency. Petitioners, a group of private landlords and an association representing landlords in the Hudson Valley, unsuccessfuly sought to invalidate Kingston’s Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) opt-in and two guidelines subsequently promulgated by the Kingston New York Rent Guidelines Board (KRGB). The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here:

To enter into the ETPA’s rent-stabilization regime, a municipality’s “local legislative body” must make “[a] declaration of emergency” as to all or any class of housing accommodations within the municipality. It may do so only if the vacancy rate for those housing accommodations “is not in excess of five percent” … . Once the municipality makes such a declaration, it must recommend members to be appointed to a newly formed rent guidelines board by the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal’s (DHCR) commissioner … . Matter of Hudson Val. Prop. Owners Assn. Inc. v City of Kingston, 2025 NY Slip Op 03691, CtApp 6-18-25

 

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THE DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON BY RETIRED NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES TO PROVE THE CITY PROMISED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH MEDICARE SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR LIFE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS PROMISE; THEREFORE THE RETIREES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THEIR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CAUSE OF ACTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the petitioners were not entitled to judgment on the promissory estoppel cause of action. Petitioners are retired New York City employees who argued the city had promised to provide them with Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life. In 2021 the city made significant changes to its health benefits program, discontinuing its most popular program, Senior Care, and most other options, and enrolling retirees in a Medicare Advantage Plan (MAP) managed by Aetna Life Insurance Company:

To support the allegation of a clear and unambiguous promise of Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life, petitioners submitted copies of Summary Program Descriptions (SPDs) that the City provides its employees and retirees on an annual basis to inform them of their health insurance options. * * *

The SPDs themselves contain nothing that could be construed as a clear and unambiguous promise of Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life. To the contrary, we agree with the City that the language in the SPDs is descriptive and for informational purposes only. The language on which petitioners rely—”becomes eligible,” “is provided,” “provides,” and “supplements”—is in the present tense. The descriptive nature of the SPD is reflected in the title of the document—Summary Program Description—and its informational nature is also clear from the context of the SPD, the purpose of which is to explain benefits for the upcoming year. Indeed, annual SPDs are necessary only because benefits change from year to year, a fact petitioners do not contest. Petitioners rely heavily on the phrase “and thereafter” in the SPDs as conclusive evidence of a continuing promise, but read in context this language is used only to explain when someone is eligible for Medicare and not in reference to any promise of future benefits. To the extent that one might infer a commitment of sorts from the SPDs’ language, it does not rise to the level of a clear and unambiguous promise that the City would pay for Medigap coverage, as opposed to some other form of health insurance coverage, for the rest of every retiree’s life. Matter of Bentkowski v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 03690, CtApp 6-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the proof requirements for a “clear and unambiguous promise,” in the context of promissory estoppel.

 

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THE REGULATIONS WHICH ALLOW THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER A NONPUBLIC SCHOOL OFFERS EDUCATION SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OFFERED BY LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS WERE PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the regulations which allow the Commissioner of Education to enforce the requirement that nonpublic schools provide an education “substantially equivalent” to that provided by local public schools were properly promulgated:

​Petitioners argue that 8 NYCRR 130.6 (c) (2) (i) and 8 NYCRR 130.8 (d) (7) (i) are invalid because they compel parents to “unenroll” their children from schools deemed not substantially equivalent, authorizing and necessarily leading to school closures, and that this exceeds the authority of the Commissioner. * * *

The regulatory provisions at issue here state that, in the event of a negative substantial equivalency determination, “the nonpublic school shall no longer be deemed a school which provides compulsory education fulfilling the requirements of Article 65 of the Education Law” … . A determination that a nonpublic school has failed to meet the substantial equivalence requirement leads naturally to this acknowledgement—that the nonpublic school fails to comply with the Education Law’s substantial equivalency mandate and thus is not a school that fulfills the statutory requirement for compulsory education. Far from exceeding the Commissioner’s statutory authority, the regulations simply establish a mechanism by which the statutory mandate is enforced. In this regard, instead of being contrary to the statute’s purpose, the challenged regulations are a natural consequence flowing from the statutory language itself.

