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ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN NEW YORK, THE ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY, INCLUDING OVERT ACTS, WERE PROPERLY PLED AS PART OF THE FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that, although there is no cause of action for civil conspiracy in New York, the conspiracy alleged here was validly pled as part of the fraud cause of action. The unjust enrichment cause of action should have been dismissed because there was no close relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. The complaint did not support the punitive damages claim because it did not allege defendants’ actions were aimed at the public or showed moral turpitude. The permanent injunction cause of action was validly pled because the injury cannot be fully compensated by money damages. The action stemmed from a failed partnership to develop a cure for rare genetic blood disorders:

The complaint states a cause of action for fraud by alleging that Sloan-Kettering knowingly misrepresented or omitted a material fact for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to rely upon it, that plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission, and that plaintiff sustained injury … . …

… “[C]ivil conspiracy is not recognized as an independent tort in this State” … . Rather, the “allegations in the complaint herein charging conspiracy are deemed part of the remaining causes of action to which they are relevant” … . Here, the conspiracy charge remains as part of the fraud cause of action. …

… “[L]iability for fraud may be premised on knowing participation in a scheme to defraud, even if that participation does not by itself suffice to constitute the fraud” … . Allegations of conspiracy “serve to enable a plaintiff to connect a defendant with the acts of his co-conspirators where without it he could not be implicated” … .

… [P]laintiff sufficiently alleges overt acts …. …

… [T]he liability of a defendant as a conspirator for co-conspirators’ wrongful acts “does not necessarily depend upon his active participation in the particular overt acts” … . Moreover, once a conspiracy is established, all defendants are liable for each other’s acts in furtherance of the conspiracy … . Errant Gene Therapeutics, LLC v Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 2019 NY Slip Op 05754, First Dept 7-23-19

 

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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION THE MORTGAGE COMPANY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING WITH PROOF MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff mortgage company did not demonstrate standing with proof meeting the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Melissa Black, an employee of the plaintiff’s loan servicer, who alleged, based upon a review of business records maintained by the loan servicer, that the plaintiff had been “in continuous possession of the note and mortgage since June 26, 2007.” However, because Black did not attest that she was personally familiar with the plaintiff’s record-keeping practices and procedures, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the records relied upon by Black were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a] … ). In any event, the submissions by the plaintiff of different copies of the note raise a triable issue of fact, inter alia, as to whether the note was assigned to the plaintiff prior to the commencement of the action … . EMC Mtge. Corp. v Tinari, 2019 NY Slip Op 01392, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM ON THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, over a partial dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) had standing to challenge a Local Law which placed a two-year moratorium on the conversion of hotels to condominiums or other residential uses. The court further determined that the REBNY did not have standing to challenge the statute under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The REBNY alleged that 29 of its members owned hotels subject to the law:

Owners of real property who are subjected to a new zoning classification or other use restriction are “presumptively affected by the change” and “therefore technically have standing” to assert claims … .

Accepted as true for purposes of these CPLR 3211 motions, REBNY’s assertion that its member hotel owners are currently negatively affected by the moratorium is sufficient to establish standing in the plenary action and in the article 78 proceeding under ULURP [the City Charter’s Uniform Land Use Review Process] … . * * *

REBNY’s claimed environmental harm is nothing more than economic harm (i.e., the reduction in property values, the loss of business opportunities and the added expense of applying for a waiver under Local Law 50). REBNY’s own filings reflect that the organization’s constitution mentions the environment only once, and only insofar as the environment relates to economic impact. The affidavit by REBNY’s president does not salvage REBNY’s standing argument. The president claims that “SEQRA is a concern” for all REBNY members in “proximity” to the hotels due to potential impacts on traffic, noise, air quality, waste disposal and demand for public services. This argument … fails to establish injury separate and apart from injury to the general public … . Matter of Real Estate Bd. of N.Y., Inc. v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05906, First Dept 8-23-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STANDING, THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT)).STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/LAND USE (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/HOTELS  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))

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CIVIL CONSPIRACY CANNOT BE BROUGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in affirming the dismissal of a complaint, noted that a civil conspiracy cause of action cannot be brought as a stand-alone tort in New York. There must be a conspiracy to commit an underlying tort. Because the underlying tort cause of action here, fraud, was dismissed, the civil conspiracy must also be dismissed:

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New York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort as an independent cause of action … . However, a plaintiff may plead the existence of a conspiracy in order to connect the actions of the individual defendants with an actionable, underlying tort, and establish that those actions were part of a common scheme … . Under New York law, “[i]n order to properly plead a cause of action to recover damages for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a cognizable tort, coupled with an agreement between the conspirators regarding the tort, and an overt action in furtherance of the agreement” … . Here, since the underlying tort of fraud was properly dismissed, the cause of action alleging civil conspiracy to commit fraud was also properly dismissed, since it stands or falls with the underlying tort … . McSpedon v Levine, 2018 NY Slip Op 00826, Second Dept 2-7-18

