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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER VIOLATED THE RECKLESS-DISREGARD-FOR-THE-SAFETY-OF-OTHERS STANDARD OF CARE FOR POLICE VEHICLES IN PURSUIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendant police officer, Benbow, violated the reckless disregard standard of care in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff was the driver’s partner in the police car which collided with another car in an intersection when the driver was pursuing a car with excessively tinted windows:

… [There is] a triable issue of fact as to whether Benbow acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. In contrast to Benbow’s deposition testimony that he stopped at the red light and looked in both directions before slowly proceeding into the intersection against the red light, the plaintiff testified at her deposition that she and Benbow were responding to a call of a security alarm at a school, that Benbow did not stop before entering the intersection, that he was going to turn right and looked only to the left, that after he had entered the intersection he said that he “saw something” and suddenly accelerated and turned to the left, without ever looking to the right, that the plaintiff saw Ilyaich’s vehicle and said “watch out,” and that in response, Benbow then looked to the right, but did not attempt to move the police vehicle away from the collision … . Thompson v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 06733, Second Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: In this case there was no dispute that the reckless disregard standard applied to the police officer driving the police car in which plaintiff, his partner, was a passenger. There was a question of fact whether the driver violated the reckless disregard standard leading to a collision in an intersection.

 

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THAT PLAINTIFF PLED GUILTY TO A TRAFFIC OFFENSE DOES NOT PROVE SHE WAS NEGLIGENT; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE PLED GUILTY BECAUSE SHE DID NOT HAVE THE MONEY TO DRIVE FROM HER HOME FOR COURT APPEARANCES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this bus-car traffic accident should not have been granted. The defendants submitted conflicting evidence about how the accident happened. The fact that plaintiff pled guilty to a traffic offense does not necessarily prove she was negligent. Plaintiff alleged she pled guilty to avoid traveling from her home in New Jersey for court appearances:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they were free from fault in the happening of the accident, because their submissions in support of the motion contained conflicting accounts of how the accident happened, and failed to eliminate triable issues of fact, including which vehicle entered the other vehicle’s lane prior to the collision … .

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the fact that the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the traffic offense of driving or operating a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner does not conclusively establish that she was negligent … . “It is well settled that a person who pleads guilty to a traffic offense is permitted to explain the reasons for the plea, and it is for the jury to decide what weight, if any, to give to the testimony” … . Here, the plaintiff contended that she pleaded guilty, inter alia, because she did not have the money to keep traveling to New Jersey for court appearances, and thus, it is for a jury to evaluate her explanation and determine what weight, if any, the plea is entitled to in determining if she was negligent … . Charles v American Dream Coaches, 2022 NY Slip Op 06685, Second Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: In a traffic accident case, the fact that plaintiff pled guilty to a traffic offense is not proof of negligence as a matter of law because the reason for the guilty plea can be explained to the jury. Here plaintiff alleged she pled guilty because she did not have enough money to return to New York for court appearances. That raised a question of fact for the jury.

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS A VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE DRIVER AND WAS RESPONDING TO A CALL AT THE TIME OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN PERSONAL PICKUP TRUCK, WHICH WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE; THEREFORE THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD OF CARE DID NOT APPLY TO DEFENDANT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that, although defendant driver was a volunteer ambulance driver responding to a call at the time of the accident, defendant was driving his own personal pickup truck which did not qualify as an emergency vehicle. Therefore the ordinary negligence, not the “reckless disregard,” standard applied to the defendant:

We agree with plaintiff, however, that he met his initial burden on his cross motion of establishing that defendant was not operating an “authorized emergency vehicle” at the time of the accident and thus that the reckless disregard standard of care does not apply. ” ‘[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) . . . applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b)’ ” … . …

… [A]t the time of the accident, defendant was driving his personally-owned vehicle, which was not affiliated with Eden Emergency … . The vehicle also did not comply with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (c), which requires authorized emergency vehicles to be equipped with “at least one red light.” Moreover, at the time of the accident, defendant’s vehicle was not being “operated by” Eden Emergency because, while defendant was a volunteer with Eden Emergency, he was not on call at the time of the incident … . Further, defendant did not qualify as an ambulance service. Defendant was not an “individual . . . engaged in providing emergency medical care and the transportation of sick or injured persons” (Public Health Law § 3001 [2]). We also note that defendant was not an emergency medical technician … . Spence v Kitchens, 2022 NY Slip Op 06355, Fourth Dept 11-10-22

Practice Point: Here defendant was a volunteer ambulance driver who was responding to a call when the traffic accident occurred. Defendant was driving his own pickup truck, was not “on call” for the ambulance service, was not engaged in emergency care and was not a medical technician. Defendant’s truck was not an “authorized emergency vehicle.” Therefore the “reckless disregard” standard of care for emergency vehicles did not apply.

