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POWERPOINT PRESENTATION OF ANNOTATED TRIAL EXHIBITS DURING PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE ANNOTATIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL EVIDENCE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a two-judge, extensive, dissenting opinion, determined that the prosecutor’s use of a PowerPoint presentation of annotated trial exhibits during summation was proper because the annotations fairly described the evidence:

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At bottom, a visual demonstration during summation is evaluated in the same manner as an oral statement. If an attorney can point to an exhibit in the courtroom and verbally make an argument, that exhibit and argument may also be displayed to the jury, so long as there is a clear delineation between argument and evidence, either on the face of the visual demonstration, in counsel’s argument, or in the court’s admonitions. We reject defendant’s position that trial exhibits in a PowerPoint presentation may only be displayed to the jury in unaltered, pristine form, and that any written comment or argument superimposed on the slides is improper. Rather, PowerPoint slides may properly be used in summation where, as here, the added captions or markings are consistent with the trial evidence and the fair inferences to be drawn from that evidence. When the superimposed text is clearly not part of the trial exhibits, and thus could not confuse the jury about what is an exhibit and what is argument or commentary, the added text is not objectionable. The slides, in contrast to the exhibits, are not evidence. The court properly instructed the jury that what the lawyers say during summations is not evidence, and that in finding the facts, the jury must consider only the evidence. In this case, as was appropriate, the jury was told that the physical exhibits admitted into evidence would be made available to them, while the slides were not supplied to the jury during deliberations. People v Anderson, 2017 NY Slip Op 02589, CtApp 4-4-17

CRIMINAL LAW (POWERPOINT PRESENTATION OF ANNOTATED TRIAL EXHIBITS DURING PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE ANNOTATIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL EVIDENCE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, POWERPOINT PRESENTATION OF ANNOTATED TRIAL EXHIBITS DURING PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE ANNOTATIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL EVIDENCE)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (POWERPOINT PRESENTATION OF ANNOTATED TRIAL EXHIBITS DURING PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE ANNOTATIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL EVIDENCE)/POWERPOINT (POWERPOINT PRESENTATION OF ANNOTATED TRIAL EXHIBITS DURING PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE ANNOTATIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL EVIDENCE)

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INACCURATE ANNOTATIONS ON TRIAL EXHIBITS DISPLAYED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN A POWERPOINT PRESENTATION DURING SUMMATION DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined the inaccurate labeling of trial exhibits (photographs) in a PowerPoint presentation by the prosecutor during summation did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. One photo, for example, was annotated with text indicating the photo depicted the defendant, but the witness who testified about the photo could not definitively say it was the defendant. The trial judge recognized the problem, stopped the PowerPoint presentation, and instructed the jury to disregard the slides:

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There is no inherent problem with the use of a PowerPoint presentation as a visual aid in connection with closing arguments. Indeed, it can be an effective tool. But, the long-standing rules governing the bounds of proper conduct in summation apply equally to a PowerPoint presentation. In other words, if it would be improper to make a particular statement, it would likewise be improper to display it … . If counsel is going to superimpose commentary to images of trial exhibits, the annotations must, without question, accurately represent the trial evidence … . Moreover, any type of blatant appeal to the jury’s emotions or egregious proclamation of a defendant’s guilt would plainly be unacceptable … .

Here, defendant argues that he was deprived of a fair trial by the annotation of images of the trial exhibits to imply that the victim’s brother, in his testimony, had positively identified either his truck or defendant from the surveillance video because this misrepresented the witness’s testimony. Significantly, the trial court was very attuned to the annotated slides and, in the exercise of its discretion, ultimately stopped the slideshow and instructed the jury to disregard the slides … . To the extent any slides may have misrepresented the trial evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on more than one occasion that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence and that the jury was the sole judge of the facts. Defense counsel also rejected the court’s offer of any less drastic relief after the denial of the mistrial motion. Thus, under these circumstances, defendant was not deprived of a fair trial. People v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 02588, CtApp 4-4-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (INACCURATE ANNOTATIONS ON TRIAL EXHIBITS DISPLAYED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN A POWERPOINT PRESENTATION DURING SUMMATION DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INACCURATE ANNOTATIONS ON TRIAL EXHIBITS DISPLAYED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN A POWERPOINT PRESENTATION DURING SUMMATION DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT  (INACCURATE ANNOTATIONS ON TRIAL EXHIBITS DISPLAYED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN A POWERPOINT PRESENTATION DURING SUMMATION DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM)/POWERPOINT (CRIMINAL LAW, SUMMATION, INACCURATE ANNOTATIONS ON TRIAL EXHIBITS DISPLAYED BY THE PROSECUTOR IN A POWERPOINT PRESENTATION DURING SUMMATION DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM)

