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THE CARRIER WHICH HAD ISSUED A BUSINESS AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY COVERING THE INSURED’S FLATBED TRUCK WAS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM AN INJURY INCURRED WHILE UNLOADING A TRACTOR FROM THE FLATBED TRUCK; UNLOADING A TRUCK IS CONSIDERED OPERATION OF THE TRUCK UNDER VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 388 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff-insurer was obligated to defend and the insured in this personal injury case stemming from the unloading of a tractor from a flatbed truck owned by the insured. The tractor rolled over the insured’s son as it was being unloaded. The son and his wife sued the insured and the insured’s farm. Plaintiff carrier brought this action for a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify, apparently claiming the (insured’s) truck was not being operated when the accident occurred:

If anything within the “four corners of the complaint suggest[s] . . . a reasonable possibility of coverage,” the insurer must defend, even though it may not ultimately be bound to pay because the insured may not be liable … . …

Pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law, “[e]very owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for . . . injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 [1]) … . * * * “The policy of insurance issued must be as broad as the insured owner’s liability for use of the vehicle by the owner or anyone using the vehicle with his [or her] permission” … .

Loading and unloading of a covered vehicle constitute “use or operation” pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1) … , and a vehicle does not have to be in motion to be in “use or operation” … . * * *

George Henderson [the insured] loaded and secured the tractor on the flatbed truck, drove the flatbed truck to the farm, rolled the bed back and tilted it, and operated the winch that was supposed to be holding the tractor in place. He also regularly requested or allowed Charles Henderson [his son} and the other individual to unload machinery from the flatbed truck. Charles Henderson asserted that, due to George Henderson not paying attention, the winch cable went slack, causing it to release from the tractor and allow the tractor to roll. George Henderson is potentially both directly and vicariously liable for negligence in the personal injury action … , and there is prima facie “reasonable possibility of coverage” … . Thus, plaintiff is obliged to defend George Henderson and the farm in the underlying action. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co. v Henderson, 2020 NY Slip Op 00021, Third Dept 1-2-20

 

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PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DRIVER OF THE TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH STRUCK HIM WHEN HE WAS STANDING IN THE ROADWAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT NO LONGER NEED BE SHOWN; OTHER ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION INCLUDE THE EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY, THE TRUCK RENTAL COMPANIES’ LIABILITY, THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e (SECOND DEPARTMENT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff police officer was entitled to summary judgment against the driver of the tractor trailer which struck the officer who was standing in the roadway both under a common law negligence theory and under General Municipal Law 205-e. The court dealt with several other issues including: (1) whether a second police officer was engaged in an emergency operation, giving rise to the reckless disregard standard, when he stopped to assist the plaintiff who had made a traffic stop (the answer is no); (2) whether the second officer was liable based upon the position of his car (the answer is no, the car furnished a condition for the accident but was not the cause); (3) whether the injured officer’s recovery was confined to Workers’ Compensation (there is a question of fact whether the injury was “grave”); (4) whether the Graves Amendment protected the truck rental companies (the answer is yes); (5) whether vicarious liability applies to the truck driver’s employer (there is a question of fact on that issue). With respect to the common law negligence and the General Municipal Law 205-e causes of action, the court wrote:

… [T]he plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate that the injured plaintiff was free from comparative negligence in order to obtain summary judgment on the issue of Burke’s [the truck driver’s] liability on the first cause of action [negligence]. * * *

When the light changed, Burke began his left turn onto northbound Midland Avenue. Prior to beginning his turn, Burke was aware that there was a police officer conducting a traffic stop on foot and a police car parked on the northbound side of Midland Avenue. Although Burke believed he could make the turn safely, the rear of the trailer hit the injured plaintiff. * * *

The plaintiffs also established … Burke’s liability as to … a violation of General Municipal Law § 205-e. … [T]hat statute permits a police officer to bring a tort claim for injuries sustained “while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by . . . superior officer[s]” where such injuries occur “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” … . In order to recover under the statute, “a police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties” … .

