Note: Before Relying On Any Decision Summarized on this Site, Make Sure It Remains Good Law Using the Method You Trust for that Purpose. See the Discussion Under “Shepardize” Below.
Note: The Easiest Way to Save a Search Result Is to Highlight It and then Copy and Paste into a Word Document. All the Links Remain Functional in the Word Document.
The search function can be used to get caught up on what all the courts have ruled on so far this year, or what any specific court has ruled on so far this year, or what any court has ruled on during any time period, going back weeks, months or years. Just add the “start” and “end” dates to your searches (the third and fourth lines in the search panel on the right side of the page).
In the posts “Just Released,” “Streamlined Research” and “Update Service,” how to do (1) searches in all legal categories, (2) searches in specific categories, (3) searches using keywords and phrases, and (4) searches confined to specific courts, is explained in some detail. Use the “start” and “end” date criteria to confine any of those types of searches to a specific time period.
If, for example, you want to see what the Fourth Department has addressed in the category “Criminal Law” in 2024, click on “Criminal Law” in the drop-down menu in the Search Panel (revealed when you click on “All Categories”), choose January 1, 2024, as the start date, choose today as the end date, click on “Fourth Department” in the Search Panel menu and click on “Search.”
If you want to see what the Court of Appeals ruled on this year in all categories, leave “All Categories” in the top line of the search panel, choose January 1, 2024, for the start date and today for the end date, click on “Court of Appeals” in the search panel menu and click on “Search.”
Any type of search can be confined to any specific time period between January 1, 2013, and today.
For more on this “personalized update service” capability, click on “Update Service.”
THE CRITERIA FOR JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL WERE NOT MET HERE (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined plaintiff was not precluded by judicial estoppel from seeking attorney’s fees deemed uncollectible in a bankruptcy proceeding:
Supreme Court incorrectly dismissed the complaint on the ground that judicial estoppel bars plaintiff from seeking attorneys’ fees that were deemed uncollectible in a bankruptcy proceeding. Judicial estoppel applies where it is shown that a debtor omitted or concealed the existence of an asset and later brought suit to collect on that asset … . Here, the court made no such findings, and in fact assumed that plaintiff had not misled the bankruptcy trustee. Nor does the record establish that plaintiff obtained a benefit in the bankruptcy proceeding by taking one position in that proceeding and then assuming a contrary position in this action “simply because [his] interest changed” … . We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that the record establishes that plaintiff unequivocally adopted a conflicting legal position to obtain a bankruptcy discharge. Bohn v Tekulsky, 2025 NY Slip Op 02848, First Dept 5-8-25
Practice Point: In the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a debtor from concealing the existence of an asset and subsequently bringing suit to collect on that asset. Although there was a dissent, the majority concluded plaintiff had not misled the bankruptcy court and therefore judicial estoppel did not apply.
PLAINTIFF’S OWN DEPOSITION TESTIMONY THAT HE CLEANED THE AREA WHERE HE STEPPED ON A NAIL PROVED DEFENDANT DID NOT NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE NAIL; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant demonstrated it did not have constructive notice of the nail plaintiff stepped on requiring dismissal of the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action. The twist here is plaintiff’s own deposition testimony that he had cleaned the area proved defendant’s lack of constructive notice:
Plaintiff expressly based his Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims on a theory that he was injured when he stepped on a nail and that his injuries therefore arose from the condition of the workplace. Thus, defendant was required to establish prima facie that it neither caused or created the dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of it … . Defendant sustained that burden by submitting plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he had swept the area before his lunch break, that everything was where he had left it and the floor was still clean when he returned from his lunch break, and that he never noticed the nail before the accident, which occurred after plaintiff’s lunch break … . Zyskowski v Chelsea-Warren Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 02860, First Dept 5-8-25
Practice Point: Proof the area where plaintiff stepped on a nail was cleaned and inspected shortly before the injury demonstrated defendant did not have constructive notice of the presence of the nail, requiring dismissal of the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action. The facts here are unusual in that it was plaintiff’s own testimony that he cleaned and inspected the area shortly before he stepped on the nail and did not notice the nail which proved defendant lacked constructive notice.