QUESTION OF FACT, CREATED BY CONFLICTING EXPERTS, WHETHER OUTSIDE STEEL STAIRCASE WAS SAFE FOR USE IN WET WEATHER, PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff fell down a temporary steel staircase which was wet from rain. There were conflicting expert affidavits about the safety of the stairs:

To the extent the Appellate Division opinion below can be read to say that a statutory violation occurred merely because plaintiff fell down the stairs, it does not provide an accurate statement of the law. As we have made clear, the fact that a worker falls at a construction site, in itself, does not establish a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) … . Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from “cases involving ladders or scaffolds that collapse or malfunction for no apparent reason” where we have applied “a presumption that the ladder or scaffolding device was not good enough to afford proper protection” … .

Here, by contrast, there are questions of fact as to whether the staircase provided adequate protection. As noted above, defendants’ expert opined that the staircase was designed to allow for outdoor use and to provide necessary traction in inclement weather. Moreover, defendants’ expert opined that additional anti-slip measures were not warranted. In addition, he disputed the assertions by plaintiff’s expert that the staircase was worn down or that it was unusually narrow or steep. In light of the above, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability. O’Brien v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2017 NY Slip Op 02466, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ASSESSED POINTS UNDER RISK FACTOR 7, DEFENDANT HAD LONG-TERM NON-SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VICTIMS BEFORE THE ABUSE STARTED, DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF VICTIMIZATION.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined defendant should not have been assessed points under risk factor 7. Risk factor 7 applies when a defendant establishes a relationship with a victim for the primary purpose of victimization. Here the victims were the children of defendant’s long-time friends. Defendant had long-term non-sexual relationships with the children before the abuse began:

The People bore the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that defendant promoted his relationship with one or more of the victims for the primary purpose of sexually abusing them (see Correction Law § 168-n [3]…). That burden was not met here. The record reflects that he had long-term, pre-existing relationships with the children, continued those relationships in the role of a close family friend who regularly spent substantial amounts of time with the children and their families, and did not begin to offend against them until the eldest child was approximately 11 years old … . Therefore, the evidence in this record does not support Supreme Court’s determination that defendant “promoted” his relationships with these children for purposes of victimization … , as opposed to redirecting his longstanding close and involved relationships with them in such a way as to allow for sexual abuse. People v Cook, 2017 NY Slip Op 02468, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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WHERE THE RELEVANT OFFENSES WERE COMMITTED IN TWO COUNTIES, NO NEED FOR TWO SORA RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined only one SORA risk assessment proceeding should have been held. Defendant had simultaneously pled guilty to crimes committed in two counties. All of the crimes were taken into consideration in the first SORA assessment proceeding:

Where, as here, a single RAI [risk assessment instrument] addressing all relevant conduct is prepared, the goal of assessing the risk posed by the offender is fulfilled by a single SORA adjudication. To hold otherwise — that is, to permit multiple risk level determinations based on conduct included in a single RAI — would result in redundant proceedings and constitute a waste of judicial resources. Here, for instance, once the Division of Criminal Justice Services was notified of the Richmond County SORA court’s determination, “it had the information it needed to serve SORA’s goal of ‘protect[ing] the public from’ this particular sex offender” … . Any further proceedings then became duplicative. People v Cook, 2017 NY Slip Op 02467, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH THE INITIAL AGGRESSOR EXCEPTION TO THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the trial court properly charged the initial aggressor exception to the justification defense in this homicide case. The evidence was not clear about the timing, but the victim (McWillis) pursued the defendant with a plastic mop handle and swung at the defendant close in time to the shooting:

Here, as the Appellate Division dissent noted, “[n]o matter what the court charged in relation to the initial aggressor issue, [the jury could have reasonably concluded] there was simply no evidentiary support for a finding that defendant was justified in using deadly physical force against McWillis when faced with McWillis’s either threatened or actual use of a mop handle” … . Our law has “never required that an actor’s belief as to the intention of another person to inflict serious injury be correct in order for the use of deadly force to be justified, but [it has] uniformly required that the belief comport with an objective notion of reasonableness” … . Thus, the jury could have concluded that defendant’s choice to respond to a swinging plastic mop handle with a loaded and operable gun was not reasonable, especially in light of his prior comments to police about taking the law into his own hands … . People v Valentin, 2017 NY Slip Op 02470, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IN THIS ASSAULT CASE.

