Nuisance – New York Appellate Digest

NOXIOUS ODORS FROM A LANDFILL DID NOT SUPPORT THE PUBLIC NUISANCE AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION; COMPLAINT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, over a dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined the public nuisance and negligence causes of action stemming from odors from a landfill should have been dismissed. The public nuisance cause of action alleged only injury to the public at large, not the required special injury unique to the parties. The negligence cause of action did not allege any tangible property damage or physical injury:

… [P]laintiffs here have not asserted an injury that is different in kind from the relevant community at large, which, in our view, consists of the other homeowners and renters impacted by the landfill’s odors … . * * *

To recover in negligence, a plaintiff must sustain either physical injury or property damage resulting from the defendant’s alleged negligent conduct … . …

… [T]he noxious odors at issue are transient in nature and do not have a continuing physical presence. … [P]laintiffs have not alleged any tangible property damage or physical injury resulting from exposure to the odors. … [T]he economic loss resulting from the diminution of plaintiffs’ property values is not, standing alone, sufficient to sustain a negligence claim under New York law … . Davies v S.A. Dunn & Co., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 05751, Third Dept 10-21-21

October 21, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Eminent Domain, Municipal Law, Nuisance, Trespass

NO NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS REQUIRED IN THIS NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND INVERSE TAKING ACTION AGAINST A VILLAGE BECAUSE MONEY DAMAGES WERE INCIDENTAL TO THE DEMAND FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a General Municipal Law notice of claim was not required in this action for nuisance, trespass, inverse taking and injunctive relief against a village. The village had installed drainage pipes in the roadway near plaintiff’s property and then repaved the road. Plaintiff alleged water runoff from the roadway flooded his property caused the foundation to collapse. Because the action was essentially for money. No notice of claim was necessary because the money damages were deemed incidental to the demand for injunctive relief. The court noted that a trespass and a taking may be pled in the alternative:

“[I]t is well settled that a notice of claim is not required for an action brought in equity against a municipality where the demand for money damages is incidental and subordinate to the requested injunctive relief” … . Viewing the amended complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff … , we conclude that the four remaining causes of action alleged continuing harm and primarily sought equitable relief … .

… “[T]he coincidental character of the money damages sought is ‘truly ancillary to an injunction suit, i.e., there is a continuing wrong presenting a genuine case for the exercise of the equitable powers of the court’ ” … . …

Although “[a]n entry cannot be both a trespass and a taking” … , the issue here is the sufficiency of the pleading, and plaintiff sufficiently pleaded both causes of action, albeit in the alternative. Friscia v Village of Geneseo, 2021 NY Slip Op 04793, Fourth Dept 8-26-21

August 26, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Negligence, Nuisance, Real Property Law

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED STORM WATER RUNOFF FROM DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY FLOODED PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS DUPLICATIVE OF THE NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE NUISANCE MAY INVOLVE INTENTIONAL CONDUCT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a decision too detailed to fairly summarize here, determined Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment in this dispute about responsibility for storm water runoff which allegedly flooded plaintiff’s property. Supreme Court, however, erred in dismissing plaintiff’s negligence cause of action as duplicative of the nuisance cause of action:

The effect of defendant’s actions was to eliminate what was described as a retention pond on the cemetery land, causing the water to back up onto plaintiff’s property, which, prior to the placement of fill, had never experienced flooding. Since the fill was placed, plaintiff’s property flooded on four occasions, and plaintiff, after the first flood in February 2009, placed defendant on notice of the flood and the resulting damages and asked for its assistance to remedy the problem. Defendant denied responsibility for the flooding and took no remedial efforts to prevent further flooding. Although the causes of action for negligence and private nuisance arise out of the same undisputed facts, it cannot be said that the private nuisance claim arises solely out of the negligence claim. To the contrary, the facts as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint and bills of particulars demonstrate a viable theory of private nuisance based upon intentional conduct, i.e., that defendant eventually knew or should have known that its actions in placing the fill caused substantial interference and nevertheless continued it … . WFE Ventures, Inc. v GBD Lake Placid, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04683, Third Dept 8-12-21

