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(1) SENTENCING COURT’S RELIANCE ON A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IN A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT, VIOLATED DUE PROCESS, (2) SENTENCING COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PUT THE REASONS FOR DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ON THE RECORD.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the appellate division, determined (1) a sentencing judge need not put on the record the reasons for the denial of youthful offender status and (2) the sentencing court’s failure to inform defendant of the nature of a “confidential” document included in the pre-sentence report and relied upon by the sentencing judge violated defendant’s due process rights:

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In its current form, CPL 390.50 — which is entitled “Confidentiality of pre-sentence reports and memoranda” — declares that while PSIs are presumptively confidential, disclosure to the parties is required for sentencing purposes. * * *

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… [I]f a court decides that it is essential to keep confidential any portion of a document that might reveal its source, the court should, at the very least, disclose the nature of the document or redacted portion thereof — to the extent possible without intruding on any necessary confidentiality — and should set forth on the record the basis for such determination. Alternatively, where possible, the court may choose not to rely on the document, and clearly so state on the record. Here, the court failed to explain the nature of the document or the reason for its confidentiality. …

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As a result of the court’s failure to comply with its statutory obligation under CPL 390.50, defendant was deprived of the ability to respond to information that the court reviewed when imposing sentence, thus implicating his due process rights. Additionally, under the circumstances here, the appellate courts were unable to adequately review the sentencing court’s denial of disclosure. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to County Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. People v Minemier, 2017 NY Slip Op 05120, CtApp 6-22-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS, SENTENCING COURT’S RELIANCE ON A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IN A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT, VIOLATED DUE PROCESS)/CRIMINAL LAW (YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, SENTENCING COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PUT THE REASONS FOR DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ON THE RECORD)/PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS (PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS, SENTENCING COURT’S RELIANCE ON A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT IN A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, AND FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT, VIOLATED DUE PROCESS)/YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (SENTENCING COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PUT THE REASONS FOR DENIAL OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS ON THE RECORD)

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