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Tag Archive for: Court of Appeals

Evidence, Real Property Tax Law

IN A TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING, EVIDENCE THE LETTERS PROVIDING NOTICE OF THE FORECLOSURE WERE NOT RETURNED TO THE TAXING AUTHORITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT WITH PROOF NOTICE WAS NOT RECEIVED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the controlling statute, Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 1125(1)(b), does not preclude plaintiff in a tax foreclosure proceeding from presenting evidence the statutory notice requirements were not complied with. The statute states that notice of the foreclosure “shall be deemed received” if neither the certified letter nor the letter sent by first class mail are returned within 45 days. The taxing authority presented evidence the letters were not returned. Plaintiff presented evidence notice was sent to the wrong address and the certified letter lacked a postmark. The Court of Appeals held plaintiff had raised a question of fact about compliance with the statutory notice requirement, notwithstanding the evidence the letters were not returned:

By its unambiguous terms, RPTL 1125 (1) (b) (i) relates to whether notice will be “deemed received,” not whether the taxing authority has complied with the statutory mailing requirements. Although the taxing authority must ensure that “[a]n affidavit of mailing of such notice [is] executed” … , the statute expressly provides that “[t]he failure of an intended recipient to receive any such notice shall not invalidate any tax or prevent the enforcement of the same as provided by law” … . It is only when both the certified mailing and the first class mailing are returned that the statute requires the taxing authority to take additional action beyond the requirements set forth in RPTL 1125 (1) (b) (i) … .

That is not the end of the analysis, however, in cases where the interested party argues, as plaintiff does here, that the taxing authority failed to comply with the mailing requirements set forth in RPTL 1125 (1) (b) (i). … RPTL 1125 (1) (b) (i) contains no “presumption of service” … . Nor does section 1125 (1) (b) (i) bar an interested party from submitting evidence that would call the taxing authority’s compliance with its requirements into issue or limit the proof an interested party may use to raise an issue of fact with respect to that compliance only to evidence that both the certified and first class mailings were returned. Courts “may not create a limitation that the legislature did not enact” … . James B. Nutter & Co. v County of Saratoga, 2023 NY Slip Op 01469, CtApp 3-21-23

Practice Point: In a tax foreclosure proceeding, proof that the letters notifying the property owner of the foreclosure were not returned to the taxing authority (RPTL 1125(1)(b)) does not preclude the owner from raising a question of fact with evidence notice was not received (here evidence the certified letter did not have a postmark and a letter was sent to the wrong address).

 

March 21, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-21 11:18:302023-03-22 12:10:30IN A TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING, EVIDENCE THE LETTERS PROVIDING NOTICE OF THE FORECLOSURE WERE NOT RETURNED TO THE TAXING AUTHORITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT WITH PROOF NOTICE WAS NOT RECEIVED (CT APP). ​
Appeals, Criminal Law

EVEN WHERE A SENTENCE HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY THE DEFENDANT AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN, AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS OBLIGATED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS UNDULY HARSH OR SEVERE, SEPARATE AND APART FROM WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS LEGAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in two concurring opinions, determined the matter should be sent back to the Appellate Term for consideration of defendant’s argument his plea-bargained sentence (a $500 fine) was unduly harsh or severe. An appellate court’s power to reduce an unduly harsh or severe sentence can be applied, even when the sentence was part of a plea bargain:

The Appellate Term concluded that there was “no basis for reducing the fine” … . Although the Court was not required to go further and set forth the basis for its conclusion (see CPL 470.25 [1] …), here, it did so, reasoning that “[d]efendant received the precise sentence for which he had bargained, which was within the permissible statutory range” …  . In other words, the sentence was legal and bargained-for. Certainly, the Appellate Term cannot be faulted for considering and addressing the legality of the sentence because the intermediate appellate courts “cannot allow an illegal sentence to stand” … . However, the legality of the sentence was irrelevant to the entirely separate issue of whether it was unduly harsh or severe … , and it was improper for the Appellate Term to treat the bargained-for nature of defendant’s sentence as dispositive of his challenge to the severity of the sentence. People v Ba, 2023 NY Slip Op 01468, CtApp 3-21-23

Practice Point: An intermediate appellate court is constrained to consider whether a sentence is unduly harsh or severe, even where the sentence was agreed to by the defendant as part of a plea bargain.

