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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REARGUE MERELY REPEATED HER EARLIER ARGUMENTS AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE COURT HAD OVERLOOKED OR MISUNDERSTOOD FACTS OR LAW; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to reargue the summary judgment motion in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Supreme Court had originally granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on the ground it did not have written notice of the dangerous condition. After the motion to reargue was granted, Supreme Court denied the city’s motion. Because the motion to reargue did not present new information and merely repeated the earlier arguments, it should have been denied:

A motion for leave to reargue “shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion” (CPLR 2221[d][2]). “Motions for reargument are addressed to the sound discretion of the court which decided the prior motion and may be granted upon a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or law or for some other reason mistakenly arrived at its earlier decision” … . However, “[a] motion for leave to reargue is not designed to provide an unsuccessful party with successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided or to present arguments different from those originally presented” … . * * *

In support of her motion for leave to reargue, the plaintiff merely repeated her earlier arguments and did not demonstrate that the Supreme Court had overlooked or misapprehended any matter of fact or law in rendering the prior determination … . Hallett v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 04367, Second Dept 8-23-23

Practice Point: A motion to reargue must be based on law or facts allegedly overlooked or misunderstood by the court. Here the motion merely repeated earlier arguments and, therefore, the motion should not have been granted.

 

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TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT WHICH WERE ALLEGEDLY BREACHED MUST BE IDENTIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT; WHERE IT IS CONCEDED THAT A CONTRACT EXISTS, A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR QUASI CONTRACT MUST BE DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint did not adequately allege breach of contract or quasi contract and therefore should have been dismissed:

“[T]o state a cause of action to recover damages for a breach of contract, the plaintiff’s allegations must identify the provisions of the contract that were breached” … . Here, the complaint failed to specify the provision of the parties’ contract that was allegedly breached … .

… Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the defendant’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging quasi contract sounding in restitution and unjust enrichment. The parties do not dispute that a contract … exists … . We Transp., Inc. v Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 04394, Second Dept 8-23-23

Practice Point: A complaint alleging breach of contract does not state a cause of action if the specific provisions alleged to have been breached are not identified.

Practice Point: Where the existence of a contract is conceded, a cause of action for quasi contract must be dismissed.

 

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A HEARING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION AND WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM CONTESTING SERVICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a concurrence arguing defendant is estopped from contesting service of process, determined a hearing was required to determine whether defendant was properly served in this foreclosure action and whether defendant should be estopped from contesting service:

The defendant’s sworn statements that he had relocated to California and was living there at the time of the purported service, coupled with a copy of the defendant’s executed residential lease agreement for an apartment in Los Angeles, were sufficient to warrant a hearing to determine whether service was properly effectuated … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s evidence demonstrating that the defendant failed to update his address with the plaintiff or with the United States Postal Service was insufficient to establish, without a hearing, that the defendant should be estopped from contesting service as a matter of law … . The defendant’s statement on a 2015 mortgage assistance application that the subject property was his principal residence also does not establish, as a matter of law, that the defendant is estopped from contesting that the subject property was a valid address for service of process, as the defendant’s representation on the mortgage assistance application was made prior to the date when he claims to have relocated to California, and three years prior to the date of purported service at the subject property … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Henry, 2023 NY Slip Op 04391, Second Dept 8-23-23

Practice Point: A party who takes steps to avoid service of process may be estopped from contesting service. Here a hearing on the issue should have been held.

 

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THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (RPTL), NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS THE COMMENCEMENT OF A REAL PROPERTY TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city in this property tax foreclosure proceeding properly followed the procedure for commencing the action prescribed in the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) (as opposed to the CPLR procedure):

Real Property Tax Law provides that a proceeding for the foreclosure of tax liens in rem shall be commenced in the manner provided in Real Property Tax Law article 11, title 3 (see id. § 1120). Title 3 sets forth specific requirements for public notice by publication and personal notice to owners and other persons with a right, title, or interest in affected properties (see id. §§ 1124, 1125). RPTL 1125(3)(c) provides that the service required by that section “shall be deemed to be equivalent to the service of a notice of petition pursuant to [CPLR 403]” … . Thus, the City was required to comply with the service requirements set forth in the Real Property Tax Law, rather than those set forth in the CPLR … . The City established that it satisfied the notice and service requirements set forth in the Real Property Tax Law and that it is entitled to a default judgment with respect to the parcels of real property identified in the City’s motion (see RPTL 1131, 1136[3]). Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens (City of Newburgh), 2023 NY Slip Op 04381, Second Dept 8-23-23

Practice Point: The procedure for commencing a real property tax foreclosure action is prescribed by the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL), not the CPLR.

