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You are here: Home1 / Civil Rights Law
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Defamation

PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE (DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY STATED PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN MONEY LAUNDERING); ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE ACTION INVOLVED “PUBLIC PETITION AND PARTICIPATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SLAPP STATUTE, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE DEFAMATION ACTION HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW; THEREFORE THE SLAPP STATUTE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action for defamation and defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint pursuant to the SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation—Civil Rights Law section 70-a(1)(a)). Plaintiff operated a marina under a 60-year lease from the National Park Service, a US governmental agency. Defendant allegedly told plaintiff’s customer that plaintiff was engaged in money-laundering:

… [D]efendant satisfied his initial burden of establishing that this action is an action involving public petition and participation, since it involves a claim based upon “lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest” (id. § 76-a[1][a][2]).  * * * … [T]he defendant established that the causes of action were asserted in connection with an issue of public interest, as the defendant allegedly accused an entity operating with the authority of a governmental agency of criminal conduct … .

Since the defendant established that this action constitutes an action involving public petition and participation, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the causes of action had a substantial basis in law … .

… [T]he defendant’s alleged statement that the plaintiff “is engaged in money laundering” did not constitute pure nonactionable opinion … . * * * …[T]he complaint alleged that the defendant acted with “actual malice” or reckless disregard as to whether the statements were true or false … . … [T]he complaint was not required to allege special damages, since it asserted a cause of action alleging defamation per se based upon allegations that the defendant made statements charging the plaintiff with a serious crime or tending to injure it in its trade, business, or profession … . Thus, the plaintiff established that the cause of action alleging defamation per se had a substantial basis in law … . Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 2025 NY Slip Op 03802, Second Dept 6-25-25

Practice Point: The motion court dismissed the defamation action on the ground it was precluded by the SLAPP statute. However the Second Department held that plaintiff had demonstrated the defamation action had a substantial basis in law. Therefore defendant did not demonstrate entitlement to dismissal under the SLAPP statute.

 

June 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-06-25 10:27:382025-06-29 11:07:36PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE (DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY STATED PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN MONEY LAUNDERING); ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE ACTION INVOLVED “PUBLIC PETITION AND PARTICIPATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SLAPP STATUTE, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE DEFAMATION ACTION HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW; THEREFORE THE SLAPP STATUTE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Rights Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Negligence

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THIS “NEGLIGENT USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE,” “FALSE ARREST,” AND “UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT” ACTION STEMMING FROM THE STREET STOP, SHOOTING AND ARREST OF THE PLAINTIFF; THE DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined conflicting evidence precluded summary judgment in this civil action stemming from the street stop and arrest of the plaintiff. Although plaintiff pled guilty, which usually forecloses any argument that the arrest was not supported by probable cause, here evidence submitted the defendant transit authority raised a question of fact about probable cause. The action alleged the negligent use of excessive force (plaintiff was shot through the windshield of his vehicle), false arrest and unlawful imprisonment:

Excessive force claims are evaluated ” ‘under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard’ ” … . * * *

“Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances is generally best left for a jury to decide” … .

” ‘The fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer’s use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer license to use force without limit. The force used by the officer must be reasonably related to the nature of the resistance and the force used, threatened, or reasonably perceived to be threatened, against the officer’ ” … . …

Though “[t]he existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the [false imprisonment cause of action]” … , the issue of probable cause is “generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury, and should ‘be decided by the court only where there is no real dispute as to the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn surrounding the arrest’ ” … . Thomas v Niagara Frontier Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 02433, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an analysis of “negligent use of excessive force,” “false arrest,” and “unlawful imprisonment” causes of action at the summary-judgment stage, in the face of conflicting evidence.​

 

April 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-04-25 11:32:402025-04-27 12:16:00CONFLICTING EVIDENCE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THIS “NEGLIGENT USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE,” “FALSE ARREST,” AND “UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT” ACTION STEMMING FROM THE STREET STOP, SHOOTING AND ARREST OF THE PLAINTIFF; THE DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Contract Law, Employment Law

THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF WAS REASONABLE AND ENFORCEABLE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION, WHICH WAS COMMENCED SIX MONTHS AND ONE DAY AFTER PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED, WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the six-month statute of limitations in the employment contract with plaintiff was reasonable and enforceable. Therefore plaintiff’s action, which was commenced one day after the six-month limitation period had expired, was time-barred:

“Parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time within which an action must be commenced to a period shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations” … . “‘[A]n agreement which modifies the Statute of Limitations by specifying a shorter, but reasonable, period within which to [*2]commence an action is enforceable provided it is in writing'” … . CPLR 201 provides that an action “must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement.”

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), “‘a moving defendant must establish, prima facie, that the time within which to commence the action has expired'” … . Once this threshold showing is met, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to “‘raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether the action was actually commenced within the applicable limitations period'” … .

Here, the defendants produced the employment application, which contained the provision regarding the six-month limitations period and which was signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not dispute that her employment was terminated on November 23, 2021. The defendants therefore established … that the limitations period expired on May 23, 2022. The plaintiff commenced this action on May 24, 2022, one day after the expiration of the limitations period. Salati v Northwell Health, 2025 NY Slip Op 01660, Second Dept 3-19-25

Practice Point: Here the six-month statute of limitations in plaintiff’s employment contract was deemed reasonable and enforceable. Therefore plaintiff’s employment discrimination action, commenced six months and one day after her employment was terminated, was time-barred.

 

March 19, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-03-19 14:57:542025-03-20 15:13:44THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF WAS REASONABLE AND ENFORCEABLE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION, WHICH WAS COMMENCED SIX MONTHS AND ONE DAY AFTER PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED, WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Fiduciary Duty

THE ALLEGATION A PLASTIC SURGEON POSTED BEFORE AND AFTER PHOTOGRAPHS OF PLAINTIFF WITHOUT PERMISSION STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined plaintiff stated causes of action for both a violation of privacy pursuant to the Civil Rights Law, and breach of a fiduciary duty. Plaintiff alleged defendant plastic surgeon posted before and after photographs of the plaintiff without her consent. The breach of a fiduciary duty claim did not duplicate the violation of privacy claim. Physicians have a fiduciary duty not to disclose a patient’s medical records without authorization:

Plaintiff instead alleges that defendants all had a physician-patient relationship with her and that they breached a distinct duty arising out of that relationship by publicly disclosing photographs of her that had been taken in the course of treatment without her agreement … . “It is well established that a patient may maintain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against his or her physician resulting from the physician’s unauthorized disclosure of the patient’s medical records,” broadly defined as essentially any information acquired by the physician that relates to the patient’s diagnosis or treatment, as such disclosure violates “the implied covenant of trust and confidence that is inherent in the physician patient relationship” … . A claim for breach of fiduciary duty, based as it is upon the well-established duty a physician owes to his or her patient as opposed to a purported right of privacy, may be viable where claims based upon a generalized invasion of privacy are not … . Perry v Rockmore, 2025 NY Slip Op 01141, Third Dept 2-27-25

Practice Point: Here the allegation defendant plastic surgeon posted before and after photographs of plaintiff stated distinct causes of action for a violation of privacy pursuant to the Civil Rights Law, and breach of fiduciary duty (unauthorized disclosure of medical records).

