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THE CITY CANNOT SEEK REIMBURSEMENT FROM WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AWARDED TO A DISABLED FIREFIGHTER WHERE THE FIREFIGHTER RECEIVED BENEFITS FROM MORE THAN ONE SOURCE WHICH, IN TOTAL, EXCEEDED THE FIREFIGHTER’S FORMER SALARY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the city (Newburgh) could not recoup payments made to a disabled firefighter (Mr. Schulze) from workers’ compensation awards. The opinion is too complex to fairly summarize here:

​Pursuant to a complicated statutory scheme, paid firefighters outside New York City who become disabled at work may receive benefits from different sources: their local governmental employer, New York State, and the Workers’ Compensation System. Adam Schulze is a retired paid firefighter who, when employed by the City of Newburgh, was disabled in the performance of duty. He received benefits from all three sources. This case concerns whether the City can compel the Workers’ Compensation Board to pay Mr. Schulze’s workers’ compensation benefits to the City, as a way to allow it to recoup an overpayment it claims to have made to Mr. Schulze. Based on the clear language of the relevant statutes, the City cannot do so. * * *

Neither Workers’ Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor Workers’ Compensation Law § 30 (2) allows reimbursement from workers’ compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The provision that prevents Mr. Schulze and other firefighters like him from receiving duplicative benefits is General Municipal Law § 207-a (4-a). The City of Newburgh Fire Department is therefore not entitled to reimbursement directly from Mr. Schulze’s workers’ compensation award for its prior payments to him under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 02101, CtApp 4-10-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for a breakdown of the sources of disability payments available to an injured firefighter who was employed outside New York City.​

 

A PATROL OFFICER’S FALLING INTO A HOLE DUG FOR A SEWER LINE WHILE INVESTIGATING, AT NIGHT, A SUSPICIOUS LIGHT FROM A VACANT HOUSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION WAS NOT AN “ACCIDENT” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined petitioner, a former police officer, was not injured in an “accident” within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law. Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits. Petitioner, at night, was investigating a suspicious light in a vacant house which was under construction. Petitioner was aware the house was under construction. He was injured when he fell into a hole which had been dug for a sewer line:

As our caselaw makes clear, an incident caused by “a risk inherent in the petitioner’s regular [job] duties” is not an accident for purposes of ADR benefits … . In determining whether an accident occurred, respondent appropriately considered whether, at the time of the incident, petitioner was “acting within the scope of [his] ‘ordinary employment duties, considered in view of [his] particular employment,’ ” and whether the incident was caused by “an inherent risk of [those] regular duties” … . On this record, respondent “reasonabl[y] and plausibl[y]” determined that petitioner’s risk of being injured by an unseen hazard while investigating a potential crime in the dark was inherent in his ordinary job duties as a patrol officer … . Matter of Compagnone v DiNapoli, 2024 NY Slip Op 06235, CtApp 12-12-24

Practice Point: A patrol officer investigating, at night, a suspicious light from a vacant house under construction, could or should have anticipated injury from an unseen hazard at the construction site, here a hole dug for a sewer line. Falling into the hole was not a compensable “accident” within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law.​

 

AN INCIDENT WHICH “COULD OR SHOULD HAVE REASONABLY BEEN ANTICIPATED” IS NOT AN “ACCIDENT” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, affirming the Appellate Division, determined petitioner, a former police officer, was not entitled to accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits for injuries suffered when a wheel on his desk chair caught in a rut and the chair began to tip over backwards. Petitioner, who was aware of the ruts in the floor, was able to stop the chair from tipping over by grabbing the desk, injuring his shoulder and neck:

An event which is “a risk inherent” in the work performed is not an “accident” for purposes of ADR benefits … . Further, an event that is not a risk inherent in one’s job must be a “sudden, unexpected” occurrence in order to amount to an “accident” … . We held in Matter of Rizzo v DiNapoli that a known danger cannot be the cause of a compensable accident, but we left open whether an event that could or should have reasonably been anticipated by the claimant can result in an accident for purposes of section 363 (see 39 NY3d 991, 992 [2022]). We answer that question today.