 

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A PROPOSED LOAN MODIFICATION DID NOT REVOKE THE ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE DEBT BY THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS; THEREFORE THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action had not revoked the acceleration of the mortgage debt and the action was therefore time-barred:

… [I]t is undisputed that the mortgage debt was accelerated on February 20, 2008, by the commencement of the 2008 foreclosure action … . Thus, absent an affirmative act of revocation during the ensuing six-year period, the statute of limitations to commence a new action to foreclose the mortgage debt expired on February 20, 2014 (see CPLR 213[4]). Contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court, the January 2013 proposed loan modification did not constitute an affirmative act of revocation sufficient to de-accelerate the mortgage debt. Not only did the January 2013 proposed loan modification fail to clearly and unequivocally indicate that the acceleration was being revoked and the loan was returned to installment status, but it was contingent on the Gardners’ [plaintiffs’] acceptance of the proposed loan modification as well as their successful completion of a trial period, neither of which occurred … . Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s contention, it failed to establish that the plaintiffs are barred from obtaining a judgment in their favor under the doctrine of unclean hands … . Gardner v Wells Fargo Bank N.A.., 2023 NY Slip Op 04304, Second Dept 8-16-23

Practice Point: Commencing a foreclosure action accelerates the debt and starts the statute of limitations. The acceleration can be explicitly revoked to stop the running of the statute. But the bank’s offering a loan modification is not an explicit revocation.

 

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WHERE A COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITHOUT A MOTION ON NOTICE, AN APPEAL IS NOT AVAILABLE BUT A MOTION TO VACATE THE DISMISSAL IS APPROPRIATE; THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SOUGHT AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DEFAULT; THEREFORE THE BANK DID NOT ABANDON THE ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action demonstrated it had not abandoned the action by moving for an order of reference within one year of the default judgment. The Second Department noted that where, as here, the dismissal of the complaint was not based upon a motion on notice, a motion to vacate the dismissal, as opposed to an appeal, is the appropriate procedure:

A motion pursuant to CPLR 2221(a) is not subject to any specific time limitation … . Where, as here, an order directing dismissal of a complaint is not appealable as of right because it did not decide a motion made on notice, it is procedurally proper for the aggrieved party to move pursuant to CPLR 2221(a) to vacate that order … .

CPLR 3215(c) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” “It is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default in order to avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c)” … . Nor is a plaintiff required to specifically seek the entry of a judgment within a year … . As long as the plaintiff has initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year of the default, there is no basis for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) … .

Here, the plaintiff initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment by moving for an order of reference in December 2008, which was within one year of the defendant’s default in the action … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Campbell, 2023 NY Slip Op 04303, Second Dept 8-16-23

Practice Point: The dismissal of a complaint not based upon a motion on notice is not appealable. A motion to vacate the dismissal, for which there is no time limitation, is appropriate.

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action where defendant defaulted, the bank need only take some action within the year following the default, here seeking an order of reference, to demonstrate the action had not been abandoned.

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THE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS THE ABILITY TO ASSERT CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSES IS APPEALABLE; DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING THE CPLR ARTICLE 16 DEFENSES ATTRIBUTING LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TO NON-PARTIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendants in this medical malpractice action should not have been precluded from asserting the negligence of non-parties (CPLR article 16 defenses) as an affirmative defenses. The court noted that, although the a ruling on a motion in limine is generally not appealable, a ruling on a motion which seeks to limit the legal theories which can be asserted is appealable:

“Generally, an order ruling [on a motion in limine], even when made in advance of trial on motion papers constitutes, at best, an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission” … . There is, however, “a distinction between an order that ‘limits the admissibility of evidence,’ which is not appealable . . . , and one that ‘limits the legal theories of liability to be tried’ or the scope of the issues at trial, which is appealable” … . * * *

… [D]efendants are entitled to assert their CPLR article 16 defenses regarding the nonparty providers. “As provided in CPLR 1601 (1), a defendant may raise the CPLR article 16 defense regarding a nonparty tortfeasor, provided that the plaintiff could obtain jurisdiction over that party” … . Here, defendants are entitled to raise their pleaded affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR article 16 … because plaintiff could have sought to maintain an action against the nonparty providers in Supreme Court … .

The crux of the issue on appeal is whether defendants were required, in response to plaintiff’s demands for bills of particulars, to particularize the pleaded CPLR article 16 defense, and thus whether the court properly precluded them from asserting that defense at trial when they did not timely particularize that defense. We conclude that no such particularization was required under the circumstances of this case, and thus that the court erred in precluding defendants from asserting the CPLR article 16 defense at trial. Harris v Rome Mem. Hosp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04273, Fourth Dept 8-11-23

Practice Point: Motions in limine generally are not appealable. But motions seeking to preclude legal theories of liability are appealable.

Practice Point: Under the unique circumstances of this case, defendants in this medical malpractice action should not have been precluded from presenting CPLR article 16 affirmative defenses on the ground the defenses were not particularized in the bill of particulars. It was not clear the demands related to the CPLR article 16 affirmative defenses.