 

February 27, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-02-27 17:36:532025-03-07 08:46:08THE ALLEGATION A PLASTIC SURGEON POSTED BEFORE AND AFTER PHOTOGRAPHS OF PLAINTIFF WITHOUT PERMISSION STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Rights Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

THE FOIL PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS, INCLUDING UNSUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS; WHETHER SUCH A DOCUMENT SHOULD BE REDACTED OR WITHHELD MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT-BY-DOCUMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the personal privacy exemption in FOIL did not provide a blanket exemption for civilian complaints against police officers, including unsubstantiated complaints. Rather, whether the personal privacy exemption applies must be determined on a record-by-record basis:

FOIL’s personal privacy exemption permits an agency to withhold from public access any record that “if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [b]). We agree with respondents that FOIL, as amended in conjunction with the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, does not deny law enforcement officers the benefit of this exemption. However, the Appellate Division correctly concluded—consistent with uniform appellate precedent—that there is no categorical or blanket personal privacy exemption for records relating to complaints against law enforcement officers that are not deemed substantiated … . * * *

Rather than withhold all such records, Public Officers Law § 87 (2) requires an agency to evaluate each record individually and determine whether “a particularized and specific justification” exists for denying access on the ground that disclosing all or part of the record would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy … . Where redactions would prevent such an invasion and can be made without unreasonable difficulty, the agency must disclose the record with those necessary redactions … . The Appellate Division properly directed respondents to undertake this process, subject to further judicial review … . Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v City of Rochester, 2025 NY Slip Op 01010, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: The personal privacy exemption in FOIL does not provide a blanket exemption for civilian complaints against police officers, even unsubstantiated complaints. Whether a document should be redacted or withheld under the personal privacy exemption must be determined document-by-document.​

 

February 20, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-02-20 18:28:472025-02-22 18:54:16THE FOIL PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS, INCLUDING UNSUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS; WHETHER SUCH A DOCUMENT SHOULD BE REDACTED OR WITHHELD MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT-BY-DOCUMENT (CT APP).
Civil Rights Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

THE FORMER EXEMPTION FROM A FOIL REQUEST FOR POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS WAS REPEALED IN 2020; THE REPEAL APPLIES RETROACTIVELY SUCH THAT DISCIPLINARY RECORDS CREATED PRIOR TO THE REPEAL ARE NO LONGER EXEMPT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined that the repeal of the exemption from a FOIL request for police disciplinary records applies retroactively to documents created before the repeal:

… [W]e conclude that the Legislature intended for the statutory repeal to have retroactive effect. For starters, there is no indication that the repeal was intended to affect the usual manner in which FOIL operates. FOIL requires agencies to “make available for public inspection and copying all records” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2]), and it defines “records” with reference to whether an agency possesses information, but without reference to the date the information was created (id. § 86 [4] [defining “record” as “any information kept” or “held . . . in any physical form whatsoever”]). The amendments impose various redaction requirements and personal privacy protections for law enforcement disciplinary records specifically, yet they do not, for example, single out records created before a certain date for special treatment, or direct that disclosure of any record is tethered to the date it was created. Had the Legislature intended to deviate from FOIL’s presumption that information kept or held by an agency is disclosable by exempting records created prior to the repeal, or to mandate that an agency responding to a FOIL request ascertain and apply the law that governed when each responsive record was created, then surely it would have said as much. Matter of NYP Holdings, Inc. v New York City Police Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 01009, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: The exemption from a FOIL request for police disciplinary records was repealed in 2020. The repeal applies retroactively to police disciplinary records created prior to the repeal.

 

February 20, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-02-20 18:04:252025-02-22 18:55:25THE FORMER EXEMPTION FROM A FOIL REQUEST FOR POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS WAS REPEALED IN 2020; THE REPEAL APPLIES RETROACTIVELY SUCH THAT DISCIPLINARY RECORDS CREATED PRIOR TO THE REPEAL ARE NO LONGER EXEMPT (CT APP).
Civil Rights Law, Constitutional Law, Municipal Law

THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 18 USC 1983 AGAINST INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS FOR DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND HIS RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM CONTINUED DETENTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined several 42 USC 1983 causes of action against individual police officers should not have been dismissed. The Second Department noted allegations that individual police officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights need not be based upon a municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff alleged the officers fabricated evidence and conspired with the district attorney’s office to deprive him of his right to a fair trial and his right to be free from continued detention:

The plaintiff alleged … that the individual defendants, with knowledge that the plaintiff was not guilty, improperly caused the neup witness to identify the plaintiff as the shooter and thereafter caused him to be prosecuted. … [T]he allegations in the complaint were sufficient to plead the personal involvement of the individual defendants in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial … . Moreover, the Supreme Court improperly concluded that this cause of action was defective for failing to satisfy the “policy or custom” standard. Since the plaintiff was asserting a cause of action against the individual defendants in their individual capacities for an alleged constitutional violation … he was not required to allege facts satisfying that standard … . * * *

… [T]he complaint sufficiently stated a viable cause of action alleging a violation of the plaintiff’s right to be free from continued detention insofar as asserted against the individual defendants. The complaint alleged that the individual defendants knowingly concealed, among other things, evidence regarding the improper lineup identification, thereby “suppress[ing] evidence that was favorable to the plaintiff during the criminal proceeding” … . …

[U]nder the intra-corporate or intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,” and subject to certain exceptions, employees of “a public entity generally cannot conspire with [other] employees or agents” of the same entity, since “all are considered a single entity” … . Here, however, the doctrine is inapplicable because the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants, members of the New York City Police Department, conspired with employees of a distinct governmental entity, the Queens County District Attorney’s Office … . Pressley v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 06563, Second Dept 12-24-24

Practice Point: Causes of action asserting the violation of constitutional rights by individual police officers, as opposed to by the police department as a municipal entity, need not allege the violations were pursuant to a department policy or custom.

Practice Point: Although a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights cannot be based upon an agreement among police officers in a single department, it can be based upon an agreement among police officers and district attorneys.

 

December 24, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-12-24 09:51:212024-12-28 13:37:29THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 18 USC 1983 AGAINST INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS FOR DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND HIS RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM CONTINUED DETENTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
Battery, Civil Rights Law, Employment Law, Mental Hygiene Law, Municipal Law

THE 18 USC 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE AND MUNICIPALITY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF REPONDEAT SUPERIOR DOES NOT APPLY AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE POLICE WERE ACTING PURSUANT TO A MUNICIPAL CUSTOM OR POLICY WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY PUSHED PLAINTIFF TO THE GROUND, HANDCUFFED HER AND TASED HER; HOWEVER THE BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the battery cause of action in this Civil Rights Law (18 USC 1983) case should not have been dismissed. The lawsuit stemmed from the police allegedly pushing plaintiff to the ground, striking her, handcuffing her and tasing her. The 18 USC 1983 cause of action was properly dismissed because plaintiff did not prove the police were acting pursuant to a municipal custom or policy. However, the battery cause of action should not have been dismissed:

However … a jury could rationally conclude that the defendants are liable for battery. “‘To recover damages for battery, a plaintiff must prove that there was bodily contact, made with intent, and offensive in nature'” … . “[A]n assault and battery cause of action may be based on contact during an unlawful arrest” … .

At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence from which the jury could rationally conclude that the detention was not privileged under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41, and the trial evidence showed that the officers engaged in contact with the plaintiff during the allegedly unlawful detention. The trial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was sufficient to allow the jury to rationally conclude that the two officers were acting within the scope of their official duties at the relevant time. Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to dismissal of the cause of action alleging battery … . Mac v County of Suffolk, 2024 NY Slip Op 06330, Second Dept 12-18-24

Practice Point: A municipality cannot be held liable pursuant to 18 USC 1983 for the actions of police officers under a respondeat superior theory. The plaintiff must show the police were acting pursuant to a municipal custom or policy.

Practice Point: A municipality may be liable for battery committed by police officers acting within the scope of their employment.

