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You are here: Home1 / Products Liability
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Products Liability

NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM OR PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE ITALIAN MANUFACTURER OF A HOSE USED AS A COMPONENT IN A DISHWASHER MADE AND SOLD BY A NONPARTY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have long-arm or personal jurisdiction over an Italian company which manufactured a hose used as a component in a dishwasher made and sold by a nonparty:

… [T]he defendant was an Italian corporation with its business located in that country. It manufactured, sold, and distributed its goods in Italy, and had no office or agent in New York. The plaintiff failed to show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York so as to subject it to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) … . The plaintiff also failed to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(3).

Since the defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction of New York, the plaintiff’s service of process upon it was not valid (see CPLR 313 …). Economy Premier Assur. Co. v Miflex 2 S.p.A., 2023 NY Slip Op 00303,Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff did not demonstrate the Italian company which manufactured a component of a dishwasher purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in New York. Therefore New York did not have long-arm or personal jurisdiction over the Italian company.

 

January 25, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-01-25 11:44:102023-01-29 11:46:06NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM OR PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE ITALIAN MANUFACTURER OF A HOSE USED AS A COMPONENT IN A DISHWASHER MADE AND SOLD BY A NONPARTY (SECOND DEPT). ​
Consumer Law, Products Liability, Uniform Commercial Code

THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this products liability case did not state causes of action for breach of warranty. Plaintiff tried the product, an elastic exercise band, which was on display at the store. He secured one end of the band with his foot. That end slipped out and hit him in the eye:

… To begin, plaintiff did not assert a claim in the SAC [second amended complaint] for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (see UCC 2-315). In any event, such a claim requires allegations that defendants had “reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods” are used and that plaintiff relied on defendants’ “skill or judgment to select or furnish [those] suitable goods” … . The SAC, however, did not allege any particular purpose of the exercise band other than its ordinary purpose for exercise, and there were no allegations that defendants knew or should have known about any particular purpose for which the goods were purchased, nor were there any allegations that plaintiff relied upon defendants’ skill or judgment in selecting those goods … .

Similarly, plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, which provides under that warranty that goods “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used” (UCC 2-314[2][c]). To plead a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must allege that goods are defective such that they were not reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which they were used, that the defect in the goods was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and that the alleged defect existed at the time the goods left the manufacturer or entity in the line of distribution … . Fiuzzi v Paragon Sporting Goods Co. LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 00054, First Dept 1-10-23

Practice Point: The complaint in this case did not state causes of action for breach of implied warrant of fitness for purpose of breach of warranty of merchantability, criteria explained.

 

January 10, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-01-10 13:19:482023-01-14 13:46:47THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Products Liability

NEW YORK DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL OR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER A UK CORPORATION WHICH ALLEGEDLY MANUFACTURED A DEFECTIVE PART OF AN EXCAVATOR (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Miller defendants, a UK corporation, were not amenable to general or long-arm jurisdiction in New York. Plaintiff alleged a part (a coupler) made by Miller failed causing an excavator bucket to detach and fall:

General jurisdiction exists over a corporate entity only in the state(s) in which it is incorporated and has its principal place of business … . * * *

Defendants have also failed to establish specific jurisdiction over the Miller parties pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), CPLR 302 (a)(3)(i) or CPLR 302 (a)(3)(ii). Although the Miller parties might have placed the coupler involved in plaintiff’s accident into the stream of commerce, and while they tout having a global customer base and business model, the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that “the ‘fortuitous circumstance’ that a product sold in another state later makes its way into the forum jurisdiction through no marketing or other effort of [the] defendant,” or “‘the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum[,]’ cannot establish the requisite connection between [the] defendant and the forum” to support an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction … . Cruz v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 06546, First Dept 11-17-22

Practice Point: The ‘fortuitous circumstance’ that a product sold in another state later makes its way into the forum jurisdiction through no marketing or other effort of [the] defendant,” or “‘the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum[,]’ cannot establish the requisite connection between [the] defendant and the forum” to support an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Here New York did not have general or long-arm jurisdiction over a UK corporation which manufactured a part on an excavator which allegedly failed causing the excavator bucket to detach.

