Eminent Domain Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Attorneys, Eminent Domain, Municipal Law

CONDEMNEE WAS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES (ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS) BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN THAT OFFERED BY THE VILLAGE AND THE AWARD BY THE COURT IN THIS EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING; THE STATUTORY INTEREST RATE OF 6%, NOT 9%, SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that some of the additional allowances for fees and costs (pursuant to Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) 701) should not have been granted and the statutory interest rate of 6%, not 9%, should have been applied. The additional allowances were sought based upon because the court awarded more compensation to the condemnees (Ferguson and Executive) than that offered by the condemnor (the Village):

Pursuant to EDPL 701, where a court’s award to a claimant in a condemnation proceeding is “substantially in excess of the amount of the condemnor’s proof” and where the court deems it necessary to “achieve just and adequate compensation,” the court may award the claimant an additional sum for costs including attorneys’ and other fees. The goal of this statute is to ” assure[ ] that a condemnee receives a fair recovery by providing an opportunity for condemnees whose property has been substantially undervalued to recover the costs of litigation establishing the inadequacy of the condemnor’s offer'” … . …

… [T]he Supreme Court’s award of $721,671 exceeded the Village’s advance payment of $575,000. While the difference is not insignificant, we find that it does not substantially exceed the Village’s advance payment within the meaning of EDPL 701 … . …

Although the Village, in effect, concedes that the Supreme Court’s award to Executive of $159,596 substantially exceeded its advance payment of $61,044, it correctly points out that Executive was unsuccessful as to the bulk of its claims for compensation and received an award of 16.4% of the $973,000 it sought. Contrary to the Village’s assertion, since Executive’s attorneys were compensated on a contingent basis, their fees were perforce proportionate to their success. Accordingly, the portion of the additional allowance awarded to Executive representing their fees should not be disturbed … . …

Although the Village, in effect, concedes that the Supreme Court’s award to Executive of $159,596 substantially exceeded its advance payment of $61,044, it correctly points out that Executive was unsuccessful as to the bulk of its claims for compensation and received an award of 16.4% of the $973,000 it sought. Contrary to the Village’s assertion, since Executive’s attorneys were compensated on a contingent basis, their fees were perforce proportionate to their success. Accordingly, the portion of the additional allowance awarded to Executive representing their fees should not be disturbed … . Matter of Village of Haverstraw, 2020 NY Slip Op 01068, Second Dept 2-13-20

February 13, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Real Property Law

CLAIMANT COULD NOT SEEK COMPENSATION FOR PERIODIC FLOODING OF HIS LOT UNDER THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW; THERE WAS NO DE JURE TAKING BY THE CITY, AND THE CRITERIA FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION WERE NOT MET (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined claimant’s action for damages based upon the periodic flooding claimant’s lot, over which the city had an easement, should have been dismissed. Claimant alleged the city had appropriated the easement by causing flooding:

… Claimant filed a notice of claim pursuant to Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) § 503, asserting a claim for appropriation of an easement over its lot. In 2015, claimant alleged for the first time that the bridge construction was causing flooding of its property. In 2017, claimant submitted the appraisal at issue in this appeal, prepared by Cushman & Wakefield, which determined that during a 31-month period from November 2014 through May 2017, claimant’s property and the non-exclusive access easement became flooded after rainfall. It attributed the flooding to a drainage pipe in the access easement area that became blocked by cement during construction of the new bridge. The appraisal provides that subsequent to the discovery of the flooding, claimant leased out its property and received rental income. Claimant’s alleged flooding damages, as set forth in the appraisal, consist of reduced rental income and the inability to develop residential towers on the property. * * *

Because claimant’s property was not subject to a de jure taking by the City, it may not pursue a claim to recover just compensation or consequential damages resulting from the flooding in this eminent domain valuation proceeding … . * * *

“In a modern inverse condemnation action, an owner whose property has been taken de facto may sue the entity that took it to obtain just compensation, and if the action is successful the defendant has no choice in the matter — the compensation must be paid” … .

