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QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN; TOWN POLICE HAD CONFISCATED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S HUSBAND’S GUN AFTER SHE TOLD THE POLICE HE HAD ASSAULTED HER; THE TOWN SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED THE GUN TO HER HUSBAND AFTER LEARNING HE WAS A RETIRED POLICE OFFICER; HER HUSBAND THEN SHOT AND KILLED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AND TOOK HIS OWN LIFE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the town’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Plaintiff’s decedent had called the town police and told them her husband had assaulted her and that she feared for her life. The town police confiscated her husband’s gun. The town returned the gun upon learning the husband was a retired police officer, even though he was not licensed to possess a gun in New York. He shot and killed plaintiff’s decedent and then took his own life:

Government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general … . Here … the return of the firearm … was not a discretionary function. [Decedent’s husband] did not, … produce a license to possess the gun in the State of New York, and did not produce the proper identification under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act … . * * *

… [T]he evidence demonstrated the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether the Town, through its police officers, voluntarily assumed a duty on behalf of the decedent when they confiscated [the] gun in response to the decedent’s alleged report that [her husband] had physically assaulted her.

… The Town was not entitled to summary judgment … on the ground that [decedent”s husband’s] shooting of the decedent was an intervening act that severed the causal connection between the Town’s alleged negligence … and the injuries and death to the decedent … . An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent … . Santaiti v Town of Ramapo, 2021 NY Slip Op 04986, Second Dept 9-15-21

 

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THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ABSENCE OF A LEFT TURN TRAFFIC SIGNAL WAS BASED ON A STUDY FINDING THE SIGNAL WAS NOT WARRANTED; THEREFORE THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY IN THIS HIGHWAY-PLANNING ACTION BY A PEDESTRIAN WHO WAS STRUCK BY A VEHICLE MAKING A LEFT TURN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city’s motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian-vehicle accident case should not have been granted. Plaintiff was crossing the street in the crosswalk with the pedestrian light in her favor when she was struck by a car making a left turn. There was a left turn lane but no left turn traffic signal. The city did not demonstrate the design of the traffic light was based upon a study which considered whether a left turn signal was warranted:

… [I]n the field of traffic design engineering, the State is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision” … . Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a governmental entity may not be held liable for a highway safety planning decision unless its study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate, or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan … . Immunity will apply only “where a duly authorized public planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury” … .

Here, the City failed to establish that the design of the subject traffic signal, including the determination that no left-turn signal was warranted, was based on a study which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that the plaintiff would put to a jury … . Rosado v City of New Rochelle, 2021 NY Slip Op 04675, Second Dept 8-11-21

 

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DEFENDANT OWNS A VINEYARD IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN AN ALL-TERRAIN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 9-103 BECAUSE THE VINEYARD WAS “SUITABLE FOR RECREATIONAL USE” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s property (a vineyard) was suitable for recreational use and therefore defendant was entitled to immunity pursuant to General Obligations Law 9-103. Defendant was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries from an all-terrain-vehicle (ATV) accident which occurred when the driver missed a bridge over a culvert:

… “[D]efendant, as the party seeking summary judgment, ha[d] the burden of establishing as a matter of law that he is immune from liability pursuant to the statute” … . We conclude that defendant met his initial burden on the motion of establishing that the site where the accident occurred was suitable for recreational use … . The evidence defendant submitted on the motion showed that the vineyard’s dirt and grass-covered roads, as well as the bridge where the accident occurred, were physically conducive to ATV riding. Additionally, defendant established that the vineyard’s roads and the bridge were appropriate for public use for recreational ATV riding based on the uncontradicted testimony of defendant Aaron P. Gibbons, an adjoining property owner, that, over a significant period of time, he and his wife had frequently driven ATVs on the vineyard’s roads and the bridge and had often observed others doing the same. Wheeler v Gibbons, 2021 NY Slip Op 04323, Fourth Dept 7-9-21

 

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THE POLICE OFFICERS’ DECIDING NOT TO ARREST PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S SON AFTER AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN HER AND HER SON WAS AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; THEREFORE THE CITY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT ATTACK BY HER SON RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this third-party assault case, determined the city could not be held liable for the injury and death of plaintiff’s decedent at the hands of her son. The police had been called to plaintiff’s decedent’s home because of an altercation between her and her son, Matthew. The police did not arrest her son. The next day her son attacked her with a baseball bat and she died from her injuries. The Second Department held that the decision not to arrest the son was an exercise of discretion which is protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity:

The governmental function immunity defense cannot attach unless the municipal defendant establishes that the discretion possessed by its employees was in fact exercised in relation to the conduct on which liability is predicated … . The immunity afforded a municipality presupposes an exercise of discretion in compliance with its own procedures … . The basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery for injury becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion … . Immunity is not available unless the municipality establishes that the action taken actually resulted from discretionary decision-making, meaning the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results … .