We hold that a precipitating event that could or should have reasonably been anticipated by a person in the claimant’s circumstances is not an “accident” for purposes of ADR benefits. It is well established that “an injury which occurs without an unexpected event . . . is not an accidental injury” for purposes of section 363 (Lichtenstein, 57 NY2d at 1012). The unexpected nature of the precipitating event is key to this definition. * * *

… [W]e conclude that substantial evidence supports the Comptroller’s determination that petitioner could or should have reasonably anticipated the near-fall from his desk chair. Matter of Bodenmiller v DiNapoli, 2024 NY Slip Op 06234, CtApp 12-12-24

Practice Point: Here petitioner was aware of ruts in the floor in which the wheels on his desk chair could catch. Therefore injuries stemming from a wheel catching in a rut were not the result of a compensable “accident” under the Retirement and Social Security Law.

 

PETITIONER, A POLICE PARAMEDIC, INJURED HIS SHOULDER WHEN THE RETRACTABLE PORTION OF A STRETCHER JAMMED; THE UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION WAS AN “ACCIDENT” ENTITLING PETITIONER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a partial concurrence and dissent, determined petitioner, a police paramedic, was entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits based on an injury caused by the malfunction of the retractable portion of a stretcher:

For purposes of accidental disability retirement benefits, “an accident is defined as ‘a sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact’ ” * * *. “An injury which occurs without an unexpected event as the result of activity undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties, considered in view of the particular employment in question, is not an accidental injury” … . * * *

… [P]etitioner testified that when he squeezed the handle to extend the retractable head portion of the stretcher and pulled, which petitioner noted usually required “a little bit of force to push it in and out,” he was able to extend it a little bit before it unexpectedly jammed — something that petitioner testified had never happened before. Petitioner testified that thereafter it took four firefighters banging on the handle with tools to finally extend the head section to the proper position. Although extending the retractable head portion of the stretcher was no doubt part of petitioner’s job duties, the precipitating external event, i.e., the jamming of the retractable head section of the stretcher, was sudden, unexpected and not a risk in his ordinary employment duties. As petitioner’s testimony reflects, this appears to have been a malfunction in the equipment … . Matter of Hamblin v DiNapoli, 2024 NY Slip Op 03787, Third Dept 7-11-24

Practice Point: Injury caused by an equipment malfunction can constitute a compensable “accident” under the Retirement and Social Security Law.

 

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THE FORMER SCHOOL PRINCIPAL’S PTSD STEMMED FROM A SERIES OF INTERACTIONS WITH A CO-EMPLOYEE OVER A PERIOD OF MONTHS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF AN “ACCIDENT;” SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS (ADR) (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the petitioner’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from interactions with a another school employee did not entitle her to accidental disability retirement benefits (ADR) as opposed to ordinary disability retirement benefits (ODR)  The court found that the employee interactions took place over a period of time and could not be characterized as “a sudden, unexpected event,” i.e., an “accident.” The court however refused to rule out that intentional conduct by a co-employee could constitute an “accident” in some circumstances:

… [T]he record supports the [Teachers’ Retirement System Medical] Board’s determination that petitioner’s injuries did not result from an event that was sudden, fortuitous, and unexpected … . Although petitioner claims that her PTSD was brought on by the April 2019 occurrence, that event was merely the latest of a series of incidents in which the food-service worker trespassed on school property and acted in a confrontational manner toward petitioner, causing her significant stress and anxiety. As early as February 2019, petitioner informed school officials that the employee was continuously disobeying instructions to keep away from the school and that she was “concerned about the students and the building staff that have to endure his confrontational behavior.” Following another incident in March, petitioner wrote that she “d[id] not feel comfortable with [the employee] given his behavior in the school.” The Board rejected petitioner’s initial ADR application on the ground that “based on the description of the events in question that occurred in the work setting on April 18, 2019, as well as the previous events in the work setting in February and March of 2019, [petitioner] has failed to demonstrate that an accident occurred in the work setting.” Because that reasoning is supported by the evidentiary record, the Board’s determination to deny ADR will not be disturbed on this appeal. Matter of Rawlins v Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of the City of N.Y., 2024 NY Slip Op 02840, CtApp 5-23-24

Practice Point: Although an intentional act by a co-employee could constitute an “accident” giving rise to accidental disability retirement benefits (ADR) under the Teachers’ Retirement System, here the interactions with the co-employee took place over a period of months and could not be described as “a sudden, unexpected event.”

