Landlord-Tenant Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Negligence

REJECTING THE 2ND DEPARTMENT’S CRITICISM OF THE 1ST DEPARTMENT’S THIRD-PARTY-ASSAULT JURISPRUDENCE, THE 1ST DEPARTMENT HELD THE BROKEN DOOR THROUGH WHICH THE ASSAILANTS GAINED ACCESS TO THE BUILDING WHERE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS SHOT AND KILLED WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SHOOTING BECAUSE THE ASSAILANTS WOULD HAVE FOUND A WAY TO ENTER THE BUILDING EVEN IF THE DOOR LOCK WERE WORKING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the landlord, New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), was not liable for the shooting death of plaintiff’s decedent, Murphy, despite conclusive video evidence the locking mechanism on the door the assailants used to enter plaintiff’s decedent’s building was broken. Disagreeing with the Second Department’s characterization of the First Department’s jurisprudence in similar third-party assault cases, the First Department held that the assailants were intent on shooting plaintiff’s decedent and would have gained entrance to the building even if the locking mechanism worked. Therefore the assailants’ actions constituted the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s death:

We disagree with the [Second Department’s] implication that under this Court’s jurisprudence the fact that a victim was targeted obviates the need for any inquiry into the security measures in place at the subject premises. Indeed, we are aware of no case in the First Department that suggests that a landowner would avoid liability even if minimal precautions would have actually prevented a determined assailant from gaining access. In reality, however, that is hardly ever the case. In Buckeridge v Broadie (5 AD3d 298, 300), … the assailants were “sophisticated” and disguised themselves to gain entry. In Cerda v 2962 Decatur Ave. Owners Corp. (306 AD2d 169, 170 [1st Dept 2003]) … the plaintiff was assaulted by a “team of assassins.” … [C]ases confirm that this Court has not abandoned the notion that more than the simple fact that a victim was targeted is necessary to shield a property owner from liability. … [T]he cases confirm that, given the minimal steps a landowner is required to take to secure premises, it has no duty to outwit or outthink those who are determined to overcome those steps.

The record establishes that Murphy’s killers were intent on gaining access to the building. … [C]onsidering that at least one other person, by all appearances oblivious to the brouhaha … , entered the building at the same time, it does not take a leap of the imagination to surmise that [the assailants] would have gained access to the building by following another person in or forcing such a person to let them in. This negates the unlocked door as a proximate cause of the harm that befell Murphy, and makes her assailants’ murderous intent the only proximate cause. Estate of Murphy v New York City Hous. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 02246, First Dept 4-13-21

April 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THERE IS NO NEED TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AFTER SERVICE OF A WARRANT AND NOTICE OF EVICTION; THE MATTER WAS CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the failure file an affidavit of service after serving the warrant and notice of eviction did not affect the validity of the service of the warrant of eviction which triggers the 14-day waiting period before execution of the warrant. The court noted that the matter was moot because the petitioner was subsequently evicted based on a different warrant, but the matter should be heard on appeal because the circumstance is likely to recur. The two dissenters argued the mootness of the matter precluded appeal:

… [T]he issuance of a warrant is the court’s last act in a summary proceeding, as denoted by the phrase, “Upon rendering a final judgment for [the owner], the court shall issue a warrant” (RPAPL 749 [1]). The execution of the warrant terminates the lease … . Likewise, the execution of the warrant terminates the summary proceeding and the jurisdiction of the court … Because the court no longer has jurisdiction, the filing of the affidavit of service is superfluous. This stands in stark contrast to the purpose of the affidavit of service at the commencement of the summary proceeding, where it suffices as proof that the party was properly served pursuant to law, as proper service is required to bring a respondent within the jurisdiction of the court … .