 

March 21, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-21 10:53:072023-03-26 10:02:19EVEN WHERE A SENTENCE HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY THE DEFENDANT AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN, AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS OBLIGATED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS UNDULY HARSH OR SEVERE, SEPARATE AND APART FROM WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS LEGAL (CT APP).
Appeals, Criminal Law

THE THIRD DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN APPLYING THE WRONG STANDARD TO THE REDUCTION OF A SENTENCE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE FOR DECADES; HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE THIRD DEPARTMENT HAS RECENTLY STOPPED APPLYING THE WRONG STANDARD, THIS APPEAL IS MOOT (CT APP),

The Court of Appeals determined the sentencing issue raised by the defendant (Baldwin) was moot. Judge Wilson, in a concurring opinion, explained that the standard applied by the Third Department for reduction of a sentence in the interest of justice is incorrect:

The question presented on this appeal is whether, for the past several decades, the Third Department has imposed an erroneous legal standard on criminal defendants seeking a reduction of their sentences in the interest of justice. Mr. Baldwin points to countless Third Department cases, including his own, in which the Third Department employed a test requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion for it to exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction to modify a sentence. Relying on the statutory language empowering the Appellate Division to reduce “unduly harsh or severe” sentences in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15 [6] [b]), Mr. Baldwin contends that the Third Department’s test constitutes an incorrect legal standard.

Mr. Baldwin argues that the Third Department’s requirement that a defendant show a clear abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances is contrary to both our case law and the practices of the other Appellate Division departments. In People v Delgado, we emphasized that the Appellate Division’s “broad, plenary power to modify a sentence may be exercised, if the interest of justice warrants, without deference to the sentencing court” (80 NY2d 780, 780 [1992]). Mr. Baldwin contends that the Third Department’s standard is an outlier: it is used by no other department, and has been expressly rejected by the Fourth Department (see eg People v Thomas, 194 AD3d 1405, 1406 [4th Dept 2021] [“We are compelled to emphasize once again that, contrary to the People’s assertion, a criminal defendant need not show extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court in order to obtain a sentence reduction under CPL 470.15 (6) (b)”] [internal quotations omitted]).

Here, however, as Mr. Baldwin himself points out, the issue is not likely to recur. The Third Department, to its great credit, apparently noticed the pendency of this appeal and the issue it raised, after which it corrected its longstanding use of the wrong standard, making repetition of the error unlikely … . People v Baldwin, 2023 NY Slip Op 01467, CtApp 3-21-23

Practice Point: The Third Department had been using the wrong standard for the reduction of a sentence in the interest of justice for decades but has recently corrected the problem, rendering this appeal moot.

 

March 21, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-21 10:26:142023-03-22 10:52:55THE THIRD DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN APPLYING THE WRONG STANDARD TO THE REDUCTION OF A SENTENCE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE FOR DECADES; HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE THIRD DEPARTMENT HAS RECENTLY STOPPED APPLYING THE WRONG STANDARD, THIS APPEAL IS MOOT (CT APP),
Appeals, Constitutional Law, Negligence

INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS; HERE A NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS COLLIDED WITH A CAR DRIVEN BY A NEW YORK RESIDENT IN THE LINCOLN TUNNEL AND THE TRIAL WAS HELD IN NEW YORK; ALTHOUGH THE INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE WAS VALIDATED BY THE US SUPREME COURT IN 2019, THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined the sovereign immunity defense raised for the first time on appeal by New Jersey in this traffic accident case was not preserved for appeal to the Court of Appeals. The accident happened in the Lincoln Tunnel and involved the New York resident plaintiff and a bus owned by the defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation. New Jersey argued that the US Supreme Court had changed the law in 2019, allowing a state to preclude suit in another state absent consent thereby presenting a constitutional issue not subject to the preservation requirement. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument:

The question before us is whether we have power to hear this appeal under NY Constitution article VI, § 3 and CPLR 5601 (b) (1). To answer this threshold issue, we must consider the jurisdictional nature of interstate sovereign immunity to ascertain whether defendants’ sovereign immunity defense is exempt from our general preservation rules. We conclude that a state must preserve its interstate sovereign immunity defense by raising it before the trial court, and no exception to the general preservation rule applies. Because defendants asserted their sovereign immunity defense for the first time on appeal after the United States Supreme Court decided Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v Hyatt (587 US &mdash, 139 S Ct 1485 [2019] [hereinafter Hyatt III]), the argument is unpreserved in this case and there is no directly involved constitutional question supporting this appeal as of right. The appeal should therefore be dismissed. Henry v New Jersey Tr. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 01466, CtApp 3-21-23

Practice Point: Interstate sovereign immunity means one state cannot be sued in the courts of another state absent consent. That form of sovereign immunity was validated by the US Supreme Court in 2019. The issue, however, must be preserved by raising it in the trial court before the Court of Appeals will consider it.

