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CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE OF INADVERTENT OMISSIONS FROM THE FORM RB-89; CLAIMANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND GIVEN 20 DAYS TO CURE THE OMISSIONS; OR THE OMISSIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IGNORED BY THE BOARD (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the Board should not have denied the application based on inadvertent omissions from the form RB-89:

… [T]he Legislature has made clear that “[n]otwithstanding anything contained in 12 NYCRR 300.13 (b)[,] . . . a mistake, omission, defect and/or other irregularity in a [form RB-89] accompanying an application for administrative review . . . shall not be grounds for denial of said application” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 23-a [1] …). The Board is instead directed to either notify the party seeking review about such a problem in writing and give the party 20 days to correct it, or disregard the problem altogether if the substantial rights of the relevant parties are not impacted by it (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 23-a [3]). There is no indication here that the Board notified claimant in writing of the deficiencies in her initial form RB-89 and, after the carrier pointed them out, claimant provided proof that the defects in the form were inadvertent and that the application had been filed and served in a timely manner. The carrier made no effort to challenge that proof, nor did it argue that it had been prejudiced in any way by the flaws in the initial form RB-89 submitted by claimant. To be sure, Workers’ Compensation Law § 23-a “addresses technical defects in the contents of applications for Board review rather than the associated service requirements,” and nothing prohibits the Board from denying applications where the latter are not satisfied … . This record shows that claimant did satisfy all filing and service requirements and only failed to note that fact on her initial form RB-89, however, and “the Board’s regulations requiring that an application for Board review be filled out completely and/or correctly may not abdicate, contravene or be inconsistent” with the provisions of Workers’ Compensation Law § 23-a … . Thus, as the Board’s denial of claimant’s application ran afoul of Workers’ Compensation Law § 23-a and its underlying goal of ensuring that “small mistake[s] on a cover sheet should not be cause for a full denial of an appeal,” it constituted an abuse of discretion and cannot stand … . Matter of Price v Premium Brands Opco, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03346, Third Dept 5-28-26

Practice Point: Workers’ Compensation Law section 23-a prohibits the denial of an application based on inadvertent omissions from the Form RB-89.​

 

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THE JUSTICE FOR INJURED WORKERS ACT (JIWA) PROHIBITS GIVING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT TO WORKERS’ COMMPENSATION BOARD RULINGS IN SUBSEQUENT PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME INCIDENT, EVEN WHEN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD RULING PREDATES THE ENACTMENT OF THE JIWA (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division’s reversal of Supreme Court on a different ground, determined the Justice for Injured Workers Act (JIWA), which prohibits giving a Workers’ Compensation Board’s ruling collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent personal injury action, applies to Workers’ Compensation Board rulings which predate the enactment of the JIWA. The Appellate Division described the application of collateral estoppel in this context as the retroactive application of the JIWA. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that a “statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment:”

At the time Supreme Court rendered its decision, JIWA had been in effect for several months. By its plain terms, JIWA, as of its effective date, prohibits courts from giving collateral estoppel effect to workers’ compensation decisions arising out of the same occurrence, except with respect to the existence of an employer-employee relationship (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 118-a). Pursuant to a straightforward prospective application of JIWA, Supreme Court therefore erred in giving collateral estoppel effect to the 2021 [pre-enactment] decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board. * * *

As of JIWA’s effective date of December 30, 2022, courts are prohibited from giving collateral estoppel effect to workers’ compensation decisions in pending or future lawsuits, except as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Because the statute applied at the time Supreme Court rendered its decision, the court erred in granting defendant’s motion.  Garcia v Monadnock Constr., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03217, CtApp 5-21-26

Practice Point: Here, although the JIWA was applied to a Workers’ Compensation Board ruling which predated the enactment of the JIWA, it was not necessary to apply the JIWA “retroactively.” Only a straightforward prospective application of the JIWA was required.

 

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THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO AWARD ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR CHARGES ASSESSED AGAINST AN EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE CARRIER FOR UNTIMELY COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissent, determined that the Workers” Compensation Board (Board) did not have the authority to approve attorney’s fees for charges against an employer or insurance carrier under Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) section 25 for untimely compensation payments. The Board may only approve legal fees in accord with its counsel fees schedule in WCL section 24 which does not include charges under WCL section 25:

Counsel argues that the Board has long recognized that legal fees may be payable from late payment penalties, and that WCL 24 (2) … does not expressly limit the Board’s authority to approve such fees. Counsel further asserts that a claimant’s late payment award under WCL 25 is “compensation” under the WCL and thus falls within the WCL 24 (2) fee schedule. Counsel adds that permitting legal fees based on these charges furthers the WCL’s legislative purpose of promoting access to justice for injured workers by incentivizing attorneys skilled in handling WCL cases to represent claimants.