 

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DEFENDANTS’ VAN FAILED TO YIELD TO APPELLANT’S VEHICLE, WHICH HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, WHEN DEFENDANTS’ VAN ATTEMPTED TO MERGE INTO APPELLANT’S LANE; THE DASH CAM VIDEO DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT-DRIVER VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; APPELLANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT). ​

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a dash cam video demonstrated that defendants’ van failed to yield to appellant’s vehicle. Therefore, appellant was not negligent as a matter of law:

“A driver has a duty not to merge into a lane of moving traffic until it is safe to do so, and a violation of this duty constitutes negligence as a matter of law” ( … see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128[a]). Moreover, a driver of a vehicle with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the driver in the lane next to him or her will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield to a driver with the right-of-way … . “‘[A] driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision'” … .

Here, in support of her motion, the appellant submitted evidence which included, among other things, a dash cam video of the accident which demonstrated that the defendant van driver failed to yield the right-of-way to the appellant’s vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a). The video revealed that the defendant van driver suddenly moved into the appellant’s lane of travel as that lane widened to become both a travel lane and an exit ramp lane and, within seconds, the right side of the vehicle of the defendant van driver collided with the driver’s side of the appellant’s vehicle as the appellant’s vehicle was entering the exit ramp lane. Thus, the evidence submitted by the appellant established, prima facie, that the defendant van driver’s failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the appellant was free from fault … . Vigdorchik v Vigdorchik, 2022 NY Slip Op 05886, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: Here defendant driver struck appellant’s car while attempting to merge into appellant’s lane, which violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law because appellant had the right of way. The accident was captured in a dash cam video. Appellant was not negligent as a matter of law.

 

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THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SNOW PLOW WAS “ENGAGED IN HIGHWAY WORK” AT THE TIME OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER THE HIGHER “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD OF CARE APPLIED; THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the state’s motion for summary judgment in this snow-plow traffic-accident case should not have been granted because there were questions of fact concerning whether the higher “reckless disregard” standard of care for snow plows was applicable. Although the “reckless disregard” standard may still apply where, as here, the snow plow is raised, the snow plow must be salting the road or otherwise “working its run” at the time of the accident:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) “exempts from the rules of the road all vehicles, including [snowplows], which are ‘actually engaged in work on a highway’ . . . , and imposes on such vehicles a recklessness standard of care” … . The exemption “applies only when such work is in fact being performed at the time of the accident” … , which includes a snowplow engaged in plowing or salting a road … . Although the exemption does “not apply if the snowplow . . . [is] merely traveling from one route to another route” … , a snowplow may be “engaged in work even if the plow blade [is] up at the time of the accident and no salting [is] occurring” when the snowplow is nevertheless “working [its] ‘run’ or ‘beat’ at the time of the accident” … .

… [W]e conclude that the State failed to establish as a matter of law that the snowplow was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b] …). Lynch-Miller v State of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 05640, Fourth Dept 10-7-22

Practice Point: Here the snow plow was raised when the traffic accident occurred. There were questions of fact about whether the snow plow was salting the road or otherwise working its run when at the time. Therefore, there were questions of fact about whether the higher “reckless disregard” standard of care for vehicles engaged in highway work applied.

 

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REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO A DWI BREATH TEST IS NOT AN OFFENSE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the conviction, noted that refusing to submit to a DWI field screening test (Alco-Sensor breath test) is not an offense:

We agree with defendant … that his “refusal to submit to a [field screening device] did not establish a cognizable offense” (People v Alim, 204 AD3d 1418, 1419 [4th Dept 2022]  … ; see People v Bembry, 199 AD3d 1340, 1342 [4th Dept 2021] …). We therefore modify the judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of count seven of the indictment and dismissing that count. People v Shirley, 2022 NY Slip Op 05631, Fourth Dept 10-7-22

Practice Point: Refusing to submit to a DWI breath test is not an offense. The “conviction” was reversed that the indictment count was dismissed.