 

March 21, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-21 09:39:072023-03-22 10:26:02INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS; HERE A NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS COLLIDED WITH A CAR DRIVEN BY A NEW YORK RESIDENT IN THE LINCOLN TUNNEL AND THE TRIAL WAS HELD IN NEW YORK; ALTHOUGH THE INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE WAS VALIDATED BY THE US SUPREME COURT IN 2019, THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT (CT APP). ​
Criminal Law, Evidence

HERE THE DEFENDANT CLAIMED HE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED THE VICTIM WITH A PEN KNIFE; THE DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE; THE TRIAL JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE BUT DID NOT ALLOW EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THAT ISSUE; THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, UPHOLDING THE RULE THAT THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF JUSTIFICATION UNLESS THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, affirming defendant’s conviction, determined the rule that evidence of a victim’s prior violent acts should not be admitted in support of the justification defense unless defendant was aware of those prior violent acts at the time of the incident. Here there was evidence the victim had four youthful offender adjudications in which the victim acted violently. The defendant stabbed the victim with a pen knife and claimed the victim was attacking him with a broken beer bottle. The trial judge instructed the jury on the justification defense:

Defendant stabbed the victim in the chest with a small knife, causing life-threatening injuries. At trial, the court determined that defendant was entitled to raise a justification defense. Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the specific violent conduct underlying four of the victim’s prior youthful offender adjudications to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor with respect to deadly physical force … . Supreme Court, in accordance with Miller, prohibited the jury from considering that evidence for that purpose. The Appellate Division affirmed … .

“Youthful Offender status provides youth four key benefits: relief from [a] record of a criminal conviction, reduced sentences, privacy from public release of the youth’s name pending the Youthful Offender determination on misdemeanor offenses only, and confidentiality of the Youthful Offender record” (Report of the Governor’s Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and Justice 135 [2014]). Youthful offender designations are given to those who have “a real likelihood of turning their lives around,” and the protection gives these individuals “the opportunity for a fresh start, without a criminal record” … . Given these policy concerns, we see no reason to revisit the Miller rule in this case. People v Guerra, 2023 NY Slip Op 01352, CtApp 3-16-23

Practice Point: Where the defendant raised the justification defense, proof of prior violent acts by the victim is not admissible unless the defendant was aware of them at the time of the incident (not the case here).

 

March 16, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-16 20:32:362023-03-17 21:04:51HERE THE DEFENDANT CLAIMED HE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED THE VICTIM WITH A PEN KNIFE; THE DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE; THE TRIAL JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE BUT DID NOT ALLOW EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THAT ISSUE; THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, UPHOLDING THE RULE THAT THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF JUSTIFICATION UNLESS THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT (CT APP).
Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

PLAINTIFFS-TENANTS DID NOT SHOW DEFENDANT LANDLORD ENGAGED IN A FRAUDULANT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE; THEREFORE THE DEFAULT FORMULA TO SET THE BASE DATE RENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE SHOULD NOT BE USED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that the default formula for determining the plaintiffs-tenants’ legal regulated rent pursuant to the Rent Stabilization Code should not be used because there was no evidence of a fraudulent scheme to deregulate. Rather defendants’ deregulation was based upon a misinterpretation of the law:

Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. and Community Renewal was decided after Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ motion (35 NY3d 332 [2020]). There, this Court made clear that, under the pre-Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 law applicable here, “review of rental history outside the four-year lookback period [i]s permitted only in the limited category of cases where the tenant produced evidence of a fraudulent scheme to deregulate and, even then, solely to ascertain whether fraud occurred—not to furnish evidence for calculation of the base date rent or permit recovery for years of overcharges barred by the statute of limitations” … . In fraud cases, because the reliability of the base date rent has been tainted, “this Court sanctioned use of the default formula to set the base date rent” … . Regina also held that “deregulation of [ ] apartments during receipt of J-51 benefits was not based on a fraudulent misstatement of fact but on a misinterpretation of the law [and so] a finding of willfulness is generally not applicable to cases arising in the aftermath of Roberts [and] [b]ecause conduct cannot be fraudulent without being willful, it follows that the fraud exception to the lookback rule is generally inapplicable to Roberts overcharge claims” … .

