The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action against defendant school for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the demand for punitive damages, should have been dismissed. This Child Victims Act case alleged plaintiff-student was sexually abused by a janitor:
… Supreme Court should have directed dismissal of the cause of action alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against each of the school defendants, as it is duplicative of the remaining negligence causes of action … . A cause of action is properly dismissed as duplicative when it is “based on the same facts and seek[s] essentially identical damages” … .
Furthermore, the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the intent to cause, or the disregard of a substantial likelihood of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress” … . “The subject conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” … . Furthermore, conclusory assertions are insufficient to set forth a cause of action sounding in the intentional infliction of emotional distress … . Here, even accepting the conclusory allegations in the amended complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the plaintiff failed to allege conduct by the school defendants that was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,” as to qualify as intentional infliction of emotional distress … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have directed dismissal of the cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against each of the school defendants pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).
… Supreme Court should have directed dismissal of the demand for punitive damages insofar as asserted against each of the school defendants. “[P]unitive damages are available for the purpose of vindicating a public right only where the actions of the alleged tort-feasor constitute gross recklessness or intentional, wanton or malicious conduct aimed at the public generally or are activated by evil or reprehensible motives” … . Here, the plaintiff’s allegations against the school defendants amount to “nothing more than allegations of mere negligence and do not rise to the level of moral culpability necessary to support a claim for punitive damages” … . Redd v Brooklyn Friends Sch., 2025 NY Slip Op 03214, Second Dept 5-28-25
Practice Point: Consult this decision for the criteria for sufficiently alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action, as well as the criteria for a demand for punitive damages against a school in a Child Victims Act case.