 

November 17, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-17 10:32:312022-11-19 10:34:51NEW YORK DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL OR LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER A UK CORPORATION WHICH ALLEGEDLY MANUFACTURED A DEFECTIVE PART OF AN EXCAVATOR (FIRST DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Products Liability

DRIVER PURCHASED A GOODYEAR TIRE FOR HIS FORD FROM US TIRES, A NEW YORK CORPORATION; THE TIRE ALLEGEDLY FAILED LEADING TO A SERIOUS ACCIDENT IN VIRGINIA; DRIVER SUED US TIRES; US TIRES SUED GOODYEAR AND FORD, BOTH OUT-OF-STATE CORPORATIONS, SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION; NEW YORK HAS LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER GOODYEAR AND FORD IN THE US TIRES SUIT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Genovesi, determined New York has long-arm jurisdiction over third-party defendants Ford and Goodyear in this suit by a New York corporation, US Tires. US Tires installed a Goodyear tire on a Ford. The tire allegedly failed in Virginia and three passengers died. The plaintiffs, including the driver, sued US Tires. US Tires sued Ford and Goodyear, both out-of-state corporation, seeking indemnification. The issue on appeal was whether Ford and Goodyear had sufficient contacts with New York to support long-arm jurisdiction:

Ford and Goodyear concede that they conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in New York, thus satisfying the first prong of CPLR 302(a)(1). As to the second prong of CPLR 302(a)(1), US Tires demonstrated that Goodyear’s and Ford’s activities in New York have a sufficient connection with the claims herein. * * *

When all the requirements of CPLR 302 are met, the exercise of personal jurisdiction still must comport with constitutional due process requirements … . * * *

Based on the record before us, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Ford and Goodyear comports with due process … . … Ford and Goodyear concede that they had sufficient “minimum contacts” with New York. … [T]he only remaining question is whether Ford and Goodyear have met their burden of presenting “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable” … . We conclude that Ford and Goodyear have failed to meet this burden. Aybar v US Tires & Wheels of Queens, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 06099, Second Dept 11-2-11

Practice Point: This decision includes a comprehensive discussion of general and specific jurisdiction which is worth consulting. In this suit by a New York corporation, US Tires, seeking indemnification from two out-of-state corporations, Ford and Goodyear, the court determined Ford and Goodyear had sufficient contacts with New York to support long-arm jurisdiction. US Tires installed a Goodyear tire on driver’s Ford. The tire allegedly failed in Virginia, causing a serious accident. The driver sued US Tires. US Tires sued Ford and Goodyear.

 

November 2, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-11-02 17:01:422022-11-04 17:46:17DRIVER PURCHASED A GOODYEAR TIRE FOR HIS FORD FROM US TIRES, A NEW YORK CORPORATION; THE TIRE ALLEGEDLY FAILED LEADING TO A SERIOUS ACCIDENT IN VIRGINIA; DRIVER SUED US TIRES; US TIRES SUED GOODYEAR AND FORD, BOTH OUT-OF-STATE CORPORATIONS, SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION; NEW YORK HAS LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER GOODYEAR AND FORD IN THE US TIRES SUIT (SECOND DEPT). ​
Evidence, Negligence, Products Liability, Toxic Torts

PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT EXPERT OPINION TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION HE INHALED SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF ASBESTOS TO HAVE CAUSED HIS CANCER; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this asbestos-exposure case did not raise a question of fact about whether his exposure to asbestos was sufficient to have caused his cancer. Plaintiff alleged he was exposed to asbestos when he installed defendant ABI’s vinyl floor tiles. Defendant presented evidence from simulation studies and plaintiff offered no expert evidence in opposition:

In Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am. (___ NY3d ___, 2022 NY Slip Op 02769 [2022]), the Court of Appeals, while recognizing its conclusion in Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. (7 NY3d 434 [2006]) that precise qualification of exposure to a toxin is not always required, stated that causation nonetheless requires plaintiff to provide proof of “sufficient exposure to a substance to cause the claimed adverse health effect” … . …