Here, the defendants established … that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law … by its submissions, which demonstrated that the police officers’ actions were discretionary, and they did not fail to follow the police department’s rules and policies in deciding not to arrest Matthew … . The evidence demonstrated that the officers determined that Matthew had committed a violation during the altercation with his mother. Since the officers determined that no crime had been committed, pursuant to CPL 140.10(4)(c) and the patrol guide mandates, the officers were not compelled to arrest Matthew. The evidence further demonstrated that the officers’ decision involved reasoned judgment and an exercise of discretion in compliance with departmental procedures. Devlin v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 02275, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

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REPORTING AN ALLEGED SEXUAL ASSAULT TO THE POLICE DOES NOT EVINCE MALICE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ASSOCIATED WITH MAKING THE REPORT; THE DEFAMATION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, determined the defamation action based upon defendant’s filing a sexual assault complaint with the police was protected by qualified immunity and the nature of the complaint did not evince the malice required to overcome the qualified immunity. The sexual assault trial ended in a hung jury and defendant agreed to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal as the disposition of her charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff was formerly an assistant district attorney and defendant was a reporter for the Daily News:

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields individuals who, like defendant, act “in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of [her] own affairs, in a matter where h[er] interest is concerned” … . To overcome the qualified privilege protecting defendant’s statements to the police, plaintiff was required to sufficiently allege that she published the statements with actual malice, i.e., that defendant “acted out of personal spite or ill will, with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth or falsity, or with a high degree belief that [her] statements were probably false” … . * * *

Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of alleging actual malice sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege attaching to defendant’s statements to the police. Even as alleged in the complaint, the statements are a straightforward rendition of the incident that defendant claims occurred during a car ride with plaintiff. There was nothing excessive or “vituperative” in the character of the reported statements that would support an inference of actual malice … . Indeed, it is difficult to see how defendant could have been more succinct or restrained in her description of the events while accomplishing her purpose: to report to the police that she had been the victim of sexual assault. Sagaille v Carrega, 2021 NY Slip Op 01369, First Dept 3-9-21

 

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SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNKECHAUG INDIAN NATION TO EXCLUDE A MEMBER OF THE NATION FROM A PARCEL OF NATION LAND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly ruled it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a land-possession dispute within the Unkechaug Indian Nation. The Nation first sought a Supreme Court ruling on the rightful possessor of the land (claimed to be Curtis Treadwell), thereby waiving sovereign immunity on that issue. Then the Nation, pursuant to its own internal Tribal Rules, determined Danielle Treadwell, who occupied a portion of the land, was an “undisirable person” and, based on that finding, could no longer occupy the property. The Supreme Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the “undesirable person” action taken by the Nation:

… [B]y bringing the April 2018 determination that Curtis was the rightful possessor of the subject property before the state Supreme Court, and seeking a declaration and enforcement, the Nation waived its sovereign immunity, though only as to that determination and its enforcement … . Accordingly, so long as the Nation relied on the April 2018 determination as its basis for excluding Danielle from the disputed portion of the subject property, the defendants’ counterclaims seeking inverse declarations could proceed along with the Nation’s action for declaratory relief. However, once the Nation proceeded to take the undesirability vote in September 2019 and issue the tribal resolution and directives based upon the membership’s vote, the Nation, pursuant to its own Tribal Rules, created a new and independent basis, under its sovereign authority, for excluding Danielle from the disputed portion of the subject property. The Supreme Court properly recognized that once it was informed of the 2019 undesirability determination, it could not take any action with respect thereto, as this was a sovereign act of the Nation outside the court’s subject matter jurisdiction … . Unkechaug Indian Nation v Treadwell, 2021 NY Slip Op 01286, Second Dept 3-3-21

 

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PLAINTIFF NYC SANITATION WORKER STEPPED ON A LIVE POWER LINE AFTER HIS SUPERVISOR ALLEGEDLY TOLD HIM THE POWER WAS OFF; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL DUTY OWED BY THE CITY DEFENDANTS TO THE PLAINTIFF; CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the NYC and NYC Department of Sanitation’s motions for summary judgment in this electrocution case should not have been granted. Plaintiff, a NYC sanitation department employee was doing clean up after Hurricane Sandy when he stepped on a live power line. Plaintiff alleged he was told by his supervisor the power had been turned off. The court applied the usual analysis for municipal liability for negligence: (1) the city was engaged in a governmental function; (2) there may have been a special relationship between the city defendants and the plaintiff; (3) it does not appear that a discretionary act was involved such that governmental immunity would apply:

… [T]he City defendants met their prima facie burden of establishing that they were engaged in a governmental function at the time that the causes of action arose … . However, the City defendants failed to establish, prima facie, the absence of a special duty to the plaintiff.