 

December 18, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-12-18 10:24:062024-12-19 10:49:03THE 18 USC 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE AND MUNICIPALITY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF REPONDEAT SUPERIOR DOES NOT APPLY AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE POLICE WERE ACTING PURSUANT TO A MUNICIPAL CUSTOM OR POLICY WHEN THEY ALLEGEDLY PUSHED PLAINTIFF TO THE GROUND, HANDCUFFED HER AND TASED HER; HOWEVER THE BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, False Arrest, Municipal Law

THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO IDENTIFY “JOHN DOE” “JANE DOE” DEFENDANTS AS POLICE OFFICERS IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED AND THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to amend the complaint to identify police officers as the “John Doe, Jane Doe” defendants in this 18 USC 1983 false arrest and unlawful search case should not have been granted. The statute of limitations had expired and the relation-back doctrine did not apply—police officers are not united in interest with the city:

CPLR 1024 provides that a “party who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or identity of a person who may properly be made a party, may proceed against such person as an unknown party by designating so much of his name and identity as is known. If the name or remainder of the name becomes known all subsequent proceedings shall be taken under the true name and all prior proceedings shall be deemed amended accordingly.” “Yet, ‘parties are not to resort to the “Jane Doe” procedure unless they exercise due diligence, prior to the running of the statute of limitations, to identify the defendant by name and, despite such efforts, are unable to do so. Any failure to exercise due diligence to ascertain the “Jane Doe’s” name subjects the complaint to dismissal as to that party'” … .

Here, the statute of limitations had expired by the time the defendants were identified in the second amended complaint. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the relation-back doctrine does not apply, because the defendants are not united in interest with the City … . The City “cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ violations of 42 USC § 1983, and there is no unity of interest in the absence of a relationship giving rise to such vicarious liability” … . Additionally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he made diligent efforts to ascertain the defendants’ identities prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations or that the City hindered any such efforts … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the Supreme Court’s prior orders allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add the then-unknown defendants by name within a certain time period are not binding on these issues. The doctrine of the law of the case does not bind an appellate court … . Agosto v Maria, 2024 NY Slip Op 05950, Second Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: Here the motion to amend the complaint to identify “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants as police officers should have been denied because the statute of limitations had expired and the relation-back doctrine did not apply because police officers are not united in interest with the city which employs them.

 

November 27, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-11-27 08:40:222024-11-30 08:42:46THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO IDENTIFY “JOHN DOE” “JANE DOE” DEFENDANTS AS POLICE OFFICERS IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED AND THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Defamation

THE DEFAMATION ACTION AGAINST A REPORTER AND A MEDIA COMPANY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE SUIT HAD A “SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW;” CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gonzalez, over a two-justice concurrence, determined plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their defamation action against a reporter and a media company had a “substantial basis in law” under the anti-SLAPP law. Therefore the complaint was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 [g] [1] and defendants were entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. The articles published by defendants concerned plaintiff Karl Reeves’ divorce and custody dispute. The facts are too detailed to fairly summarize here:

… [T]he anti-SLAPP law creates an accelerated summary dismissal procedure, which applies when a defendant in a SLAPP suit moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint. Upon such a motion, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the action or claim is a SLAPP suit (see CPLR 3211[g][1]). Once the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the claim has a “substantial basis in law” (id.). If the claim is dismissed, the defendant recovers a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees.

This case presents the issue of what constitutes a “substantial basis in law” under the anti-SLAPP law. We hold, based on our reading of CPLR 3211(g) and (h), that “substantial basis” under the anti-SLAPP law means “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … , a phrase drawn from the relevant legislative history. We further find that, because the complaint in this case fails to survive ordinary CPLR 3211(a)(7) analysis, plaintiffs have failed to meet the higher burden under CPLR 3211(g) of showing that their SLAPP suit has a substantial basis in law. Accordingly, defendants — a media entity and a reporter — are entitled to mandatory costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a. We remand the case solely for calculation of those costs and fees.  Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 2024 NY Slip Op 04286, First Dept 8-22-24

Practice Point: To overcome a motion to dismiss a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff must demonstrate the action has a “substantial basis in law.” This decision fleshes out the meaning of that phrase.

 

August 22, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-08-22 09:41:122024-08-24 10:16:34THE DEFAMATION ACTION AGAINST A REPORTER AND A MEDIA COMPANY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE SUIT HAD A “SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW;” CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​
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