Vehicle and Traffic Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

EVEN A UBIQUITOUS “DE MINIMUS” VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW IS VALID JUSTIFICATION FOR A PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOP; HERE THE LICENSE PLATE FRAME OBSCURED “GARDEN STATE” ON THE NEW JERSEY LICENSE PLATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the pretextual traffic stop was valid and defendant’s suppression motion should not have been denied on that ground. Apparently the license-plate frame obscured New Jersey’s nickname “Garden State” on the plate, which constitutes a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 402(1)(b):

The trial court’s concerns of permitting police officers to engage in pretextual traffic stops based on observations of trivial or technical traffic violations, which may lead to impermissible profiling, are noteworthy and merit consideration. However, once the court found that the officers reasonably believed that a traffic violation had been committed, this provided the required probable cause to stop the car … , regardless of whether the violation could be deemed de minimis, ubiquitous, unintentional, or caused by a third party such as a car dealer … . “Probable cause to believe that the Vehicle and Traffic Law has been violated provides an objectively reasonable basis for the police to stop a vehicle and . . . there is no exception for infractions that are subjectively characterized as ‘de minimis'” … . People v Dula, 2021 NY Slip Op 05465, First Dept 10-12-21

October 12, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

NYC’S RIGHT OF WAY LAW CRIMINALIZES ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE WHEN A VEHICLE STRIKES A PEDESTRIAN OR A BICYCLIST WHO HAS THE RIGHT OF WAY; THE LAW IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS, PROPERLY IMPOSES ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE AS THE MENS REA, AND IS NOT PREEMPTED BY OTHER LAWS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a concurring opinion, determined New York City’s “Right of Way Law,” which criminalizes ordinary negligence when a vehicle strikes a pedestrian or bicyclist who has the right of way, is constitutional and is not preempted by other laws. Both defendants were convicted under the Right of Way Law (NYC Administrative Code 19-190), a misdemeanor. The defendants unsuccessfully argued (1) the law is void for vagueness; (2) ordinary negligence cannot constitute the mens rea for a criminal act; and (3) the law is preempted by the Penal Law and the Vehicle and Traffic Law:

Article 15 of the Penal Law lists and defines four “culpable mental states”—”intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “criminal negligence” … . However, strict liability is also contemplated by article 15: “[t]he minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which [such person] is physically capable of performing,” and, “[i]f such conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, . . . such offense is one of ‘strict liability'” … . * * *

The provisions of the Penal Law “govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside” of the Penal Law, “[u]nless otherwise expressly provided, or unless the context otherwise requires” (Penal Law § 5.05 [2]). The two key provisions at issue, Penal Law § 15.00 (Culpability; definitions of terms) and § 15.05 (Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states), expressly provide otherwise by making clear that they are “applicable to this chapter” only. Further contradicting defendants’ interpretation of article 15 is the legislature’s own use of an ordinary negligence mens rea for offenses defined outside the Penal Law. For example … Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 and Agriculture and Markets Law § 370—which were enacted after the relevant provisions in article 15 of the Penal Law—both employ an ordinary negligence standard for imposing criminal liability. People v Torres, 2021 NY Slip Op 05448, CtApp 10-12-21

October 12, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Employment Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law, Workers' Compensation

DEFENDANT CAR DEALERSHIP OWNED THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF, ITS SALESMAN, WAS INJURED DURING A TEST DRIVE; THE DEALERSHIP, AS PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE AS THE OWNER OF THE CAR UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant Paddock Chevrolet was immune from suit by its employee in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff, a salesman for Paddock, was a passenger in a car owned by Paddock which was being test-driven at the time of the accident. The court noted that the Workers’ Compensation Law protected Paddock from vicarious liability as the owner of the car pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law:

Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 provides that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed by [section 10] shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, . . . or any person otherwise entitled to recover damages, contribution or indemnity, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death or liability arising therefrom . . .” We thus agree with Paddock that plaintiff’s claims against it are barred.

Paddock correctly contends that New York has rejected the “dual capacity” doctrine … , rendering it irrelevant whether the amended complaint and cross claims asserted against Paddock were based on its status as plaintiff’s employer or its status as the owner of the vehicle who is vicariously liable for the negligence of a nonemployee driver under Vehicle and Traffic Law … . Mansour v Paddock Chevrolet, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 05190, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

October 1, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Contract Law, Criminal Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE SENTENCE AGREED TO IN THE PLEA BARGAIN AND IMPOSED BY THE COURT WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS LESS THAN STATUTORILY REQUIRED; THE SENTENCE WAS VACATED AND THE MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined defendant’s sentence was illegal because it was less than statutorily required. Because the plea agreement included the illegal sentence, the sentence was vacated and the matter was remitted to give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea:

Defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) in 2019. Inasmuch as that conviction was within five years of the instant plea of guilty to driving while intoxicated, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1-a) (a) requires the additional penalty of either five days in jail or 30 days of community service. As no such penalty was imposed by the court, the sentence imposed is less than is statutorily required and, therefore, is illegal.