Plaintiff challenges the opinion proffered by ABI’s expert, who relied upon calculations arising from experiments funded by defendants, in determining that decedent was exposed, if at all, to asbestos in amounts similar to those in ambient air, an exposure insufficient to cause cancer. While the reliability of those calculations could pose an issue of credibility, the fact that they were performed by a paid expert does not automatically invalidate their conclusions. Plaintiff offered no expert to counter ABI’s calculation of decedent’s cumulative lifetime exposure, and thus no question of fact was raised as to its validity … . Killian v A.C. & S., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 04610, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: Here defendant presented evidence of simulation studies to show that plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos was not sufficient to have caused his cancer and plaintiff presented no expert evidence in opposition. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

 

July 19, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-07-19 11:41:342022-07-23 11:59:27PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT EXPERT OPINION TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION HE INHALED SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF ASBESTOS TO HAVE CAUSED HIS CANCER; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence, Products Liability, Toxic Torts

THE PROOF AT TRIAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF INHALED SUFFICIENT LEVELS OF ASBESTOS WHEN USING DEFENDANT’S TALCUM POWDER TO HAVE CAUSED HER MESOTHELIOMA; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant J & J’s motion to set aside the verdict in the asbestos-exposure trial should have been granted. Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate the exposure to asbestos in defendant’s talcum powder caused plaintiff’s mesothelioma:

At trial, plaintiffs failed, as a matter of law, to carry their burden “to establish sufficient exposure to a substance to cause the claimed adverse health effect” … . To make such a showing, a plaintiff must present expert testimony providing a “scientific expression of the level of exposure to toxins in defendant’s products that was sufficient to have caused the disease” … . Even if it is assumed that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support their mineral expert’s estimate of the amount of asbestos to which plaintiff Donna Olson was exposed each time she used J&J’s talcum powder products, plaintiffs’ medical expert never set forth a scientific expression of the minimum lifetime exposure to asbestos that would have been sufficient to cause mesothelioma, the disease in question … . Thus, the medical expert’s testimony that mesothelioma could have resulted from “a significant exposure above normal background levels” was insufficient. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 2022 NY Slip Op 04611, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: This is another decision in a group of four decisions released on the same day by the First Department finding plaintiff’s expert evidence failed, as a matter of law, to demonstrate plaintiff had inhaled enough asbestos to have caused lung disease.

 

July 19, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-07-19 11:18:222022-07-23 11:41:28THE PROOF AT TRIAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF INHALED SUFFICIENT LEVELS OF ASBESTOS WHEN USING DEFENDANT’S TALCUM POWDER TO HAVE CAUSED HER MESOTHELIOMA; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Evidence, Negligence, Products Liability, Toxic Torts

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGHT ASBESTOS FIBERS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not present sufficient expert evidence that his exposure to asbestos from defendant ABI’s vinyl floor tiles and sheet flooring caused his cancer. Plaintiff was an electrician and he alleged he worked in close proximity to workers installing ABI’s flooring:

[I]n asbestos exposure and other toxic tort cases, “an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)” …  As to specific causation, “there must be evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of th[e] agent that are known to cause the [relevant] harm” … .

… “[B]ecause there are times that ‘a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin will be difficult or impossible to quantify by pinpointing an exact numerical value,’ ‘it is not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation are generally accepted in the scientific community'” … . …

Plaintiff’s opposition failed to raise any issue of fact as to specific causation. A showing that the decedent “work[ed] in dust laden with asbestos generated from products containing asbestos” accompanied by “expert testimony that dust raised from manipulating asbestos products ‘necessarily’ contains enough asbestos to cause mesothelioma” is not enough … . Plaintiff’s medical expert did point to simulation studies measuring an average level of airborne asbestos as high as 0.27 f/cc during the cutting, sanding, and snapping of asbestos-containing floor tile. He did not, however, provide any correlation between the asbestos fiber levels to which plaintiff may have been exposed and the amount of inhaled asbestos that would have caused decedent’s lung cancer … .Pomponi v A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 04612, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: The general evidentiary requirements for a plaintiff’s prima facie case in an asbestos-exposure care are clearly explained. Plaintiff’s expert evidence was not sufficient to raise a question of fact about whether the exposure caused his cancer.

