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SUPREME COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE LANDLORD’S CALCULATION OF RENT OVERCHARGES FOR RENT-REGULATED APARTMENTS REMOVED FROM RENT STABILIZATION WHILE THE BUILDING WAS RECEIVING J-51 TAX BENEFITS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, determined Supreme Court properly refused to consider defendant landlord’s (Whitehouse’s) calculation of rent overcharges and ordered calculation by a referee. The landlord had removed rent-regulated apartments from rent stabilization while the building received J-51 tax benefits:

We find that the motion court correctly determined that plaintiffs’ legal regulated rent should be calculated according to the default formula set forth in RSC (9 NYCRR) § 2522.6(b). Although defendants may have been following the law in deregulating apartments during the period before Roberts [13 NY3d 270] was decided (see Regina, 35 NY3d at 356), their 2012 retroactive registration of the improperly deregulated apartments was an attempt to avoid the court’s adjudication of the issues and to impose their own rent calculations rather than face a determination of the legal regulated rent within the lookback period. Casey v Whitehouse Estates, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 04646, First Dept 8-5-21

 

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AS LONG AS BOTH THE CERTIFIED AND FIRST-CLASS-MAIL LETTERS NOTIFYING A MORTGAGEE OF A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE ARE NOT RETURNED, THE MORTGAGEE IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PROPERLY SERVED PURSUANT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW 1125 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that plaintiff property owner, pursuant to Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 1125, was properly notified of the tax foreclosure proceedings, despite plaintiff’s allegation that the certified letter was delivered to a post office box, not the street address. RPTL 1125 deems service accomplished if the letters are not returned:

Defendants were required to send the notice of the tax foreclosure proceeding to plaintiff “by certified mail and ordinary first class mail” (RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i] … ). The record contains documentary evidence demonstrating that the petition and notice of foreclosure were sent via certified mail and first class mail to plaintiff at “4153 Broadway” in Kansas City, Missouri — the address for plaintiff as listed on the mortgage … .The record also discloses that neither of these mailings was returned. Accordingly, defendants satisfied their burden of demonstrating that they complied with RPTL 1125.

In opposition thereto, plaintiff submitted, among other things, the tracking information sheet for the certified mailing sent by the County. This sheet indicated that the certified mailing was delivered to an unspecified post office box, as opposed to 4153 Broadway, in Kansas City, Missouri. To that end, plaintiff asserts that a material issue of fact exists as to whether it received notice of the tax foreclosure proceeding. The petition and notice of foreclosure sent to plaintiff, however, “shall be deemed received unless both the certified mailing and the ordinary first class mailing are returned by the United States [P]ostal [S]ervice within [45] days after being mailed” (RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i] …). James B. Nutter & Co. v County of Saratoga, 2021 NY Slip Op 04074, Third Dept 6-24-21

 

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THE CITY CHARTER PROVISION DID NOT PROVIDE FOR NOTICE OF A PENDING TAX FORECLOSURE SALE TO MORTGAGEES AND THEREBY VIOLATED THE MORTGAGEE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN THIS PROCEEDING; THE MORTGAGEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the city charter provision did not provide for notice of pending tax lien sales to parties other than the owner which violated the due process rights of mortgagees:

“The constitutional guarantee of due process requires that a party who has a substantial property interest which may be affected by a tax lien sale receive notice that is ‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise it of an impending sale” … . Thus, “actual notice of a tax sale must be given to all parties with a substantial interest in the property whose names and addresses are ‘reasonably ascertainable'” … . A mortgagee has a legally protected property interest and is legally entitled to notice of a pending tax sale … .

Here, section 93 of the City Charter of the City of Middletown … does not provide for notice of pending tax lien sales to parties other than the owner, but provides only for post-sale notice 60 days prior to the divesting of all rights in the property. As such, City Charter section 93 fails to comport with due process requirements because it makes no provision for actual notice of impending tax sales to be given to mortgagees of record … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the City’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and, as relevant to this appeal, granted that branch of [the mortgagee’s]  motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the City. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v City of Middletown, 2021 NY Slip Op 04006, Second Dept 6-23-21

Similar issue and result in Delacorte v Luyanda, 2021 NY Slip Op 04009, Second Dept 6-23-21

 

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A TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING IS AN IN REM ACTION AGAINST THE PROPERTY, NOT THE PROPERTY OWNER; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS NOT A NULLITY DESPITE THE DEATH OF THE OWNER (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the tax foreclosure proceeding was not a nullity and did not violate due process. The foreclosed restaurant belonged to plaintiff’s husband, who died in 2006. The treasurer of Ontario County followed all the proper procedures for notification of the tax foreclosure proceedings. Tax foreclosure is an in rem action to which there are no parties. So the argument that the action could not be brought against the deceased owner of the restaurant was rejected:

… [B]y statute, mortgagors are necessary party defendants to mortgage foreclosure actions (see RPAPL 1311 [1]). In contrast, a petition in a tax foreclosure proceeding relates only to the property and not any particular person (see RPTL 1123 [2] [a]). The distinction between in rem tax foreclosure proceedings and mortgage foreclosure actions with respect to the “parties” is critical. While an action or proceeding cannot be commenced against a dead person who, by necessity, is a named party to the action … , a tax foreclosure proceeding is not commenced against any person; it is commenced against the property itself. The owners are not necessary “parties” to the tax foreclosure proceeding; they are only “[p]arties entitled to notice” of the proceeding (RPTL 1125 [1] [a]; see RPTL 1123 [1], [2] [a]; cf. RPAPL 1131). As a result, the tax foreclosure proceeding was properly commenced even though decedent had died … , and there was no need to substitute someone for the dead owner (see CPLR 1015). Hetelekides v County of Ontario, 2021 NY Slip Op 02697, Fourth Dept 4-30-21

 

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NON-OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO MOVE TO VACATE AN ERIE COUNTY TAX FORECLOSURE SALE; THE RIGHT TO PAY THE DELINQUENT TAXES HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the tax foreclosure sale of property owned by Black Rock to appellant should not have been vacated.  Respondent, Fedder, moved to vacate the sale. After County Court granted Fedder’s motion, the delinquent taxes were paid, the County issued a certificate of redemption to Black Rock, which then sold the property to Fedder:

… [T]his is not a mortgage foreclosure action, where the “equity of redemption” permits property owners “to redeem their property by tendering the full sum” owed before a valid sale is effectuated … . Here, instead, the right to pay the delinquent taxes by virtue of the equity of redemption was extinguished several months prior to Fedder’s motion by order to show cause, according to the ECTA [Erie County Tax Act], the public notice of foreclosure, and the terms of the judgment of foreclosure (see ECTA §§ 11-10.0, 11-12.0; see also RPTL art 11 … ). … [T]he purported redemption, the issuance of the certificate of redemption, and the purported sale and transfer of title from Black Rock to Fedder are nullities … . …

Fedder did not have standing to seek equitable relief in this case. Pursuant to ECTA § 7-10.0, the court could not set aside the sale to appellant “except upon a proceeding brought therefor by the owner of such real property within three months from the date of such sale.” Here, no such proceeding was brought. Instead, Fedder, a nonowner, filed a motion by order to show cause in this foreclosure action, and Black Rock, the owner, was not a party to the motion. In light of the ” ‘clear legislative intent’ ” of section 7-10.0 …, Fedder did not have standing to seek rescission of the sale.  Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens, 2021 NY Slip Op 02681, Fourth Dept 4-30-21

 

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PLAINTIFF IN THIS TAX LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE NOTICE TO REDEEM; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES FROM THE DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was not entitled to attorney’s fees in this tax lien foreclosure action because plaintiff did not demonstrate defendant was properly served with the notice to redeem:

Pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0(c), prior to the commencement of this action, the plaintiff was required to serve the defendant with a notice to redeem “by personal service, as defined in the Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New York” (see Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0[a]). Here, the plaintiff purportedly served the defendant with the notice to redeem by “nail and mail” service (see CPLR 308[4]). However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, this service was ineffective, as the plaintiff failed to exercise the requisite due diligence in first attempting to serve the defendant pursuant to CPLR 308(1) or (2) … .

Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to properly serve the notice to redeem prior to commencing a foreclosure action, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering attorney’s fees from the person to whom the notice was required to be sent, provided that the person “offers to pay the penalties allowed by law at any time before final judgment is entered” (Nassau County Administrative Code § 5-51.0[f]). Here, the defendant offered to pay the penalties allowed by law in a letter … , nearly one month prior to entry of the final judgment … . DBW TL Holdco 2014, LLC v Kirk, 2021 NY Slip Op 00543, Second Dept 2-3-21

 

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THE COUNTY MUST REIMBURSE THE TOWNS FOR UNPAID PROPERTY MAINTENANCE AND DEMOLITION CHARGES (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, reversing the Appellate Division, determined Monroe County was required to credit unpaid property maintenance and demolition charges assessed by the Town of Irondequoit and the Town of Brighton. The county is required to deduct the unpaid town charges from the sales tax owed by the towns to the county:

Requiring that these charges be credited pursuant to section [RPTL] 936 accords with the overall structure for the enforcement of property tax liens, including the legislative grant of exclusive authority to counties in RPTL 1123 to commence in rem proceedings to foreclose on real property to “enforce the payment of delinquent taxes or other lawful charges which have accumulated and become liens against certain property” … , permitting counties—but not towns—to initiate proceedings to enforce the types of liens at issue here. Indeed, Town Law § 64 (5-a) directs that these charges “levied” on “real property” are to “be collected in the same manner and at the same time as other town charges” by virtue of the normal process of levying and collecting town property taxes, in which towns make the first attempt at collection and after which enforcement shifts to the county … . It appears that the Legislature, recognizing that towns have little power to recoup their costs for unpaid real property tax liens, has shifted the risk of loss to counties, which are in the best position to recover the funds through in rem foreclosure proceedings. The same considerations apply to blighted properties, where the Legislature may have presumed that counties are in a better position to recover charges imposed on real property pursuant to the Town Law … . Thus, the County was required to credit the maintenance and demolition charges, and its determination to the contrary should have been annulled. Matter of Town of Irondequoit v County of Monroe, 2020 NY Slip Op 07689, CtApp 12-22-20

 

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THE SOLAR ARRAY IS ATTACHED TO THE COLLEGE’S LAND AND IS THEREFORE TAXABLE REAL PROPERTY; THE ARRAY IS OWNED BY THE INSTALLER, NOT THE COLLEGE, AND IS THEREFORE NOT EXEMPT FROM TAXATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the solar array installed on petitioner-college’s land was owned by the installer, Argos, not the college, and is taxable as real property because it is permanently attached to the land:

Respondents contend that the system constitutes taxable real property under RPTL 102 (12) (b). We agree. Pursuant to that statute, taxable real property is defined as “[b]uildings and other articles and structures, substructures and superstructures erected upon, under or above the land, or affixed thereto” (id.). “The common law relating to fixtures provides guidance in determining whether particular items fall within [that] statutory definition” … . “To meet the common-law definition of fixture, the personalty in question must: (1) be actually annexed to real property or something appurtenant thereto; (2) be applied to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated; and, (3) be intended by the parties as a permanent accession to the freehold” … . …

… .RPTL 420-a (1) (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[r]eal property owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for . . . educational . . . purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon . . . such purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation.” “Land and [structures] are separately defined as taxable forms of real property (see RPTL 102 [12] [a], [b]), and [parties to an agreement] may agree to their separate ownership” … . …

Here, it is undisputed that petitioner is a qualifying corporation, but Argos is not, and that the system is used for a qualifying purpose; therefore, whether the system is tax exempt depends on its ownership. Matter of Cornell Univ. v Board of Assessment Review, 2020 NY Slip Op 04636, Fourth Dept 8-20-20

 

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BECAUSE THE HOLDER OF A FIRST MORTGAGE WAS A DEFENDANT IN THE TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, THE MORTGAGE HOLDER DID NOT NEED TO FILE ITS OWN FORECLOSURE ACTION TO ENFORCE ITS LIEN ON THE SURPLUS TAX-FORECLOSURE-SALE PROCEEDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scheinkman, determined that HPD,  the holder of a first mortgage on property which was the subject of a tax foreclosure, was entitled to the surplus funds from the tax foreclosure sale. The issue was whether HPD’s action seeking the surplus was time-barred because it didn’t enforce the lien on the surplus within six years of the tax foreclosure sale. The Second Department held no further action to enforce the lien was necessary because HPD was a defendant in the tax foreclosure proceedings:

… HPD’s appearance in the tax lien foreclosure action put [the property owner] and anyone else interested in a potential surplus on notice of HPD’s claims. To require HPD to commence a separate foreclosure action, when an action to foreclose the tax lien was already pending, would serve no useful purpose. NYCTL 1997-1 Trust v Stell, 2020 NY Slip Op 02802, Second Dept 5-13-20

 

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OWNER OF A SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM INSTALLED ON SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERTY WAS ENTITLED TO THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX DESPITE THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S RESOLUTION OPTING OUT OF THE EXEMPTION; THE RESOLUTION WAS NEVER FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the petitioner, Laertes Solar, the owner of a solar energy system installed on school district property, was entitled to the statutory exemption from property tax on the system. The school district had adopted a resolution opting out of the exemption. But the resolution had never been filed with the NYS Department of Taxation and Finance (Department) or the NYS Energy and Research Development Authority (NYSEARDA) as required by the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL 487):

The … examination of “the language of the statute and the legislative intent underlying it” … leads us to agree with Supreme Court that the filing requirements of RPTL 487 (8) are mandatory and that the 2014 resolution was inapplicable to the system given the school district’s failure to meet those requirements during the relevant period (see RPTL 487 [8] [a]). Indeed, although we need not defer to the Department’s interpretation of RPTL 487 given that this case presents a question “of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent”… , it is notable that the Department has also taken the position that an opt-out resolution “must be filed” with both it and NYSERDA … . It follows that — even assuming that the system may be viewed as a distinct parcel of real property that may be taxed — Laertes was entitled to the RPTL 487 exemption for which it applied (see RPTL 487 [6]). Matter of Laertes Solar, LLC v Assessor of the Town of Harford, 2020 NY Slip Op 02302, Third Dept 4-16-20

 

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