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEW COUNSEL BASED UPON COUNSEL’S REMARK THAT DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA WAS UNWARRANTED; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED AN INQUIRY ABOUT DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL AND HIS REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA; MATTER REMITTED FOR ASSIGNMENT OF NEW COUNSEL AND A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, over a dissent, determined defendant’s appeal waiver was invalid, defendant demonstrated a conflict of interest on assigned counsel’s part, and the judge did not conduct a proper inquiry about defendant’s requests for new counsel and to withdraw his guilty plea. The Third Department vacated defendant’s sentence, not the conviction or plea, and remitted the matter for the assignment of new counsel and an inquiry about defendant’s request for substitute counsel and his request to withdraw his plea:
At sentencing, the Conflict Defender explained that she had “numerous phone conversations” with defendant about the grounds for his motion — namely, that assigned counsel’s communication of the People’s plea offer amounted to coercion; that defendant’s learning disability had prevented him from comprehending the consequences of his plea; and that the Conflict Defender was herself conflicted out of representing defendant. Based on her conversations with defendant, the Conflict Defender stated to County Court, “I don’t believe there is anything that warranted [defendant] withdrawing a plea, so I didn’t file a motion” … . “While apparently inadvertent, counsel’s remark . . . affirmatively undermined arguments her client wished the court to review, thereby depriving defendant of effective assistance of counsel” … , and the court should have relieved the Conflict Defender and assigned new counsel to represent defendant on the motion … .
We also agree with defendant that the allegations of assigned counsel’s ineffectiveness were sufficiently serious and factually specific to trigger County Court’s duty to consider his request for substitute counsel … . An indigent defendant’s right to court-appointed representation “does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant’s option” … . “Rather, a defendant may be entitled to new counsel only upon showing good cause for a substitution, such as a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel” … . * * *
In addition to alleging that assigned counsel coerced him into pleading guilty, defendant’s letters to County Court asserted that assigned counsel failed to visit him in jail or discuss his case with him; dodged his phone calls on specific dates; sent other attorneys to represent defendant who did not seem to be knowledgeable about the case; intended to oppose any motion defendant made to substitute counsel; and told defendant that his only other options for representation were to hire private counsel or represent himself. Further, defendant indicated that assigned counsel misadvised defendant about his sentencing exposure in a prior case, resulting in an appeal from that conviction on the ground of assigned counsel’s ineffectiveness. Defendant also alleged that assigned counsel was not relaying information or following his instructions in representing him in a separate, contemporaneous criminal action against him. Reading defendant’s allegations of ineffectiveness in the context of defendant’s purported history with assigned counsel, defendant’s complaints set out a plausible claim that the trust and communication between him and assigned counsel had broken down irretrievably … . Faced with these complaints, the court was required to “make at least a minimal inquiry, and discern meritorious complaints from disingenuous applications by inquiring as to the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” … . People v Ubrich, 2025 NY Slip Op 02824, Third Dept 5-8-25
Practice Point: Here defense counsel’s remark that defendant’s request to withdraw his plea was unwarranted demonstrated a conflict of interest requiring the assignment of new counsel.
Practice Point: Here defendant raised serious issues about assigned counsel’s representation requiring the judge to consider his request for substitute counsel.
Practice Point: Here defendant raised serious issues in support of his request to withdraw his guilty plea which required an inquiry by the judge.
BECAUSE THE INITIAL USE OF THE ROADWAY WAS PERMISSIVE, AND THERE WAS NO HOSTILE USE FOR THE REQUIRED TEN YEARS, THE CRITERIA FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT WERE NOT MET; HOWEVER BECAUSE THE INITIAL USE WAS PERMISSIVE AND CONTINUED FOR 50 YEARS, THE CRITERIA FOR AN EASEMENT BY ESTOPPEL WERE MET (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiffs did not have a prescriptive easement over defendants’ properties, but did have an easement by estoppel. Because there was an agreement among the original owners of the three adjacent camps to construct, maintain and use a roadway providing vehicular access to all three camps, and because there had been no hostile use of the roadway for ten years, the requirements for a prescriptive easement were not met. However plaintiffs were entitled to an easement by estoppel. The court noted that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to an easement by estoppel:
[Re; a prescriptive easement] … [B]ecause plaintiffs’ predecessors’ use of the extension was permissive, the element of hostility was negated … . Therefore, no adverse use could have arisen until there was the assertion of a hostile right … , which, at the earliest, occurred in 2018. We are presented with a permissive use that did not ripen into a prescriptive one for the time required … .
