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THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR TAKING A JUDGMENT RUNS FROM THE DEFAULT AFTER THE FILING AND SERVING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, NOT A SUBSEQUENT AMENDED COMPLAINT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the one-year period for taking a judgment after a default runs from the default after the filing and serving of the original complaint, not the amended complaint:

The mortgage foreclosure action should have been dismissed as against original borrower Melissa Eaton, pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), because plaintiff failed to “take proceedings for the entry of judgment” within one year of Eaton’s default. The time to seek a default judgment should be measured from the default in responding to the original, not the amended, complaint … . Although an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and therefore requires a new responsive pleading to avoid default … , allowing the filing of an amended complaint to effectively cure a failure to timely move for a default in responding to the original complaint would create an exception that swallows the rule. Because plaintiff did not move for a default judgment until well after one year after Eaton’s default in responding to the original complaint, and because plaintiff fails to offer any excuse for this delay … , dismissal was appropriate under CPLR 3215(c) — notwithstanding plaintiff’s inability to bring a new action due to expiration of the statute of limitations … . MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Shay, 2021 NY Slip Op 00237, First Dept 1-14-21

 

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THE PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION DIRECTING THE COLLECTION OF MORE EVIDENCE IS THE LAW OF THE CASE; THE DIRECTION WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY SUPREME COURT UPON REMITTAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the decision in the prior appeal was the law of the case and Supreme Court did not follow the instruction to collect additional evidence:

In our prior decision and order, we noted that the issue of the burden that would be imposed upon the DOE [Department of Education] to comply with the petitioner’s FOIL request and whether the DOE is able to engage an outside professional service to cull the records sought was not addressed by the Supreme Court and could not be resolved on the record before us … . We noted that “[a]mong other things, it is unclear as to how much time would be involved for an employee at each school to review the relevant files. Further, although the petitioner has expressed its willingness to reimburse the [DOE] for reasonable costs involved in having the [DOE’s] employees, or an appropriate third party, review and copy the [DOE’s] records, there is no information in the record as to what that cost would be or whether the petitioner would in fact be willing to reimburse the [DOE] for the full amount of those costs, once those costs are determined” … . Accordingly, we remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, including additional submissions by the parties … .

Our prior decision and order was law of the case and binding on the Supreme Court … . However, the court failed to conduct further proceedings, including the taking of additional submissions on the issues of burden, cost and reimbursement, in accordance with our decision and order. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remit the matter for further proceedings in accordance with our decision and order in Matter of Jewish Press, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Educ. (183 AD3d 731). Matter of Jewish Press, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2021 NY Slip Op 00173, Second Dept 1-13-21

 

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CLAIMS BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS SEEKING TO REQUIRE THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT FOR DEALING WITH VIOLENT PRISONERS WERE NOT JUSTICIABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the allegations by the plaintiff corrections officers concerning training and equipment for dealing with violent prisoners were not justiciable:

These claims are not justiciable. In seeking an order that would require the Department of Correction (DOC) to make specific decisions on staffing, training, and equipment, plaintiffs would have the courts involved in the management of DOC policy, thereby interfering with the discretion granted to DOC under the New York City Charter … . Unlike the claims brought in Center for Independence of the Disabled v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (184 AD3d 197 [1st Dept 2020]), plaintiffs’ claims, that DOC’s current training/equipment scheme for correction officers fails to satisfy the statutory safe workplace requirement, are not well suited for judicial review, because they do not involve the protection of a fundamental right to be free from discrimination but would instead embroil the judiciary in extensive consideration of policy, and the remedy sought would require the courts to take on the improper task of mandating the specifics of DOC’s plans and operations. Correction Officers’ Benevolent Assn., Inc. v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 00109, First Dept 1-12-21

 

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THE DEBT WAS ACCELERATED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY STAY WAS LIFTED; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED; DISAGREEING WITH THE 2ND DEPARTMENT, THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT NEED TO INTERPOSE A COUNTERCLAIM TO CANCEL THE MORTGAGE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1501 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined the debt was accelerated when the automatic bankruptcy stay was lifted. Therefore the foreclosure action was untimely and the mortgage was properly cancelled pursuant to RPAP 1501:

… [T]he mortgage was accelerated on December 8, 2011, the date on which the bankruptcy court issued the order lifting the automatic bankruptcy stay as to plaintiff’s predecessor in interest and its assignees and/or successors in interest … . By filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and shortly thereafter seeking affirmative relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest communicated a clear and unequivocal intent to accelerate the entire mortgage debt … . …

Supreme Court did not err in discharging and canceling the mortgage. RPAPL 1501 (4) states, as relevant here, that, where the statute of limitations period for the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action has expired, “any person having an estate or interest in the real property subject to such encumbrance may maintain an action . . . to secure the cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance, and to adjudge the estate or interest of the plaintiff in such real property to be free therefrom” … . Contrary to the Second Department, we do not read RPAPL 1501 (4) as stating that the cancellation and discharge of a mortgage can only be obtained by commencing an action or interposing a counterclaim for such relief … .

… [D]efendants did not interpose a counterclaim seeking to discharge and cancel the mortgage. However, defendants requested, in their answer, dismissal of the complaint and such “other and further relief as [Supreme Court] deem[ed] just and equitable” and thereafter specifically requested in their cross motion that the mortgage be discharged and canceled. MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Wentworth, 2021 NY Slip Op 00064, Third Dept 1-7-21

 

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A GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SOUNDS IN TORT TRIGGERING THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a deceptive business practice cause of action pursuant to General Business Law 349 sounds in tort. The GBL 349 cause of action against the city did not state a cause of action because no notice of claim was filed:

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 and General Municipal Law § 50-e together require a plaintiff, in order to bring an action sounding in tort against the City of New York, to serve a notice of claim within ninety days after the date the claim arises … . Failure to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement is a ground for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action … .