… [W]e find that filing the affidavit of service at the conclusion of service of a warrant of eviction is not required, and the 14-day notice begins the day following the date of service, posting or mailing, whichever is later … . Matter of Dixon v County of Albany, 2021 NY Slip Op 01819, Third Dept 3-25-21

March 25, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Debtor-Creditor, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Real Property Law

THE COMMERCIAL LEASE GUARANTEE MET THE DEFINITION OF AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY; THE COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS ON ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LEASE GUARANTEES DO NOT APPLY; THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY DEFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) although guarantees generally are not instruments for the payment of money within the meaning of CPLR 3213, the language of the guarantee was unconditional and therefore met the criteria of such an instrument; (2) the COVID-19-related provision of the NYC Administrative Code and executive orders, prohibiting enforcement of commercial lease guarantees, do not apply where the business were not required to cease operations; (3) the warranty of habitability was not available as a defense because of the language of the guarantee; and (4) a commercial tenant cannot assert the warranty of habitability:

While a guarantee of both payment and performance does not qualify as an instrument for the payment of money only under CPLR 3213 … , paragraph 1 of the guaranty signed by defendants includes an unconditional obligation to pay all rent and additional rent owed under the sublease, and therefore does so qualify … ; “it required no additional performance by plaintiff[] as a condition precedent to payment or otherwise made defendant[s’] promise to pay something other than unconditional” … .

While the prohibition on the enforcement of commercial lease guaranties against natural persons under Administrative Code of City of NY § 22-1005 applies to businesses that were required to “cease operation” or “close to members of the public” under executive orders 202.3, 202.6, or 202.7, issued in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants never asserted that the nonparty subtenant ceased operations or closed to the public as a result of those orders.

Defendants’ claim that they properly raised warranty of habitability defenses under the sublease is without merit. Such defenses are not available to defendants because all defenses under the guaranty, with the exception of prior payment, were waived. Moreover, a commercial tenant cannot avail itself of the statutory warranty of habitability (see Real Property Law § 235-b …). iPayment, Inc. v Silverman, 2021 NY Slip Op 01846, First Dept 3-25-21

March 25, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AFTER DISCOVERY WAS CLOSED TO RAISE A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY STEMMING FROM FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY ALLEGED; DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD DEMONSTRATED THE LEASE DID NOT REQUIRE THE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE DOOR WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGED CLOSED ON HER HAND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend the bill of particulars after discovery was complete should not have been granted and defendant out-of-possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged the door of a retail store closed on her hand as she was pushing a cart with merchandise through the doorway. She alleged the door was not properly maintained. After discovery she sought to amend her bill of particulars to allege there was a crack in the floor which caused the cart to get stuck as she was attempting to pass through the doorway:

“While leave to amend a bill of particulars is ordinarily to be freely given in the absence of prejudice or surprise” … , “once discovery has been completed and the case has been certified as ready for trial, [a] party will not be permitted to amend the bill of particulars except upon a showing of special and extraordinary circumstances” … . In such a case, leave may properly be granted “where the plaintiff makes a showing of merit, and the amendment involves no new factual allegations, raises no new theories of liability, and causes no prejudice to the defendant” … . However “where a motion for leave to amend a bill of particulars alleging new theories of liability not raised in the complaint or the original bill is made on the eve of trial, leave of court is required, and judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly, and should be discreet, circumspect, prudent, and cautious” … . “In exercising its discretion, the court should consider how long the party seeking the amendment was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated, whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered, and whether prejudice resulted therefrom” … .

… [T]he proposed amendment to the bill of particulars raised an entirely new theory of liability well after discovery had been completed, and was advanced only in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for her delay in seeking the amendment … , and the proposed amendment was prejudicial to the defendant … . * * *

… [T]he defendant [out-of-possession landlord] demonstrated its … entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint by submitting, inter alia, the lease, which established that the tenant enjoyed complete and exclusive possession of the demised premises at the time of the plaintiff’s injury and that the defendant was not responsible for maintenance of the door. King v Marwest, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 08225, Second Dept 3-17-20

March 17, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

THE NYC HOUSING STABILITY AND TENANT PROTECTION ACT OF 2019 PART I, WHICH IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS ON A LANDLORD’S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO RENEW A RENT-STABILIZED LEASE, DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS HOLDOVER PROCEEDING WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN THE LAW WAS ENACTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the Appellate Term, determined the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) Part I did not apply to did not apply to the instant holdover proceeding which was pending when the HSTPA was enacted:

As amended by HSTPA Part I … , Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-511(c)(9)(b), which governs an owner’s right to refuse to renew a rent-stabilized lease on the ground that the owner seeks the unit for his or her own personal use and occupancy as a primary residence, limits the owner to the recovery of only one dwelling unit in a building, requires proof of “immediate and compelling necessity” for the owner’s use, and requires that the owner provide an equivalent housing accommodation for any tenant over the age of 62 and in occupancy for 15 years or more. …

… [F]our months after Appellate Term issued its decision in this proceeding, the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (35 NY3d 332 [2020]), holding that HSTPA Part F, relating to rent overcharges, could not be applied to pending cases because “application of these amendments to past conduct would not comport with our retroactivity jurisprudence or the requirements of due process” … .