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) requires a driver to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any . . . pedestrian.” Here, the unrebutted evidence established a prima facie violation of § 1146(a), as it demonstrated that Burke failed to exercise due care to avoid hitting the injured plaintiff. Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 09251, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS WERE PASSENGERS HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY ON A THROUGH ROAD; WHETHER DEFENDANT’S CAR STOPPED AT THE STOP SIGN BEFORE PULLING OUT INTO THE PATH OF PLAINTIFFS’ CAR WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-passengers’ motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should have been granted. The Hernandez/Transit car, in which plaintiffs were passengers, had the right of way on a through road. The defendant Desriviere’s car was on an intersecting street with a stop sign. The Second Department held that the fact the Desriviere car may have stopped at the stop sign before entering the intersection did not raise a relevant question of fact:

As a general matter, a driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a) is negligent as a matter of law … . The driver with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other motorist will obey traffic laws that require him or her to yield … . Yet, “a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident” … . Here, Hernandez and Julie P. Transit established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that (1) Hernandez had the right-of-way, (2) that because Desriviere failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and (3) that Desriviere’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . The question of whether Desriviere stopped at the stop sign is not dispositive, since the evidence established that he failed to yield even if he did stop … . Belle-Fleur v Desriviere, 2019 NY Slip Op 09244, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BICYCLE-CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST WAS TRAVELING THE WRONG WAY ON A ONE-WAY STREET AND DID NOT SLOW DOWN APPROACHING THE INTERSECTION WHERE HE COLLIDED WITH THE SIDE OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant driver was entitled to summary judgment in this bicycle-car collision case. Plaintiff was bicycling in the wrong direction on a one-way street. Defendant pulled out into the intersection after checking the traffic in the appropriate direction and plaintiff ran into the side of defendant’s car:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, a person riding a bicycle on a roadway has the same rights and responsibilities as a driver of a motor vehicle. Therefore, a bicyclist is required to use reasonable care for his or her own safety, to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for vehicles, and to avoid placing himself or herself into a dangerous position … .

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(b) states that a “driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall . . . slow down to a speed reasonable for existing conditions, or shall stop if necessary,” and “yield the right of way . . . to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time such driver is moving across or within the intersection.” In addition, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) requires motorists to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, pedestrian, or domestic animal” on the roadway and to “give warning by sounding the horn when necessary.”

The undisputed testimony was that plaintiff was traveling in the opposite direction of traffic, in clear violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, and traveled into the intersection without stopping or yielding to defendant’s vehicle which was clearly already in the intersection. Admittedly, plaintiff made no attempt to stop, or to alert defendant of his presence. Although a driver of a motor vehicle has a duty to see what is there to be seen, defendant was not required to look in the opposite direction of the intersecting one-way street to see if someone was traveling in the wrong direction and at a speed indicating no intent to stop. Felix v Polakoff, 2019 NY Slip Op 09100, First Dept 12-19-19

 

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PLAINTIFFS (CUPID AND ROBINSON) DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT AND HIS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF CUPID, NOT PLAINTIFF ROBINSON, WAS DRIVING THE CAR DID NOT CREATE A RELEVANT QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should have been granted. The evidence demonstrated defendant driver (Paul) went through a red light and failed to see what he should have seen. The defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs claimed that Cupid was driving when in fact the other plaintiff, Robinson, was driving was irrelevant:

The evidence submitted in support of Robinson’s motion demonstrated, prima facie, that Paul entered the subject intersection against a red light, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d) … . That evidence further showed that Paul failed to see the plaintiffs’ vehicle before colliding with it in the middle of the intersection, thus demonstrating that Paul failed to see that which he should have seen through the proper use of his senses. Contrary to the defendants’ contention in the Supreme Court, Robinson was not required to demonstrate her freedom from comparative fault in order to establish her prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability … .

Thus, Robinson made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the defendants’ liability by demonstrating that Paul was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the subject accident and her resulting injuries … . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. On the facts presented here, whether Robinson or Cupid was driving their vehicle is not germane to the issue of the defendants’ liability. Robinson v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 08881, Second Dept 12-11-19

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW IN MAKING A LEFT TURN, THE OFFICER REASONABLY BELIEVED THERE WAS A VIOLATION; THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED AND THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined: (1) the left turn made by the defendant from the right-most lane did not violate Vehicle and Traffic Law 1160; and (2) the officer who stopped the defendant reasonably believed the turn was a traffic violation. Therefore the traffic stop was justified:

Unlike the language used in other subsections of section 1160, the language of subsection (b) does not specify how close to the center line a vehicle must be when it completes its turn, nor does it designate a specific lane within which the vehicle must complete the turn (compare § 1160 [b] with § 1160 [a], [c], [e]). In light of the more specific language employed elsewhere in the statute, we read the use of the more general phrase “right of the center line” as meaningful and intentional … . Indeed, reading “right of the center line” to mean the lane to the immediate right of the center line, or as close to center as possible, would improperly render the more specific language used elsewhere in the statute superfluous … . …