The Board counters that the plain text of WCL 24 (2) limits legal fee awards to those enumerated in the statute’s fee schedule. The Board further argues that charges assessed for late payments are not compensation but a separate award for a claimant assessed against an employer or insurance carrier. Lastly, the Board maintains that the amount of legal fees generated from an award listed on the fee schedule and the certainty that an attorney will receive those fees are sufficient incentives for attorneys to represent claimants.

We conclude that the Board does not have authority to approve legal fees based on charges assessed pursuant to WCL 25 because the text of WCL 24 (2) establishes a mandatory fee schedule that does not provide for such fees. Our interpretation does not lead to an absurd result. Indeed, the legislative history makes no mention of legal fees based on charges imposed for violations of WCL 25, let alone reflect a legislative concern that attorneys would refuse workers’ compensation cases if such fees were unavailable. Matter of Gonzalez v Northeast Parent & Child Socy., 2026 NY Slip Op 01443, CtApp 3-17-26

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WORKING UNDER GTLF’S SUPERVISION; GTLF HAD HIRED ATRIUM, PLAINTIFF’S GENERAL EMPLOYER, TO HANDLE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT, INCLUDING PAYROLL AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE; PLAINTIFF RECEIVED WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FROM ATRIUM FOR A WORK-RELATED INJURY; GTLF, AS PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL EMPLOYER, CANNOT BE SUED IN NEGLIGENCE BY PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined GTLF was plaintiff’s special employer and Atrium was plaintiff’s general employer. The Workers’ Compensation Board determined plaintiff was entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits from Atrium, his general employer, for a work-related injury. Therefore, plaintiff could not sue GTLF, his special employer, in negligence based upon that work-related injury. GTLF was entitled to summary judgment:

For purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law, a person may be deemed to have more than one employer—a general employer and a special employer … . “The receipt of Workers’ Compensation benefits from a general employer precludes an employee from commencing a negligence action against a special employer” … .

“In determining whether a special employment relationship exists, ‘who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work’ is a ‘significant and weighty feature,’ but is not determinative of the issue” … . Indeed, “[m]any factors are to be considered when deciding whether such a special employment relationship exists and not one factor is decisive” … . Other principal factors to be considered include “who is responsible for the payment of wages and the furnishing of equipment, who has the right to discharge the employee, and whether the work being performed was in furtherance of the special employer’s or the general employer’s business” … . General employment will be presumed to continue unless there is a “clear demonstration of surrender of control by the general employer and assumption of control by the special employer” … .

Here, in addition to a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and a copy of the agreement between GTLF and Atrium, GTLF submitted an affidavit of its CEO, who averred, among other things, that after GTLF retained Atrium for “certain aspects of [the] plaintiff’s employment, including payroll and Workers’ Compensation insurance . . . [GTLF] maintained the same supervision and control of the plaintiff regarding his duties as a” brand ambassador. Based upon this evidence, GTLF established, prima facie, that GTLF was the plaintiff’s special employer … . Samuel v Petainer, 2026 NY Slip Op 00925, Second Dept 2-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into how to determine whether an employer is a general employer or a special employer for purposes of Worders’ Compensation benefits. If a worker receives Workers’ Compensation benefits from the worker’s general employer for a work-related injury, the employee cannot sue the special employer in negligence for that same injury.

 

DURING MARCH AND APRIL 2020 CLAIMANT, WHO WORKED IN RETAIL IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PUBLIC, WAS EXEMPT FROM THE EMERGENCY WORK RESTRICTIONS; CLAIMANT CONTRACTED COVID, SUFFERED A STROKE AND WAS HOSPITALIZED FOR FOUR MONTHS; HIS CLAIM CONSTITUTED A “COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT;” CLAIMANT DEMONSTRATED AN EXTRAORDINARY RISK OF EXPOSURE DUE TO FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE PUBLIC “IN AN AREA WHERE COVID WAS PREVALENT” (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly considered the “prevalence of the COVID virus” in the claimant’s workplace and properly awarded benefits. Claimant, who worked in retail, was exempt from the emergency restrictions and had extensive contact with the public during March and April 2022. After contracting COVID, claimant had a stroke and was hospitalized for four months:

… [C]laimant testified that he worked full time in a high-volume store during March and April 2020. According to claimant, his job responsibilities involved almost constant contact with the public, working either on the store floor or as a cashier. Claimant testified that employer did not provide store employees with sneeze guards or protective face masks until mid-April 2020. Although employer had a policy requiring customers to socially distance and wear face masks in the store, claimant explained that management advised employees not to enforce that policy. Many customers did not wear face masks, and claimant recounted specific instances of close contact with customers despite employer’s social-distancing policy. * * *

The Board determined that relevant case law “indicate[d] that if a claimant contracts COVID-19 through close contact with the public, such exposure could be found to be a work-related accident within the meaning of [Workers’ Compensation Law] § 2 (7).” According to the Board, a claimant can demonstrate this by showing COVID-19’s “prevalence” in the workplace … . * * *

… [T]o establish that an illness due to exposure to pathogens or adverse environmental conditions is compensable, a claimant must demonstrate that the illness was caused by “extraordinary” workplace exposure … . Consistent with that requirement, the Board’s “prevalence” framework requires a claimant to show a “significantly elevated” risk of exposure … . As applied to COVID-19, the “prevalence” framework specifically requires a claimant to demonstrate an “extraordinary” level of exposure through evidence of frequent contact with the public or co-workers “in an area where COVID-19 is prevalent.” … [P]ersistent, high-risk exposure to a disease in the workplace culminating in infection can constitute a compensable accident … . Matter of Aungst v Family Dollar, 2025 NY Slip Op 06530, CtApp 11-24-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when exposure to a disease in the workplace, here COVID, can be considered a “compensable accident” under the Workers’ Compensation Law.​

 

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY DENIED BENEFITS FOR PTSD SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF EXPOSURE TO COVID IN THE WORKPLACE BECAUSE THERE WAS NOTHING UNIQUE ABOUT THE CLAIMANTS’ EXPOSURE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF THE REST OF THE WORK FORCE; THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW HAS SINCE BEEN AMENDED TO CHANGE THE ANALYSIS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY SUCH THAT WHETHER A CLAIMANT SUFFERED STRESS GREATER THAN WHAT USUALLY OCCURS IN THE NORMAL WORK ENVIRONMENT IS NO LONGER A CONSIDERATION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a three-judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the workers’ claims for benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from workplace exposure to COVID were properly denied by the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board reasoned that the exposure was not the result of an “accident” because everyone in the workplace was similarly exposed. The Court of Appeals noted that the Workers’ Compensation Law has recently been amended to provide that psychological-injury claims can no longer be disallowed on the ground the underlying stress was no greater that what usually occurs in the normal work environment:

… [E]vidence of COVID-19’s prevalence in the workplace does not relieve a claimant of the burden to establish that the injury was accidental which, in cases of emotional stress-induced psychological injury, has involved a demonstration by the claimant of stress greater than the stress experienced by similarly situated workers in the normal work environment. Here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the stress of workplace exposure experienced by claimants was comparable to the stress experienced by similarly situated workers in the normal work environment during the COVID-19 pandemic … .

Neither our decision today nor the approach of our dissenting colleagues could be expected to have a significant impact on the development of the law. After the Appellate Division decided these appeals, the legislature amended the Workers’ Compensation Law to provide that the Board “may not disallow a claim” for PTSD, acute stress disorder, or major depressive disorder “upon a factual finding that the stress was not greater than that which usually occurs in the normal work environment” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 [3] [c]). By amending the statute in this manner, the legislature has determined that claims of psychological injuries should be evaluated under a standard more favorable than even the dissent’s novel standard.…  Claimants do not argue that the newly amended language applies retroactively to the Board decisions, which predate the effective date of the legislation. Matter of McLaurin v New York City Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 06529, CtApp 11-24-25

Practice Point: A recent amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Law provides that, where psychological injury is claimed, whether the stress suffered by the claimants is greater than that which usually occurs in the normal work environment is no longer a consideration. Here, in this pre-amendment case, the fact that the claimants’ exposure to COVID was no greater than the exposure suffered by the rest of the workforce was a proper ground for the denial of psychological-injury benefits.​

 