Yet, these same facts establish plaintiffs’ entitlement to an easement by estoppel … . “An easement by estoppel may arise when, among other things, a party reasonably relies upon a servient landowner’s representation that an easement exists” … . The uncontested existence of the agreement between the parties’ predecessors for the construction and use of the extension, together with the time and expense of not only the initial construction but, also, the continued 50-year maintenance thereof, demonstrates that plaintiffs “undertook . . . action[s] to their detriment in reasonable reliance upon a representation that they held an easement” … . Sardino v Scholet Family Irrevocable Trust, 2025 NY Slip Op 02828, Third Dept 5-8-25
Practice Point: Consult this decision for clear illustrations of the criteria for a prescriptive easement and an easement by estoppel.
CONFINEMENT IN A RESIDENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT UNIT (RMHU) FOR 17 HOURS A DAY, WITH AT LEAST SEVEN HOURS OF OUT-OF-CELL TIME PER DAY, FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE HUMANE ALTERNATIVES TO LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ACT (HALT ACT) (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined the sanctions imposed upon petitioner, an incarcerated person with serious mental illness, did not violate the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (HALT Act) but did violate the Special Housing Unit Exclusion Law (SHU Exclusion Law):
… [P]etitioner remained in the RMHU [residential mental health treatment unit] where he received at least seven hours of out-of-cell time, therefore he was not in segregated confinement, which is defined as “the confinement of an incarcerated individual in any form of cell confinement for more than [17] hours a day” (Correction Law § 2 [23]). * * * Therefore, based on the foregoing, DOCCS [Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] did not violate Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) by placing petitioner in the RMHU longer than three days without the requisite findings under the HALT Act.
However … we do find that the disciplinary sanctions, as written, violated the SHU Exclusion Law as set forth in Correction Law § 401. To that end, Correction Law § 401 provides that “[a]n incarcerated individual . . . shall not be sanctioned with segregated confinement for misconduct [in an RMHTU], or removed from the unit and placed in segregated confinement or a[n RRU (residential rehabilitation unit)], except in exceptional circumstances where such incarcerated individual’s conduct poses a significant and unreasonable risk to . . . safety . . . and . . . has been found to have committed an act or acts defined in [Correction Law § 137 [k] [6] [ii]]” (Correction Law § 401 [5] …). “Because the statute is phrased in the disjunctive” … , DOCCS must find that exceptional circumstances existed and a Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) act occurred if either 1) the incarcerated individual is sanctioned with segregated confinement for misconduct on the unit or 2) the incarcerated individual is removed and placed in segregated confinement or an RRU. Here, the former applies as petitioner was sanctioned, in writing, with segregated confinement in the RMHU but was not found, in a written determination, to have committed an act pursuant to Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii), a fact which is uncontested by either party. Thus, the written disciplinary sanction was in violation of the SHU Exclusion Law. Therefore, the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon petitioner must be annulled. Matter of Walker v Commissioner, N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2025 NY Slip Op 02834, Third Dept 5-8-25
THE FACT THAT BOTH PLAINTIFF AND THE COW PLAINTIFF WAS WALKING FELL, WITH THE COW LANDING ON PLAINTIFF’S FOOT, DID NOT REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF SUE IN STRICT LIABILITY BASED UPON AN ANIMAL’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES; PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE CAUSE OF THE FALL WAS THE SLIPPERY CONDITION OF THE FLOOR, NOT THE ACTIONS OF THE COW (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff slipped and fell because of the condition of the floor, and not because of the actions of an animal, a cow which plaintiff was walking back to her stall when both he and the cow fell:
The plaintiff, who was working as a farrier, went to the defendant Bobby Wickham’s farm to service his cows. The cement area that the plaintiff had to traverse to transport each cow to and from her stall allegedly was covered with feces and urine. When the plaintiff complained to Wickham that the floor was very slippery, Wickham allegedly stated that he did not have sand to put down on the ground. The plaintiff serviced six or seven cows without incident. While he was working, the plaintiff saw cows slip on the floor. After servicing the cow at issue, the plaintiff was walking the cow back to her stall when he slipped and fell on the floor. The cow then fell on top of the plaintiff’s right foot.
