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You are here: Home1 / Landlord-Tenant
Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant, Real Property Law

HERE PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY ALLEGED A RELETTING FEE (TWO MONTHS RENT) IN A LEASE BUYOUT AGREEMENT VIOLATED REAL PROPERTY LAW SECTION 227 WHICH PROVIDES THAT IF THE LANDLORD EXPEDITIOUSLY RELETS THE PROPERTY THE OUTGOING TENANT MAY OWE NOTHING AT ALL; PLAINTIFF SUCCESSFULLY ALLEGED THE RELETTING-FEE CLAUSE VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff adequately alleged the reletting fee (two months rent) in a lease buyout agreement violated the Real Property Law and thereby violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing:

… Real Property Law § 227-e expressly provides, “Any provision in a lease that exempts a landlord’s duty to mitigate damages under this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.” Under Real Property Law § 227-e, if a landlord’s reletting efforts succeed expeditiously, a tenant may not owe anything at all, as plaintiff alleges should have been the case here.

At this stage the allegations are sufficient to sustain plaintiff’s claim that the lease’s reletting fee and the lease buyout agreement violate Real Property Law § 227-e, which, if established, would constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant, implied in all New York contracts, requires the parties to avoid doing “anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract” and includes all “promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included” … . As the amended complaint adequately alleges, a promise not to charge amounts barred by Real Property Law § 227-e is among those promises. Desai v Ninety Five Wall St. LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 06198, First Dept 10-22-26

Practice Point: Real Property Law section 227 provides that if a landlord successfully relets the premises expeditiously, the outgoing tenant may owe the landlord nothing. Therefore a lease buyout agreement which requires a reletting fee (two months rent) may impose a charge barred by Real Property Law 227 and thereby violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 20:36:302026-10-31 21:33:44HERE PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY ALLEGED A RELETTING FEE (TWO MONTHS RENT) IN A LEASE BUYOUT AGREEMENT VIOLATED REAL PROPERTY LAW SECTION 227 WHICH PROVIDES THAT IF THE LANDLORD EXPEDITIOUSLY RELETS THE PROPERTY THE OUTGOING TENANT MAY OWE NOTHING AT ALL; PLAINTIFF SUCCESSFULLY ALLEGED THE RELETTING-FEE CLAUSE VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (FIRST DEPT). ​
Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant

THE “GUARANTY LAW,” ENACTED BY THE NYC COUNCIL DURING COVID, DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (DISAGREEING WITH THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT); THE GUARANTY LAW PRECLUDED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY GUARANTIES OF CERTAIN COMMERCIAL LEASES FOR 16 MONTHS (FIRST DEPT)

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rosado, over a dissenting opinion, determined the “guaranty law,” enacted during COVID, did not violate the Contracts Clause of the US Constitution:

This case calls on us to determine the constitutionality of New York City Administrative Code § 22-1005, commonly referred to as the “guaranty law.” Enacted by the New York City Council in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the guaranty law precluded the enforcement of personal liability guaranties of certain commercial leases for a statutorily prescribed 16-month period. Principally, we are asked to decide whether this law, which the City Council passed as a means of mitigating the economic fallout of the public health crisis and to help small business owners avoid personal bankruptcy, impermissibly impairs existing contractual obligations in violation of the Contracts Clause of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution. … [W]e conclude that the guaranty law does not violate the Contracts Clause.

[Overview of the facts:]

… [T]he landlord entered into a lease agreement with the tenant to rent the lower level of its building … for a 10-year term expiring on August 31, 2025. As principal of the tenant, a gallery that conducts shows for artists and sells artwork, the guarantor signed a “good guy” guaranty, agreeing to personally guaranty the tenant’s obligations under the lease. …

In March 2020, the tenant stopped paying rent, and by email dated November 1, 2020, the guarantor informed the landlord that the tenant intended to surrender the space back to the landlord on November 30, 2020. The tenant agreed to forfeit the security deposit to “settle up,” and by email dated December 7, 2020, the guarantor informed the landlord that the tenant had closed the gallery and returned the keys that day.

