False Imprisonment Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Battery, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE NYPD IS A DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY AND CANNOT BE SEPARATELY SUED; THE 42 USC 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT ALLEGATIONS OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CITY CUSTOM OR POLICY; THE OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY FALL BECAUSE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST AND THE FORCE USED BY THE POLICE WAS NOT EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the 42 USC 1983 violation-of-civil rights, negligence, assault and battery, excessive force, false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action against the New York Police Department (NYPD) and New York City (City) should have been dismissed. Plaintiff was shot when, in the midst of a psychotic episode, she approached the police with a knife. She was indicted, tried and found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. The court noted that the NYPD is a department of the City and cannot be sued separately. The court also noted the 1983 action against the City failed to state a cause action because no city policy or custom was identified as violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights:

To hold a municipality liable under 42 USC § 1983 for the conduct of employees below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his or her constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy … . Here, “[a]lthough the complaint alleged as a legal conclusion that the defendants engaged in conduct pursuant to a policy or custom which deprived the plaintiff of certain constitutional rights, it was wholly unsupported by any allegations of fact identifying the nature of that conduct or the policy or custom which the conduct purportedly advanced” … . * * *

The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action insofar as asserted against the City. The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to a cause of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment … , including causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law … . Brown v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 01743, Second Dept 3-24-21

March 24, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Battery, Civil Rights Law, False Imprisonment, Negligence, Social Services Law

SOCIAL SERVICES LAW ARTICLE 11 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR THE INAPPROPRIATE USE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, determined the Social Services Law did not create a private right of action for the inappropriate use of physical restraints. The complaint alleged infant plaintiff, a person with special needs, was injured by the hospital defendants:

[The] causes of action alleged assault, battery, false imprisonment, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, violation of a section of Social Services Law article 11, violation of Civil Rights Law § 79-n, and negligence. The two causes of action alleging violation of Social Services Law article 11 were the fifth and sixth causes of action. In these causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed physical abuse and deliberate inappropriate use of physical restraints as defined in Social Services Law § 493(4)(b). * * *

A legislative intent to create a private right of action for alleged violation of article 11 of the Social Services Law is not fairly implied in these statutory provisions and their legislative history. Finding such a private right of action would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. The Protection of People with Special Needs Act, generally, and article 11 of the Social Services Law, specifically, “already contain[ ] substantial enforcement mechanisms”… . These mechanisms in the Act include the creation of the Justice Center, the “central agency responsible for managing and overseeing the incident reporting system, and for imposing or delegating corrective action” … . These mechanisms in article 11 include the maintenance of a statewide vulnerable persons’ central register to accept, investigate, and respond to allegations of abuse or neglect; the delineation of possible findings and consequences in connection with an investigation of abuse or neglect allegations, along with procedures for amending and appealing substantiated abuse or neglect reports; and the maintenance of a register of subjects found to have a substantiated category one abuse or neglect case. The substantial enforcement mechanisms “indicat[e] that the legislature considered how best to effectuate its intent and provided the avenues for relief it deemed warranted” … . Joseph v Nyack Hosp., 2020 NY Slip Op 07042, Second Dept 11-25-20

November 25, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Battery, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Municipal Law

DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST FOR THE CHARGED CRIMES OR FOR ANY UNCHARGED CRIMES; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery action should not have been granted because defendants did not demonstrate as a matter of law that there was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest. When plaintiff flagged down the police he told the police he had been shot and had the drug dealer’s weapon on his person which he immediately surrendered:

… [D]efendants failed to establish prima facie that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for criminal possession of a weapon or firearm … , which is the lynchpin to plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery … , as well as the arresting officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity … . While “the police are not obligated to pursue every lead that may yield evidence beneficial to the accused, even though they had knowledge of the lead and the capacity to investigate it” … , plaintiff’s claim that he temporarily lawfully possessed the gun at issue after an alleged altercation with a drug dealer who attempted to rob him was not merely a lead. Rather, as soon as plaintiff flagged down the officers, he told them that he had been shot and volunteered that he had the drug dealer’s gun on his person, which he immediately surrendered.