… Wickham moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, contending that the sole means of recovery of damages for injuries caused by a domestic animal was upon a theory of strict liability, whereby the plaintiff must establish that the domestic animal had vicious propensities and that the owner knew or should have known of the domestic animal’s vicious propensities, which the plaintiff did not allege here. …
* * * The evidence submitted raised triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell due to the condition of the floor and whether the cow’s subsequent contact with the plaintiff was causally related to the condition of the floor. Gomez v Wickham, 2025 NY Slip Op 02760, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: Just because a plaintiff’s injuries are caused by an animal, here a cow falling on plaintiff, does not require that plaintiff’s lawsuit be brought under animal law (strict liability based on the animal’s vicious propensities). Plaintiff successfully alleged, under a negligence theory, that both he and the cow fell because of the slippery condition of the floor.
PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT TO REMEDY DEFECTS IN THE COMPLAINT IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE AFFIDAVIT; THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging that defendants improperly influenced the decedent to name them as beneficiaries of two bank accounts should not have been dismissed. The allegations in the complaint were supplement by plaintiff’s affidavit. The Second Department noted that the affidavit should have been considered in assessing the sufficiency of the complaint:
The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that it failed to state a cause of action. In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which she made statements to supplement the causes of action alleged in the complaint. … Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion. …
“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “‘Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss'” … . Where a cause of action is based upon, inter alia, fraud, breach of trust, or undue influence, the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail (see CPLR 3016[b]).
Here, the Supreme Court should have considered the plaintiff’s affidavit to remedy any defects in the complaint when it assessed the defendants’ motion … . Rauch v Rauch, 2025 NY Slip Op 02802, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: Here the court held that an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff to remedy defects in the complaint in response to a motion to dismiss should have been considered by the motion court. The complaint as supplemented by the affidavit was deemed to state a cause of action for undue influence.
A PROPER FOUNDATION WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SOME BUSINESS RECORDS RELIED ON BY THE REFEREE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE MOTION TO CONFIRM THE REFEREE’S REPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to confirm the referee’s report in this foreclosure action should have been denied. A proper foundation had not been provided for the admissibility of some of the business records relied upon by the referee:
Generally, the report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the findings are substantially supported by the record … . Here, the referee computed the amount due to the plaintiff based upon the affidavit of an employee of the plaintiff and certain business records. Although the affiant purported to have personal knowledge of the amounts due and owing on the loan, she averred that this was based upon her review of the plaintiff’s records. “[A] review of records maintained in the normal course of business does not vest an affiant with personal knowledge” … . The affiant also failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of all of the business records relied upon (see CPLR 4518[a]). “A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker’s business practices and procedures” … . Here, the referee’s findings with respect to the total amount due on the note were premised upon a payment history beginning in 2009. The plaintiff, however, did not acquire the note until 2013. The plaintiff’s affiant failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of the records from 2009 to 2013 … , and, therefore, the referee’s report was not substantially supported by the record. Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Lewis, 2025 NY Slip Op 02789, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: Reversals in foreclosure proceedings often stem from the failure to provide a proper foundation for the admissibility of business records relied upon by the parties and/or the referee.
THE EIGHT-AND-A-HALF-MONTH DELAY BETWEEN THE JUVENILE’S ARREST AND THE FILING OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DEPRIVED THE JUVENILE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing the order of disposition in this juvenile delinquency proceeding, determined the juvenile, Adonis J W, was deprived of his constitutional right to due process by the eight-and-a-half-month delay between his arrest and the filing of the petition:
“The due process right to a speedy trial extends to respondents in juvenile delinquency proceedings” … . “An unreasonable delay in prosecuting a juvenile delinquency proceeding following a respondent’s arrest can constitute a violation of due process” … . “To determine whether a respondent’s due process rights were violated by a delay in filing, the court must engage in a balancing of factors, including the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the underlying charge, whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and whether there is any indication of prejudice to the defense resulting from the delay” … . “When applying this balancing test, ‘courts must remain acutely cognizant of the goals, character and unique nature of juvenile proceedings'” … . “‘[T]he central goal of any juvenile proceeding—rehabilitation of the juvenile through prompt intervention and treatment—can seem trivialized when a presentment agency delays the filing of a petition'” … .