Contrary to petitioners’ claims, nothing in these provisions requires that parents “unenroll” their children from a nonpublic school deemed not to provide substantially equivalent instruction. Nor do the regulations authorize school closures. The provisions merely state that the nonpublic school does not provide substantially equivalent instruction—a determination well within the authority provided to the Commissioner by the statute. The parent or custodian must determine how then to ensure their compliance with the Education Law. Matter of Parents for Educ. & Religious Liberty in Schs. v Young, 2025 NY Slip Op 03689, CtApp 6-18-25

 

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“MAKING A TERRORISTIC THREAT” IS A BAILABLE FELONY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Hallligan, over a three-judge dissent, determined “making a terroristic threat” is a bailable felony:

Michael Cavagnolo was arrested and charged with making a terroristic threat after he repeatedly called the Hyde Park Police Department emergency line threatening to commit violent acts against officers, their families, and Police Department property. County Court fixed bail pursuant to CPL 510.10 (4) (a). That paragraph makes bailable all violent felony offenses listed in Penal Law § 70.02, with two specific exceptions. One of the offenses listed in Penal Law § 70.02 is the crime of making a terroristic threat (see Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [c]). Paragraph (g) of CPL 510.10 (4), however, makes bailable the felony crimes of terrorism defined in Penal Law article 490 but expressly excludes the crime of making a terroristic threat.

Although these two paragraphs are difficult to reconcile, the text and disjunctive structure of CPL 510.10 (4) indicate that paragraph (g) was not intended to narrow the independent authorization provided in paragraph (a) to set monetary bail for all violent felony offenses listed therein. We therefore hold that making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense. Accordingly, we reverse. People ex rel. Ellis v Imperati, 2025 NY Slip Op 03646, CtApp 6-17-25

Practice Point: Despite seemingly conflicting statutory provisions, “making a terroristic threat” was deemed a bailable felony by the Court of Appeals.

 

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BAIL MAY BE IMPOSED ON A DEFENDANT WHO IS CHARGED WITH COMMITTING NEW OFFENSES WHILE OUT ON BAIL, EVEN IF THE NEW OFFENSES WOULD NOT OTHERWISE QUALIFY FOR THE IMPOSITION OF BAIL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a two-judge concurrence, determined a defendant who commits new offenses when out on bail is subject to the imposition of bail for the new offenses, even when the new offenses would not otherwise have qualified for the imposition of bail:

CPL 510.10 (4) (t) provides a judge with discretion to set bail on certain otherwise non-qualifying offenses committed after a defendant has been “released under conditions” on a prior charge. The issue raised on this appeal is whether a defendant who is arrested on new charges after having been released on bail on the prior, underlying charge is “released under conditions” within the meaning of that provision. We hold that the statute applies in such circumstances, and because affirmative habeas relief is no longer available, we reverse the Appellate Division … .

The 2019 bail reform legislation eliminated cash bail for most crimes, except for certain specified qualifying offenses listed in CPL 510.10 (4) … . In 2020, the legislature amended subdivision (4) by expanding the categories of offenses that qualified for bail. The changes included the addition of CPL 510.10 (4) (t), a harm-on-harm provision, by which “an otherwise non-qualifying offense may be converted into a qualifying offense” … . Under that provision, certain ineligible crimes may otherwise qualify for bail if those crimes “arose from conduct occurring while the defendant was released on his or her own recognizance, released under conditions or had yet to be arraigned after the issuance of a desk appearance ticket for a separate felony or class A misdemeanor involving harm to an identifiable person or property” … . For purposes of section (4) (t), the underlying crime need not be a qualifying offense … . People ex rel. Welch v Maginley-Liddie, 2025 NY Slip Op 03645, CtApp 6-17-25

Practice Point: Where a defendant is charged with new offenses committed while on bail, bail may be imposed for the new offenses even where they otherwise would not qualify for the imposition of bail.