The Court of Appeals determined the trial court properly refused to charge the jury with the justification defense in this assault case:

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the defense of justification. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendant, as we must … , we conclude there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would have permitted the factfinder to conclude that defendant’s conduct was justified … . That is, we agree with the People that there is no evidence that objectively supports a belief that defendant was in danger of being physically harmed by the victim at the time defendant used force against him … .

Here, after “knocking [the victim] out,” defendant was able to freely and safely walk away from the bodega. Moreover, there simply is no evidence that, once he returned to the bodega, defendant needed to leave that store to strike the victim to defend himself. Even if defendant’s trial testimony establishes that he actually believed that the victim was lying in wait for him with a weapon … , there is no reasonable view of the evidence that “a reasonable person in . . . defendant’s circumstances would have believed” the victim to have threatened him with the imminent use of unlawful physical force … . Put simply, the surveillance footage reflects that defendant’s ambush of the victim with the milk crate cannot be considered self defense. People v Sparks, 2017 NY Slip Op 02469, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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ALTHOUGH THE MURDER WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE BURGLARY CHARGE, THE PEOPLE JUSTIFIED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BY PRESENTING PROOF THE TWO CRIMES ENCOMPASSED DISTINCT ACTS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Klein, determined there was sufficient evidence the burglary and murder were separate acts to justify consecutive sentences. The defendant was charged with breaking and entering his girlfriend’s home, dragging her downstairs and then murdering her:

“By definition, the act of causing death is subsumed within the element causing . . . physical injury” … and, thus, the act constituting murder here was a material element of that burglary count. The People therefore concede that, with respect to the latter burglary charge, they were required to identify facts establishing that defendant committed this offense and murder through separate and distinct acts. Because “the People offer[ed] evidence of the existence of . . . separate and distinct act[s]” with respect to that count of burglary in the first degree — indeed, with respect to both counts — “the trial court ha[d] discretion to order consecutive sentences” … . People v Brahney, 2017 NY Slip Op 02465, CtApp 3-30-17

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE SANDOVAL RULING AT TRIAL, THE OBJECTION WAS NOT ON THE PRECISE GROUND RAISED ON APPEAL, THE ISSUE WAS THEREFORE NOT PRESERVED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge concurring opinion, determined defendant’s objection to a Sandoval ruling about the admissibility of evidence of a juvenile delinquency adjudication did not preserve the precise issue which was the subject of the appeal. The concurring opinion argued the error had been preserved, but was harmless. The People sought to introduce evidence of the facts underlying the juvenile delinquency adjudication, but not the adjudication itself. The defendant objected arguing that the defendant should not be judged by actions taken when his mind and values were undeveloped. The court ruled the People could elicit the fact that defendant was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, but could not elicit the facts. On appeal defendant argued it was a legal error to admit evidence of the juvenile delinquency adjudication:

Under the unique factual circumstances of this case and based on the trial court’s colloquy with counsel, we conclude that defendant’s challenge to the Sandoval ruling is unpreserved. Defendant did not make the argument he now asserts at the time of the alleged erroneous ruling, or at any time at all. Instead, he argued, against the People’s initial proffer, that the court should deny the request because defendant’s actions should not be judged based on a young offender’s undeveloped mind and sense of values. Defendant failed to argue that it would be legal error to permit the People to elicit that defendant was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent … . Defendant did not make that argument before or after the compromise ruling, or at any point during the proceedings “when the court had the ‘opportunity of effectively chang[ing]’ its ruling” … and avoiding the error of which defendant now complains. People v Jackson, 2017 NY Slip Op 02361, CtApp 3-28-17

 

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DEFENDANT’S HAND UNDER HIS HOODIE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENT OF ROBBERY FIRST WHICH REQUIRES THE DISPLAY OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE A FIREARM.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a full-fledged dissenting opinion, determined the evidence was sufficient to support the element of robbery first degree which requires the display of what appears to be a firearm. The defendant threatened to shoot the teller and, at some point in time, one of his hands was under his hoodie.  The defendant was quickly apprehended and no firearm was found:

We reject defendant’s assumption that the timing of the moment at which the defendant places a hand under his clothing is dispositive of the legal sufficiency analysis. A victim may reasonably believe that a gun is being used, on the basis of conduct that makes it appear that the defendant is holding a gun, regardless of whether the defendant makes a movement while addressing the victim or keeps his hand concealed throughout the encounter in a manner and location suggesting the presence of a gun. Whether a defendant displays what appears to be a firearm does not depend on when precisely the defendant begins the display, provided it occurs “in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]). People v Smith, 2017 NY Slip Op 02362, CtApp 3-28-17

 

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