“Where the plea bargain includes a sentence which is illegal because the minimum imposed is less than that required by law, . . . the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and afford the defendant, having been denied the benefit of the bargain, the opportunity to withdraw the plea” … . Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to County Court for resentencing in accordance with the governing sentencing statute, with the opportunity for defendant to withdraw from the plea agreement … . People v Gary, 2021 NY Slip Op 05052, Third Dept 9-23-21

September 23, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK AFTER DEFENDANT CROSSING GUARD MOTIONED FOR HIM TO CROSS; THE CROSSING GUARD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED; THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE DENIED THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a dissent, affirmed the grant of the crossing guard’s (Gandolfo’s) and the county’s motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian-vehicle accident case. Defendant Gandolfo had assumed her position in the crosswalk and motioned for infant plaintiff to cross the road when plaintiff was struck by a car driven by Upton. The dissent argued there was some evidence that Gandolfo may have been negligent:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1102 provides that “[n]o person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer or flagperson or other person duly empowered to regulate traffic.” Here, the County defendants … [submitted] transcripts of the deposition testimony of Gandolfo, Upton, and an eyewitness to the accident, which demonstrated that Upton’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Gandolfo testified that, upon seeing the infant at the southern corner of the intersection from her post on the northern corner, she entered the crosswalk, and, upon reaching the middle, raised her stop sign toward traffic traveling east on Montauk Highway, and her gloved hand toward traffic traveling west, checked in both directions two times for approaching vehicles, and seeing none, nodded to the infant to enter the crosswalk. Gandolfo further testified that she heard Upton’s vehicle, which was traveling east on Montauk Highway, before she saw it, and that, despite Gandolfo’s presence in the crosswalk, Upton failed to stop her vehicle, and struck the infant as he had almost reached the middle of the crosswalk. The eyewitness testified that, after dropping her child off at the high school, she was waiting for the infant to walk through the crosswalk before making a right turn onto Montauk Highway, and the crossing guard, dressed in a crossing guard uniform, was in the middle of the crosswalk holding a stop sign, when the infant was struck as he approached the middle of the crosswalk. During her deposition, Upton, who frequently traveled the route where the accident occurred, testified that, prior to striking the infant, she saw Gandolfo in the road, holding up her stop sign, but did not see the infant until after her vehicle struck him. Christopher W. v County of Suffolk, 2021 NY Slip Op 04922, Second Dept 9-1-21

September 1, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW PROVISION WHICH REQUIRES SIGNALING FOR 100 FEET BEFORE MAKING A TURN, EVEN THOUGH THE TRUCK WHICH MADE THE TURN WAS STOPPED AT A TRAFFIC LIGHT; DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS TRUCK-BICYCLE ACCIDENT CASE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Barros, overruling a City Court decision, reversing the jury verdict in this truck-bicycle traffic accident case, determined the jury should have been instructed on the Vehicle and Traffic Law provision requiring that a turn signal be activated for 100 feet before turning. The truck was at a stop light and plaintiff testified the truck’s turn signal was not on when she pulled up to the stop light next to the truck. When she started riding straight through the intersection, the truck allegedly made a right turn and ran over her. The driver (Murphy) testified he put his signal on and then made the turn. The trial court instructed the jury on the Vehicle and Traffic Law provision which applies to parked cars and which does not have the “100-foot” signaling requirement. The Second Department found that the truck was not “parked” within the meaning of that provision:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) provides that “[a] signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Under Vehicle and Traffic § 1163(a), Murphy was required to signal his intention to turn right at the subject intersection. Thus, since a signal of intention to turn was required, the clear and unambiguous words used in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) also required Murphy to give such signal “continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet” that he traveled before making the turn. The provision makes no exception for vehicles that are stopped at a red traffic light … .

… Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d), which applies … to vehicles moving from a parked position, and which does not require a vehicle to signal its turn 100 feet before making it, is inapplicable. Murphy’s truck was not parked within the meaning of “park or parking” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 129. Rather, it was stopped at a red light … . To the extent that People v Brandt (60 Misc 3d 956, 961 [Poughkeepsie City Ct]) holds otherwise, we overrule it.

The precise and specific duty established in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) bore directly on the facts to which the parties testified, and, therefore, the Supreme Court erred in refusing to give that charge … . The statute establishes a standard of care, the unexcused violation of which is negligence per se … . Moore v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 04483, Second Dept 7-21-21

July 21, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

ALTHOUGH AN ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THE GRASSY STRIP BETWEEN THE SIDEWALK AND THE CURB, HERE THE PROPERTY OWNER DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION; IN ADDITION, THE VILLAGE CODE DID NOT IMPOSE TORT LIABILITY ON PROPERTY OWNERS, AN ISSUE PROPERLY CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property-owner’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should have been granted. Although, pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law, defendant can be responsible for a dangerous condition in the grassy strip between the sidewalk and a curb, here defendant demonstrated he did not create the condition and the village code did not impose tort liability on abutting property owners. Although the “village code” issue was not raised below, it was a purely legal issue that can be considered on appeal:

The grass strip situated between a sidewalk and a roadway is part of the sidewalk (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 144; Code of the Village of Westbury [hereinafter Village Code] § 215-2 … ). “‘An abutting landowner will be liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a public sidewalk only when the owner either created the condition or caused the defect to occur because of a special use, or when a statute or ordinance places an obligation to maintain the sidewalk on the owner and expressly makes the owner liable for injuries caused by a breach of that duty'” … .