The landlord commenced this action against the tenant and the guarantor, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of lease, (2) breach of guaranty, (3) attorneys’ fees under the guaranty, and (4) attorneys’ fees under the lease. The landlord sought to enforce the lease and personal guaranty … . 513 W. 26th Realty LLC v George Billis Galleries, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06058, First Dept 10-20-26

 

October 20, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-20 20:11:592026-10-27 20:36:22THE “GUARANTY LAW,” ENACTED BY THE NYC COUNCIL DURING COVID, DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (DISAGREEING WITH THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT); THE GUARANTY LAW PRECLUDED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY GUARANTIES OF CERTAIN COMMERCIAL LEASES FOR 16 MONTHS (FIRST DEPT)
Arbitration, Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Cooperatives, Landlord-Tenant

IN THIS RENT RESET ARBITRATION, THE UMPIRE COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LANDLORD’S COUNSEL, CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY; THE AWARD WAS THEREFORE VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined communications between an umpire and the landlord’s counsel created the appearance of impropriety requiring the vacation of the arbitration award in the rent reset proceeding:

… [T]he tenants exercised their second extension option under the lease … . The parties attempted to negotiate a new annual net rent, but upon reaching an impasse, they proceeded to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (the AAA). That arbitration concluded with a one-week hearing that resulted in a final award largely in the landlord’s favor. * * *

… [T]he umpire created an appearance of impropriety when he directly communicated with the landlord’s counsel about a paid offer to serve as a neutral umpire in the [another arbitration] and did so without including the tenants in the conversation. Further, the umpire’s subsequent attempt to remedy this issue with a disclosure to the tenants failed to cure his misconduct. Indeed, the disclosure was incomplete as it was the landlord’s counsel, not the umpire, who informed the tenants of the direct communication with the landlord’s counsel. To compound matters, the umpire then attempted to bargain with the tenants — offering to trade his rejection of the offer in exchange for the cooperative withdrawing its recusal application. Ultimately, although he did eventually decline the offer, the umpire’s actions irreversibly and improperly implicated the “integrity of the process” … . Matter of 57th & 6th Ground LLC v Carnegie House Tenants Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 05230, First Dept 9-3-26

Practice Point: In this arbitration of a rent reset, the umpire communicated directly with landlord’s counsel, creating the appearance of impropriety. The award was therefore vacated.

 

September 3, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-03 11:06:312026-09-09 13:35:17IN THIS RENT RESET ARBITRATION, THE UMPIRE COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LANDLORD’S COUNSEL, CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY; THE AWARD WAS THEREFORE VACATED (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Fraud, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

IN AN ACTION ALLEGING A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE APARTMENTS, TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE SUCH THAT THE FOUR-YEAR LOOK-BACK DOES NOT APPLY, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT DEMONSTRATE EACH ELEMENT OF COMMON-LAW FRAUD; SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF FRAUD OR A COLORABLE CLAIM OF A FRAUDULENT SCHEME ARE WHAT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals, over a two-justice dissent, remitted the matter to Supreme Court for application of the recently clarified standard for the prima facie demonstration of fraud in an action alleging a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments. The issue is whether plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of fraud to overcome the four-year look-back provision in the former Rent Stabilization Law:

… [T]he Court [of Appeals] refined the common-law standard applied to allegations of a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments subject to rent stabilization on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 … . More specifically, [the Court of Appeals] “made clear that, for the fraud exception [to the four-year lookback period in the former Rent Stabilization Law § 26-516 (a)] to apply, a plaintiff need not demonstrate each element of common-law fraud and instead must put forth sufficient indicia of fraud or a colorable claim of a fraudulent scheme” … .

Parallel to the Court of Appeals’ development of the common law applicable to fraudulent deregulation claims, the legislature addressed the fraudulent deregulation standard by statute … . Under the legislature’s statutory amendments, the relevant inquiry is whether the landlord ” ‘knowingly engaged in [a] fraudulent scheme [to deregulate] after a consideration of the totality of the circumstances’ ” … To date, the Court of Appeals has not had occasion to “address to what extent this legislation differs from [the] common-law rule, and, if there is any difference, the impact or applicability of that legislation” … . Aras v B-U Realty Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 04983, First Dept 8-13-26

​Practice Point; Consult this decision for insight into what a plaintiff must allege or demonstrate to survive a motion to dismiss or to warrant summary judgment in an action alleging a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments and seeking the “fraud exception” to the statutory four-year look-back for damages.