General Business Law § 349(a) prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state” … . We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ first cause of action, which sought to recover damages for violations of General Business Law § 349, was a claim sounding in tort, and therefore was subject to the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, as a cause of action sounding in fraud … . Accordingly, we agree with the court’s determination granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action due to the plaintiffs’ failure to serve a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arose … . Singh v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 08123, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RESTORE THE FORECLOSURE ACTION TO THE CALENDAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ABSENT SPECIFIC AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES PLAINTIFF BANK NEED NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff’s motion to restore the matter to the calendar should have been granted and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. The court noted that defendant had not waived the defense of standing but plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of standing and held plaintiff, in the absence of specific affirmative defenses, need not present proof of compliance with statutory and contractual notice requirements:

The defendant’s contention that the plaintiff was required to demonstrate its compliance with statutory and/or contractual notice requirements in order to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law is without merit … . Specifically, the defendant’s sixth affirmative defense generally and conclusorily alleged that the “plaintiff has failed to comply with all conditions precedent to commencement of this action.” This Court has held such language to be insufficient to raise the issue of the plaintiff’s compliance with either statutory or contractual notice requirements ( … CPLR 3013). Absent there being a cognizable affirmative defense alleging non-compliance with statutory or contractual notice requirements, the plaintiff was not required to address those issues as part of its prima facie burden in moving for summary judgment … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a question of fact that the plaintiff failed to comply with statutory or contractual notice requirements. One W. Bank, FSB v Rosenberg, 2020 NY Slip Op 08070, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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SURROGATE’S COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE, NUNC PRO TUNC, A METHOD OF SERVICE ON AN OUT-OF-STATE PARTY ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PRIOR COURT APPROVAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, in a matter of first impression, determined Surrogate’s Court had the authority to approve, nunc pro tunc, service upon an out-of-state party by a method which was not in compliance with the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA). Here the attempts at service which complied with the SCPA were unsuccessful. Without procuring permission from court, the executor served the party by first class mail and the letter was not returned. Surrogate’s court approved the service by mail nunc pro tunc:

… [S]ince we find that the Surrogate’s Court had the authority to deem service on the appellant complete, nunc pro tunc, pursuant to SCPA 307(3)(b), which allows for substituted service such as regular first-class mail, the remaining issue to address is whether the court properly determined that such substituted service was valid; to wit, whether service on the appellant by regular first-class mail met the requirements of due process such that personal jurisdiction over the appellant was established … . * * *

… [T]he Executor undertook diligent but unsuccessful attempts to serve the appellant pursuant to SCPA 307(2) before regular first-class mail service was undertaken. Moreover, this is not a circumstance where the appellant had no knowledge of the proceeding that was taking place. Here, the appellant acknowledged that she (1) received a copy of the notice of probate at the time of the commencement of the probate proceeding, (2) immediately retained an attorney to represent her interests in the probate proceeding, and (3) subsequently received a copy of the will. The appellant was also aware of the scheduled hearing on July 12, 2017, in advance of that date, and neither she nor her attorney at that time chose to attend the proceeding. Thus, we find that the substituted service on the appellant by regular first-class mail satisfied the requirements of due process … . Matter of Pollina, 2020 NY Slip Op 08068, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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THE PETITIONER, A PROBATIONARY POLICE OFFICER CHALLENGING HIS TERMINATION, RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THIS ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING; THEREFORE THE SUMMARY DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO CPLR 409 WAS NOT AVAILABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this Article 78 proceeding reviewing the termination of a probationary police officer (Lake) involved questions of fact rendering a summary determination pursuant to CPLR 409(b) improper:

Since Lake submitted sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons put forth by the Town were pretextual, the Town was not entitled to a summary determination on the petition (see CPLR 409[b] …). To the contrary, the record presented triable issues of fact as to whether Lake’s employment was terminated in bad faith for reasons unrelated to his job performance … . Under the these circumstances, the matter should be remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for an immediate trial … . Matter of Lake v Town of Southold, 2020 NY Slip Op 08064, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED; THE DISCONTINUANCE DID NOT DE-ACCELERATE THE DEBT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should have been granted. The action was time-barred. The debt was accelerated when the foreclosure action was started and the discontinuance did not de-accelerate the debt:

Plaintiff’s … contention—that the stipulation of discontinuance in the 2007 action revoked the acceleration of the debt—is likewise without merit. … Here, the stipulation of discontinuance in the 2007 action is silent on the issue of the revocation of the election to accelerate and does not otherwise indicate that the plaintiff would accept installment payments from the defendant and thus did not constitute an affirmative act revoking acceleration … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Ebanks, 2020 NY Slip Op 08035, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN JOINED AND OTHER CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO DISMISSAL WERE NOT MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to vacate the conditional order dismissing the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to CPLR 3216:

The conditional order constituted a defective 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216. The court was without authority to issue a 90-day notice since issue was not joined in the action (see CPLR 3216[b][1] … ). Moreover, the conditional order failed to state that the plaintiff’s failure to comply “will serve as a basis for a motion” by the court to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute … . The purported dismissal was not properly effectuated since the court never directed the parties to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, and failed to issue a formal order of dismissal on notice to the parties as required by CPLR 3216 … . Moreover, the conditional order was erroneous since it directed the plaintiff to move for an order of reference, even though the plaintiff had already moved for an order of reference. Accordingly, we grant the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the conditional order and restore the action to the active calendar. U.S. Bank N.A. v Thompson, 2020 NY Slip Op 08098, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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