 

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DECEDENT’S WORK-RELATED COVID DEATH ENTITLED DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER, DECEDENT’S “STATUTORY BENEFICIARY,” TO “ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS” UNDER A RECENT STATUTE; PETITIONER, DECEDENT’S PARTNER, WHO WAS DECEDENT’S “DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY” FOR “ORDINARY DEATH BENEFITS,” WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE “ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the respondent Teachers’ Retirement System properly awarded “accidental death benefits” to decedent’s daughter under a recent law which classified certain work-related COVID death as “accidental.” The dispute here was between the “statutory beneficiary,” decedent’s daughter who received the “accidental death benefits,” and the “designated beneficiary,” decedent’s partner, who was entitled to any “ordinary death benefits:”

he statutory text refutes petitioner’s argument that respondent’s denial of her claim for ordinary death benefits was irrational. Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-i (a) (3) provides that the accidental death benefit “shall” be paid to a member’s statutory beneficiary if the member meets the stated criteria. This is consistent with the recognition in the legislative history that “[o]nce the statutory beneficiary demonstrates this proof, entitlement to the [a]ccidental [d]eath [b]enefit is mandatory” … . Additionally, preexisting law provided that an ordinary death benefit is only available when accidental death benefits are unavailable (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 606-a [a] [3]). Matter of Colon v Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of the City of N.Y., 2024 NY Slip Op 01331, CtApp 3-14-24

Practice Point: Here decedent’s daughter was the “statutory beneficiary” of “accidental death benefits” under the Retirement and Social Security Law, and decedent’s partner was the “designated beneficiary” for “ordinary death benefits” under the Retirement and Social Security Law. Decedent’s daughter was properly awarded the “accidental death benefits” under a recent statute covering work-related COVID deaths.

 

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PETITIONER FIREFIGHTER WAS INJURED WHEN HE BECAME DEHYDRATED DURING TRAINING; HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS BECAUSE THE INJURY DID NOT OCCUR AS A RESULT OF AN UNEXPECTED EVENT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner NYC firefighter was not entitled to accidental retirement (ADR) benefits because he was injured performing routine duties and not when responding to an unexpected event. Petitioner suffered an injury to his leg due to dehydration during training:

ADR benefits are awardable only where the individual’s disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident, i.e., “a ‘sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact'” … . Petitioner’s injury was the result of an incidental — not accidental — event … because the injury was sustained while petitioner was performing routine duties, not as a result of an unexpected event … . Dehydration suffered by petitioner while running in hot weather in heavy gear was a foreseeable risk of the firefighting training exercise … . Matter of Rivera v Board of Trustees of N.Y. Fire Dept., 2023 NY Slip Op 05379, First Dept 10-24-23

Practice Point: Here a NYC firefighter was injured during training, not as a result of an “unexpected event.” Therefore he was not entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits.

 

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TIER 3 NYC POLICE OFFICERS CANNOT COUNT YEARS OF NON-POLICE SERVICE TOWARD THE 22 YEARS OF POLICE SERVICE REQUIRED FOR RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the appellate division, determined tier 3 police officers may not count prior “non-police” service in computing the 22 years of service required for eligibility for retirement benefits:

… [T]ier 3 officers are eligible for retirement after 22 years of service without regard to their age … . The issue before us is whether a tier 3 police officer’s prior non-police service “qualifies to be counted as credited service pursuant to [Retirement and Social Security Law § 513]” … .

… [W]e conclude that the legislature intended tier 3 officers to receive the same service credit as their tier 2 counterparts, but restricted to the credit available prior to July 1, 1976.

Before July 1, 1976, the Administrative Code provided that a tier 2 officer would not be eligible for retirement until he or she “served in the police force for” the then-minimum period of 20 or 25 years … . This language plainly demonstrates that, prior to July 1, 1976, tier 2 officers could count only prior police service toward their retirement eligibility. Accordingly, tier 3 officers may receive retirement credit only for prior police service. Matter of Lynch v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 02753, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: Tier 3 NYC police officers cannot count years of non-police service toward retirement eligibility.