 

August 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-13 14:00:362026-08-15 16:02:06IN AN ACTION ALLEGING A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE APARTMENTS, TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE SUCH THAT THE FOUR-YEAR LOOK-BACK DOES NOT APPLY, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT DEMONSTRATE EACH ELEMENT OF COMMON-LAW FRAUD; SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF FRAUD OR A COLORABLE CLAIM OF A FRAUDULENT SCHEME ARE WHAT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).
Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

IN THIS CEILING-COLLAPSE CASE, THE NEGLIGENCE PER SE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW AND THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the cause of action alleging negligence per se and the res ipsa loquitur cause of action in this ceiling-collapse case should have been dismissed. The negligence per se cause of action alleged a violation of Multiple Dwelling Las section 78(1) which does not impose a specific duty on the landlord. The res ipsa loquitur cause of action failed, in part, because the landlord did not have exclusive control of the plaintiff’s bathroom and the leaking bathtub in the apartment above:

A cause of action alleging negligence per se predicated on a violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 78(1) cannot lie, as the statute imposes only a general duty to maintain a multiple dwelling and does not impose a specific duty upon a landlord … .

“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of an accident where the plaintiff can show that: (1) the event is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) the instrumentality that caused the injury is within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) the injury is not the result of any voluntary action by the plaintiff” … . Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that her bathroom ceiling and a bathtub in an upstairs apartment were within the defendants’ exclusive control … . The plaintiff also failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to her comparative fault, as she entered the bathroom to scrub the bathtub despite being concerned about the imminent collapse of the ceiling before it fell … . Williams v SI 1688 Realty, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 04896, Second Dept 8-5-26

Practice Point: Multiple Dwelling Law 78(1) imposes a general duty to maintain a multiple dwelling but does not impose a specific duty upon a landlord. Therefore it could not be the basis of a negligence per se cause of action against the landlord in this ceiling-collapse case.

Practice Point: The res ipsa loquitur cause of action did not lie in this ceiling collapse case because the landlord did not have exclusive control over the bathroom where the ceiling fell or the leaking bathtub in the apartment above.

 

August 5, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-05 08:08:492026-08-10 08:48:11IN THIS CEILING-COLLAPSE CASE, THE NEGLIGENCE PER SE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW AND THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Judges, Landlord-Tenant

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, TERMINATED THE LEASE BASED ON ALLEGED NONPAYMENT; AND THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHICH GRANTED PLAINTIFF THE ULTIMATE RELIEF SOUGHT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, terminated the lease and should not have issued a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff alleged defendant breached the lease and sought to enjoin defendant from using the land pending the outcome of the litigation:

The Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, declaring that the Lease Agreement terminated due to the defendant’s nonpayment of rent … . There was no motion for summary judgment before the court, and the court did not afford the parties notice of any intention to deem the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, for leave to amend the complaint, as one, among other things, for summary judgment … .

… [A] preliminary injunction may not issue unless the moving party demonstrates a probability of success on the merits, a danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, and a balance of equities in that party’s favor … . The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final determination in the action or proceeding … and “not to determine the ultimate rights of the parties” … . “[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, a preliminary injunction will not issue where to do so would grant the movant the ultimate relief to which he or she would be entitled in a final judgment” … .

Here, the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that the circumstances were of such an extraordinary nature to justify th[e] relief that was granted pending the resolution of the action” … . County of Nassau v NY Youth Sports Network, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03289, Second Dept 5-27-26

Practice Point: The appellate courts do not like “sua sponte” actions by a judge. Here the judge terminated the lease based on nonpayment in the absence of any motion requesting that relief.

Practice Point: A preliminary injunction which grants the ultimate relief sought by the plaintiff should only rarely be issued. Here the circumstances did not justify such extraordinary relief.