Here, while the charges were serious and Adonis J. W. did not demonstrate any actual prejudice to his defense attributable to the delay in filing the petition, the presentment agency failed to establish a legitimate reason for the delay. Additionally, the ultimate goal of promptly treating and rehabilitating Adonis J. W. was not furthered by permitting a fact-finding hearing on the petition following the unjustified delay. Matter of Adonis J. W., 2025 NY Slip Op 02788, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: The constitutional speedy trial rights apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
PETITIONER JUDGMENT-CREDITOR WAS ENTITLED TO THE TURNOVER OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY WHICH HAD BEEN FRAUDULENTLY TRANFERRED TO A TRUST BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGMENT-DEBTORS, AS WELL AS THE CONTENTS OF RESPONDENTS’ SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner was entitled to real property which was fraudulently transferred by respondents to a trust, as well as to the contents of respondents’ safety deposit box, to satisfy a judgment against respondents in the approximate amount of $338,000:
… [P]etitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 52, seeking … the turnover of a safety deposit box maintained by the respondents Zakhar Brener and Ninel Krepkina and of certain residential real property owned by the respondent B and K Trust. * * *
… [P]etitioner established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action seeking relief pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 273 by submitting evidence that Brener was insolvent at the time of the conveyance of the property, which was made without fair consideration … . * * *
… [P]etitioner established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action seeking relief pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 276. “Pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 276, every conveyance made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors is fraudulent. The requisite intent required by this section need not be proven by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the allegedly fraudulent transfer” … . “In determining whether a conveyance was fraudulent, the courts consider the existence of certain common ‘badges of fraud,’ which include ‘a close relationship between the parties to the alleged fraudulent transaction; a questionable transfer not in the usual course of business; inadequacy of the consideration; the transferor’s knowledge of the creditor’s claim and the inability to pay it; and retention of control of the property by the transferor after the conveyance'” … . “A prime example of this type of fraud is where a debtor transfers his property to another while retaining the use thereof so as to continue . . . free from the claims of creditors” … . Here, the petitioner submitted, among other things, the Brener respondents’ answer, wherein they admitted that Brener continued to occupy and use the property with Krepkina. …
… [P]etitioner established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action to direct Chase Bank to turn over of the contents of the safe deposit box maintained by Brener and Krepkina by submitting a letter establishing that Brener and Krepkina jointly held a safe deposit box at one of Chase Bank’s branches in Brooklyn … . Matter of Schiffman v Affordable Shoes, Ltd., 2025 NY Slip Op 02786, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise description of a CPLR Article 52 turnover proceeding by a judgment creditor against judgment debtors based in part upon respondents’ fraudulent transfer of real property to avoid creditors (Debtor and Creditor Law sections 273 and 276).
THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR FILING AND SERVING A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH RUNS FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR; HERE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS TIMELY FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION; HOWEVER THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING AND PREIMPACT TERROR RUNS FROM THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT; THE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN REJECTED AS UNTIMELY FOR THOSE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the application to deem a notice of claim timely served for the conscious pain and suffering and preimpact terror causes of action in this pedestrian-bus-accident wrongful-death case should not have been granted. General Municipal Law 50-e provides that a notice of claim alleging wrongful death is timely filed and served within 90 days of the appointment of an administrator; that requirement was met here. The notice of claim was therefore timely for the wrongful death cause of action. However the wrongful-death notice-of-claim provision in General Municipal Law 50-e does not apply to the conscious pain and suffering and preimpact terror causes of action. The Second Department held that the notice of claim should have been rejected as untimely for those two causes of action:
Here, [defendant] NYCTA [New York City Transit Authority] did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims of conscious pain and suffering or preimpact terror within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day statutory period … . “As a general rule, knowledge of an accident or occurrence by a municipality’s police or fire department cannot be imputed to another public or municipal corporation” … . Furthermore, the case file did not indicate that anyone associated with NYCTA acquired actual knowledge of essential facts constituting the subject claims.
As to the other relevant factors, the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her failure to timely serve a notice of claim … . The petitioner also failed to meet her initial burden of presenting “some evidence or plausible argument” … to support a finding that NYCTA will not be substantially prejudiced by the approximate six-month delay from the expiration of the 90-day statutory period until the commencement of this proceeding … . Matter of Egalite v New York City Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 02773, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: A notice of claim for wrongful death is timely filed and served within 90 days of the appointment of an administrator pursuant to General Municipal Law 50-e (a) (1). However, that statutory provision does not apply to causes of action for conscious pain and suffering and preimpact terror. Notices of claim for those causes of action must be filed and served within 90 days of the accident.
