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42 USC 1983 IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE MUNICIPAL-LAW NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT; THE NOTICE OF THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ACTION WAS TIMELY; THE PETITION TO FILE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM FOR THE REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE EXCUSES WERE NOT VALID AND THE VILLAGE DID NOT HAVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE CLAIMS SIMPLY BY VIRTUE OF THE POLICE REPORT AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF A POLICE OFFICER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a partial dissent, determined: (1) the 42 USC 1983 action was not subject to the notice of claim requirement of the General Municipal Law; the notice of claim for the malicious prosecution cause of action was timely because the limitations period began when the underlying charges were dismissed; and (3) the petition for leave to file late notices of claim for the state law discrimination, false arrest, abuse of process, excessive force, failure to intervene, denial of access to the courts, intimidation and intentional infliction of emotional distress actions should not have been granted:

The petitioner’s explanation that the counsel who represented him during the criminal proceeding did not advise him of the notice of claim requirement and that he did not learn of the requirement until … he retained his current attorney to represent him in a potential civil action did not constitute a reasonable excuse for his failure to timely serve the Village with a notice of claim for the remaining state law claims … . The petitioner’s ignorance of the law does not constitute a reasonable excuse … . Moreover, the petitioner’s assertion that he knowingly delayed commencing any action against the Village while the criminal charges were pending due to unsubstantiated claims of fear and intimidation does not constitute a reasonable excuse … . …

The petitioner did not establish that the Village acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the remaining state law claims within 90 days after they arose or a reasonable time thereafter. “Generally, knowledge of a police officer or of a police department cannot be considered actual knowledge of the public corporation itself regarding the essential facts of a claim” … . “[F]or a report to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts, one must be able to readily infer from that report that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the public corporation” … . Here, the involvement of a Village police officer in arresting the petitioner did not, without more, establish that the Village acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner’s remaining state law claims within 90 days following their accrual or a reasonable time thereafter … . Matter of Nunez v Village of Rockville Ctr., 2019 NY Slip Op 07783, Second Dept 10-30-19

 

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THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED DEFENDANTS FROM CALLING PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIANS AS WITNESSES IN THIS POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE CASE BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE NOTICE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ACCEPTED PLAINTIFF’S REDACTIONS OF THE MEDICAL RECORDS BECAUSE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SUGGEST THEIR OWN REDACTIONS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the trial court properly precluded the defendants to call plaintiff’s (Walid’s) treating physicians as witnesses and properly redacted plaintiff’s medical records. Plaintiff, a teenager with autism, brought this action against police officers for assault, battery and use of excessive force. Defendants did not give timely notice of their wish to call the treating doctors and did not supply their own suggested redactions:

We find that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding defendants from introducing testimony from Walid’s treating doctors at Ferncliff Manor. Defendants failed to disclose any of these witnesses until four days before trial, after having previously affirmatively represented to the court that they did not intend to call any witnesses. The court and plaintiffs relied on this representation in estimating the length of trial and selecting a jury. In view of the trial court’s broad authority to control its courtroom, it was not unreasonable for the court to decline to add these witnesses and prolong the trial when a jury had already been chosen (twice) based on certain representations about its length … .

The trial court also did not improvidently exercise its discretion in allowing only a limited subset of Walid’s records from Ferncliff Manor to be admitted into evidence. It is clear that these records required at least some redaction, including to eliminate double hearsay … and propensity evidence … . Because defendants refused to propose any redactions, after having been given ample opportunities to do so, the trial court was justified in adopting plaintiffs’ proposed redactions instead. Even if defendants are correct that the complete records contain additional relevant evidence that should not have been excluded, having failed to propose any redactions of their own, defendants cannot now complain that the records should have been redacted less heavily. Walid M. v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 07739, First Dept 10-29-19

 

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PLAINTIFF’S ‘DENIAL OF A FAIR TRIAL’ ACTION PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BEFORE PLAINTIFF’S CASE WAS CLOSED; THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PREMATURE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN IF PLAINTIFF’S ULTIMATE SUCCESS WAS UNLIKELY; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, setting aside the verdict, and ordering a new trial, determined that the motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted prior to the close the plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff had brought an action against the City of New York pursuant to 42 USC 1983 alleging he had not received a fair trial:

The denial of a fair trial claim is a stand alone cause of action (see e.g. Garnett v Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F3d 265, 278-279 [2d Cir 2016]), which should not have been dismissed prior to the conclusion of plaintiff’s case in chief. CPLR 4401 permits a party to move for a directed verdict “after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue.” “[I]t is reversible error to grant a motion for a directed verdict prior to the close of the party’s case against whom a directed verdict is sought” … , even if the ultimate success of a plaintiff’s cause of action is unlikely … . Cromedy v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 07527, First Dept 10-22-19

 