The claim here for inverse condemnation is legally flawed, since the interference with claimant’s property rights, as set forth in its own appraisal report, is not sufficiently permanent to constitute a de facto taking as a matter of law … . Matter of Willis Ave. Bridge Replacement, 2019 NY Slip Op 08162, First Dept 11-12-19

November 12, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Environmental Law, Municipal Law

THE TOWN RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SEWER LINE ALONG A NATURE TRAIL WAS ANNULLED BY THE 4TH DEPARTMENT, THE TOWN BOARD DID NOT TAKE THE REQUIRED ‘HARD LOOK’ AT THE EFFECTS OF THE SEWER-LINE CONSTRUCTION ON CERTAIN RARE ANIMAL AND PLANT SPECIES, AS WELL AS THE EFFECTS UPON SURFACE WATERS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department annulled the determination allowing an easement to install a sewer line along a nature trail. The Fourth Department held that the Town Board did not take the required “hard look” (required by the State Environmental Quality Review Act [SEQRA]) at the effect of the sewer line on certain endangered and rare animal and plant species, as well as the effects on surface water:

… [T]he New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) made respondent aware that its database indicated the presence of certain endangered, threatened, or rare animal and plant species on the project site. Those species included the northern long-eared bat, the imperial moth, and the northern bog violet. In addition, the database indicated the presence of inland salt marsh. The DEC recommended that respondent conduct a survey of the professional literature and determine whether the project site contains habitats favorable to such species and, if so, that respondent conduct a field survey to determine whether the species are present. The DEC instructed that, if respondent determined that such species are present, modifications should be considered to minimize impact. There is no indication that respondent conducted such a survey. [With the exception of the Indiana bat. the species’] presence was merely noted…, along with the bare conclusion that there would be no significant impact on those species. …

[R]espondent merely set forth general practices for avoiding significant adverse impacts on surface water and stream corridors without providing a reasoned elaboration that, by implementing such practices in this particular project, respondent would successfully avoid any significant adverse impacts on surface water. Matter of Frank J. Ludovico Sculpture Trail Corp. v Town of Seneca Falls, 2019 NY Slip Op 04621, Fourth Dept 6-7-19

June 7, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Civil Procedure, Eminent Domain, Evidence

PORTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS’ APPRAISAL REPORT IN THIS CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK BECAUSE THE PROPER VALUATION METHOD WAS USED; THE EVIDENTIARY RULING ON THE MOTION IN LIMINE IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE THE RULING AFFECTS THE SCOPE OF THE TRIAL ISSUES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the portions of motion in limine seeking to strike parts of respondents’ appraisal report in this condemnation proceeding should not have been granted. The court noted that the evidentiary ruling was appealable because it limited the scope of the trial issues. The court further noted that the proof of valuation offered at trial must be limited to the valuation method(s) described in the appraisal report:

Where, as here, “the highest and best use is the one the property presently serves and that use is income-producing, then the capitalization of income is a proper method of valuation” … . In our view, the stricken portion of respondents’ appraisal report, although titled “investment valuation,” applied an income capitalization approach using the standard income capitalization formula, i.e., value equals net income divided by a capitalization rate … , and applied factors that, according to respondents’ appraiser, accurately reflect the property’s value and would make the property more appealing to prospective purchasers. To the extent that petitioner contends that certain factors considered by respondents’ appraiser in valuing the property do not accurately reflect market value, “[t]he fact that some aspects of the valuation methodology [of respondents’ appraiser] may be subject to question goes to the weight to be accorded the appraisal[],” not its admissibility … . … Matter of Rochester Genesee Regional Transp. Auth. v Stensrud, 2019 NY Slip Op 04612, Fourth Dept 6-7-19

June 7, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Municipal Law

PRIOR PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE PRECLUDED CONDEMNATION OF LAND ALREADY SUBJECT TO A PUBLIC USE BECAUSE THE PROPOSED USE WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE EXISTING PUBLIC USE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the condemnation of a parcel of land owned by the city, determined that the proposed new use of the land would interfere with its current public use as a bus depot, a violation of the prior public use doctrine:

… [T]he proposed condemnation is prohibited under the doctrine of prior public use. Under the doctrine of prior public use, land already devoted to a public use may not be condemned absent legislative authority for the particular acquisition at issue … . However, land already devoted to a public use may be condemned without legislative authority ” where the new use would not materially interfere with the initial use'” … . The Agency does not contest that the subject parcel is devoted to a public use, or that there exists no legislative authority for the proposed condemnation … . Thus, the subject parcel may not be condemned unless the new use would not materially interfere with the existing public use … .

