New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Vehicle and Traffic Law
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this intersection traffic-accident case, determined defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case. The Second Department held that a jury could find that, although defendant (Capobianco) had the right of way, plaintiff was already in the intersection and Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision. In addition, the Second Department found that Supreme Court should not have excluded evidence of the damage to the vehicles because the damage was relevant to liability for failure to see what should have been seen:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), a driver entering an intersection controlled by a stop sign must yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is already in the intersection or that is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard … , and a driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic law requiring them to yield … . A driver also has a common-law duty to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of the driver’s senses … . Thus, while a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision … , he or she still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection … .

Here, affording the plaintiff every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that even if Capobianco had the right-of-way, the plaintiff’s vehicle was already in the intersection, and that Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.

In addition, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding photographs depicting the nature and extent of damage to the parties’ vehicles after the accident. Even where a trial is bifurcated, some evidence of damages may nevertheless be admitted, in the trial court’s discretion, to establish liability at the liability phase of the trial, so long as such evidence is probative of liability and accompanied by an appropriate limiting instruction … . Pruessen v Richard Capobianco, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06155, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: A driver who had the right of way may still be liable in an intersection traffic accident if the other driver was already in the intersection and the driver who had the right of way did not exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Practice Point: In a bifurcated traffic-accident trial, evidence of the nature of the damage to the vehicles may have relevance to liability and, if so, should be admitted.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 13:00:062026-10-30 16:15:12EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).
Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE HAD THE GREEN LIGHT AND WAS GOING STRAIGHT; PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE INTERSECTION MAKING A LEFT TURN FROM THE ONCOMING LANE; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact concerning which of the two vehicles which collided had the right of way. Defendant had the green light and was driving straight. Plaintiff was making a left turn across defendant’s lane. Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1141, if plaintiff was in the process of turning when the light turned green, plaintiff would have had the right of way:

Plaintiff argues that defendant was required under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 to yield the right-of-way because plaintiff’s vehicle was in the intersection before defendant’s vehicle … . Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 provides, in relevant part, that traffic facing a steady green signal — here defendant — may proceed straight but shall yield the right of way to other traffic lawfully within the intersection at the time the signal is exhibited. Plaintiff testified that he almost completed his left turn through the intersection when he first saw defendant. The evidence does not conclusively establish which vehicle was required to yield. Moreover, both parties testified that the truck blocked the intersection and prevented them from being able to observe oncoming traffic.

Additionally, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143, a driver “about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.” Plaintiff contends that defendant was required to yield because defendant attempted to enter the roadway from the bicycle and parking lanes to get around the truck. However, the record does not provide conclusive evidence of each vehicle’s location leading up to the accident and which party ultimately had a duty to yield. Accordingly, there are questions of fact precluding summary dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. Sanchez-Rodriguez v Bruce, 2026 NY Slip Op 06077, First Dept 10-20-26

Practice Point: In an intersection accident case where one vehicle is traveling straight through the intersection on green and the oncoming vehicle is in the intersection making a left turn when the light changed, the vehicle which is in the intersection first has the right of way (Vehicle and Traffic Law 1141).

 

October 20, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-20 17:55:452026-10-27 20:11:29DEFENDANT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE HAD THE GREEN LIGHT AND WAS GOING STRAIGHT; PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE INTERSECTION MAKING A LEFT TURN FROM THE ONCOMING LANE; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT REAR DRIVER PROVIDED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this rear-end collision case raised a question of fact precluding summary judgment. Defendant alleged plaintiff abruptly changed lanes without signaling and came to a sudden stop in front of defendant’s vehicle:

… [A] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision to rebut the inference of negligence” … . “A nonnegligent explanation may include that a vehicle made a sudden lane change in front of a defendant’s vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly” … .

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting an affidavit wherein she averred that the rear of her stopped vehicle was struck by the front of the defendants’ vehicle … . However, in opposition, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of a nonnegligent explanation for striking the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. According to the defendant driver’s affidavit, the accident occurred when the plaintiff’s vehicle abruptly changed lanes, without signaling, and immediately came to a sudden stop in front of the defendants’ vehicle … . Johnson v Payne, 2026 NY Slip Op 05775, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an example of a “nonnegligent” explanation for a rear-end collision which precluded summary judgment.​

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 11:30:362026-10-12 11:53:00DEFENDANT REAR DRIVER PROVIDED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​
Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATION THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED IN THE HIGHWAY LANE FOR NO APPARENT REASON RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end collision case, determined defendant’s affirmation that plaintiff stopped for no apparent reason raised and question of fact:

… [T]he plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability through the submission of the plaintiff driver’s affidavit, in which he averred that his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] …). However, an affirmation of the defendant driver, submitted in opposition to the motion, raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant driver had a nonnegligent explanation for the defendants’ vehicle striking the rear of the plaintiffs’ vehicle. According to the defendant driver, the plaintiff driver was solely at fault for causing the accident by making a sudden stop for no apparent reason in the middle of their lane of traffic on the highway … . Ramirez v Red Cloud Trucking, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 05332, Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: In this rear-end collision case, defendant’s affirmation that plaintiff stopped in the highway lane for no apparent reason raised a question of fact whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for striking the back of plaintiff’s vehicle.