 

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HERE DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS REDUCED PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) AFTER SHE HAD BEEN IMPRISONED LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED BY THE DVSJA; THE EXCESS PRISON TIME SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CREDITED TO ELIMINATE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a two-judge dissent, determined defendant’s (Brenda’s) sentence was properly reduced by the Appellate Division pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), but the excess time Brenda was imprisoned beyond the maximum allowed by the DVSJA should not been credited to eliminate the period of postrelease supervision:

The DVSJA requires that resentenced defendants be given a period of postrelease supervision. Penal Law § 70.45 (2) (f) … states that that the period of postrelease supervision for resentences imposed under Penal Law § 60.12 (8) “shall be” not less than two and one-half years nor more than five years. That requirement is specific to DVSJA resentences. * * *

… [T]he Appellate Division was within its plenary factual review power when it reversed and reduced Brenda’s sentence pursuant to the DVSJA, but because the court’s imposition of the maximum term of postrelease supervision may have been based on its erroneous conclusion that time Brenda spent incarcerated beyond that imposed by the DVSJA resentencing could be credited against the term of postrelease supervision required by the DVSJA, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by remitting the case to the Appellate Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion … . People v Brenda WW., 2025 NY Slip Op 03643, CtApp 7-17-25

Practice Point: The Appellate Division has the power to make a “de novo” determination whether a defendant is entitled to a sentence reduction pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA).​

Practice Point: Where a defendant’s sentence is reduced under the DVSJA to a term below the amount of time already served by the defendant, the excess time cannot be credited towed the period of postrelease supervision.

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S REPEATED CLAIMS, DURING SUMMATION, THAT EVERYTHING THE JURY HEARD FROM DEFENDANT WERE “LIES;” MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s manslaughter conviction and ordering a new trial, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, with two concurrences, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s claims during summation that defendant had repeatedly lied. Defendant had been abused by the victim and had asserted the justification defense. She testified she stabbed the victim once in fear for her life when the victim lunged at her, after he had raped her:

During summation, the prosecutor sought to undermine the defendant’s justification defense by suggesting that the defendant was not credible. In furtherance of that strategy, the prosecutor told the jury, “You never heard testimony that [the defendant] was in fear for her life. You never heard testimony that she was in fear of serious injury. Nothing.” As the People concede, this statement was false. The defendant had, in fact, testified that immediately before the stabbing she was “scared for my life,” and when subsequently asked whether she had testified that she was “afraid for your life,” the defendant responded “Yes, I was.”

Additionally, the prosecutor claimed in summation that the defendant had lied on the stand, using the word “lie” or “lies” fourteen times in total. Among other comments, the prosecutor claimed that “the only thing we can get out of [the defendant] are lies”; that her testimony was “unsubstantiated wild lies”; and that her testimony was “[m]eant to distract you from . . . the endless lies she has told you throughout this entire process.” The prosecutor also posed rhetorical questions along similar lines to the jury: “How could you possibly believe one thing that comes out of her mouth after all the lies she told you?” and “What wouldn’t she lie about?” Following summations, the court excused the jury and expressed concern about “[t]he repeated use of the word lies, which I also was going to limit if not eliminate,” but noted that it did not do so as the word “had been used throughout the trial without objection and I didn’t think it was proper for me to do it at this point.”

Defense counsel did not object either to the prosecutor’s flat misstatement of the defendant’s testimony that she feared for her life or to the repeated use of the word “lies.”  People v T.P., 2025 NY Slip Op 03642, CtApp 6-17-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when a prosecutor can go too far in summation.