 

July 19, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-07-19 10:59:002022-07-23 11:18:10PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGHT ASBESTOS FIBERS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Evidence, Negligence, Products Liability, Toxic Torts

WHETHER PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGH ASBESTOS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER WAS THE SUBJECT OF COMPETING SIMULATION STUDIES; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant ABI’s motion for summary judgment in this asbestos-exposure case should have been granted. Plaintiff sold vinyl floor tiles made by ABI. Plaintiff alleged when he cut, manipulated and broke the tiles in demonstrations for customers, he inhaled asbestos fibers which were embedded in the vinyl tiles. The Fist Department found the expert evidence did not demonstrate plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of asbestos to cause lung cancer:

ABI had the burden to tender sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact as to causation … . Once this burden was met, it would fall to plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof, in admissible form, establishing that there were disputed material issues of fact … . * * *

The dispute based upon the competing simulation studies about whether the decedent was exposed to asbestos in an amount that exceeded ambient levels typically found in non-occupational settings is not enough to avoid summary judgment. … [S]imply showing that exposures to a toxin were “‘excessive'” or “‘far more'” a certain threshold (ambient) is not enough … . … [P]laintiff had the “‘difficult, if not impossible,'” task of establishing that his decedent had a sufficient exposure to asbestos to have caused his lung cancer … . [Plaintiff’s expert] does not provide any reliable correlation between the presence of asbestos fiber concentrations found in the studies and how much in haled asbestos would have caused lung cancer generally and the decedent’s lung cancer in particular. Dyer v Amchem Prods. Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 04609, First Dept 7-19-22

Practice Point: This decision includes a useful discussion of the proof requirements in an asbestos-exposure case. The decision characterized the plaintiff’s task of demonstrating sufficient exposure to cause cancer as “difficult, if not impossible.”

 

July 19, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-07-19 10:16:212022-07-23 10:58:51WHETHER PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGH ASBESTOS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER WAS THE SUBJECT OF COMPETING SIMULATION STUDIES; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Products Liability, Toxic Torts

PLAINTIFF, A TEXAS RESIDENT WHO WAS A FLIGHT ATTENDANT FOR 30 YEARS WITH MONTHLY STAY-OVERS IN NEW YORK, DEMONSTRATED NEW YORK HAD LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER THE NEW JERSEY COMPANY WHICH MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED TALCUM POWDER PLAINTIFF USED; THE TALCUM POWDER ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S MESOTHELIOMA (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined New York had specific long-arm jurisdiction of defendant Shulton, the manufacturer and distributor of talcum powder alleged to have cause plaintiff’s peritoneal mesothelioma. Plaintiff (English) was a flight attendant for 30 years who used the talcum powder when she stayed in New York. Shulton has its principal place of business in New Jersey but has an office in New York and markets the product in New York:

English, a Texas resident, was employed as a flight attendant for 33 years, from 1966 to 1999. During a substantial part of that time, she used Desert Flower on a daily basis after showering. From 1966 to 1984, English was regularly assigned to flights into New York and flew into this state two to four times a month. She usually remained in New York on two- or three-day layovers. When English travelled, she packed Desert Flower in her luggage, so she would have it available for use when she showered. There is no claim that the Desert Flower English used in New York was purchased in New York.

Shulton is incorporated in New Jersey, where it had its principal place of business during the time that English claims to have used Desert Flower. Shulton never manufactured Desert Flower in New York, and in the mid-1970s the manufacture of its talc products shifted from Tennessee to New Jersey. Desert Flower was marketed nationally, including in New York. During the relevant period of time, Shulton maintained a New York office from which it conducted its marketing activities for its Cosmetics and Toiletries Division. The New York office was also headquarters for its International Division. * * * Shulton’s maintenance of its own New York office satisfies the first prong under CPLR 302(a)(1). * * * Desert Flower was marketed and sold nationally, and English used Desert Flower when she travelled to and while she stayed in New York. Shulton’s activities and contacts with New York and the allegedly hazardous talcum powder used by English are sufficient to support an assertion of specific jurisdiction over Shulton…. . English v Avon Prods., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03571, First Dept 6-2-22

Practice Point: Even though plaintiff was a Texas resident and the company she was suing was based in New Jersey, she was able to sue using New York courts. Plaintiff was a flight attendant for 30 years with monthly stay-overs in New York. Defendant had an office in New York and marketed the talcum powder which allegedly cause plaintiff’s mesothelioma nationwide.