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 15:15:322026-09-20 15:29:32IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATION THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED IN THE HIGHWAY LANE FOR NO APPARENT REASON RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Municipal Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE PROVISIONS WHICH ALLOW THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF VEHICLES USED BY DRUNK DRIVERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCormack, determined the provisions of the Suffolk County Code which provide for the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used by drunk drivers is constitutional:

On this appeal, we are called upon to consider the validity of Suffolk County’s civil forfeiture statute, codified in chapter 420, article II (hereinafter chapter 420) of the Code of Suffolk County (hereinafter the Code), pursuant to which a vehicle being operated by the defendant Hassan Qamar (hereinafter the defendant) was seized at the time of his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The defendant challenges the validity of chapter 420 of the Code on three bases: (1) that the procedures relating to the post-seizure hearings conducted pursuant thereto violate article VI of the New York State Constitution, and deprived him of due process of law, (2) that the provisions of chapter 420 of the Code are preempted by State law, and (3) that the forfeiture of his vehicle constitutes an excessive fine prohibited by the State and Federal Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the defendant’s challenges to the procedures involving the post-seizure hearing have been rendered academic, and that there is no merit to his remaining challenges. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. * * *

… [A] Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter the SCPD) police officer observed the defendant operating a Nissan Altima (hereinafter the vehicle) on Pulaski Road in Huntington at a speed of 100 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone and passing a steady red traffic control light. According to the felony complaint, the defendant, inter alia, had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and admitted having “a few beers and a few shots of J[a]m[e]son[ ] W[h]iskey.” The defendant purportedly displayed “clues indicative of intoxication upon submitting to standardized field sobriety test” and submitted to a chemical breath test that resulted in a .20% blood alcohol content. The defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a) and driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3). The defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3) on April 1, 2015. The vehicle was seized and impounded by the SCPD pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code. * * *

… [T]he defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a), with one prior conviction. …

 … [T]he plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code, seeking forfeiture of the defendant’s vehicle.   Cohen v A 2019 Nissan, 2026 NY Slip Op 05158, Second Dept 9-2-26

 

September 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-02 14:25:222026-09-09 16:20:44THE SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE PROVISIONS WHICH ALLOW THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF VEHICLES USED BY DRUNK DRIVERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT TREATING NEUROLOGIST INDICATED ON A DMV FORM FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE PATIENT-DRIVER’S LICENSE THAT THE DRIVER’S LAST SEIZURE WAS TWO YEARS BEFORE WHEN, IN FACT, THE LAST SEIZURE WAS FOUR MONTHS BEFORE; TWO MONTHS AFTER REINSTATEMENT OF THE LICENSE, THE DRIVER HAD A SEIZURE-RELATED ACCIDENT IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENTS DIED; THE ACTION AGAINST THE NEUROLOGIST SOUNDED IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE, NOT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, AND WAS THEREFORE TIMELY BROUGHT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined the action sounded in negligence, not medical malpractice, rendering the action timely brought. Defendant neurologist was treating the non-party driver for seizures. In filling out a NYS Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) form for reinstatement of the driver’s license, defendant stated that the driver’s last seizure was about two years before, when in fact the last seizure was four months before. To be entitled to reinstatement of the driver’s license, the driver must have been free of seizures for the previous 12 months. Two months after the driver’s license was reinstated, the driver had a seizure which resulted in a horrific traffic accident in which two people died. The lawsuit was brought by their estates:

… [P]laintiffs’ survival-action claims, premised on the theory that Dr. Avila erroneously recorded the date of the driver’s last seizure in the DMV form, which error led to the DMV reinstating the driver’s license, sound in ordinary negligence. The crux of the survival-action claims is not Dr. Avila’s negligence in furnishing medical treatment to the driver; rather, the essence of the claims is that Dr. Avila failed to fulfill a different duty. The nature of the act underlying those claims — transcribing a date from a treatment note to a governmental administration form — “is more administrative than medical in nature” … . Because the act underpinning the survival-action claims is administrative in nature, jurors can use their common everyday experience to evaluate whether Dr. Avila exercised due care … . That a physician made the alleged administrative error does not transform the claim from one sounding in ordinary negligence to one for medical malpractice; the characterization of a particular claim depends not on the title of the actor but on the nature of the challenged act … .