IT IS PROPER TO MAKE PARTICIPATION IN COUNSELING A COMPONENT OF A PARENTAL ACCESS ORDER, BUT IT IS IMPROPER TO CONDITION A FUTURE APPLICATION FOR PARENTAL ACCESS ON PARTICIPATION IN COUNSELING (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined that the judge should not have conditioned any future application for parental access on father’s participation in counseling. It is proper to direct a party to participate in counseling as a component of a parental access order, but it is improper to make participation in counseling a prerequisite for a future parental access application:
“A court deciding a custody proceeding may properly direct a party to submit to counseling or treatment as a component of a [parental access] or custody order” … . “However, a court may not direct that a parent undergo counseling or treatment as a condition of future parental access or reapplication for parental access rights” … , and/or “successfully complete treatment or therapy as a condition to any future application” … . While it was acceptable to direct the father to participate in therapeutic services, so much of the order appealed from as, in effect, conditioned any future expansion of the father’s parental access with the children upon his participation in therapeutic services, leading to his understanding of the reasons for neglect findings entered against him … , and progress in his therapeutic visitation with the children, was improper … . Accordingly, we modify the order so as to eliminate those conditions. Matter of Badalyan v Antaplian, 2025 NY Slip Op 02769, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: This is a common appellate issue in Family Law. Counseling is an appropriate component of a parental access order, but future applications for parental access can not be conditioned upon participation in counseling.
THE “EVEN YEAR ELECTION LAW” (EYEL) IS CONSTITUTIONAL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Even Year Election Law (EYEL) does not violate the New York Constitution or the United States Constitution. The decision is complex and cannot be fairly summarized here:
The EYEL amended provisions of County Law § 400, Town Law § 80, Village Law § 17-1703-a (4), and Municipal Home Rule Law § 34 (3) such that elections for most county, town, and village officials would be held on even-numbered years, and would no longer be held on odd-numbered years, effective January 1, 2025 … . Exceptions were made for the offices of town justice, sheriff, county clerk, district attorney, family court judge, county court judge, and surrogate court judge — each of which has a term of office provided in the New York Constitution … — as well as town and county offices with preexisting three-year terms, all offices in towns coterminous with villages, and all offices in counties located in New York City … . Additionally, a new subsection (h) was added to Municipal Home Rule Law § 34 (3) to preclude county charters from superseding the newly enacted County Law § 400 (8).
The EYEL purports to encourage an increased voter turnout in local elections now scheduled in odd-numbered years, which are years without federal or state-wide elections on the ballot, consistent with the State’s public policy of “[e]ncourag[ing] participation in the elective franchise by all eligible voters to the maximum extent” … , and the mandate of the New York Board of Elections to “take all appropriate steps to encourage the broadest possible voter participation in elections” … . County of Onondaga v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 02818, Fourth Dept 5-7-25
PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC ASSERTIONS BY DEFENDANT’S EXPERT RE: PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action did not address all the proximate-cause issues railed by defendant’s expert, specifically the plaintiff’s failure to return for a follow-up visited after being treated in the emergency room at Elmhurst Hospital (the defendant). Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted:
At Elmhurst, the injured plaintiff’s forearm was X-rayed, and his wound was cleaned, sutured, and dressed. Later that same day, the injured plaintiff was discharged and instructed to return in two days for a follow-up appointment. The injured plaintiff did not return for the follow-up appointment but instead followed up with several physicians who were not associated with the defendant. The injured plaintiff allegedly required surgery later to repair several tendons in his forearm. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant negligently failed to properly diagnose and treat the injured plaintiff’s injuries during the initial emergency department visit at Elmhurst. * * *
… [T]he defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting … an affirmation of an expert physician, who opined that the physicians and employees of the defendant did not depart from the applicable standard of care and that any alleged departures were not a proximate cause of the injured plaintiff’s injuries … . In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding proximate cause. The opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert regarding proximate cause failed to address specific assertions made by the defendant’s expert regarding, among other things, the implications of the injured plaintiff’s failure to return for a follow-up appointment as instructed … . Torres v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 02806, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: In this med mal action, the defense expert’s affirmation submitted with defendant’s motion for summary judgment raised proximate-cause issues that were not addressed by plaintiffs’ expert. Therefore, defendant’s summary judgment motion should have been granted.
