Landlord-Tenant Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Administrative Law, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

ALTHOUGH THE TENANT HAD VIOLATED CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE, THE EVICTION PENALTY SHOCKED THE CONSCIENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the housing authority’s (THA’s) eviction of petitioner was too severe a penalty for her alleged sporadic failure to make timely rent payments, her alleged failure to allow an exterminator to enter the apartment, and her single allegedly “rude and loud” phone conversation with a THA employee. The dissenter argued eviction was an appropriate penalty:

Here, although the petitioner made late rental payments during the subject period, she did eventually pay all of the rent due, as well as the fees that had accrued on the account. Moreover, the record establishes that during the subject period, the amount of the petitioner’s rent fluctuated monthly, with little advance notice, such that her December 2015 rent was nearly three times as much as her September 2015 rent. …

… [T]he two isolated incidents concerning the exterminator and the offensive telephone conversation were not proportionate to the penalty of eviction. First, although the petitioner denied the exterminator entry to her apartment on March 14, 2016, the THA’s evidence otherwise established that the petitioner was the one who had requested treatment for bedbugs, she fully complied with the first treatment, and over several years of biweekly extermination for other pests, she had never denied the exterminator entry … . …

… [T]he petitioner’s single threat of violence occurred in a heated telephone conversation, immediately before the petitioner hung up in frustration and anger. The THA employee to whom the comment was directed testified at the hearing that she found the comment “[e]xtraordinary and extremely rude,” but she did not testify that she was frightened or that she understood the comment to be a genuine threat of violence. …

The penalty imposed is so grave in its impact on the petitioner that it is disproportionate to the misconduct, or the risk of harm to the THA or the public. Under the circumstances of this case, the penalty of termination of the petitioner’s tenancy is so disproportionate to the offenses committed as to be shocking to the judicial conscience as a matter of law … . Matter of Jacobs v Tuckahoe Hous. Auth., 2020 NY Slip Op 04392, Second Dept 8-5-20

August 5, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Tax Law

THE 2009 ROBERTS CASE APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO RENT OVERCHARGES STEMMING FROM THE RENTAL OF DEREGULATED APARTMENTS BY LANDLORDS RECEIVING J-51 TAX BENEFITS; THE OVERCHARGES HERE MUST BE RE-CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A RECENT RULING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE CLASS OF TENANTS IN THIS RENT OVERCHARGE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXPANDED BY SUPREME COURT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined: (1) Roberts v Thishman, 13 NY3d 270 applies retroactively to landlords who rent deregulated apartments while receiving J-51 tax benefits; (2) the class of tenants bringing the rent-overcharge action should not have been expanded by Supreme Court; and (3) Supreme Court must re-calculate the rent overcharges in accordance with the recent Court of Appeals ruling in Matter of Regina, 2020 NYSlipOp 02127:

In Gersten v 56 7th Ave. LLC (88 AD3d 189, 198 [1st Dept 2011]), this Court held that Roberts should be applied retroactively because the decision simply interpreted a statute that had been in effect for a number of years, and did not establish a new principle of law. * * *

In Matter of Regina … , the Court of Appeals determined that “the overcharge calculation amendments [in the HSTPA (HousiNg Stability and Tenant Protection Act)] cannot be applied retroactively to overcharges that occurred prior to their enactment.” The Court also resolved a split in this Department as to what rent records can be reviewed to determine rents and overcharges in Roberts cases … . Regina concluded that “under pre-HSTPA law, the four-year lookback rule and standard method of calculating legal regulated rent govern in Roberts overcharge cases, absent fraud” … .Accordingly, we … remand the matter for the court to set forth a methodology consistent with the Rent Stabilization Law as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Regina. …

… [T]he motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in expanding the class. The court’s order failed to analyze whether class action status was warranted based on the criteria set forth in CPLR 901 and CPLR 902. Conducting that analysis ourselves, we find that the redefined class represents such a fundamental change in the theory of plaintiffs’ case that expansion of the class would be improper. Dugan v London Terrace Gardens, L.P., 2020 NY Slip Op 04239, First Dept 7-23-20

July 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

THE LANDLORD AND PROPERTY MANAGER DEMONSTRATED THE POWER-OPERATED DOOR WHICH ALLEGEDLY STRUCK PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DEFECTIVE AND THEY HAD NO NOTICE OF ANY DEFECTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the landlord (North Shore Towers) and the property manager (Greenthal Management) demonstrated the power-operated door which allegedly struck plaintiff as she walked through the doorway was not defective. Therefore the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly granted:

A landowner has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable injuries … . “In order for a landowner to be liable in tort to a plaintiff who is injured as a result of an allegedly defective condition upon property, it must be established that a defective condition existed and that the landowner affirmatively created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence” … .