The Agency’s proposed condemnation of the subject parcel for the purpose of returning the parcel to productive use in furtherance of urban renewal would materially interfere with its existing public use as a bus depot. … Accordingly, the Agency’s determination to condemn the subject parcel must be rejected. Matter of City of New York v Yonkers Indus. Dev. Agency, 2019 NY Slip Op 02087, Second Dept 3-20-19

March 20, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Environmental Law

CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION BASED UPON THE VALUE OF THE LAND BEFORE IT WAS DESIGNATED PROTECTED WETLANDS WHICH COULD NOT BE DEVELOPED (SECOND DEPT)

The Second Department modified (reduced) the award for condemnation of regulated land but upheld the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning. Claimant owned vacant land in a commercial zone. After claimant acquired title New York City took title by eminent domain and designated the land as protected wetlands. Claimant sought the difference in value of the land before and after the wetlands regulation. The Second Department held that claimant was entitled to that relief but accepted the city’s pre-regulation value of the land, which was substantially less than the claimant’s valuation (which had been accepted by Supreme Court):

As the City does not dispute, the claimant established that there was a reasonable probability that the imposition of the wetlands regulations on the property would be found to constitute a taking, inasmuch as the parties agreed that the imposition of the regulations diminished the value of the property by approximately 95% and that there was virtually no chance that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation would issue a permit allowing the property to be developed … .

Accordingly, the claimant established its entitlement to an increment … .

“The increment above the regulated value of the property that must be added to the regulated value of the property is a percentage that represents the premium a reasonable buyer would pay for the probability of a successful judicial determination that the regulations were confiscatory” . “When adding an increment to the value of vacant land to reflect its development potential, the specific increment which is selected and… applied must be based on sufficient evidence and be satisfactorily explained” … . Matter of New Cr. Bluebelt Phase 3, Staten Is. Land Corp. (City of New York), 2019 NY Slip Op 00128, Second Dept 1-9-19

January 9, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Environmental Law, Real Property Law, Utilities

ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, over a two-justice dissent, considering a matter of first impression, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a gas supply company could not acquire easements over private property by eminent domain for the installation of a pipeline for which the state denied a permit:

In February 2017, the FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] granted petitioner’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a 97-mile natural gas pipeline from Pennsylvania into western New York. The pipeline’s proposed route travels directly across respondents’ land … . Within the voluminous certificate, the FERC found that petitioner’s “proposed [pipeline] project is consistent with the Certificate Policy Statement,” i.e., the public interest. “Based on this finding and the environmental review for the proposed project,” the FERC further found “that the public convenience and necessity require approval and certification of the project.” …

… [T]he New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) denied petitioner’s application for a WQC [water quality certification]. The WQC application, held the DEC, “fails to demonstrate compliance with New York State water quality standards.” Petitioner has taken various steps to challenge the WQC denial, including the filing of a petition for judicial review in the Second Circuit pursuant to 15 USC § 717r (d). It appears that those challenges have not yet been finally resolved. It is undisputed, however, that if the WQC denial is ultimately upheld, the pipeline cannot be built … . * * *

… [P]etitioner is trying to expropriate respondents’ land in furtherance of a pipeline project that, as things currently stand, cannot legally be built. Such an effort turns the entire concept of eminent domain on its head. If the State’s WQC denial is finally annulled or withdrawn, then petitioner can file a new vesting petition. But until that time, petitioner cannot commence a vesting proceeding to force a sale without going through the entire EDPL [Eminent Domain Procedure Law] article 2 process. Matter of National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Schueckler, 2018 NY Slip Op 07550, Fourth Dept 11-9-18

UTILITIES (GAS PIPELINE INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/GAS PIPELINE (EMINENT DOMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY LAW (GAS PIPELINE, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/EMINENT DOMAIN (GAS PIPELINE INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (GAS PIPELINE INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/GAS PIPELINE (EMINENT DOMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))

November 9, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain, Environmental Law, Municipal Law

CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive decision describing the relevant law and procedures, determined the city had complied with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), the Eminent Domain Procedure Law and the prior public use doctrine in determining the taking of a strip of land for a bicycle-pedestrian trial would not have a significant adverse impact on the environment:

… [P]etitioners have failed to demonstrate how the City’s condemnation of the Village’s property would “interfere with or destroy the public use” … . Accordingly, the prior public use doctrine will not prevent the City from condemning the Village’s property. * * *