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. Defendants’ deregulation of the apartments was based on this same “misinterpretation of the law” involved in Regina and therefore that conduct did not constitute fraud … . Defendants’ subsequent re-registering of the apartments occurred after the four-year lookback period, and plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence that it somehow affected the reliability of the actual rent plaintiffs paid on the base date. Casey v Whitehouse Estates, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 01351, CtApp 3-16-23

Practice Point: In order to use the default formula pursuant to the Rent Stabilization Code, there must have been a fraudulent scheme to deregulate on the part of the landlord. Here there was no evidence of a fraudulent scheme as opposed to a misinterpretation of the law.

 

March 16, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-16 20:01:342023-03-17 20:32:26PLAINTIFFS-TENANTS DID NOT SHOW DEFENDANT LANDLORD ENGAGED IN A FRAUDULANT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE; THEREFORE THE DEFAULT FORMULA TO SET THE BASE DATE RENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE SHOULD NOT BE USED (CT APP).
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE UNEXPLAINED DELAY OF 38 MONTHS IN SEEKING A WARRANT FOR A DNA SAMPLE FROM THE DEFENDANT, WHO HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE RAPIST BY THE COMPLAINANT RIGHT AWAY, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; CONVICTION REVERSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a dissenting opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that the inexplicable delay in seeking a DNA sample from the defendant in this rape case violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The complainant reported the rape right away and named the defendant as the perpetrator. The defendant denied having sex with the complainant and refused to voluntarily provide a DNA sample. 38 months later the People applied for and were granted a warrant for the DNA sample. Defendant was convicted after a trial. The majority opinion went through the Taranovich (37 NY2d 442) pre-indictment-delay factors:

“Generally when there has been a protracted delay, certainly over a period of years, the burden is on the prosecution to establish good cause” … . It has not established good faith in this case. Here, 24 months are wholly unexplained by the record or any of the People’s papers in this matter and 7 months at a point late in the timeline are flimsily justified as necessary to decide the case required DNA evidence and then figure out how to get DNA evidence from defendant. The People’s own submissions demonstrate the emptiness of the claim that the police and the People did not know how to obtain defendant’s DNA and could not have figured it out sooner: not only did the assigned ADA obtain guidance on the warrant process in November of 2010—two years before the People filed their ultimately successful warrant application—but the investigator who eventually prepared the warrant application managed to figure out the procedure in part of a day. Indeed, our own case law dating back to at least 1982 provides the needed guidance on how to address this routine legal matter … . People v Regan, 2023 NY Slip Op 01353, CtApp 3-16-23

Practice Point: Although much longer pre-indictment delays have been excused, here the unexplained 38-month delay in applying for a warrant for a DNA sample from the defendant, who had been identified right away as the rapist by the complainant, violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial requiring reversal of the rape conviction.

 

March 16, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-16 09:23:112023-03-18 09:52:21THE UNEXPLAINED DELAY OF 38 MONTHS IN SEEKING A WARRANT FOR A DNA SAMPLE FROM THE DEFENDANT, WHO HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE RAPIST BY THE COMPLAINANT RIGHT AWAY, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; CONVICTION REVERSED (CT APP).
Administrative Law, Employment Law

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEES FOR CIVIL SERVICE EXAMS IS NOT A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION UNDER THE TAYLOR LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the appellate division and the NYS Public Employees Relations Board (PERB), determined the implementation of application fees for promotional and transitional civil service exams.by the Department of Civil Service (DCS) was not a condition of employment subject to negotiation under the Taylor Law:

Civil Service Law § 50 (5) vests DCS with power to impose fees to recoup the administrative costs of conducting civil service exams, not with authority to alter the employer-employee relationship through the imposition of the fees. The fees for promotional and transitional exams at issue here are akin to fees imposed by an agency with plenary authority to set fees for licenses that an employer may demand as a job requirement, such as a driver’s license or professional license. As with those fees, DCS’s statutory authority to impose the at-issue application fees is unrelated to the employment itself. The fees have no connection to job qualifications, criteria for employment, or job-related duties and obligations. The imposition of the subject fees is therefore not encompassed within the definition of terms and conditions of employment under Civil Service Law § 201 (4). Nor did the waiver of the fees for State employees render them terms or conditions of employment.