 

PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER WAS AWARE OF THE DEFECT IN THE FLOOR WHICH CAUSED HIS CHAIR TO START TO TIP OVER BACKWARDS WHEN THE WHEELS CAUGHT IN THE DEFECT; THEREFORE THE INCIDENT WAS NOT UNEXPECTED AND PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, over a dissent, determined petitioner police officer was not entitled to accidental disability benefits for injuries incurred at his desk when he prevented himself from falling over backwards in his chair. When he attempted to roll the chair backwards it caught in a rut and petitioner was injured when he grabbed at a desk to keep from tipping over backwards:

Petitioner acknowledged that he was aware that the flooring at the front desk was in poor condition and that, both on previous occasions and prior to the incident that day, he had observed that there were two ruts in the flooring right behind the desk. Petitioner also testified that, in his estimation, the ruts were “three inches across, maybe a little more.” His testimony also demonstrates that he was aware that the chair he was utilizing that day had wheels and that, when sitting at the desk, those wheels would be in the “general area” of the holes. Given this testimony and the photographs of the floor that were admitted, respondent’s finding that petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the hazard — i.e., that the small wheels catching a depression in the floor would cause the chair to tip — was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, despite other reasonable interpretations. Therefore, the finding that the precipitating event was not unexpected and did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law will not be disturbed … . Matter of Bodenmiller v DiNapoli, 2023 NY Slip Op 01930, Third Dept 4-13-23

Practice Point: To constitute an accident under the Retirement and Social Security Law, the incident must be “unexpected.” Here petitioner was aware of the floor-defect which cause his chair to start tipping over backwards when the wheels caught in the defect. Therefore the incident was not “unexpected” within the meaning of the applicable law.

 

PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER FELL TWICE AT NIGHT WHILE INVESTIGATING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY; HE FELL IN A THREE-FOOT DEEP HOLE WHEN CHECKING OUT A HOUSE AND HE FELL DOWN SOME STAIRS CHECKING OUT A PARKING LOT; NEITHER FALL WAS A COMPENSABLE “ACCIDENT” (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined the two falls by petitioner police officer were not compensable “accidents” within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law and petitioner was not entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits. The opinion discusses in some depth the difficulties of determining what is and what is not an “accident” in this context:

… [P]etitioner testified … he was assigned to the midnight shift and was in his patrol car when, at approximately 1:00 a.m., he became suspicious upon observing a light coming from the second floor of a house that was under construction. According to petitioner, it was “very dark” around the house due to the lack of streetlights in the area. Petitioner took a flashlight and began walking around the perimeter of the house, illuminating the second floor of the house as he walked, in accordance with police protocol. As he continued walking the perimeter of the house, petitioner fell in a three-foot-deep hole in the ground that had been dug alongside the house. As petitioner’s regular employment duties included conducting investigations in the dark, the risk that he might fall due to an unseen condition while engaged in such activity is an inherent risk of that employment … .

… [P]etitioner testified that, at approximately 2:00 a.m. … , he was investigating a report of a “suspicious party going through cars in a parking lot.” According to petitioner, it was drizzling that morning, and the area of the parking lot was dark. Petitioner was using a flashlight and, as he descended a wooden stairway that connected the parking lot to a baseball field, he was illuminating the field with the flashlight when he slipped and fell. Petitioner testified that, after his fall, he observed “green algae [and] mold,” as well as leaves, on the stairs. “When carrying out some police duties, an officer on foot may encounter, as part of the work being performed, a vast array of conditions, many of which are not easily traversed and can cause a fall. Encountering such conditions while actively engaged in police duties often is not an unexpected event, and the Comptroller may find a fall caused thereby to be an inherent risk of the job” … . Matter of Compagnone v DiNapoli, 2023 NY Slip Op 00354, Third Dept 1-26-23

Practice Point: This opinion should be consulted when trying to determine what constitutes a compensable “accident” within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

 

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