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THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a dissenting opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined the development of the old Shea Stadium parking lot, which is on parkland (Flushing Meadows Park), was subject to the public trust doctrine, requiring specific legislation. The court held that the existing provisions of the administrative code, which approved and described the construction of Shea Stadium, could not be interpreted to allow the proposed development (Willets West) which includes the construction of a hotel, mall and residential housing:

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The statutory language and legislative history demonstrate that the legislation did not authorize further developments on the tract of parkland but, rather, ensured that the City was authorized to accommodate other public uses of the stadium and appurtenant facilities.

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… [T]he text of the statute and its legislative history flatly refute the proposition that the legislature granted the City the authority to construct a development such as Willets West in Flushing Meadows Park.

We acknowledge that the remediation of Willets Point is a laudable goal. Defendants and various amici dedicate substantial portions of their briefs to the propositions that the Willets West development would immensely benefit the people of New York City, by transforming the area into a new, vibrant community, and that the present plan might be the only means to accomplish that transformation. Those contentions, however, have no place in our consideration of whether the legislature granted authorization for the development of Willets West on land held in the public trust. Of course, the legislature remains free to alienate all or part of the parkland for whatever purposes it sees fit, but it must do so through direct and specific legislation that expressly confers the desired alienation. Matter of Avella v City of New York , 2017 NY Slip Op 04383, CtApp  6-6-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE)/PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (PARKLAND DEVELOPMENT, THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE)/PARKS (PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD PARKING LOT FOR SHEA STADIUM, ON PARKLAND, IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND REQUIRES SPECIFIC ENABLING LEGISLATION, THE LEGISLATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHEA STADIUM IS NOT APPLICABLE)

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