Assuming, without deciding, that defendants could meet their prima facie burden by identifying probable cause to arrest plaintiff for an uncharged crime or offense … , they failed to do so. Specifically, defendants have not established probable cause to arrest plaintiff for trespass … , since there is no evidence that plaintiff knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in the basement where his altercation with the drug dealer took place. Nor did they establish probable cause to arrest plaintiff for attempted criminal possession of marijuana … or attempted unlawful possession of marijuana in the first degree … , since there is no evidence as to the quantity of marijuana that plaintiff allegedly attempted to possess. Finally, defendants failed to establish prima facie probable cause to arrest and detain plaintiff to the extent that they did for attempted unlawful possession of marijuana in the second degree … , since, had they so charged him, they only would have been permitted to issue a desk appearance ticket … . Idelfonso v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 05854, First Dept 10-20-20

October 20, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Criminal Law, Evidence, False Imprisonment, Municipal Law

THE CITY NEED NOT PROVE THE POLICE CORROBORATED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY AN INFORMANT IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR FALSE ARREST STEMMING FROM THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH WARRANT BASED UPON ‘BAD CI INFORMATION’ (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that, in the context of a civil trial alleging false imprisonment stemming from police officers entering plaintiffs’ apartment to execute a search warrant, the city does not have to prove the police properly corroborated the informant’s allegations on which the warrant was based. Apparently, the informant provided “bad … information:”

To prevail on a cause of action alleging false arrest or false imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove (1) intentional confinement by the defendant, (2) of which the plaintiff was aware, (3) to which the plaintiff did not consent, and (4) which was not otherwise privileged … . “The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to a cause of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment” … . Unlike in a criminal prosecution, where the hearsay statements of an informant can only constitute probable cause if it is demonstrated that the informant is reliable and had a sufficient basis for his or her knowledge, in a trial in a civil action alleging false arrest or false imprisonment, it is not “appropriate for a jury to determine, as a factual matter, whether the police obtained sufficient corroboration of the information provided by an informant” … . In a civil action resulting from the detention of the occupants of premises searched pursuant to a search warrant, “there is a presumption of probable cause for the detention which the plaintiff must rebut with evidence that the warrant was procured based upon the false or unsubstantiated statements of a police officer” … . Ali v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 04138, Second Dept 7-23-20

July 22, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution

PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM AND WHETHER THE POLICE GAVE FALSE EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY; THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment and 42 USC 1983 civil rights causes of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff had been arrested and indicted in a shooting based upon information from Pierre-Riviera, who allegedly claimed plaintiff was the shooter. The charges against plaintiff were dismissed by the District Attorney. Plaintiff alleged the information provided by Pierre-Riviera was the product of coercion by the police, and the police witnesses provided false evidence to the grand jury:

… [T]he defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff … . Pierre-Riviera’s deposition testimony, submitted by the defendants on their motion, raised triable issues of fact as to whether his identification of the plaintiff as the shooter was coerced, and therefore, whether the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff … . …

Regarding malicious prosecution, once a suspect has been indicted, the grand jury action creates a presumption of probable cause … . A plaintiff can overcome the presumption of probable cause “by evidence establishing that the police witnesses have not made a complete and full statement of facts either to the Grand Jury or to the District Attorney, that they have misrepresented or falsified evidence, that they have withheld evidence or otherwise acted in bad faith” … . Elie v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 03001, Second Dept 5-27-20

May 27, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Evidence, False Imprisonment

MOTHER ATTACKED HER SISTER WITH A KNIFE WHEN MOTHER’S CHILDREN WERE IN THE HOME, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REVERSED THE NEGLECT FINDING BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES, THERE WAS NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE CHILDREN WITNESSED OR WERE AWARE OF THE ATTACK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence that mother attacked her sister with a knife while mother’s children were in the home supported the finding of neglect. There was no need to demonstrate the children witnessed the attack:

“To establish neglect pursuant to Family Court Act § 1012(f)(i)(B), a petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and (2) that the actual or threatened harm to the child is due to the failure of the parent or caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship” … .

Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, an imminent danger of impairment to the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the subject children should be inferred from the mother’s egregious conduct of attacking the children’s pregnant aunt with a knife while the children were in the home … . Furthermore, impairment or imminent danger of physical impairment should also be inferred from the subject children’s proximity to violence directed against a family member, “even absent evidence that they were aware of or emotionally impacted by the violence” … . Matter of Najaie C. (Niger C.), 2019 NY Slip Op 04935, Second Dept 6-19-19

June 19, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Court of Claims, Evidence, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution

VALID EVIDENTIARY ISSUES WERE NOTICED BY APPELLATE COUNSEL BUT WERE NOT ADDRESSED AT TRIAL, THE STATE’S VERDICT IN THIS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE ARREST AND UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT ACTION AFFIRMED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, noting the validity of questions raised about the evidence that claimant sold the drugs, affirmed the verdict in favor of the state in this malicious prosecution, false arrest and unlawful imprisonment action. The evidentiary issues were noticed and raised by appellate counsel, but were not raised in the Court of Claims:

If taken at face value, this evidence would validate claimant’s testimony that he did not sell drugs to the informant and that defendant should have known as much. Critically important, however, is the fact that this timing discrepancy was never addressed at claimant’s criminal trial or the subject bench trial before the Court of Claims, and appears only to have been discerned by claimant’s counsel in his appellate brief. Defendant points out in its brief that it was unable to verify when the audio recording began because it did not have the original compact disc. The discrepancy between the commencement of the audio recording and the taking of the photographs is a matter of minutes at best. Missing from this record is any testimony expressly validating the timing as to when the audio recording began. Had this discrepancy been called to the attention of the Court of Claims, corresponding testimony could have been entertained … . As such, on this record, we decline to disturb the credibility determination made by the Court of Claims. Jenkins v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 02932, Third Dept 4-18-19

April 18, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Battery, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Municipal Law

NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s application for permission to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted. After criminal charges were dismissed, eight months after the deadline for filing a notice of claim, petitioner sought to bring an action alleging violations of 42 USC 1983, false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution. The Second Department found that a notice of claim is not required for the 42 USC 1983 action, the statute of limitations had expired on the assault and battery actions, reports documenting an investigation did not provide the city with timely notice of the essential facts of the claim, the excuse for the delay was not reasonable, and petitioner did not show the city was not prejudiced by the delay:

The branch of the petition which sought leave to serve a late notice of claim to assert, pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, violations of the petitioner’s federal civil and constitutional rights, should have been denied as unnecessary… . Such a claim is not subject to the State statutory notice of claim requirement … . …

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the City acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the relevant state law claims within 90 days after they arose or a reasonable time thereafter. Actual knowledge could not be readily inferred from two reports dated June 18, 2015, documenting an internal investigation conducted by the police department to determine how a firearm was allegedly carried into, and concealed within, the station house, that “a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the [City]” against the plaintiff … . Moreover, the mere alleged existence of other police reports and records, without evidence of their content, and the involvement of the City’s police officers in the alleged incident, without more, were insufficient to impute actual knowledge to the City … .

We also disagree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the petitioner presented a reasonable excuse for his failure to serve a timely notice of claim. The petitioner’s incarceration did not constitute such an excuse, since the relevant state law claims did not accrue, and the petitioner’s time to serve a notice of claim did not begin to run, until he was released from custody … . Matter of Nicholson v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 08134, Second Dept 11-28-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (42 USC 1983, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/42 USC 1983 (NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/FALSE ARREST (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/FALSE IMPRISONMENT (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/ASSAULT (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/BATTERY (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))//MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (NOTICE OF CLAIM, NO NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 42 USC 1983, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED ON ASSAULT AND BATTERY, PERMISSION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ON THE REMAINING STATE CHARGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

November 28, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Municipal Law

POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY CITY OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER’S FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT

The Second Department determined the petition to file a late notice of claim in this false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution action was properly denied. The police report association with petitioner's arrest did not provide notice of the claims to the city and that allegation that petitioner's assigned counsel did not timely inform him of the notice of claim requirement was not an adequate excuse:

… [T]he involvement of a City police officer in arresting the petitioner did not, without more, establish that the City acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner's claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution within 90 days following their accrual or a reasonable time thereafter… . In addition, the contents of the arrest report and the certificate of disposition, submitted by the petitioner in support of his application, were insufficient to impute actual knowledge to the City of the facts underlying his claims … . Further, the petitioner failed to establish that the delay in serving a notice of claim and seeking leave to serve such notice would not substantially prejudice the City in maintaining its defense on the merits with respect to those claims … . Matter of Islam v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05763, Second Dept 8-15-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY CITY OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY CITY OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/FALSE ARREST (POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY CITY OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/FALSE IMPRISONMENT (POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY CITY OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY CITY OF THE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS, PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

August 15, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Municipal Law

THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution causes of action should have been dismissed. Drugs were found in her apartment when a search warrant was executed in her absence. Her children’s father pleaded guilt to possession of the drugs. The First Department determined there was probable cause for her arrest under the theory of constructive possession of the drugs:

The evidence shows that plaintiff resided in and was the leaseholder of an apartment where contraband was discovered pursuant to a search warrant. Plaintiff’s residence and tenancy established her dominion and control over the apartment, and thus placed her in constructive possession of the contraband found therein … . This is so despite the fact that her children’s father had access to the apartment and also admitted and was charged with possession of the same contraband, since “[p]ossession if joint is no less possession” … . This is also true despite the fact that plaintiff was not in the apartment when the search warrant was executed and the contraband discovered … . Plaintiff’s possession of the contraband, in turn, gave rise to probable cause for her arrest. Nor does the record show that there were any material changes in fact to undermine the probable cause between her arrest and the filing of charges against her … . There is no evidence in the record sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity in the search warrant which led to the discovery of the contraband … .

The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to plaintiff’s state claims … and federal claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution … . Phin v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 00333, First Dept 1-18-18

FALSE ARREST (THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/FALSE IMPRISONMENT (THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

January 18, 2018/by CurlyHost