 

June 2, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-02 14:36:372022-07-26 20:49:45PLAINTIFF, A TEXAS RESIDENT WHO WAS A FLIGHT ATTENDANT FOR 30 YEARS WITH MONTHLY STAY-OVERS IN NEW YORK, DEMONSTRATED NEW YORK HAD LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER THE NEW JERSEY COMPANY WHICH MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED TALCUM POWDER PLAINTIFF USED; THE TALCUM POWDER ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S MESOTHELIOMA (FIRST DEPT).
Negligence, Products Liability

IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION WHERE A ROUTER SEVERED PLAINTIFF’S THUMB, THE FAILURE-TO-WARN CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE MANUAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE PLANTIFF NEVER READ IT; THE GENERALIZED FAILURE-TO-WARN CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DISAGREEING WITH THE SECOND DEPARTMENT, THE DESIGN-DEFECT CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE LACK OF AN INTERLOCK DEVICE PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court in this products liability case where plaintiff severed his thumb using a router, determined: (1) the failure-to-warn cause of action based upon the product manual should have been dismissed because plaintiff testified he never read it; (2) the generalized failure-to-warn cause of cause properly survived summary judgment; and (3) the design defect cause of action alleging the router should have had an interlock device which would shut it down properly survived summary judgment. Whether plaintiff was familiar with the risk of amputation such that the defendant was relieved of the duty to warn is a question of fact. And whether the lack of an interlock device is a design defect is a question of fact (disagreeing with decisions from the Second Department):

… [T]he record contains evidence that plaintiff had knowledge of power tools other than the router and the general hazards associated with cutting devices. Plaintiff also had used the router on one prior occasion at the premises before the accident. However, it is for a jury, not the court, to determine whether, based on the evidence and testimony presented, plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the specific hazards from the use of the router to relieve defendants of their duty to warn of them. Further, whether the router presented an open and obvious danger is also a jury issue. * * *

The branch of defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the design defect claim based on the lack of an interlock was also properly denied. We recognize that the Second Department has held that such a claim is per se unviable in Chavez v Delta Intl. Mach. Corp. (130 AD3d 667 [2d Dept 2015]), Patino v Lockformer Co. (303 AD2d 731 [2d Dept 2003]), and Giunta v Delta Intl. Mach. (300 AD2d 350 [2d Dept 2002]). Chavez (at 669), the most recent of these cases, cited Patino and Giunta for this proposition, and in Giunta (at 351), the Second Department held that a theory of liability that a “table saw should have been designed with an interlock which would have prevented the motor from starting if the blade guard was off. . . . was explicitly rejected as a matter of law in David v Makita U.S.A. (233 AD2d 145 [1st Dept 1996]), and implicitly rejected in Banks v Makita, U.S.A. (226 AD2d 659 [2d Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 805 [1996]).”

However, we read neither David nor Banks as supporting Giunta’s conclusion. Vasquez v Ridge Tool Pattern Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 03488, First Dept 5-31-22

Practice Point: In this products liability case where plaintiff lost a thumb using a router, there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was familiar enough with the danger of amputation that the defendant should be relieved of liability for the failure to warn. Here the First Department, disagreeing with the Second Department, determined the absence of an interlock device which would shut the router down raised a question of fact on the design-defect cause of action.

 

May 31, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-31 09:31:072022-06-01 10:41:19IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION WHERE A ROUTER SEVERED PLAINTIFF’S THUMB, THE FAILURE-TO-WARN CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE MANUAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE PLANTIFF NEVER READ IT; THE GENERALIZED FAILURE-TO-WARN CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DISAGREEING WITH THE SECOND DEPARTMENT, THE DESIGN-DEFECT CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE LACK OF AN INTERLOCK DEVICE PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).
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