Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” Below.
Note: The Easiest Way to Save a Search Result Is to Highlight It and then Copy and Paste into a Word Document. All the Links Remain Functional in the Word Document.
The search function can be used to get caught up on what all the courts have ruled on so far this year, or what any specific court has ruled on so far this year, or what any court has ruled on during any time period, going back weeks, months or years. Just add the “start” and “end” dates to your searches (the third and fourth lines in the search panel on the right side of the page).
In the posts “Just Released,” “Streamlined Research” and “Update Service,” how to do (1) searches in all legal categories, (2) searches in specific categories, (3) searches using keywords and phrases, and (4) searches confined to specific courts, is explained in some detail. Use the “start” and “end” date criteria to confine any of those types of searches to a specific time period.
If, for example, you want to see what the Fourth Department has addressed in the category “Criminal Law” in 2024, click on “Criminal Law” in the drop-down menu in the Search Panel (revealed when you click on “All Categories”), choose January 1, 2024, as the start date, choose today as the end date, click on “Fourth Department” in the Search Panel menu and click on “Search.”
If you want to see what the Court of Appeals ruled on this year in all categories, leave “All Categories” in the top line of the search panel, choose January 1, 2024, for the start date and today for the end date, click on “Court of Appeals” in the search panel menu and click on “Search.”
Any type of search can be confined to any specific time period between January 1, 2013, and today.
For more on this “personalized update service” capability, click on “Update Service.”
THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED HER AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE PARENTAL ACCESS TO ONE OF THE CHILDREN IN THIS ABUSE/NEGLECT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court in this abuse and neglect proceeding, held Family Court should not have delegated its authority to determine father’s parental access to one of the children:
… Family Court … found that the father sexually abused and neglected Alexander and derivatively abused and neglected Maximillian, and conditioned the father’s parental access with Alexander and Maximillian upon the consent of Alexander. * * *
… [A] court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child … . … [W]e remit the matter … for a new determination as to the father’s parental access with Alexander and Maximillian in accordance with the best interests of those children … . Matter of Alexander M.R. (Manuel D. J. R.), 2026 NY Slip Op 05790, Second Dept 10-7-26
Practice Point: A judge cannot delegate the authority to determine parental access.
THE WORDING OF THE WILL RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR BECAUSE SEVERAL CHILDREN WERE MISIDENTIFIED AND ONE WAS OMITTED; THE PETITION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the wording of the will raised questions about the testator’s intent. Therefore the petition for construction of the will pursuant to SCPA (Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act) section 1420 should not have been denied without a hearing:
“The cardinal rule of construction of a will is to carry out the intent of the testator” … . “All rules of interpretation are subordinated to the requirement that the actual purpose of the testat[or] is sought and effectuated as far as is consonant with principles of law and public policy” … . “Intent is not to be gleaned by focusing upon any one particular word, sentence, or provision; rather, it must be ascertained from a perusal of the entire will by a reader mindful of the particular facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the instrument were framed” … . “The heirs of a testator are favored by the policy of the law and cannot be disinherited upon mere conjecture, and when the testator intends to disinherit them he must indicate that intention clearly” … .
Here, the Surrogate’s Court should not have, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding without a hearing … . The allegations in the verified petition, inter alia, that several of the decedent’s children were misidentified in Article THIRD and that Article THIRD contained the word “children” but omitted the name of one of the decedent’s children … , were sufficient to indicate that the testator’s intent was not clear and unambiguous.
Accordingly, the Surrogate’s Court should have held a hearing to give the petitioner the opportunity to submit proof to establish the decedent’s intent … . Matter of Covington, 2026 NY Slip Op 05785, Second Dept 10-7-26
Practice Point: Here the wording of the will raised questions about the testator’s intent. The petition for construction of the will should not have been denied without a hearing at which petitioner could present evidence of the decedent’s intent.
A PUTATIVE CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING MUSEUM ADMISSION TICKETS FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE FULL PRICE OF THE TICKET PROPERLY SURVIVED A MOTION TO DISMISS; THE “VOLUNTARY PAYMENT DOCTRINE” DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ottley, in a matter of first-impression, affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss, determined plaintiff stated a cause of action for a violation of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law and had standing to bring a class action suit. The essence of the violation was the purported failure to disclose the full price of a ticket for admission to a museum, which included taxes and fees, prior to the ticket purchase. The cause of action is statutory. The “voluntary payment doctrine” was deemed inapplicable:
Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 25.07(4) provides that the defendant shall disclose the total cost of the ticket, including ancillary fees, prior to the ticket being selected for purchase and that the “service charge, or any other fee or surcharge to the purchaser” be “disclosed in a clear and conspicuous manner” (id.). Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 25.33 provides that “any person who has been injured by reason of a violation of this article may bring an action in his or her own name to enjoin such unlawful act, an action to recover his or her actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff.” * * *
The voluntary payment doctrine “bars recovery of payments voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts, and in the absence of fraud or mistake of material fact or law” … .
… [W]e conclude … the voluntary payment doctrine does not bar the plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 25.07(4) because such claims are predicated on a lack of full disclosure … .