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ALTHOUGH CLAIMANT’S MEDICAL REPORT DID NOT ADHERE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 137 AND COULD BE DEEMED INADMISSIBLE FOR THAT REASON, THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO MAKE A TIMELY OBJECTION TO THE REPORT; THE PRECLUSION OF THE REPORT WAS THEREFORE ERROR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the medical report (by Dr, Kountis) finding claimant had a 42.5% schedule loss of use (SLU) of the right wrist should not have been precluded because it did not meet the requirements of Workers’ Compensation Law 137. Although the Board has the power to preclude the report for that reason, the employer did not make a timely objection to the report:

Although “[a] report of an examination that does not substantially comply with the requirements of Workers’ Compensation Law [§] 137 . . . shall not be admissible as evidence,” a party raising an objection to such a report’s admissibility must “raise [that] objection in a timely manner” … . Claimant filed Kountis’ report in March 2023, after which the employer was notified that it had 75 days to respond in any of several enumerated ways, including by filing a memorandum to refute the sufficiency and credibility of the report. At no time during that 75-day period did the employer challenge Kountis’ report for failing to adhere to the requirements of Workers’ Compensation Law § 137. Further, the employer failed to raise the argument during the subsequent hearing held in September 2023. It is clear that the employer had, and failed to avail itself of, ample opportunity to challenge Kountis’ report prior to the WCLJ’s determination. As a result, the employer’s eventual challenge was untimely, and it was error for the Board to preclude Kountis’ report … . Matter of Troiano v New York City Hous. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 06377, Third Dept 11-20-25

Practice Point: If there are grounds for precluding a medical report for failure to meet the requirements of Workers’ Compensation Law 137, the employer must make a timely objection to the report. Here the employer failed to object to the report during the 75-day period allowed for objections and failed to object in a hearing held six or seven months after the report was filed. The Third Department determined, under those facts, it was error to preclude the report.

 

THE EXTENSION (NOW TO 2026) OF THE TIME FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE 9-11 CLEANUP TO FILE CLAIMS FOR MEDICAL BENEFITS DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS FOR DEATH BENEFITS BY A BENEFICIARY OF A DECEASED PARTICIPANT; HERE THE PARTICIPANT’S WIFE MADE A CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS WHICH WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE THE STATUTORY DEADLINE IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW SECTION 28 HAD PASSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the two-year death-benefit statute of limitations in Workers’ Compensation Law section 28 precluded a claim for death benefits made by the wife of a volunteer who participated in the 9-11 cleanup and who had received lifetime benefits for resulting medical conditions. Although the deadline for claims for medical benefits has been extended (to 2026), that extension does not apply to claims for death benefits by surviving beneficiaries:

[Workers’ Compensation Law 168] explicitly refers to “[a] claim by a participant,” permits such participant’s claim to be filed within the enumerated extended time period, and again repeats “[a]ny such participant” when stating that certain previously denied claims “shall be reconsidered by the board” … . The phrase “claim by a participant” does not encompass claims by the surviving beneficiaries of those individuals. This is made clearer by comparison with the language in Workers’ Compensation Law § 18, which expressly provides that notice may be given by “any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or some one in his behalf” and can be “signed by [the employee] or by a person on his behalf or, in case of death, by any one or more of his dependents, or by a person, on their behalf.” Likewise, Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 refers to “the claimant” and references payments “to an employee or his dependents in case of death.” Workers’ Compensation Law § 168’s use of the phrase “[a] claim by a participant” must therefore be understood to mean that only a claim brought by a participant, and not by the survivors or beneficiaries of a participant, may benefit from the extended time limits of Workers’ Compensation Law § 168. As the Appellate Division reasoned, “it was decedent who was entitled to file a claim for benefits outside of the period allowed by Workers’ Compensation Law § 28” … .

No other provision provides claimant with relief from the requirement that claims be filed within the two-year limitations period. Matter of Garcia v WTC Volunteer, 2025 NY Slip Op 06360, CtApp 11-20-25

Practice Point: Claims for death benefits by the beneficiaries of deceased participants in the 9-11 cleanup are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Workers’ Compensation Law.