Ultimately, the core issue related to plaintiffs’ survival-action claims — whether Dr. Avila failed to exercise due care in recording a fact on the DMV form — may not implicate questions of medical competence or judgment regarding the treatment of the driver … . Unlike the inquiry on a medical malpractice claim, whether Dr. Avila breached his duty to exercise due care in recording a fact on the DMV form does not depend on an analysis of the medical treatment rendered to the driver … . Lafferty v Avila, 2026 NY Slip Op 05147, First Dept 8-27-26

Practice Point: If a jury does not need to analyze the medical treatment rendered by a doctor to determine a doctor’s negligence, the action does not sound in medical malpractice and is subject to a three-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence.

 

August 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-27 12:13:242026-08-30 12:55:01DEFENDANT TREATING NEUROLOGIST INDICATED ON A DMV FORM FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE PATIENT-DRIVER’S LICENSE THAT THE DRIVER’S LAST SEIZURE WAS TWO YEARS BEFORE WHEN, IN FACT, THE LAST SEIZURE WAS FOUR MONTHS BEFORE; TWO MONTHS AFTER REINSTATEMENT OF THE LICENSE, THE DRIVER HAD A SEIZURE-RELATED ACCIDENT IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENTS DIED; THE ACTION AGAINST THE NEUROLOGIST SOUNDED IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE, NOT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, AND WAS THEREFORE TIMELY BROUGHT (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEFENDANT DRIVER’S STRIKING A 12-YEAR-OLD PEDESTRIAN WAS THE PEDESTRIAN’S SUDDENLY RUNNING ONTO THE HIGHWAY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this traffic-accident action stemming from defendant’s striking a 12-year-old pedestrian (J.W.) should have been dismissed. J.W. suddenly ran into defendant driver’s (Li’s) highway lane:

Li testified that he was driving south in the right lane of the Hutchinson River Parkway in the Bronx at about 45 miles per hour when he first saw J.W. standing 100 feet in front of him in a grassy area on the side of the highway to his right. Li testified that when the vehicle approached, J.W. made a “running gesture” and began to run towards the vehicle when it was approximately two car lengths away. Li did not brake or honk his horn, but did take his foot off the gas pedal and was in the process of moving into the left lane to move away from J.W. when J.W. entered the highway, at which point the front right side of the van struck him. Police conducted sobriety tests at the scene and allowed Li to drive the van from the scene. He did not receive a ticket, violation, or citation as a result of the collision. It is undisputed that pedestrians are prohibited from occupying the location where J.W. was traversing (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-a).

Defendants established prima facie that J.W.’s act of running into the highway unlawfully was the sole proximate cause of the collision … . Li’s testimony shows that he was confronted with a sudden and unforeseen situation in which he was forced to make a split second decision and could not “weigh alternative courses of action” such that “he cannot reasonably be held to the same conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect” … . “While it is often a jury question whether a person’s reaction to an emergency was reasonable, summary resolution is possible when the individual presents sufficient evidence to support the reasonableness of his or her actions and there is no opposing evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a legitimate question of fact on the issue” … . Danielle W. v Li, 2026 NY Slip Op 04821, First Dept 7-30-26

 

July 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-07-30 12:21:012026-08-07 10:05:13THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEFENDANT DRIVER’S STRIKING A 12-YEAR-OLD PEDESTRIAN WAS THE PEDESTRIAN’S SUDDENLY RUNNING ONTO THE HIGHWAY (FIRST DEPT).
Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THAT PLAINTIFF IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE DID NOT HAVE A PROPER DRIVER’S LICENSE DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The Frist Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that the fact that plaintiff in this traffic accident case did not have a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident did not raise a question of fact about plaintiff’s purported comparative negligence:

… [T]hat plaintiff was driving without a proper driver’s license does not provide a basis for finding an issue of fact as to comparative negligence (see Huff v Rodriguez, 88 AD3d 1274, 1275 [4th Dept 2011] …”[“the absence or possession of a driver’s license is not relevant to the issue of negligence”]). Torres v Occhino, 2026 NY Slip Op 03412, First Dept 6-2-25

Practice Point: In a traffic accident case, the fact that plaintiff did not have a proper driver’s license does not raise a question of fact about plaintiff’s purported comparative negligence.