… [T]he City … performed the steps required in the SEQRA review process and considered areas of potential environmental concern, but failed to provide an adequate written explanation for its negative declaration. Upon realizing its mistake (albeit after receiving communications from petitioners complaining about the negative declaration), and before approving the condemnation of property in relation to the project, the City held a public meeting and formally adopted the supplemental resolution to remedy the defects in the July 2017 negative declaration … . Under the circumstances, remittal to the City for further environmental review or explanation of its determination would be redundant … . …

The City did not abuse its discretion in determining the scope of the proposed taking. Although a municipality cannot use the power of eminent domain to take “‘property not necessary to fulfill [a] public purpose, it is generally accepted that the condemnor has broad discretion in deciding what land is necessary to fulfill that purpose'” … . Matter of Village of Ballston Spa v City of Saratoga Springs, 2018 NY Slip Op 05248, Third Dept 7-12-18

EMINENT DOMAIN (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/CONDEMNATION (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (EMINENT DOMAIN, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, ITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (EMINENT DOMAIN, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, ITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/BICYCLES (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))

July 12, 2018/by Bruce Freeman

Eminent Domain

SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE PROPERTY WOULD HAVE BEEN REZONED, RAISING THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly valued the condemned property by assuming the property would have been rezoned, increasing its value:

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the claimant had established that, in the absence of the project, there was a reasonable probability that the property would have been rezoned to C6-2A. … The court’s findings that many of the buildings in the immediate area had been converted to commercial and residential use, that New York City policy was to rezone underutilized industrial sites to allow for commercial or residential development, and that a zoning district with a FAR of 6 would be in scale to this portion of Atlantic Avenue were supported by the record. * * *

Further, the Supreme Court properly accepted the highest and best use proposed by the claimant of a 12-story budget hotel … . Contrary to ESDC’s [Empire State Development Corporation’s] contention, the … lease on the property did not prohibit a finding of a different highest and best use than contemplated in the lease, since the property must be valued at “its highest and best use on the date of the taking, regardless of whether the property is being put to such use at the time” … . Matter of 730 Equity Corp. v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06086, 2nd Dept 9-21-16

EMINENT DOMAIN (SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE PROPERTY WOULD BE REZONED, RAISING THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY)/HIGHEST AND BEST USE (EMINENT DOMAIN, SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE PROPERTY WOULD BE REZONED, RAISING THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY)

September 21, 2016/by CurlyHost

Eminent Domain, Municipal Law

CLAIM FOR A DE FACTO TAKING ACCRUES WHEN THE TAKING IS FIRST APPARENT, NOT WHEN IT IS FIRST DISCOVERED BY THE CLAIMANT.

The Second Department determined the structures built by the city, which caused water to accumulate on claimant’s land, were apparent when constructed in 2005. The fact that the structures were not discovered by the claimant until 2011 was not relevant. Therefore the claim for a de facto taking expired in 2008 and was time-barred:

A de facto taking claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims to recover damages for injury to property set forth in CPLR 214(4) … . Such a claim accrues at the time of the taking or, at the latest, when the taking becomes apparent, regardless of the time of discovery … .

Here, the record established that the headwall and overflow outlet were readily visible when the alleged taking occurred in September 2005. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the claimant’s time to bring any claim for damages for the alleged de facto taking expired in September 2008… . Matter of South Richmond Bluebelt, Phase 3. 594 Assoc., Inc. (City of New York), 2016 NY Slip Op 05577, 2nd Dept 9-20-26

EMINENT DOMAIN (CLAIM FOR A DE FACTO TAKING ACCRUES WHEN THE TAKING IS FIRST APPARENT, NOT WHEN IT IS FIRST DISCOVERED BY THE CLAIMANT)/MUNICIPAL LAW (EMINENT DOMAIN, CLAIM FOR A DE FACTO TAKING ACCRUES WHEN THE TAKING IS FIRST APPARENT, NOT WHEN IT IS FIRST DISCOVERED BY THE CLAIMANT)/DE FACTO TAKING (EMINENT DOMAIN, CLAIM FOR A DE FACTO TAKING ACCRUES WHEN THE TAKING IS FIRST APPARENT, NOT WHEN IT IS FIRST DISCOVERED BY THE CLAIMANT)

July 20, 2016/by CurlyHost