We conclude that the same reasoning applies with equal measure to HSTPA Part I. Matter of Harris v Israel, 2021 NY Slip Op 00796, First Dept 2-9-21

February 9, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Fraud, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

THE FOUR-YEAR LOOKBACK CAN BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT ENGAGED IN A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE NYC APARTMENTS RECEIVING J-51 TAX BENEFITS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the four-year lookback period can be applied to determine whether there was a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments which, under Roberts (12 NY3d 270 [2009]) should not have been deregulated because the landlord was receiving “J-51” tax benefits. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied and plaintiff’s motion to certify a class was properly granted:

… [I]n pre-Roberts cases where landlords relied on DHCR [NYC Division of Housing & Community Renewal] guidance there could be no fraudulent scheme to deregulate. * * *

[W]e have not extended this rule to cases decided after Roberts … . To the contrary, our jurisprudence holds that an owner may not flout the teachings of Roberts. * * *

The hallmarks of a fraudulent scheme to deregulate are present here. … Defendant deregulated the apartment after Roberts was decided and did not re-register with DHCR, despite receiving J-51 tax benefits … . During the four-year period preceding commencement of the lawsuit, plaintiff was still not given a rent-stabilized lease. … Defendant’s actions cannot be deemed to be prompt compliance. Rather, at this stage, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a six-year scheme to illegally deregulate 27 units or approximately 32% of the building. Montera v KMR Amsterdam LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 00805, First Dept 2-9-21

February 9, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

EVICTION WAS TOO SEVERE A PENALTY FOR PETITIONER’S MOMENTARY LOSS OF CONTROL DURING WHICH SHE STRUCK A NYC HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the NYC Housing Authority (NYCHA) should not have penalized petitioner for striking a NYCHA employee by evicting her:

The termination of the tenancy of petitioner, a now 64-year-old woman who has been a NYCHA tenant without incident for more than 40 years and will be evicted from her home along with her adult daughter because she suffered a momentary loss of control when she struck respondent’s employee, whom she believed to be in a relationship with her former partner, is “so disproportionate to [her] offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness” … .

Given the facts presented as well as the lack of any evidence presented by NYCHA that petitioner’s continued occupancy presents a concern to the safety of NYCHA employees or a risk to the other NYCHA tenants, this Court finds that a lesser penalty is warranted … . Matter of Bryant v Garcia, 2021 NY Slip Op 00521, First Dept 2-2-21

February 2, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

IN THIS THIRD-PARTY ASSAULT CASE, THE FACT THAT THE INTRUDER KILLED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESIDENT OF DEFENDANT’S APARTMENT BUILDING, IN A PRE-MEDITATED, TARGETED ATTACK DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, INSULATE THE LANDLORD FROM LIABILITY BASED UPON AN ALLEGEDLY BROKEN LOCK ON THE BUILDING’S EXTERIOR DOOR; THE 2ND DEPARTMENT DISAGREED WITH A LINE OF 1ST DEPARTMENT CASES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, disagreeing with a line of First Department decisions, determined a targeted, premeditated attack on a building resident is not necessarily an intervening cause which insulates the landlord from liability. Here plaintiff’s decedent was targeted by her former fiance (Boney) who set her, himself and one of her children on fire in the hallway outside plaintiff’s decedent’s apartment. There was evidence the exterior door to the building did not have a functioning lock. The Second Department held that the defendant landlord (the New York City Housing Authority [NYCHA]) did not eliminate questions of fact about whether the broken lock was a proximate cause of the attack and whether the attack was foreseeable:

The test in determining summary judgment motions involving negligent door security should … not focus on whether the crime committed within the building was “targeted” or “random,” but whether or not, and to what extent, an alleged negligently maintained building entrance was a concurrent contributory factor in the happening of the criminal occurrence. In examining whether there is a triable issue of fact as to foreseeability and proximate cause requiring trial, a jury could conceivably conclude that the chronically broken lock at the building’s front door provided Boney with an opportunity to attack the decedent, in a manner that might not otherwise have been possible, and that NYCHA could have foreseeably anticipated that its broken front door lock would result in the entry of intruders into the building for the commission of criminal activities against known or unknown specific tenants … . All of these actions should be examined sui generis, recognizing the unique facts of individualized matters, rather than simplistically or arbitrarily channeling them into either “targeted” or “random” criminal boxes that do not accommodate the factual nuances that may vary from case to case. Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 00447, Second Dept 1-27-21

January 27, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant

THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND LEGISLATION PROHIBITING EVICTIONS DURING THE PANDEMIC APPLIED TO A HOLDOVER TENANT WHO HAD ENTERED AN AGREEMENT TO VACATE THE APARTMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, determined the Executive Orders and legislation prohibiting evictions during the COVID pandemic precluded the eviction of a holdover tenant based upon an agreement by the tenant to vacate the apartment:

On August 27, 2020, petitioner commenced a summary eviction proceeding seeking a warrant of eviction to remove respondents from the premises (see RPAPL 711 [1]). At an appearance before Supreme Court on September 17, 2020, the parties, with the assistance of counsel, reached an agreement in which respondents agreed to vacate the premises on or before October 2, 2020. Pursuant to the agreement, the court issued a warrant of eviction, effective October 3, 2020, to be executed if respondents failed to vacate. Respondents remained on the premises and, on October 5, 2020, the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office, in accordance with the warrant, served respondents a 14-day notice indicating that the eviction would take place on October 21, 2020. After counsel for respondent Kaia Humphrey (hereinafter respondent) contacted the County Attorney’s office regarding the suspension of evictions via a new executive order issued by Governor Andrew Cuomo, petitioner moved for an order seeking, among other things, enforcement of the parties’ agreement to vacate and of the warrant of eviction. Following a virtual appearance on October 20, 2020, Supreme Court granted petitioner’s motion and ordered enforcement of the warrant of eviction. Respondent appeals. * * *

Because these executive orders prohibit enforcement of residential evictions, without any exceptions for holdover proceedings or warrants issued based on stipulations, Supreme Court was precluded from ordering enforcement of the warrant to evict respondents. Further executive orders have extended the stay on enforcements to December 3, 2020 … . …

Furthermore, on December 28, 2020, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 … . That act, which was effective immediately … , allows tenants to file a hardship declaration, which will prevent an eviction until at least May 1, 2021 … . Matter of Cabrera v Humphrey, 2021 NY Slip Op 00358, Third Dept 1-21-21

January 21, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Evidence, Landlord-Tenant

A NON-DEFECTIVE CELLAR DOOR CLOSED AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S HEAD; THE LEASE DID NOT REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE PREMISES; AND THERE WAS NO STRUCTURAL DEFECT; THE LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant out-of-possession landlord (West 16th) was not liable for an injury from a non-defective cellar door which closed and struck plaintiff’s head:

It is well established that an out-of-possession landlord like West 16th “is generally not liable for negligence with respect to the condition of the demised premises unless it (1) is contractually obligated to make repairs or maintain the premises, or (2) has a contractual right to reenter, inspect and make needed repairs and liability is based on a significant structural or design defect that is contrary to a specific statutory safety provision” … .

The lease did not obligate West 16th to maintain or repair the cellar doors or to install an auxiliary safety device on the cellar doors, which were fully functional and not broken in any way. …

Further, the alleged defect is not a structural defect contrary to a specific statutory safety provision. … [W]e have previously held that the failure to install a safety device to hold such doors open—the precise negligence alleged against West 16th herein—was “not a structural defect contrary to a specific statutory safety provision” … . Matias v West 16th Realty LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 08000, First Dept 12-29-20

December 29, 2020/by Bruce Freeman