… [S]uppression [of the seized weapon] is not required here because the stop was the result of the officer’s objectively reasonable belief that he observed a traffic violation … . In light of ” the reality that an officer may suddenly confront a situation in the field as to which the application of a statute is unclear—however clear it may later become[,]’ ” an officer’s misreading of a statute that is susceptible of multiple interpretations and has not been definitively construed by New York appellate courts may amount to a reasonable mistake of law justifying a traffic stop … . Notwithstanding our interpretation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1160 (b) above, the “right of the center line” language is, in our view, susceptible of multiple interpretations, including the interpretation taken by the officer here, and the ambiguity has not previously been definitively construed. People v Turner, 2019 NY Slip Op 07190, Fourth Dept 10-3-19

 

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NO EVIDENCE THE FATAL ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY DRIVING TOO FAST FOR THE CONDITIONS; PETITIONER WAS TRAVELLING BELOW THE SPEED LIMIT WHEN HIS CAR STRUCK A POTHOLE, CAUSING A MECHANICAL FAILURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the NYS Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board, annulled the finding that petitioner was speeding and the suspension of his driver’s license. Petitioner was traveling below the speed limit when his car struck a pothole causing a mechanical failure which resulted in a fatal accident. The Administrative Law Judge had determined petition was driving too fast for the conditions, meaning too fast for a road with potholes:

“To annul an administrative determination made after a hearing directed by law at which evidence is taken, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination” … . Here, the determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) is not supported by substantial evidence. There is no evidence to support the determination that the petitioner operated his vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. There was no evidence to show that the petitioner’s speed contributed to the accident or that the vehicle would not have been damaged by the pothole had the petitioner been traveling at a lesser rate of speed … . Matter of Pepe v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 2019 NY Slip Op 06397, Second Dept 8-28-19

 

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COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS ACTION FOR SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AFTER A DWI CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE COUNTY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COUNTY CODE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county’s motion for summary judgment in its action to seize defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the Nassau County Administrative Code after a DWI conviction (Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192) should not have been granted. The county did not comply with the notice requirements of the code:

…. [T]he complaint, as amplified by the plaintiff’s submissions establishing that the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, stated a cause of action for civil forfeiture of the vehicle pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code § 8-7.0(g)(4) … . Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her. However, in opposition to the plaintiff’s showing of its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact by adducing evidence demonstrating that, while she was given a copy of the notice of seizure in person, the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of Nassau County Administrative Code § 8-7.0(g)(4)(a) that she also be served with the notice of seizure by certified mail, return receipt requested … . Accordingly, the court should have denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment awarding civil forfeiture of the vehicle. County of Nassau v Urban, 2019 NY Slip Op 05762, Second Dept 7-24-19

 

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CONVICTIONS OF INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE FIRST DEGREE VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined vacated defendant’s conviction of two inclusory concurrent counts of the court alleging aggravated operation of a operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree:

… [T]he counts alleging driving while intoxicated as a felony in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree were inclusory concurrent counts of the count alleging aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (see CPL 300.30[4]; 300.40[3][b]; Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 511[2][a][ii]; [3][a][i]; 1192). Accordingly, the defendant’s convictions of driving while intoxicated as a felony in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3), and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree and the sentences imposed thereon must be vacated, and those counts of the indictment dismissed. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s contention that the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee must be reduced is more appropriately raised before the Supreme Court and, accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to consider this issue … . People v Delcid, 2019 NY Slip Op 05788, Second Dept 7-24-19

 

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PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY ABOUT HOW THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT HAPPENED FOUND INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, DISSENT ARGUED THE TESTIMONY RAISED CLASSIC QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DETERMINE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case was properly granted. The majority argued plaintiff’s testimony was incredible and therefore was properly disregarded. The dissent argued plaintiff’s testimony raised classic questions of fact about how the accident happened. The collision occurred when plaintiff was attempting to change lanes. The majority interpreted plaintiff’s testimony to mean that she was straddling two lanes and was not moving when the truck struck her SUV, which, based on photographic evidence, the majority found incredible as a matter of law:

The photographic evidence shows that plaintiff’s SUV struck the rear of defendants’ tractor-trailer as plaintiff was attempting to merge into defendants’ truck’s lane of traffic. Thus, plaintiff violated her “duty not to enter a lane of moving traffic until it was safe to do so” (… see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128[a] …), “and [her] failure to heed this duty constitutes negligence per se”. * * ^

… [I]n summary judgment analysis, we must discount the plaintiff’s testimony where the plaintiff has “relied solely on [her] own testimony, uncorroborated by any other witnesses or evidence,” and her testimony belied “common sense” … . As these circumstances are presented in this case, plaintiff’s testimony was properly “disregarded as being without evidentiary value” … . Thus, plaintiff’s testimony raised no triable issues of fact. Castro v Hatim, 2019 NY Slip Op 05639, First Dept 7-16-19

 

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