 

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A MISSING JURY-NOTE-RESPONSE TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL UNLESS THE DEFENDANT SHOWS ENTITLEMENT TO A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING AND THE TRANSCRIPT CANNOT BE RECONSTRUCTED, NOT THE CASE HERE; WHEN A MOTION TO VACATE A CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE GROUNDS TURNS ON FACTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD, DENIAL WITHOUT A HEARING IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, remitting the matter for a hearing, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, determined (1) the absence of the transcript of a response to a jury note did not require reversal, and (2) defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds should not have been denied without a hearing:

Re: missing response-to-a-jury-note transcript:

… [A] missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to the extreme remedy of vacatur, but may entitle a defendant to a reconstruction hearing … . To be sure, if a defendant shows that they are entitled to a reconstruction hearing, and that the missing transcript at issue “cannot be reconstructed . . . , there must be a reversal” … . But defendant has not made that showing. Thus, the missing transcript does not warrant reversing defendant’s conviction.

Re: motion to vacate conviction, ineffective assistance:

Where a defendant moves to vacate their conviction under CPL 440.10, the court “must” decide “whether the motion is determinable without a hearing to resolve questions of fact” … . The court “may deny” the motion summarily under enumerated circumstances, including where purported facts essential to the motion are unsupported by “sworn allegations” that “substantiat[e] or tend[ ] to substantiate” those facts … , or where such a fact “is contradicted by a court record or other official document” and “there is no reasonable possibility that [the] allegation is true” … . We review a CPL article 440 motion’s summary denial for abuse of discretion … .

Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim cannot be decided without first resolving questions of fact. Defense counsel’s affirmation, together with the trial record, suggest that counsel may have lacked a strategic or other legitimate basis for one or more of his actions relating to eyewitness identification testimony at the heart of the People’s proof. Whether counsel in fact had such a basis for his conduct turns on factual information outside the present record that should be developed at an evidentiary hearing. People v Salas, 2025 NY Slip Op 03603, CtApp 6-12-25

Practice Point: A missing jury-note-response transcript does not require reversal unless the defendant shows entitlement to a reconstruction hearing and the transcript cannot be reconstructed.​

Practice Point: Where a motion to vacate the conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds turns on facts outside the record, here the strategic or other legitimate basis for counsel’s actions, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the motion without a hearing.

 

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THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CONDUCT PROPERLY REVOKED PETITIONER-RADIATION-ONCOLOGIST’S LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE; THE BOARD’S EXPERT OPINED THAT PETITIONER’S USE OF HIGHER “CURATIVE” RADIATION DOSES WHEN LOWER “PALLIATIVE” DOSES WERE APPROPRIATE FELL SHORT OF THE RELEVANT STANDARD OF CARE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the Department of Health’s Board for Professional Medical Conduct properly revoked petitioner’s license to practice medicine. Petitioner, a radiation oncologist, was found to have deviated from the generally accepted standard of care by administering higher “curative” doses of radiation treatment when lower “palliative” doses were appropriate. The inquiry came down to a battle of experts about what the appropriate standard of care is. The petitioner argued that the Board’s expert improperly relied solely on clinical practice guidelines for that determination:

Petitioner’s contention that the Board’s expert relied solely on clinical practice guidelines overvalues the import of the following testimony:

Counsel: “[W]hat do you mean when you say standard of care?

Expert: “We have accepted guidelines that are published by multiple societies, they include our board, [the] American College of Radiology or [the] American Board of Radiology, [and] national comprehensive cancer networks and these are fairly descriptive, prescriptive guidelines for what a physician should do in the management of cases in very specific areas. When you deviate from those, it is considered to fall short of a standard.”

This answer by the Board’s expert, and others like it, should not be viewed in isolation. The Board’s expert was well-credentialed and had over 30 years of practice in the field of radiation oncology. Rather than merely citing the clinical practice guidelines as being the standard of care, he established the standard of care as he understood it based on his years of seeing patients. For each of the seven patients at issue, the Board’s expert identified the relevant medical and scientific principles underlying the standard of care and provided detailed explanations about why that standard best served patients and why deviating from it risked causing significant harm to those patients. Thus, respondent’s expert did not rely exclusively on clinical practice guidelines. Instead, as the Appellate Division concluded, he used those guidelines as “one link in the chain” of his evaluation process … . Matter of Won Yi v New York State Bd. of Professional Med. Conduct, 2025 NY Slip Op 03103, CtApp 5-22-25

 

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