DEFENDANT’S EXPERT AFFIDAVIT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFFS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant surgeon was not entitled to summary judgment in this medical malpractice action. The defendant’s expert affidavit did not address specific allegations of negligence asserted by plaintiffs:
… [T]he defendants failed to establish .. that Ashraf [defendant] did not depart from the applicable standard of care in treating the injured plaintiff or that any such departure did not proximately cause the injured plaintiff’s injuries. An expert affidavit of Ashraf submitted by the defendants in support of their motion failed to address specific allegations of negligence asserted by the plaintiffs, including whether Ashraf departed from the applicable standard of care in placing a 14-millimeter polyethylene component during the September 2016 surgery, as opposed to a smaller size, and whether such departure was a proximate cause of the injured plaintiff’s injuries … . Sanchez v Ashraf, 2025 NY Slip Op 02803, Second Dept 5-7-25
Practice Point: Summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action is dependent upon the defense expert’s affidavit. If the affidavit fails to address specific allegations of negligence made by the the plaintiff, summary judgment is not warranted. This is a fairly common ground for reversal.
PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO PROCEED UNDER THE PSEUDONYM “JANE DOE” SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s request to proceed using the pseudonym “Jane Doe” should have been granted. Plaintiff is apparently suing her former employer, a charter school, contesting her termination, which apparently was based upon a video depicting plaintiff masturbating:
As to the merits, Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to proceed in this litigation under the pseudonym “Jane Doe” … . This action concerns information of a highly sensitive, intimate, and personal nature — namely, a video depicting plaintiff masturbating. Plaintiff’s affidavit establishes the serious psychological harm that disclosure of her role in this video caused her and would continue to cause her, as well as the potential impact on her career in education … . That plaintiff was able to obtain a new job in education after her termination by defendants is of no moment, as she may still need to apply for other jobs in future and it is not clear whether her current employer is aware of the circumstances of her termination.
Defendants do not identify any source of prejudice to them from allowing plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym, as they know who she is and therefore are not impeded in mounting a defense … . The public interest in disclosure of plaintiff’s identity is also minimal. Even if the charter school defendants were deemed public entities for these purposes (see Education Law § 2854[3][a], [c] …), that fact would not be dispositive, especially because plaintiff is not requesting that court records be sealed or public access denied … . Furthermore, the termination decision at issue here is not claimed to be the result of any government policy.
Plaintiff’s privacy interest outweighs the reputational interest of the individual defendants’ anonymity … . Jane Doe v KIPP N.Y., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 02718, First Dept 5-6-25
Practice Point: Consult this decision for a brief discussion of the factors which control whether a plaintiff can sue under a pseudonym, “Jane Doe” in this case.
THE PORT AUTHORITY DEMONSTRATED IT WAS NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH BY SUICIDE; PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT CLIMBED OVER A FOUR-FOOT-TALL PEDESTRIAN RAILING AND JUMPED OFF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON BRIDGE (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pitt-Burke, over a dissent, affirming summary judgment dismissing the complaint, determined the Port Authority was not liable for the plaintiff’s decedent’s death by suicide. Plaintiff’s decedent climbed over the four-foot-tall pedestrian railing and jumped off the George Washington Bridge (GWB). Plaintiff alleged the Port Authority was negligent in failing to install suicide prevention barriers along the pedestrian walkways:
In this action to recover damages for wrongful death, plaintiff seeks to hold defendant the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey liable for the death of the decedent, who died by suicide after jumping off the George Washington Bridge (GWB). To fully capture the nature of this appeal, however, it is pertinent to first discuss that the issue here is not whether the Port Authority’s alleged negligence arose out of the performance of a governmental rather than a proprietary function; this Court has already determined that the Port Authority, as owner of the GWB, was acting in a proprietary capacity at the time this claim arose and therefore that the ordinary rules of negligence apply. In the appeal now presented to us, the Port Authority’s expert engineer opines that the engineering concerns associated with modifying the 100-year-old bridge justified the steps taken and the interim measures implemented, but also opines that reasonable engineering judgment delayed the implementation of the safety mechanism that plaintiff contends would have ultimately prevented the decedent’s death by suicide. We therefore consider whether, given the record presented, the Port Authority has established its prima facie burden under ordinary rules of negligence. For the reasons that follow, we find that the Port Authority established that the pedestrian walkways on the bridge were safe for the public at large, and the steps taken, including additional interim measures implemented prior to this incident to help individuals who, like the decedent, were suffering from suicidal ideations, were reasonable in light of the complexity and size of the bridge. Donaldson v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2025 NY Slip Op 02719, First Dept 5-6-25