 

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DEFENDANT MOVED TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA ON THE GROUND HE WAS NOT AWARE HE COULD PERMANENTLY LOSE HIS DRIVER LICENSE BASED ON THE PLEA; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POST-REVOCATION RELICENSING IS OUTSIDE OF THE COURTS’ CONTROL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction by guilty plea should not have been granted. Defendant argued he would not have pled guilty had he realized he could permanently lose his driver license. The regulation which allowed permanent revocation of defendant’s license did not exist at the time of the plea:

The subject regulations that led to the denial of the defendant’s application to restore his driver license did not exist at the time he pleaded guilty, and the defendant failed to identify any conduct that occurred during the plea proceedings that constituted a violation of his due process rights … . “The defendant’s grievance lies with the enactment and enforcement of the new regulation, not the manner of his conviction” … .

… [T]he loss of a driver license is a collateral consequence of a plea of guilty and is not a consequence within the control of the court system … . The Supreme Court had no duty to inform the defendant of this consequence during the plea colloquy … . As the Court of Appeals stated in Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. (29 NY3d at 220), “the Commissioner [of the DMV] will have exclusive authority over post-revocation relicensing, and . . . those relicensing determinations will be discretionary.” People v DiTore, 2022 NY Slip Op 05541, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: Courts have no control over post-revocation relicensing. The Department of Motor Vehicles has exclusive jurisdiction over relicensing. Here defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction by guilty plea on the ground he was not aware he could permanently lose his driver license should not have been granted.

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY AND PLAINTIFF APPARENTLY PULLED OUT OF A DRIVEWAY IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT KEPT A PROPER LOOKOUT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact in this traffic accident case, even though defendant driver had the right-of-way and plaintiff pulled out of a driveway in front of defendant. The facts are not described:

The defendants’ evidence established, prima facie, that the defendant driver had the right-of-way, that the plaintiff was at fault in the happening of the accident, and that the defendant driver was not at fault in the happening of the accident (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 …). In opposition, the plaintiff submitted, among other things, his own affidavit, in which he gave a completely different version of the events preceding the accident. The plaintiff’s evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver, who was obligated to keep a proper lookout, see what was there to be seen through the reasonable use of his senses, and avoid colliding with other vehicles … , was indeed at fault in the happening of the accident. Hassan v Brauns Express, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 05520, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: Defendant driver had the right-of-way and plaintiff apparently pulled out of a driveway in front of defendant. However, plaintiff raised a question of fact about whether defendant kept a proper lookout which was sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

 

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ONLY THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT ENUMERATED IN VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 (E) IS SUBJECT TO THE HIGHER “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD OF CARE FOR EMERGENCY VEHICLES; OTHER INJURY-CAUSING ACTIONS INVOLVING THE EMERGENCY VEHICLE ARE SUBJECT TO THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE STANDARD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that while parking in a “no standing” zone maybe subject to the “reckless disregard” standard for emergency vehicles, other injury-causing actions may not be exempt from the ordinary negligence standard:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)” … . “Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence” … . Here, although defendants established that they engaged in conduct covered by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)(1) by parking in a “No Standing” area, there were, at a minimum, questions of fact whether the ambulance had its emergency lights and sirens activated as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(c). Taveras v Almodovar, 2022 NY Slip Op 05385, First Dept 9-29-22

Practice Point: Only the specific conduct enumerated in Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104 (e) is subject to the higher “reckless disregard” standard of care for emergency vehicles. Other injury-causing actions involving the emergency vehicle (i.e. failure to activate emergency lights and sirens) are subject to the ordinary negligence standard.

 

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DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DISCOVERY WOULD LEAD TO EVIDENCE ESSENTIAL TO DEFEND AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED AS PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff motorcyclist’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case was not premature, defendant’s violation of the Vehicle and Traffic law was negligence per se, and the comparative-negligence affirmative defense should have been dismissed. Plaintiff demonstrate defendant made an illegal left turn in front of him and he could not avoid the collision:

… [A] violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence as a matter of law … . “The operator of an oncoming vehicle with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that the opposing operator will yield in compliance with the Vehicle and Traffic Law” … . “[A] driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s motion was not premature since the defendants failed to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212[f] … ). Higgins v Stelmach, 2022 NY Slip Op 05155, Second Dept 9-13-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff demonstrated defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s motorcycle. Defendant did not demonstrate discovery would lead to evidence essential to defending the motion for summary judgment. The motion therefore was not premature. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of the comparative negligence affirmative defense.

 

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