INTENTIONAL TORTS (CIVIL CONSPIRACY CANNOT BE BROUGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL CONSPIRACY (CIVIL CONSPIRACY CANNOT BE BROUGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT))/CONSPIRACY, CIVIL (CIVIL CONSPIRACY CANNOT BE BROUGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT))

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TOWN’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF A HEARING ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED IN THE TOWN WAS PROPERLY DENIED, THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE ADJOURNMENT WERE NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the town’s request for an adjournment of a hearing was properly denied. After the hearing, the NYS Off. for People with Dev. Disabilities permitted the establishment of a community residential facility for the developmentally disabled within the town. Although the town requested that the hearing be adjourned, it did offer timely explanations of the reasons for the adjournment:

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Petitioner (the town) contends that, if it had been given additional time to prepare for the hearing, it could have proposed alternative sites, and thus the denial of an adjournment was an abuse of discretion. If petitioner believed that another site would be appropriate, however, it should have suggested another site in response to the sponsoring agency’s initial notice or, if needed, asked for time to find such a site … . Instead, petitioner decided to object to the facility outright … , which led the sponsoring agency to request an “immediate hearing” … . We therefore respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that there was no reason for petitioner to anticipate preparing for a hearing upon receiving notice from the sponsoring agency.

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We further respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that an adjournment should have been granted so that petitioner could study traffic and waste disposal concerns. In its requests for an adjournment, petitioner did not state that it needed time to study those issues. It was not until after the decision of respondent’s Acting Commissioner, in which she stated that petitioner’s traffic and septic concerns were not based on any studies, that petitioner argued that it should have been granted an adjournment to study those issues. To the extent that petitioner contends that its stated reason of needing “time to prepare” encompassed those specific issues, we reject that contention. To conclude otherwise would mean that adjournments should always be granted upon request, even when it is well settled that the decision to grant or deny an adjournment is a matter of discretion … . Matter of Town of Boston v New York State Off. for People with Dev. Disabilities, 2017 NY Slip Op 07803, Fourth Dept 11-9-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ADJOURNMENTS, TOWN’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF A HEARING ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED IN THE TOWN WAS PROPERLY DENIED, THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE ADJOURNMENT WERE NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW ( OWN’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF A HEARING ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED IN THE TOWN WAS PROPERLY DENIED, THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE ADJOURNMENT WERE NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (FOURTH DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (TOWN’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF A HEARING ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED IN THE TOWN WAS PROPERLY DENIED, THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE ADJOURNMENT WERE NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (FOURTH DEPT))/RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES (TOWN’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF A HEARING ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED IN THE TOWN WAS PROPERLY DENIED, THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE ADJOURNMENT WERE NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (FOURTH DEPT))/DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED  (TOWN’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF A HEARING ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED IN THE TOWN WAS PROPERLY DENIED, THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE ADJOURNMENT WERE NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (FOURTH DEPT))

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NO CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK.

In affirming the dismissal of a complaint, the Second Department explained the law re: conspiracy to commit a tort:

Under New York law, conspiracy to commit a tort is not a separately cognizable cause of action from the underlying tort … . A cause of action alleging conspiracy to commit a tort stands or falls with the underlying tort … . Here, since the court properly granted dismissal of the causes of action alleging defamation and misappropriation of confidential information, the court also properly granted dismissal of the causes of action alleging conspiracy to commit those torts … . Arvanitakis v Lester, 2016 NY Slip Op 08191, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

INTENTIONAL TORTS (NO CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK)/CONSPIRACY (CIVIL, (NO CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK)/TORTS (NO CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK)

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Purchase of Property Encumbered by an Unsatisfied Mortgage Gave Rise to Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraud, and Civil Conspiracy Causes of Action Against Title Insurance Company

Third-party plaintiff, Drummond, purchased property that was encumbered by an unsatisfied mortgage held by plaintiff bank. Drummond sued the title company, third-party defendant New York Land, as well as the company from which she procured her mortgage, Residential, and the bank to which the mortgage was transferred, Wells Fargo.  The third-party defendants brought CPLR 3211 motions to dismiss. The Second Department determined the causes of action against New York Land for negligence and negligent misrepresentation properly survived a motion to dismiss because the relationship between Drummond and New York Title was “so close as to approach privity,” but no such relationship was demonstrated with Residential and Wells Fargo.  The Second Department further determined the fraud and civil conspiracy causes of action against New York Land should not have been dismissed, explaining the pleading requirements. In addition, the Second Department determined that the suit was not “consumer-related” and therefore the General Business Law 349 cause of action was properly dismissed:

Although there was no contract between Drummond and New York Land, affording the pleadings a liberal construction and accepting all facts alleged as true …, the third-party complaint supports Drummond’s contention that the relationship between these two parties was so close as to approach privity .. . Indeed, the pleading alleges that New York Land was aware that the abstract and title report that it prepared were to be used for the specific purpose of facilitating a sale or mortgage of the property, that New York Land knew that Drummond was a member of a definable class who would rely on the certification in furtherance of that purpose, and that there was conduct between New York Land and Drummond evincing New York Land’s understanding of Drummond’s reliance … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of New York Land’s motion which were to dismiss, for failure to state a cause of action, the third-party causes of action alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation insofar as asserted against it. * * *