August 12, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Municipal Law, Nuisance, Private Nuisance, Real Property Law

PLAINTIFF’S ACTION FOR PRIVATE NUISANCE ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ AIR CONDITIONING UNIT IS TOO LOUD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the private nuisance cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged defendants’ air conditioning unit made too much noise:

The elements of a private nuisance cause of action are: “(1) an interference substantial in nature, (2) intentional in origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with a person’s property right to use and enjoy land, (5) caused by another’s conduct in acting or failure to act” … . “[E]xcept for the issue of whether the plaintiff has the requisite property interest, each of the other elements is a question for the jury, unless the evidence is undisputed” … .

Here, the plaintiff stated a cause of action to recover damages for private nuisance by alleging that the defendants’ air conditioning and condenser units generated a noise level exceeding that permitted by the Code of the Town of Hempstead … , which interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his bedroom, garden, and patio, and diminished his property value … . Curry v Matranga, 2021 NY Slip Op 03304, Second Dept 5-26-21

May 26, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Immunity, Municipal Law, Negligence, Nuisance, Trespass

MUNICIPALITIES AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN THIS WATER- DAMAGE LAWSUIT STEMMING FROM EXTINGUISHING A FIRE; NUISANCE AND TRESPASS ALSO PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the negligence, nuisance and trespass action against the municipalities and the municipal fire departments were properly dismissed. A fire in defendant paper mill was probably the result of arson. In the course of putting out the fire, the fire department returned water to a canal using a deck gun which shot a stream of water over plaintiff’s building. Apparently water seeped into the building causing damage. The negligence cause of action was precluded by governmental immunity, the nuisance action was precluded by the lack of evidence of intent, and firefighters doing their jobs are not deemed trespassers. With regard to governmental immunity, the court wrote:

To address the claims against the fire department defendants first, even accepting that questions of fact exist as to whether they had a special relationship with plaintiff that would give rise to a claim for negligence … , they are nevertheless protected by the governmental immunity doctrine, which “shield[s] public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions” … . Under the doctrine, “[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general” … . There is no question that fire protection, and obtaining the water necessary to provide it, is a purely governmental function … . The key issue is therefore whether the fire department defendants’ purportedly negligent acts — choosing to use the deck gun and aim it in a direction that caused a rain to fall around the powerhouse — were discretionary in that they arose from “the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results” … . Stevens & Thompson Paper Co. Inc. v Middle Falls Fire Dept., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06996, Third Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Nuisance, Real Property Law, Trespass

PLAINTIFF PRESENTED CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST A NEIGHBOR FOR TRESPASS, PRIVATE NUISANCE, AND VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW; THE MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in this dispute between neighbors should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged the neighbor repeatedly damaged and defaced plaintiff’s property and installed a surveillance camera aimed at plaintiff’s property. The Fourth Department went through the elements required for issuance of a preliminary injunction and described the proof offered in support of the trespass, private nuisance and Civil Rights Law causes of action:

Plaintiff’s supplemental affidavit and photographs submitted in support of the motion demonstrate that Nichols repeatedly drove across her lawn and blew snow with his snowblower onto the side of plaintiff’s house, allegedly causing damage to her awning and fence. Both events were intentional invasions of plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of her land. Furthermore, although “an action for trespass over the lands of one property owner may not be maintained where the purported trespasser has acquired an easement of way over the land in question” … , plaintiff established that the acts allegedly committed by Nichols on the easement exceeded the scope of the easement and did not constitute a reasonable use of his interest in the easement … . Thus, plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her trespass claim. …

The evidence submitted by plaintiff established that Nichols drove across plaintiff’s lawn, used a snowblower to blow snow onto her house, tampered with and removed her property markers, parked his vehicle so as to obstruct plaintiff’s driveway, drove on the freshly paved driveway and left tire tracks in the asphalt, and repeatedly painted a white line across the driveway. That conduct exceeds the scope of the easement and may fairly be characterized as a substantial interference with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property. Thus, plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her private nuisance claim.