THE DOCTRINE OF ABATEMENT AB INITIO REMAINS VALID; WHERE A DEFENDANT DIES BEFORE THE CONVICTION BECOMES FINAL THROUGH THE APPELLATE PROCESS VACATION OF THE CONVICTION AND DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT IS REQUIRED; HERE BOTH DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN CONVICTED AND DIED BEFORE SENTENCING (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department affirmed Supreme Court in two consolidated cases in which the People unsuccessfully argued the doctrine of abatement ab initio should no longer be followed. The doctrine provides that where a defendant dies before the appellate process is complete the conviction is vacated and the indictment dismissed:
In these consolidated cases (People v Ricardo Cruciani and People v Jessie Nowell), the People, as the appellant, raise similar questions: Whether we should decline to follow, in the particular circumstances of each case, the common-law doctrine of abatement ab initio, which was first pronounced by the Court of Appeals in People v Mintz (20 NY2d 770 [1967]). The abatement ab initio doctrine seeks to protect a defendant’s constitutional due process rights that are afforded by appellate review of a conviction (see People v Matteson, 75 NY2d 745, 747 [1989]). Under this doctrine, the death of a defendant whose conviction has not become final through the appellate process results in the abatement of not only any pending appeal but also all proceedings from the case’s inception. In Cruciani, defendant’s conviction resulted from a jury verdict, but he died before sentencing. In Nowell, defendant’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea, but he died before sentencing. In each case, the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment pursuant to the abatement ab initio doctrine. People v Cruciani, 2025 NY Slip Op 02735, First Dept 5-6-25
Practice Point: The doctrine of abatement ab initio requires the vacation of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment where a defendant dies before the appellate process is complete.
THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER A RAISED MANHOLE COVER, EXPOSED WHEN THE ROAD SURFACE AROUND THE MANHOLE WAS MILLED IN PREPARATION FOR REPAVING, CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION CREATED BY THE CITY AND WHETHER THE CONDITION WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and reinstating the complaint, determined there were questions of fact whether the raised manhole cover constituted a dangerous condition, and whether the condition was open and obvious. Plaintiff was a passenger in a car which struck a raised manhole cover. In preparation for repaving, the existing road surface was milled or scarified such that the manhole covers extended above the surface of the road. Although asphalt was placed around the manhole (called ramping) so that the wheels on one side of a vehicle could pass over it, here the wheels on both sides of the manhole were on the milled surface and undercarriage of the car apparently struck it, causing the windshield to crack and the air bags to deploy:
[Defendant’s witness] could not say whether that ramping made it safe [for a vehicle to traverse directly over the manhole, with the wheels completely to the side of the entire width of the manhole’s ramping. It is this condition that plaintiff alleges was dangerous and defective, and the City adduced no evidence to refute that allegation. Accordingly, whether the City’s work — the ramping of the manhole — “immediately resulted in the existence of a dangerous condition,” thus rendering the City liable to plaintiff for her injuries, is a question of fact for the jury … . …
The City’s argument that the court erred in rejecting its argument sub silentio that it is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it on the ground that the condition was open and obvious is unavailing. Whether a dangerous or defective condition is open and obvious relates to the duty to warn of the hazard, not the duty to neutralize it … . Summary judgment may only be granted on an open-and-obvious defense “when the established facts compel that conclusion . . . on the basis of clear and undisputed evidence”; otherwise, the inquiry “is generally fact-specific and thus usually a jury question” … . Timmons v Praylow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02744, First Dept 5-6-25
Practice Point: The question whether a condition, here a raised manhole cover, is open and obvious applies to the duty to warn, not the duty to neutralize a hazard, and is rarely appropriate as a basis for summary judgment.
Practice Point: The written-notice requirement, which is often a condition precedent for a negligence action against a municipality stemming from a road-condition, does not apply where, as here, it is alleged the municipality created the dangerous condition (a raised manhole cover).