Here, North Shore Towers and Greenthal Management established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the subject door did not constitute a dangerous or defective condition … .. In support of their motion, they submitted evidence that they conducted daily inspections of the door, that the door activating system had been fully replaced two months before the incident, that, after the new system had been installed, there had been no complaints of the door malfunctioning prior to the incident, and that the door functioned in accordance with industry standards. Alkon v North Shore Towers Apts. Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03883, Second Dept 7-15-20

July 15, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Rights Law, Landlord-Tenant, Nuisance, Trespass

CAUSES OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION AND TRESPASS WERE PROPERLY ALLEGED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action against all but two of the defendants should have been dismissed. Defendant alleged she had an arrangement with the landlord which allowed her to stay in the basement of the premises rent-free in exchange for maintenance of the property. When the landlord died, the landlord’s wife (Brigitte) changed the locks. The Second Department held that the causes of action for wrongful eviction against the landlord’s wife and estate, and the trespass against the landlord’s wife, were sufficiently alleged. However, the causes of action for nuisance, invasion of privacy (Civil Rights Law), and false arrest were not sufficiently alleged. The court also noted that there is no civil cause of action for harassment in New York:

… [T]he plaintiff’s allegation that she performed maintenance on the building in exchange for the exclusive use and possession of the basement, yard, and two closets, and that this arrangement continued following the expiration of the lease … , indicated that a month-to-month tenancy was created and was in effect for as long as she remained in possession of the premises (see Real Property Law § 232-c …), which, according to the complaint, was until March 2017, when she allegedly was wrongfully evicted from the premises. The plaintiff’s allegation that in March 2017, Brigitte changed the locks on the door of the building and refused to provide keys to the plaintiff and permitted her entry into the basement through the cellar door only in response to the plaintiff contacting the police in May 2017, suggests that Brigitte, in effect, acting as agent for the estate, resorted to self-help measures to evict the plaintiff from the premises (see RPAPL 711, 853 …). The complaint, therefore, adequately stated a cause of action alleging wrongful eviction against Brigitte and the estate … . …

The plaintiff’s allegation that … Brigitte entered the basement and yard whenever she wanted for no reason and disturbed the plaintiff’s personal property in the basement sufficiently stated a cause of action alleging trespass … . Trec v Cazares, 2020 NY Slip Op 03941, Second Dept 7-15-20

July 15, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant

TENANT’S MOTION TO REMOVE AN EVICTION PROCEEDING FROM CIVIL COURT AND CONSOLIDATE IT WITH A BREACH-OF-LEASE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; LEASE PROVISIONS PRECLUDED THE COUNTERCLAIMS AND EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDING, BUT THAT RELIEF IS AVAILABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s (tenant’s) motion pursuant to CPLR 602(b) to remove a summary proceeding (eviction proceeding) from Civil Court and consolidate it with the breach-of-lease proceeding in Supreme Court should have been granted:

On January 1, 2015, the plaintiff executed a five-year commercial lease with the defendant for a condominium unit in a building in Brooklyn for the purpose of operating a medical practice on the premises. In May 2017, the defendant commenced a summary proceeding against the plaintiff in the Civil Court, Kings County, to recover possession of the premises and unpaid rent. In October 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant in the Supreme Court, Kings County, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of the lease. The plaintiff also moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 602(b) to remove the summary proceeding from the Civil Court to the Supreme Court and to consolidate it with the instant action. … Although the Civil Court is the preferred forum for the resolution of landlord-tenant disputes when the tenant may obtain full relief in a summary proceeding … , here, the lease provisions preclude the plaintiff from asserting counterclaims in the summary proceeding and the equitable relief sought by the plaintiff in the Supreme Court is unavailable to it in the summary proceeding in Civil Court … . Barkagan v S&L Star Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03759, Second Dept 7-8-20

July 8, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Negligence, Toxic Torts

PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT FINDING DEFENDANT-LANDLORD VIOLATED NYC LOCAL LAW NO. 1 BY FAILING TO TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE HAZARDOUS LEAD-PAINT CONDITION IN PLAINTIFFS’ APARTMENT; HOWEVER DEFENDANTS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS’ NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CHILD’S INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, determined plaintiffs demonstrated defendants violated Local Law No. 1 of the City of New York in failing to take reasonable measures to address the hazardous lead-based paint condition in plaintiffs’ apartment. However defendants’ medical expert raised a question of fact whether defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s child’ (S.T.’s) injuries:

Under Local Law 1 defendants’ liability is not predicated on their observations of peeling paint or whether they are informed of it. Defendants’ liability does not depend on the mother demonstrating that she credibly complained about each and every instance or location of peeling paint. Even assuming that the mother never complained about the paint condition, defendants are charged with notice of the hazardous lead-based paint condition under Local Law 1 from the time that defendants were aware that S.T. moved into apartment. Moreover, Local Law 1 imposes on landlords “a specific duty to ameliorate hazardous levels of lead-based paint” … . Defendants cannot avoid liability by attempting to shift their statutory obligation to the mother by questioning her memory or her credibility, or for failing to inform them when the paint began to peel. Shifting the burden to the mother is inconsistent with the purpose of Local Law 1 which “is unquestionably intended to protect a definite class of persons [plaintiffs] from a particular hazard they are incapable of avoiding themselves” … . S.T. v 1727-29 LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03630, First Deptp 6-25-20