In this case, the plaintiff had an employer-employee relationship with the New York City Department of Sanitation. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be equated with a member of the general public. It appears from this record that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether the City defendants voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally that generated the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance … .

This Court has applied the doctrine of governmental immunity to an employee of the New York City Department of Sanitation, but in that case, the issue was whether the City of New York engaged in discretionary governmental actions based upon reasoned judgment in selecting equipment … . On this record, it does not appear that this case involves discretionary determinations … . Lewery v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 01035, Second Dept 2-17-21

 

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RARE CASE IN WHICH A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE CITY MAY RENDER THE CITY LIABLE FOR A DELAYED RESPONSE TO A 911 CALL; BECAUSE THE DELAY MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A DELIBERATE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY MAY NOT APPLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had sufficiently alleged the existence of a special relationship with the city and dismissal based on the doctrine of governmental function immunity was not appropriate. Plaintiff called 911 and was told the ambulance was on its way. Plaintiff had other options for assistance but relied on the 911 operator’s statement. Apparently the ambulance response was delayed. Absent a special relationship a municipality may not be held liable for breach of a duty owed to the general public. Governmental immunity generally protects discretionary actions. Here the delayed response may not have been due to the deliberate exercise of discretion and therefore may not be protected by the immunity doctrine:

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to establish a special relationship between the City and the decedent that brings her claim within the exception to the general rule that a municipality may not be held liable to a person injured by the breach of a duty that it owes to the general public — such as the duty to provide ambulance service … . The allegation that the 911 operator told plaintiff that “we are on our way” is sufficient to establish defendants’ assumption of an affirmative duty to act on the decedent’s behalf … . Plaintiff sufficiently alleged justifiable reliance on the call operator’s statement through an affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion in which she listed several additional actions she would have taken to secure help but for the operator’s assurance … .

Dismissal is also not appropriate at this stage pursuant to the doctrine of governmental function immunity, which shields public entities from liability for “discretionary” actions taken during the performance of “governmental functions” … . It is undisputed that the provision of emergency care by FDNY EMTs constitutes a governmental function … . It is also clear that determinations of whether and when to dispatch an ambulance, the type of ambulance to dispatch and from where, and the route the ambulance should take are discretionary in nature … . However, it is not clear that the delay at issue here was due to an affirmative exercise of this discretion, rather than an unintentional failure to timely dispatch an ambulance … . Xenias v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 00647, First Dept 2-4-21

 

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THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE TOWN JUSTICE’S ISSUANCE OF AN ARREST WARRANT FOR PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the malicious prosecution cause of action against the town should have been dismissed. Plaintiff daughter filed a report accusing her mother of withdrawing money from the daughter’s account without permission. An arrest warrant was issued. Plaintiff thereafter produced a power of attorney allowing her to withdraw money from her daughter’s account and the larceny charge against plaintiff was dropped. Plaintiff then brought a malicious prosecution action against the town and the village:

Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is immune from civil liability for any acts that he or she performs in the exercise of his or her judicial function … .

Defendants correctly observe that plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against the Town is premised solely upon the Town Justice signing the warrant authorizing plaintiff’s arrest. The record indisputably establishes that the Town Justice signed the arrest warrant in the exercise of his judicial function. Consequently, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies and Supreme Court should have dismissed the malicious prosecution claim against the Town on that basis … . Gagnon v Village of Cooperstown, N.Y., 2020 NY Slip Op 07256, Third Dept 12-3-20

 

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THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; AN INDICTMENT RAISES ONLY A PRESUMPTION OF PROBABLE CAUSE WHICH CAN BE REBUTTED; A PROSECUTOR IS ENTITLED ONLY TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS AN INVESTIGATOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s malicious prosecution cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was arrested and indicted for sex trafficking, held in jail for 10 months, and then the charges were dropped. The court noted that the indictment raised only a presumption of probable cause which can be rebutted. The plaintiff raised a question of fact about whether the prosecution was motivated by malice. A prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity when acting as an investigator:

“The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice” … . Although a grand jury indictment raises a presumption of probable cause, this presumption may be rebutted … . “[E]ven if the jury at a trial could, or likely would, decline to draw inferences favorable to the plaintiff on issues of probable cause and malice, the court on a summary judgment motion must indulge all available inferences of the absence of probable cause and the existence of malice” … . …

“[A] prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of his or her official duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the People’s case, but a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity when acting in an investigatory capacity” … . Crooks v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 07161, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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