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THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS’ RULING THAT A BREAKWALL AND RETAINING WALLS ON LAKEFRONT PROPERTY WERE FENCES WHICH VIOLATED THE CODE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WAS ANNULLED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Zoning Board of Appeals’ (ZBA’s) ruling that the breakwall and retaining walls on lakefront property were fences which violated the code was not supported by substantial evidence. The matter was brought as a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and action under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988:

… [T]he undisputed relevant evidence establishes that the walls do not fall within the plain meaning of fences as defined by Code former § 77-1 inasmuch as they were not erected for the purpose of enclosing or dividing a piece of land …. Instead, the breakwall was constructed to maintain the shoreline of the lake in light of the future construction of a house on petitioner’s property, the septic system retaining wall was constructed to secure the integrity of the proposed leach field, and the north side retaining wall was constructed to provide better drainage and avoid soil erosion. We thus conclude that the ZBA’s determination affirming the order to remedy with respect to the violations of the Code that depend on the walls being considered fences lacks a rational basis and is not supported by substantial evidence. Matter of Fox v Town of Geneva Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2019 NY Slip Op 07160

 

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APPELLANT WAS NOT AGGRIEVED BY SUPREME COURT’S DECISION WHICH DENIED HER MOTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE PENDING FURTHER DISCOVERY; THEREFORE THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the plaintiff’s Joan and Christopher Porco were not aggrieved by Supreme Court’s ruling and therefore could not appeal it. The underlying action alleges Civil Rights Law (right to privacy) violations related to a film made by defendant about a crime committed by Christopher Porco. The complaint alleged the film had been republished making the action timely. Supreme Court denied the motion without prejudice to try again after discovery:

Christopher Porco is not an aggrieved party. Defendant’s motion sought dismissal of only those claims asserted by Joan Porco. In other words, defendant did not seek any relief against Christopher Porco. Supreme Court likewise did not grant defendant any relief against him. Accordingly, Christopher Porco has no basis to appeal from the February 2018 order.

Regarding Joan Porco, Supreme Court held that she could not rely on the relation back doctrine for her claims in the amended complaint to be timely asserted. The court nonetheless denied defendant’s motion without prejudice to renew upon completion of discovery after considering plaintiffs’ republication argument. … Accordingly, the court neither granted defendant any affirmative relief against Joan Porco nor withheld any affirmative relief requested by Joan Porco. Indeed, the only affirmative relief sought by Joan Porco was for leave to serve a second amended complaint, which the court granted and is not contested on appeal. Because Joan Porco was not granted incomplete relief, the exception to the aggrievement requirement … does not apply in this case.

Furthermore, a party is not aggrieved when his or her interests are only remotely or contingently affected by the order appealed from … . Although Joan Porco’s claims are subject to dismissal in the future given that Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice to renew, it is possible that defendant may never seek to renew its motion. And, even if defendant did move to renew, we can only surmise at this juncture how the court would decide it. Finally, to the extent that Joan Porco is dissatisfied with the court’s rationale concerning the relation back doctrine, such dissatisfaction does not make her an aggrieved party … . Porco v Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 07122, Third Dept 10-3-19

 

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VERDICT AWARDING ZERO DAMAGES FOR PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS POLICE EXCESSIVE-FORCE CASE SET ASIDE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO A $200,000 DAMAGES AWARD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the verdict awarding plaintiff zero damages for past pain and suffering should have been set aside in this police-excessive-force case (42 USC 1983). The court ordered a new trial unless the parties stipulated to a $200,000 damages award:

Plaintiff sustained injuries when a New York City police officer smashed him in the nose with a bullet-proof shield after entering his apartment to execute a search warrant. After a trial, the jury found that the officer violated plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by using excessive force while arresting him and that the excessive force was a substantial factor in causing his injuries. However, the jury awarded plaintiff no damages for pain and suffering. * * *

However, we find that the jury’s failure to award damages for past pain and suffering is contrary to a fair interpretation of the evidence and deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation (CPLR 5501[c]; …). The undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiff was in pain the first night after being struck, that for about two weeks after the incident his broken nose and orbital bone fractures were “kind of rough,” that he could only breathe through his mouth, that he had to get medication, that he suffered “really bad” headaches, and that he required reconstructive nasal surgery as a result of his injuries. Shimukonas v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 07147, First Dept 10-3-19

 

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PETITIONER’S APPLICATION TO CHANGE THE DESIGNATION OF HIS RACE/NATIONALITY PROPERLY DENIED; EX PARTE ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE, NOTICES OF APPEAL TREATED AS APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW PURSUANT TO CPLR 5704 (a) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined petitioner’s application to change his race/nationality from “black/African American” to “Moor/Americas Aboriginal” was properly denied. The court noted that an ex parte order is not appealable but deemed the notices of appeal applications pursuant to CPLR 5704 (a):

“An ex parte order is not appealable … . However, under the circumstances of this case, we deem it appropriate to treat the instant notices of appeal as applications for review pursuant to CPLR 5704(a) … .

We agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of that branch of the petition which was to change the petitioner’s race/nationality, as the petitioner presented no authority for the court to grant him such relief. Article 6 of the Civil Rights Law, which governs petitions for leave to assume another name, does not provide such authority. Further, a person’s race is a matter of self-identification. As to nationality, the sole means by which the petitioner may renounce his nationality as a United States citizen is to satisfy one of the conditions set forth in 8 USC § 1481(a) … . The petitioner made no showing that he met any of these conditions. Matter of Keis, 2019 NY Slip Op 04944, Second Dept 6-19-19

 

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THE CITY AND DEFENDANT CORRECTION OFFICER ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST BECAUSE THE CITY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR ITS EMPLOYEES’ VIOLATION OF 42 USC 1983, THEREFORE THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE CAN NOT BE RELIED UPON TO SUBSTITUTE THE CORRECTION OFFICER FOR “JANE DOE” AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the relation-back doctrine could not be relied upon to substitute the name of a correction officer for “Jane Doe” in the complaint in this 42 USC 1983 action. The correction officer and the city are not “united in interest.” The city cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ violation of 42 USC 1983:

In this action alleging a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and 42 USC § 1983, plaintiff did not serve the Jane Doe correction officer defendant before the statute of limitations ran. Although the claims against the intended defendant arise out of the same transaction as the claims alleged in the complaint, plaintiff cannot rely on the relation-back doctrine. The correction officer and defendant City are not “united in interest” because “the City cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ violations of 42 USC § 1983” … . Nor can plaintiff’s more than two-year delay in seeking to add the new defendant as a party after learning her identity be characterized as a mistake for relation-back purposes … .

Plaintiff’s reliance on CPLR 1024 is unavailing, as he does not demonstrate diligence in seeking to identify the unknown correction officer prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations … . Burbano v New York City, 2019 NY Slip Op 03937, First Dept 5-21-19

 

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UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORTS, USE OF FORCE REPORTS, AND MISBEHAVIOR REPORTS KEPT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SERVICES (DOCCS) RE: INCIDENTS IN PRISONS ARE NOT PERSONNEL RECORDS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50-a, THEREFORE PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO UNREDACTED COPIES PURSUANT TO HIS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, in a matter of first impression, determined that records kept by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) regarding incidents in prisons were not personnel records pursuant to Civil Rights Law 50-a. Therefore petitioner was entitled to unredacted copies pursuant to his Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request:

… [U]nusual incident reports, use of force reports and misbehavior reports have distinct characteristics. However, they share several important commonalities. To begin with, each category of report is, at its core, a written memorialization of an event that occurred at a DOCCS facility. Additionally, and significantly, each type of report is authored, as a mandatory component of their job duties, by staff members with knowledge of the underlying event. The reports do not arise out of inmate allegations or grievances … . Nor are they written documentation of disciplinary proceedings or disciplinary action taken against a correction officer … . Given their factual nature and that each is written by a witness or witnesses with knowledge of the underlying facility event, we find unusual incident reports, use of force reports and misbehavior reports to be more akin to arrest reports, stop reports, summonses, accident reports and body-worn camera footage, none of which is quintessentially “personnel records” … . * * *

… [W]hile it is relevant that unusual incident reports and use of force reports may be used in employee performance evaluations, that factor alone is not determinative. Otherwise, any employee work product or record documenting an employee’s on-duty actions would classify as a personnel record with the justification that it could be used to evaluate work performance and would, thus, result in a situation in which the exception swallows the rule … .

… [W]ith regard to the legislative objective of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, respondents have not demonstrated a “substantial and realistic potential” for the unredacted reports to be used against the officers in a harassing or abusive manner … . Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2019 NY Slip Op 03421, Third Dept 5-2-19

 

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POLICE BODY-WORN-CAMERA FOOTAGE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PERSONNEL RECORD AND IS NOT THEREFORE PROTECTED FROM RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC BY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50-a (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined police officers’ body-worn-camera footage did not constitute a personnel record within the meaning of Civil Rights Law 50-a. Therefore the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y.’s petition for a preliminary injunction prohibiting release of the footage was properly denied:

We find that given its nature and use, the body-worn-camera footage at issue is not a personnel record covered by the confidentiality and disclosure requirements of § 50-a … . The purpose of body-worn-camera footage is for use in the service of other key objectives of the program, such as transparency, accountability, and public trust-building.

Although the body-worn-camera program was designed, in part, for performance evaluation purposes, and supervisors are required, at times, to review such footage for the purpose of evaluating performance, the footage being released here is not primarily generated for, nor used in connection with, any pending disciplinary charges or promotional processes. New York Civil Liberties Union v New York City Police Department (__NY3d__, 2018 NY Slip Op 8423 [2018]), which involved disciplinary matters, does not constrain this analysis. The footage, here, rather, is more akin to arrest or stop reports, and not records primarily generated for disciplinary and promotional purposes. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the body-worn-camera program to promote increased transparency and public accountability. Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y. v De Blasio, 2019 NY Slip Op 03265, First Dept, 4-30-19

 

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