“The elements of a cause of action sounding in fraud are a material misrepresentation of an existing fact, made with knowledge of the falsity, an intent to induce reliance thereon, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damages” … . “All of the elements of a fraud claim must be supported by factual allegations containing the details constituting the wrong’ in order to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(b)” … . In certain circumstances, however, it may be “almost impossible to state in detail the circumstances constituting a fraud where those circumstances are peculiarly within the knowledge of [an adverse] party” … . “Under such circumstances, the heightened pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(b) may be met when the material facts alleged in the complaint, in light of the surrounding circumstances, are sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of the alleged conduct’ including the adverse party’s knowledge of, or participation in, the fraudulent scheme” … . Here, accepting all facts alleged as true … , the third-party complaint contains sufficient allegations of fact from which it can be inferred that New York Land was aware of the alleged fraudulent scheme and intended to aid in the commission thereof … . * * *

“Although New York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort . . . as an independent cause of action, a plaintiff may plead the existence of a conspiracy in order to connect the actions of the individual defendants with an actionable, underlying tort and establish that those actions were part of a common scheme” … . Again, affording the third-party complaint a liberal construction, Drummond alleged sufficient facts from which it may be inferred that New York Land knowingly participated, with certain other third-party defendants, in the alleged fraudulent scheme … . * * *

General Business Law § 349 is a broad consumer protection statute, which declares “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce” to be unlawful (General Business Law § 349[a]…). A party claiming the benefit of General Business Law § 349 must, as a threshold matter, ” charge conduct that is consumer oriented'” … . “The single shot transaction, which is tailored to meet the purchaser’s wishes and requirements, does not, without more, constitute consumer-oriented conduct for the purposes of this statute” … . Rather, the defendant’s acts or practices “must have a broad impact on consumers at large” … . Here, Drummond’s General Business Law § 349 cause of action is predicated upon allegations that the third-party defendants fraudulently induced her to purchase the subject property and finance it with a mortgage loan from [Residential]. As the Supreme Court properly concluded, these factual allegations do not amount to conduct that has an impact on the public at large and, as such, do not state a cause of action for violation of General Business Law § 349 … . JP Morgan Chase Bank NA v Hall, 2014 NY Slip Op 07475, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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Allegations of a “Conspiracty to Commit Fraud” Survived a Motion for Summary Judgment/Conspiracy Allegations Must Connect Individual Defendants with an Actionable Underlying Tort

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly refused to grant summary judgment in favor of an attorney in an action based upon serious allegations of malpractice in connection with a real estate transaction.  Amony other allegations, it was claimed that the attorney allowed an employee to pose as him and caused the plaintiffs to (unknowingly)  sign documents accepting the premises as is. In affirming Supreme Court’s finding that a question of fact had been raised about the “conspiracy to commit fraud” allegations, the Second Department explained the nature of a civil conspiracy:

“New York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort . . . as an independent cause of action” … . However, “a plaintiff may plead the existence of a conspiracy in order to connect the actions of the individual defendants with an actionable, underlying tort and establish that those actions were part of a common scheme” … . “The allegation of conspiracy carries no greater burden, but also no less, than to assert adequately common action for a common purpose by common agreement or understanding among a group, from which common responsibility derives. Therefore, under New York law, [i]n order to properly plead a cause of action to recover damages for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a cognizable tort, coupled with an agreement between the conspirators regarding the tort, and an overt action in furtherance of the agreement. A bare conclusory allegation of conspiracy is usually held insufficient”… . Blanco v Polanco, 2014 NY Slip Op 02735, 2nd Dept 4-23-14

 

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Board of County Legislators is Necessary Party Re: Legality of Local Law

The Second Department determined the Board of County Legislators was a necessary party in an action concerning the legality of a local law enacted by the Board:

A challenge to the procedures by which local legislation is enacted should be raised in a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the body which enacted it … . In view of the defendants’ challenge to the validity of the procedures by which the local law was enacted, the Board, as the body that enacted the local law, was a necessary party (see CPLR 1001[a]…). However, it appears that there are legal impediments to the defendants’ commencement of an action or proceeding against the Board without the Board’s consent (see Westchester County Charter § 158.11[3]). Under these circumstances, in the interest of fairness and judicial economy, we join the Board as a necessary party …, and direct the plaintiffs to effect service of process upon the Board, and serve the Board with all appropriate papers. Matter of Jenkins v Astorino, 2013 NY Slip Op 06684, 2nd Dept 10-16-13

 

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Timeliness Requirements for Motion for Summary Judgment Explained

In affirming the trial court’s determination defendants’ motion for summary judgment was untimely, the Fourth Department explained the applicable law:

“Where . . . a court does not set a date by which summary judgment motions must be made pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), such a motion must be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue ‘except with leave of court on good cause shown’ ” … .  Good cause in the context of CPLR 3212 (a) “requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy”… .  O’Brien v Bainbridge…, 990, 4th Dept 9-27-13

 

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