 

May 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-27 12:11:532026-06-01 10:13:36THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, TERMINATED THE LEASE BASED ON ALLEGED NONPAYMENT; AND THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHICH GRANTED PLAINTIFF THE ULTIMATE RELIEF SOUGHT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Fraud, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

THIS TENANT ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT RENT OVERCHARGES AND VIOLATIONS OF THE NYC RENT STABILIZATION LAW AND CODE IS APPROPRIATE FOR A CLASS ACTION; THE MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the tenants’ motion for class certification in this action alleging fraudulent rent overcharges and violations of the NYC Rent Stabilization Law and Code should not have been dismissed:

CPLR 901(a) sets forth the five requirements for certification of a class action: “1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; 2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; 3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and 5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” “These factors are commonly referred to as the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation and superiority” … . “[T]he court’s inquiry ‘vis-à-vis the merits is limited to a determination as to whether on the surface there appears to be a cause of action which is not a sham'” … .

… [T]he issue of whether the defendant overcharged tenants in violation of the rent stabilization laws pursuant to a fraudulent scheme predominates over the questions affecting the individual class members … . …

… [T]he plaintiffs demonstrated that they “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” … . Because the plaintiffs’ attorneys had “assume[d] responsibility for litigation expenses, the [plaintiffs’] personal financial condition [was] irrelevant” … . The plaintiffs also demonstrated that a class action was the superior vehicle for addressing their allegations … . Abdelrazek v 12-15 Broadway Astoria, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03283, Second Dept 5-27-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into how the criteria for a class action are applied to allegations of fraudulent rent overcharges.

 

May 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-27 10:40:522026-05-31 11:34:57THIS TENANT ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT RENT OVERCHARGES AND VIOLATIONS OF THE NYC RENT STABILIZATION LAW AND CODE IS APPROPRIATE FOR A CLASS ACTION; THE MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
Contract Law, Evidence, Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

TENANTS AND THE PROPERTY MANAGER COULD BE LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY FURNITURE BLOWN OFF A 12TH STORY TERRACE BY WIND (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s actions against the property manager and tenants should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged she was injured by a heavy wooden lounge chair that was blown off a 12th story apartment terrace:

In this personal injury action, plaintiff seeks damages for injuries that she allegedly sustained when a heavy wooden lounge chair struck her after it was blown off the terrace of a 12th floor apartment in Manhattan. The building was owned by 15 Union Square West and managed by BHS; the apartment itself was owned by GR Realty and was rented to the tenant defendants.

Supreme Court should not have dismissed the complaint as against the tenant defendants and BHS. There are issues of fact as to whether the tenant defendants, who owe a common-law duty of reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition independent of any obligation that might be imposed by their lease, had constructive notice of the potentially hazardous condition created by the unsecured lounge chair … . Although the lease stated that tenant defendants were not permitted to change the location of any furniture in the apartment, there were occasions when GR Realty granted tenant requests to move furniture. The record also presents evidence that the tenant defendants used the terrace during their occupancy, and issues of fact exist as to whether the risk posed by this furniture was visible and apparent during this period.

Similarly, there are issues of fact as to whether BHS, which managed the property, had constructive notice of the potentially hazardous condition and exercised control over the use of the terraces yet failed to take sufficient precautions in order to prevent or remedy a hazardous condition … . There is evidence in the record that BHS had previously been involved in notifying owners of potential hazards posed by windy conditions, and in fact had helped owners to secure furniture or bring it inside during bad weather…. . Sen v GR Realty Holdings LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 02947, First Dept 5-12-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the various theories of liability triggered by injury caused by furniture which was blown off a 12th story apartment terrace.​

 

May 12, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-12 12:03:182026-05-16 12:21:46TENANTS AND THE PROPERTY MANAGER COULD BE LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY FURNITURE BLOWN OFF A 12TH STORY TERRACE BY WIND (FIRST DEPT). ​
Battery, Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

THE LANDLORD DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO A TENANT TO PREVENT AN ASSAULT BY ANOTHER TENANT; THE LANDLORD’S DUTY IS NOT TRIGGERED UNLESS THE LANDLORD HAS THE AUTHORITY, ABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF A TENANT-ASSAILANT; THE ABILITY TO EVICT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the landlord did not have a duty to prevent one tenant from attacking another:

… [The landlord] demonstrated prima facie that they were not liable for the third-party defendant’s alleged assault on plaintiff. A landlord has no duty to prevent one tenant from attacking another tenant unless it has the authority, ability, and opportunity to control the actions of the assailant …  Here, defendants had no authority or opportunity to remove Vasquez from the premises prior to the assault. Defendants’ employee testified that defendants were unaware of prior complaints of [the tenant] engaging in violence, and plaintiff acknowledged that before the attack she never complained about [the tenant] being violent. Moreover, the assault upon the plaintiff was not reasonably foreseeable … .

Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact in opposition. Defendants’ ability to evict [the tenant] did not constitute the requisite authority, ability, and opportunity to control him … . Plaintiff failed to identify any prior complaints about [the tenant] being violent or making explicit threats of violence. Plaintiff’s generalized complaints about unsupervised children on the complex and about other children engaging in bullying were not sufficient to put defendants on notice that [the tenant] might be violent … . Rodriguez v Madison Sec. Group, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 01869, First Dept 3-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the nature of a landlord’s duty to prevent an assault by one tenant against another.

 

March 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-03-26 11:09:372026-03-28 11:11:44THE LANDLORD DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO A TENANT TO PREVENT AN ASSAULT BY ANOTHER TENANT; THE LANDLORD’S DUTY IS NOT TRIGGERED UNLESS THE LANDLORD HAS THE AUTHORITY, ABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF A TENANT-ASSAILANT; THE ABILITY TO EVICT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY (FIRST DEPT).
Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

ONE PLAINTIFF-TENANT TESTIFIED HE MADE SEVERAL COMPLAINTS TO THE LANDLORD DEFENDANTS ABOUT THE TENANT WHO SET FIRE TO THE APARTMENT BUILDING, INFORMING THE DEFENDANTS THAT THE TENANT THREATENED “TO KILL EVERYONE” IN THE BUILDING AND WAS SEEN CARRYING GASOLINE TANKS INTO THE BUILDING; THE DEFENDANT LANDLORDS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PREVENT THE TENANT FROM STARTING THE FIRE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the landlord defendants did not have a duty to investigate, monitor, or control a tenant who set fire to the five-story building injuring the plaintiff-tenants:

One of the plaintiffs testified that he made several complaints to defendants concerning the tenant’s behavior before the incident. Specifically, he reported to defendants that the tenant threatened “to kill everyone” in the building and was seen carrying gasoline tanks into the building. The motion court found that this testimony “raise[d] issues of fact as to whether defendants failed to take minimal measures to investigate the presence of gasoline in the apartment, and to protect the occupants from the risk of fire arising out of the presence of gasoline.”

The motion court erred in applying the “minimal precaution” standard set forth in negligent security cases because the assailant here was not a third-party nontenant … . Rather, he was a tenant in the building who was lawfully permitted to be there at the time of the fire. The appropriate test is, therefore, whether defendants lacked the “authority, ability, and opportunity to control” the tenant’s actions such that they had a duty to prevent him from starting the fire …  . Applying that standard to the facts here, defendants had no authority or ability to evict the tenant under the lease or New York law prior to the fire … . Moreover, plaintiffs failed to establish a clear basis under New York law for defendants to investigate, monitor, or control the tenant which could have prevented him from setting the fire … . Accordingly, defendants established their entitlement to summary judgment on the basis of their inability to prevent the tenant from starting the fire that caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Molina v Appula Mgt. Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 01603 First Dept 3-19-26

Practice Point: The negligent-security-minimal-precaution standard of care for landlords applies only to security re: the actions of non-tenants. Here it was a tenant who set fire to the apartment building and injured other tenants. The appropriate test for the landlord’s duty re: a tenant’s actions is whether the landlord has the authority, ability, and opportunity to control the tenant’s actions under the lease or New York law, which was not the case here.

 

March 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-03-19 16:33:352026-03-23 17:12:43ONE PLAINTIFF-TENANT TESTIFIED HE MADE SEVERAL COMPLAINTS TO THE LANDLORD DEFENDANTS ABOUT THE TENANT WHO SET FIRE TO THE APARTMENT BUILDING, INFORMING THE DEFENDANTS THAT THE TENANT THREATENED “TO KILL EVERYONE” IN THE BUILDING AND WAS SEEN CARRYING GASOLINE TANKS INTO THE BUILDING; THE DEFENDANT LANDLORDS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PREVENT THE TENANT FROM STARTING THE FIRE (FIRST DEPT).
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