 

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CONTRARY TO THE STANDARD USED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, AN SLU NEED NOT BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF ANY PRIOR SLU TO THE SAME PART OF THE BODY; MATTER REMITTED FOR APPLICATION OF THE PROPER STANDARD (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing and remitting the matter to the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the Board applied the wrong standard for compensation for an injury to a member for which an SLU had been made for a prior injury. The Board used the erroneous standard that an SLU “must always be reduced by the amount of any prior SLU to the same statutory member:”

The Court of Appeals has clarified … that successive and “separate SLU awards for different injuries to the same statutory member are contemplated by [Workers’ Compensation Law §] 15 and, when a claimant proves that the second injury, ‘considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability,’ has caused an increased loss of use, the claimant is entitled to an SLU award commensurate with that increased loss of use” … . Thus, a claimant’s entitlement to an additional SLU award for a successive injury to the same statutory member “turns upon the sufficiency of the medical proof adduced” … . “Such demonstration may include medical evidence that a prior injury and the current injury to the same member are ‘separate pathologies that each individually caused a particular amount of loss of use of [the subject member]’ and that the current injury resulted in a greater degree of loss of use of the body member in question ‘beyond that . . . [of] the prior injury’ ” … .

… [T]he standard articulated and then applied by the Board, which relied solely upon Matter of Genduso v New York City Dept. of Educ. (164 AD3d at 1510), was that an SLU “must always be reduced by the amount of any prior SLU to the same statutory member” (emphasis supplied). The Board is not required to reduce or offset the SLU by the prior SLU where a “claimant demonstrates that a subsequent injury increased the loss of use of a body member beyond that resulting from the prior injury” (Matter of Johnson v City of New York, 38 NY3d at 444). Given that the Board’s decision did not consider, or otherwise ascertain the credibility of, the conflicting medical evidence that was before it — which included documentary and testimonial evidence from claimant’s treating physician — regarding the extent to which claimant’s injuries were “separate pathologies that each individually caused a particular amount of loss of use” of his right leg … , the Board’s finding of a 12.5% SLU of the right leg must be reversed and the matter remitted for further consideration by the Board in accordance with the holding in Matter of Johnson [supra]. Matter of Krein v Green Haven Corr. Facility, 2025 NY Slip Op 06238, Third Dept 11-13-25

Practice Point: When an SLU has been made for a prior injury, a subsequent SLU for the same part of the body need not be reduced by the amount of the prior SLU. The claimant can submit medical evidence that the injuries are separate pathologies which individually caused a specific amount of loss of use.

 

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ALTHOUGH CONTRACTING COVID-19 IS COMPENSABLE UNDER WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, HERE THE PROOF THAT CLAIMANT CONTRACTED COVID-19 BECAUSE OF WORKPLACE EXPOSURE WAS INSUFFICIENT (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the record did not support the finding that claimant, a school custodian, contracted COVID-19 from workplace exposure. The decision is fact-specific. Claimant had little contact with students during his work hours and there were other possible sources of infection:

We acknowledge that “the contraction of COVID-19 in the workplace is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law” … , that the issue of whether a compensable accident has occurred is a question of fact for the Board to resolve and that the Board’s findings in this regard, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed … . Additionally, our case law makes clear that where, as here, the injured claimant alleges that he or she contracted COVID-19 at work, such claimant “bears the burden of demonstrating either a specific exposure to COVID-19 or that COVID-19 was so prevalent in the work environment as to present an elevated risk of exposure constituting an extraordinary event” … ; “for example, workers with significant contact with the public in communities with high rates of infection or workers in a workplace experiencing high rates of infection” … .

… Although claimant’s job included cleaning various areas of the school and picking up supplies, he acknowledged that his only contact with students would occur while he was mopping the hallways, at which time approximately 20 students would pass by him on their way to the locker rooms. During the relevant time frame, no other member of claimant’s household tested positive for COVID-19, but claimant’s then-spouse worked in-person and did the grocery shopping, her son attended sporting events three days each week and claimant attended church each week with approximately 40 other people. Claimant, who did not wear a mask during church services, testified that his fellow attendees “wouldn’t have been [sitting] that close” to one another. The record is silent as to the rate of infection in either the school where claimant worked or the surrounding community.

Upon reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. As a starting point, the record is devoid of proof that there was a high rate of infection present in claimant’s work environment at the relevant point in time … . Further, claimant’s brief encounters with a passing group of students in a corridor falls short of the degree of regular, consistent and close interaction with the public at large necessary to sustain a finding of prevalence … . Finally, the record reflects that either claimant or members of his household engaged in other in-person pursuits during the relevant time period. Under these circumstances, the Board’s finding that claimant’s employment exposed him to an elevated risk of exposure to COVID-19 cannot stand. Matter of Angelo (Southwestern Cent. Sch.), 2025 NY Slip Op 05998, Third Dept 10-30-25

Practice Point: Contracting COVID-19 is compensable under Workers’ Compensation but claimant must present proof exposure at the workplace was the source of the infection, not the case here.​

 

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