 

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THE DEFENDANT REHABILITATION FACILITY DID NOT PROVE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT SIGNED THE ADMISSIONS AGREEMENT USING AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT CALLED DOCUSIGN; THEREFORE THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AUTHENTICATED AND THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE ENFORCED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gonzalez, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the defendant rehabilitation facility, Dewitt. did not demonstrate plaintiff’s decedent signed the facility’s admission agreements. Therefore the forum selection clause in the agreements should not have been enforced by the motion court. The agreements were allegedly signed using an electronic format called Docusign. But the defendant did not submit any evidence demonstrating how Docusign works and did not submit an affidavit by the representative who allegedly witnessed plaintiff’s signatures. The agreement was not, therefore, authenticated and was not admissible evidence of an agreement to the forum:

… [T]he “burden of proving the existence, terms and validity of a contract rests on the party seeking to enforce it” … . This requires, in the first instance, authentication of the purported writing … . Authentication may be effected by various means, including, for example, by certificate of acknowledgment (see CPLR 4538), by comparison of handwriting (see CPLR 4536), or by the testimony of a person who witnessed the signing of the document … .

Here, …in support of its motion, Dewitt submitted Trimarchi’s [the defendant’s director of admission’s] affidavit, along with copies of the admissions agreements. Trimarchi admitted, however, that she was not present during the signing of the admissions agreement. Trimarchi attested only to her understanding of how admissions agreements were usually signed; she had no actual knowledge of how the agreements bearing decedent’s name came to be signed. Moreover, Trimarchi did not describe any protocols governing the use of Docusign. Accordingly, her affidavit cannot serve to authenticate the agreements … . Dewitt did not seek to authenticate decedent’s signature by any other means, such as a certificate of acknowledgment or a handwriting exemplar. Since Dewitt failed to authenticate the agreements, it correspondingly failed to show that the forum selection clauses set forth in those documents are enforceable against plaintiff … . Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04258, First Dept 8-10-23

Practice Point: This case illustrates the need to authenticate signatures which involve some sort of electronic signing format. Here the defendant did not demonstrate how the electronic signature format worked and therefore did not authenticate plaintiff’s decedent’s signature. The forum selection clause in the agreement, therefore, could not be enforced.

 

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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, A HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO DETERMINE IF THE BANK HAD PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A DEFENDANT, THE BANK ESTABLISHED STANDING (NOTE AFFIXED TO THE COMPLAINT), THE BANK FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1303 AND 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether a defendant was properly served, the bank demonstrated standing to foreclose by affixing the note to the complaint, and the bank failed to demonstrate compliance with RPAPL 1303 and 1304:

Ordinarily, a process server’s affidavit of service gives rise to a presumption of proper service … . However, “a sworn denial of service containing specific facts generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the affidavit of service and necessitates a hearing” … . “If an issue regarding service turns upon a question of credibility, a hearing should be held to render a determination on this issue” * * *

The plaintiff established, prima facie, that it had standing to commence this action by submitting in support of its motion a copy of the note, endorsed in blank, that was annexed to the certificate of merit filed with the summons and complaint at the time the action was commenced … . Where, as here, the note is affixed to the complaint, “‘it is unnecessary to give factual details of the delivery in order to establish that possession was obtained prior to a particular date'” * * *

… [T]he plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1303  … . RPAPL 1303 requires that the party foreclosing a mortgage on residential property deliver, along with the summons and complaint, a notice titled “Notice to Tenants of Buildings in Foreclosure” to any tenant of the property by certified mail, if the identity of the tenant is known to the foreclosing party … . * * *

… [T]he affiant did not state that he had personal knowledge of the purported mailings, and the documents that he relied upon to affirm that the mailings took place failed to establish that the RPAPL 1304 notices were actually mailed … by both certified and first-class mail. Since the plaintiff “failed to provide proof of the actual mailing, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure,” the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 … . U.S Bank N.A. v 22-33 Brookhaven, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 04228, Second Dept 8-9-23

Practice Point: Here a defendant raised a question of fact whether he was properly served, requiring a hearing.

Practice Point: In this foreclosure action the bank established standing by affixing the note to the complaint.

Practice Point: The bank’s failure to strictly comply with RPAPL 1303 or 1304 precludes summary judgment.

 

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EVERY CAUSE OF ACTION WAS ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED; THE PROPER CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE CORRECT STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined several causes of action including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of constructive trust, and breach of contract should not have been dismissed as time-barred:

“‘[W]here an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8)'” … . * * * … [P]laintiffs discovered the alleged fraud in 2019 and the cause of action was timely commenced within two years. * * *

… [T]he statute of limitations on the cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust did not begin to run until 2019, when [defendant] allegedly breached his promise … . …

“[I]n order to determine the statute of limitations applicable to an action for a declaratory judgment, a court must examine the substance of the action. Where it is determined that the parties’ dispute can be, or could have been, resolved in an action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily required, that limitation period governs” … . * * *

… Supreme Court erred in concluding that the causes of action alleging fraud in the inducement and promissory estoppel are time-barred. The statute of limitations for those causes of action is six years … . …

The statute of limitations applicable to a breach of contract cause of action is six years (see CPLR 213[2]), “and begins at the time of the breach, even when no damage occurs until later, and even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury” … . Statharos v Statharos, 2023 NY Slip Op 04226, Second Dept 8-9-23

Practice Point: Here the criteria for determining the applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of constructive trust, declaratory judgment, promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement and breach of contract are discussed in some detail.

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