 

June 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-06-02 12:45:022026-06-06 12:57:57THAT PLAINTIFF IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE DID NOT HAVE A PROPER DRIVER’S LICENSE DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (FIRST DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Insurance Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

TO THE EXTENT VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW SECTION 370 HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE RENTAL-CAR COMPANIES TO PROVIDE PRIMARY LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE TO RENTER-DRIVERS, SECTION 370 IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL “GRAVES AMENDMENT” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, affirming the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissent, determined the federal “Graves Amendment (49 USC 30106),” which relieves rental-car companies of vicarious liability for the negligence of the renter-drivers, preempts Vehicle and Traffic Law 370 to the extent that section 370 has been interpreted to require rental companies to provide primary liability insurance coverage to renters. But section 370’s requirement that rental-car companies carry a specified minimum amount of insurance is not preempted by the Graves Amendment:

The Appellate Division [held] that “the Graves Amendment does not supersede Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 insofar as it is a state law that requires rental car companies to carry a specified minimum amount of insurance for each of their vehicles” but “is superseded to the extent it requires a rental car company to ‘provide primary insurance to their renters up to the minimum liability limits provided by the statute’ ” … . The Court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would rescue every vicarious liability claim up to statutory minimum insurance amounts and render the Graves Amendment’s preemption clause a nullity” … . The Court further held that section 370 does not reverse preempt the Graves Amendment under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, because the Graves Amendment “does not entirely ‘invalidate, impair, or supersede’ ” section 370 … . * * *

We note that the Graves Amendment does not free car rental companies from all liability arising from the use of a rented vehicle. On the contrary, it expressly permits States to impose liability on rental companies for damages arising from their own negligence or criminal wrongdoing (see 49 USC § 30106 [a] [2]). Nor does the Graves Amendment restrict New York’s ability to require rental companies to obtain insurance, no matter what kind, “for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle” (id. § 30106 [b] [1]). Our decision today does not affect section 370’s requirement that car rental companies obtain insurance coverage for such other liability or for the privilege of registering vehicles in New York. Rather, we narrowly hold that the Graves Amendment preempts Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 to the extent that it requires car rental companies to provide primary liability insurance to their renters up to the statute’s minimum liability amounts. Second Child v Edge Auto, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 02436, CtApp 4-23-26

Practice Point: The interpretation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 370 which required rental-car companies to provide primary liability insurance to renter-drivers has been preempted by the federal “Graves Amendment.”​

 

April 23, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-23 08:41:052026-04-24 09:36:20TO THE EXTENT VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW SECTION 370 HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE RENTAL-CAR COMPANIES TO PROVIDE PRIMARY LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE TO RENTER-DRIVERS, SECTION 370 IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL “GRAVES AMENDMENT” (CT APP).
Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

ALTHOUGH THE COURT FOUND THAT THE DEPUTY DID NOT SOUND HER AIR HORN BEFORE THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WITH PLAINTIFFS’ VEHICLE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEPUTY TOOK PRECAUTIONS BEFORE ENTERING THE INTERSECTION; THEREFORE THE COUNTY DEMONSTRATED THE DEPUTY DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS IN VIOLATION OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over an extensive dissent, determined the county was entitled to summary judgment in this negligence suit stemming from an intersection accident involving a sheriff’s deputy (Wong) who was responding to an emergency call. Although the court found that Wong did not sound her air horn prior to the collision with plaintiffs’ (Granaths’) car, the evidence demonstrated Wong did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others:

It is undisputed that, before proceeding through the intersection, Deputy Fong slowed down, came to a complete stop at least once, observed northbound traffic, waited for that traffic to yield to her, and turned on her overheard lights. The Granaths contend that a jury could nonetheless find that Deputy Fong exhibited reckless disregard for the safety of others by failing to activate her air horn or siren; declining to call in a “Code 77” as required by MCSD [sheriff’s department] policy; and proceeding into the intersection despite having an obstructed view of southbound traffic.

We agree with the Appellate Division that defendants met their initial burden on their summary judgment motion and that, in opposition, the Granaths failed to raise a material triable issue of fact. Even assuming Deputy Fong failed to activate her air horn or siren, call in a “Code 77,” or observe southbound traffic—either because her view was obstructed or she neglected to look to her right—taken together with the actions she undisputably did take—slowing down, stopping, activating her emergency lights and proceeding only once she observed northbound traffic yield to her—we cannot conclude that Deputy Fong, with “conscious indifference to the outcome,” “reckless[ly] disregard[ed] . . . a highly probable risk of harm” … . Granath v Monroe County, 2026 NY Slip Op 01586, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the meaning of “reckless disregard for the safety of others” in the context of an intersection traffic accident involving a sheriff’s deputy responding to an emergency call.

 

March 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-03-19 11:02:362026-03-21 12:06:09ALTHOUGH THE COURT FOUND THAT THE DEPUTY DID NOT SOUND HER AIR HORN BEFORE THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WITH PLAINTIFFS’ VEHICLE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEPUTY TOOK PRECAUTIONS BEFORE ENTERING THE INTERSECTION; THEREFORE THE COUNTY DEMONSTRATED THE DEPUTY DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS IN VIOLATION OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 (CT APP).
Page 1 of 29123›»

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Civil Service Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Scroll to top