Plaintiff’s affidavit and video evidence also submitted on the motion demonstrate that Nichols threatened to install a “150-foot night vision camera” in his backyard and to point it directly into plaintiff’s backyard and at her living room. As Nichols installed the surveillance camera, he stated to plaintiff, “It’s gonna look right in your fucking living room! . . . You’re on camera bitch! . . . Smile for the camera bitch!” Thus, plaintiff also demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim under Civil Rights Law § 52-a. Cangemi v Yeager, 2020 NY Slip Op 04023, Fourth Dept 7-17-20

July 17, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, Landlord-Tenant, Nuisance, Trespass

CAUSES OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION AND TRESPASS WERE PROPERLY ALLEGED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action against all but two of the defendants should have been dismissed. Defendant alleged she had an arrangement with the landlord which allowed her to stay in the basement of the premises rent-free in exchange for maintenance of the property. When the landlord died, the landlord’s wife (Brigitte) changed the locks. The Second Department held that the causes of action for wrongful eviction against the landlord’s wife and estate, and the trespass against the landlord’s wife, were sufficiently alleged. However, the causes of action for nuisance, invasion of privacy (Civil Rights Law), and false arrest were not sufficiently alleged. The court also noted that there is no civil cause of action for harassment in New York:

… [T]he plaintiff’s allegation that she performed maintenance on the building in exchange for the exclusive use and possession of the basement, yard, and two closets, and that this arrangement continued following the expiration of the lease … , indicated that a month-to-month tenancy was created and was in effect for as long as she remained in possession of the premises (see Real Property Law § 232-c …), which, according to the complaint, was until March 2017, when she allegedly was wrongfully evicted from the premises. The plaintiff’s allegation that in March 2017, Brigitte changed the locks on the door of the building and refused to provide keys to the plaintiff and permitted her entry into the basement through the cellar door only in response to the plaintiff contacting the police in May 2017, suggests that Brigitte, in effect, acting as agent for the estate, resorted to self-help measures to evict the plaintiff from the premises (see RPAPL 711, 853 …). The complaint, therefore, adequately stated a cause of action alleging wrongful eviction against Brigitte and the estate … . …

The plaintiff’s allegation that … Brigitte entered the basement and yard whenever she wanted for no reason and disturbed the plaintiff’s personal property in the basement sufficiently stated a cause of action alleging trespass … . Trec v Cazares, 2020 NY Slip Op 03941, Second Dept 7-15-20

July 15, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Nuisance, Public Nuisance, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DIOCESE OF BUFFALO ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief against the Diocese of Buffalo NY stemming from alleged sexual abuse by a priest did not state a cause of action for public nuisance based on common law and Penal Law 240.45 (criminal nuisance). The court noted that a nuisance suit in this context would conflict or compete with the classification system under the Sex Offender Registration Act and, to the extent plaintiff seeks damages, a suit pursuant to the Child Victims Act is available:

“Conduct does not become a public nuisance merely because it interferes with . . . a large number of persons. There must be some interference with a public right. A public right is one common to all members of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured” … . Here, the complaint alleges the infringement of, at most, a common right of a particular subset of the community, i.e., a group of Roman Catholic parishioners in the area of the Diocese who attended or were active in the priest’s parishes. The complaint does not allege that the general public was exposed to the priest’s conduct, nor does it otherwise allege interference with a collective right belonging to all members of the public … . …

Penal Law § 240.45 does not imply a private right of action under the circumstances presented here. “Where a penal statute does not expressly confer a private right of action on individuals pursuing civil relief, recovery under such a statute may be had only if a private right of action may fairly be implied’ ” … . Three essential factors are considered in determining whether a private right of action may fairly be implied: “(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme” … . Golden v The Diocese of Buffalo, NY, 2020 NY Slip Op 03354, Fourth Dept, 6-12-20