Here, the defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him by demonstrating that he did not create the alleged dangerous condition or cause that condition through a special use of the sidewalk … . In addition, while Village Code § 215-12 imposes a duty on owners and occupants of abutting land to keep sidewalks free of obstructions, the Village Code does not specifically impose tort liability for breach of that duty … . Although the defendant did not make an argument based on the provisions of the Village Code in support of his motion before the Supreme Court, his argument in this regard is reviewable on appeal because it is a purely legal argument that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided had it been raised at the proper juncture … . Lamorte v Iadevaia, 2021 NY Slip Op 04126, Second Dept 6-30-21

June 30, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVING A FIRE TRUCK DRIVEN BY A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER, THE FIRE DISTRICT CAN BE HELD TO A NEGLIGENCE, AS OPPOSED TO A RECKLESS DISREGARD, STANDARD PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-B (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a dissent, determined the defendant volunteer fire district could be held liable for a traffic accident under a negligence, as opposed to reckless disregard, standard, pursuant General Municipal Law 205-b. The dissent argued the reckless disregard standard applies because General Municipal Law 205-b does not specify a particular standard of care:

Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-b, “fire districts created pursuant to law shall be liable for the negligence of volunteer firefighters duly appointed to serve therein in the operation of vehicles owned by the fire district upon the public streets and highways of the fire district, provided such volunteer firefighters, at the time of any accident or injury, were acting in the discharge of their duties.” Thus, contrary to the Fire District’s contention, it was not limited to liability for conduct rising to the level of “reckless disregard” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), and could be held liable for the ordinary negligence of a volunteer firefighter operating the Fire District’s vehicle … . Anderson v Commack Fire Dist., 2021 NY Slip Op 03821, Second Dept 6-16-21

June 16, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Criminal Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE TRAFFIC AND PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU (TPVA) IS A CRIMINAL COURT WHICH CANNOT ISSUE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHEN A DEFENDANT FAILS TO APPEAR FOR A TRAFFIC-INFRACTION TRIAL; IN CONTRAST, A TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS BUREAU (TVB) IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, NOT A CRIMINAL COURT, AND MAY ISSUE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Bureau (TPVA) is a criminal court which cannot issue a default judgment when a defendant who has pled not guilty does not show up for a traffic-infraction trial. On the other hand, a Traffic Violations Bureau (TVA) is not a criminal court and may issue a default judgment:

Defendants in these cases were prosecuted in district court … . Each defendant timely appeared before the TPVA, pleaded not guilty, and requested a trial. They were each given a document indicating the date and time of the trial with a warning of the repercussions for failure to appear: “THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST OR PROCEED IN YOUR ABSENCE AND YOU WILL BE LIABLE FOR ANY SENTENCE AND/OR FEES IMPOSED, INCLUDING INCARCERATION, AND other penalties permitted by law.” Despite the warning notice, defendants failed to timely appear on their respective trial dates. No attempt was made by the People to try defendants in absentia. Rather, a judicial hearing officer of the TPVA rendered default judgments against them and imposed fines. …

The issue before us is whether a TPVA judicial hearing officer is authorized under the Vehicle and Traffic Law to render a default judgment against a defendant charged with a traffic infraction who first enters a timely not guilty plea but then fails to appear for trial. We answer that question in the negative. …

Unlike TPVAs, … the TVB is not a criminal court … . It is … an administrative tribunal where, in cities having a population of one million or more, traffic infractions may be disposed of in an administrative hearing held before a hearing officer appointed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles … . In contrast to trials conducted before TPVAs, hearings before the TVB are not governed by the CPL … . People v Iverson, 2021 NY Slip Op 03347, CtApp 5-27-21

May 27, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT DID NOT STOP FOR A RED LIGHT AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S CAR AS PLAINTIFF WAS PASSING THROUGH THE INTERSECTION; FAILING TO STOP FOR A RED LIGHT VIOLATES THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW AND CONSTITUTES NEGLIGENCE PER SE; PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence that defendant Glennon ran a red light and struck plaintiff’s car as plaintiff was passing through the intersection warranted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor. Running a red light is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which constitutes negligence per se:

“[A] violation of a standard of care imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se” … . Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1), a driver when “facing a steady circular red signal, . . . shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or in the event there is no crosswalk, at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of the approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection.” …

[Steedman, a witness, testified the] first two vehicles passed through the intersection without incident, but then the plaintiff, who was driving the third vehicle, was struck by Glennon’s vehicle. Steedman … testified that he observed Glennon looking down into her lap at the time of the accident. Thus, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that Glennon entered the subject intersection against a red light, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1) … . Callahan v Glennon, 2021 NY Slip Op 02509, Second Dept 4-28-21

April 28, 2021/by Bruce Freeman