Because the imposition of the fees was not a term and condition of employment, the State had no obligation to negotiate with respect to their implementation. PERB’s conclusion to the contrary was error. Matter of State of New York v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2023 NY Slip Op 00805, CtApp 2-14-23

​Practice Point: Fees for civil service promotional and transitional civil services exams are not a condition of employment subject to negotiation under the Taylor Law.

February 14, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-14 13:52:072023-02-18 14:12:51THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEES FOR CIVIL SERVICE EXAMS IS NOT A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION UNDER THE TAYLOR LAW (CT APP).
Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING THE RPAPL 1304 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE RPAPL 1304 AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (CT APP) ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the appellate division, determined the inclusion of additional information in the envelope with the 90-day foreclosure notice required by RPAPL 1304 does not violate the statute and therefore is not a basis for summary judgment in favor of a defendant in a foreclosure action:

The operative statutory language here contains two requirements: (1) the notice “shall include” the specified language and information; and (2) the notice must be sent “in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice” … . As to the first requirement, subdivision (1) does not say that the notice must state only the cautionary language set forth in the statute, but rather that the notice “shall include” that language. Where the “natural signification of the words employed” “ha[s] a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning” Here, the notice indisputably contains all of the mandatory language set forth in the version of section 1304 (1) in effect at the time Bank of America commenced this action. The statute says that the notice “shall include” certain information; the notice here does so.

The question then is the constraint imposed by the requirement that the envelope not contain “any other mailing or notice.” The bright line rule adopted by the lower courts effectively defines “any other mailing or notice” as “any additional material or information whatsoever.” Although it might be possible to read “other notice” as the lower courts did—such that any deviation from the statutory language, however minor, would void the notice—that interpretation would stand in great tension with “shall include,” a phrase that contemplates the addition of something else. The statute must be given “a sensible and practical over-all construction, which . . . harmonizes all its interlocking provisions” … . Application of a bright line rule here would require the use of a highly constrained definition of “other,” where it is more appropriately read to mean mailings or notices “of a different kind.” Here, “other mailing or notice” more aptly refers other kinds of notices, such as pre-acceleration default notices, notices disclosing interest rate changes to borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages … . Bank of Am., N.A. v Kessler, 2023 NY Slip Op 00804, CtApp 2-14-23

Practice Point: The inclusion of additional information in the same envelope with the RPAPL 1304 90-day foreclosure notice does not violate RPAPL 1304 and is no longer a basis for awarding summary judgment to a defendant in a foreclosure action.

 

February 14, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-14 13:10:152023-02-18 13:51:50THE INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING THE RPAPL 1304 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE RPAPL 1304 AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (CT APP) ​
Foreclosure, Real Property Tax Law

THE COUNTY HAD IN REM JURISDICTION IN THIS TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AND MADE ADEQUATE ATTEMPTS TO NOTIFY THE NECESSARY PARTIES (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, affirming the appellate division, determined the county had in rem jurisdiction in this tax foreclosure proceeding and the county’s attempts to notify all parties of the tax foreclosure proceedings were sufficient:

Two fundamental legal principles govern our decision in this appeal. First, a tax foreclosure proceeding is in rem against the “res”—the taxable real property—and not an action in personam commenced against an individual to establish personal liability. Second, New York statutory law and state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process require that the petitioner in a foreclosure proceeding must attempt notice that is reasonably calculated to alert all parties with an interest in the property.

Here, defendants commenced an in rem tax foreclosure proceeding and mailed the statutorily-required notice to the publicly-listed owners of the property, posted and filed the notice, and publicized the notice in the press. Upon learning that a person listed as an owner died before the notices were issued, defendant County Treasurer also personally contacted the sole business located on the property in an effort to identify and personally inform a manager, owner, or any person in charge of the pending foreclosure proceeding. Under these circumstances, defendants provided legally adequate notice of a validly commenced tax foreclosure action. Hetelekides v County of Ontario, 2023 NY Slip Op 00803, CtApp 2-14-23

Practice Point: A tax foreclosure proceeding is an in rem proceeding against the taxable real property, not an in personam action against an individual.

 

February 14, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-14 12:38:392023-02-18 13:10:08THE COUNTY HAD IN REM JURISDICTION IN THIS TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING AND MADE ADEQUATE ATTEMPTS TO NOTIFY THE NECESSARY PARTIES (CT APP).
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