June 12, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Nuisance, Private Nuisance, Public Nuisance, Real Property Law

PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE NUISANCE EXPLAINED; BECAUSE DEFENDANTS SOLD THEIR PROPERTY, THE APPEAL RELATED TO THE INJUNCTION CAUSE OF ACTION WAS MOOT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ private nuisance cause of action should not have been dismissed, but the public nuisance cause of action was properly dismissed. The Third Department noted that, because defendants’ property had been sold, the injunction aspect of the case was moot. The defendants had put in a parking area and a retaining wall which plaintiffs’ alleged blocked their view of oncoming traffic making it dangerous for plaintiffs’ to pull out from their driveway:

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants paved a significant area of their front yard and proceeded to park cars and trucks thereon, and, as a result, their view of oncoming traffic was significantly hindered when they used their driveway. As a consequence, they claimed that they suffered great anxiety, as they continually worried about being in a traffic accident. What plaintiffs can ultimately prove, or whether damages of this sort are recoverable, is not our concern when determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action … . Rather, “the dispositive inquiry is whether plaintiffs have a cause of action and not whether one has been stated, i.e., whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . Here, after applying the strict standards of a pre-answer motion to dismiss, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ cause of action for private nuisance.

… “A public nuisance is actionable by a private person only if it is shown that the person suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large” … . Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants interfered with the use of a public place or public rights. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs and the public (pedestrian, cyclist or motorist) are at risk of suffering a collision. “[W]here the claimed injury is common to the entire community, a private right of action is barred” … . Moreover, we find without merit plaintiffs’ claim that they suffer a special damage in that they will suffer liability as a result of any collision that might occur. Even were we to conclude that this claim is not completely speculative, the injury proposed by plaintiffs is not different in kind, but merely in degree, to that which may be suffered by the public as a whole. As such, it does not qualify as a “special injury” so as to allow plaintiffs to bring a public nuisance cause of action … . Duffy v Baldwin, 2020 NY Slip Op 02836, Third Dept 5-14-20

May 14, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Environmental Law, Nuisance, Public Nuisance, Real Property Law, Toxic Torts

ACTION AGAINST GAS COMPANY FOR CONTAMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY ACCRUED WHEN INJURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND WAS TIME BARRED; ACTION FOR NUISANCE RELATING TO REMEDIATION EFFORTS, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO A DIFFERENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION AND WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action against a gas company to recover damages for contamination of real property were time-barred, but the nuisance actions stemming from remediation efforts were not time-barred:

“Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property must be commenced within three years of the injury” … . “[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances,” however, “shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier” (CPLR 214-c[2] …). “For purposes of CPLR 214-c, discovery occurs when, based upon an objective level of awareness of the dangers and consequences of the particular substance, the injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based'” … . …

… [T]he defendants here demonstrated that they undertook extensive efforts beginning in 1999 to inform and engage with property owners potentially affected by the contamination and remediation by conducting, among other things, door-to-door canvassing, direct mailings of newsletters and fact sheets, numerous public meetings, and highly visible and disruptive remediation work. The defendants also inspected the subject property twice in 2005 to determine whether certain remediation work between those inspections caused any damage, and mailed the results of their inspections to the plaintiff in 2006. … The defendants … established, prima facie, that the plaintiff should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the primary condition upon which its exposure-related claims were based prior to January 22, 2007 … . …

We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court’s determination that the causes of action to recover damages for public and private nuisance allegedly arising from the defendants’ remediation work were time-barred … . These causes of action are subject to the limitations period in CPLR 214(4) rather than CPLR 214-c(2) because they do not seek “to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure” … . Here, the papers submitted in support of the defendants’ motion demonstrated that there was no dispute that the defendants conducted remediation work in close proximity to the subject property shortly after new tenants signed a lease to occupy the space in 2008 … . Onder Realty, Inc. v Keyspan Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07406, Second Dept 10-16-19

October 16, 2019/by Bruce Freeman