June 25, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT BARRED FROM SEEKING RENT OVERCHARGES BASED UPON A 1986 RENT REDUCTION ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

he Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff could seek rent overcharges based upon a 1986 rent reduction order:

… [T]he plaintif’s first cause of action to recover damages for rent overcharges based upon the May 1, 1986, rent reduction order was not barred by the then-applicable four-year statute of limitations and the “look-back rule,” precluding examination of the rental history prior to the four-year period preceding commencement of the action (see former Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-516[a][2]; former CPLR 213-a; Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, _____ NY3d _____, 2020 NY Slip Op 02127). Since rent reduction orders impose a continuing obligation on landlords, tenants are entitled to recover for any rent overcharges occurring during the applicable limitations period by reference to rent reduction orders that remain in effect during that period, even if the rent reduction order was initially issued outside the limitations period … . Santana v Fernandez, 2020 NY Slip Op 03383, Second Dept 6-17-20

June 17, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE LEASE DID NOT OBLIGATE THE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE AREA AND NO STATUTORY VIOLATION WAS ALLEGED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant out-of-possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Plaintiff allegedly slipped on ice which formed from a leak in a pipe in a walk-in freezer. The lease did not require the landlord to maintain the freezer. No statutory violation was alleged:

“An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries that occur on its premises unless the landlord has retained control over the premises and has a duty imposed by statute or assumed by contract or a course of conduct'” … . Here, where the complaint sounds in common-law negligence and the plaintiff does not allege the violation of a statute, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that they were an out-of-possession landlord that was not bound by contract or course of conduct to repair the allegedly dangerous condition … . The lease in this case specified that the “Landlord’s Obligations do not include the performance nor the payment of the costs for . . . the maintenance, repair and/or replacement of Freezer System or the replacement of the Refrigeration System at any time.” Mallet v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 03220, Second Dept 6-10-20

June 10, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant

THE OPTION TO RENEW THE LEASE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE; IT WAS MERELY AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, applying the “doctrine of definiteness” determined the option to renew the lease was not enforceable and the lease had therefore expired:

“The doctrine of definiteness or certainty is well established in contract law. In short, it means that a court cannot enforce a contract unless it is able to determine what in fact the parties have agreed to” … . Among the terms of a lease that must be known is the amount of rent that is to be paid … . The doctrine of definiteness, however, is not applied rigidly, and “where it is clear from the language of an agreement that the parties intended to be bound and there exists an objective method for supplying a missing term, the court should endeavor to hold the parties to their bargain” … . In the absence of an explicit contract term, the requirement of definiteness may be satisfied where: (1) the agreement itself sets forth an agreed methodology for determining the missing term within its four corners or (2) the agreement invites recourse to an objective extrinsic event, condition, or standard to ascertain the term … .

Here, the parties’ failure to set forth either the amount of rent to be paid during the renewal period, or an agreed formula, methodology, or objective extrinsic event by which that rent could be determined, rendered the option to renew an unenforceable agreement to agree … . Vizel v Vitale, 2020 NY Slip Op 03140, Second Dept 6-3-20

June 3, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Human Rights Law, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Social Services Law

HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION SECURITY DEPOSIT VOUCHERS MUST BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF CASH DEPOSITS; TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE VOUCHERS VIOLATES THE NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; THE VOUCHER PROGRAM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW OR THE URSTADT LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Webber, determined plaintiff Estates, a leasing agent for multi-family apartment buildings in New York City, must accept a Human Resources Administration (HRA) security deposit voucher for an apartment. When the potential tenant, Walters, applied for an apartment, plaintiff’s employee told her the security deposit must be cash:

We find that the court correctly concluded that HRA’s security deposit vouchers are a “lawful source of income” under the City HRL [Human Rights Law] (Administrative Code § 8-102) and are therefore included in the HRL’s prohibition against discrimination by a landlord against a prospective tenant because of “any lawful source of income” (Administrative Code § 8-107[5][a][1]). “The term lawful source of income’ includes income derived from social security, or any form of federal, state or local public assistance or housing assistance including section 8 vouchers” … .

Administrative Code § 8-107(5) prohibits a landlord from refusing to accept a Section 8 voucher from an existing tenant or refusing a lease to a prospective tenant who seeks to pay rent with a Section 8 voucher … . …

Supreme Court correctly found that HRA’s security deposit voucher program does not violate Social Services Law § 143-c. * * *

Finally, we find that the voucher program does not violate the Urstadt Law (McKinney’s Uncons Laws of NY § 8605). “The Urstadt Law was intended to check City attempts, whether by local law or regulation, to expand the set of buildings subject to rent control or stabilization'” … . Here, a landlord’s acceptance of such security deposit vouchers “will have no impact in expanding the buildings subject to the rent stabilization law or expanding regulation under the rent laws” … . Estates NY Real Estate Servs. LLC v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 03093, First Dept 5-28-20

May 28, 2020/by Bruce Freeman