New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • CLE Courses-Pending
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Vehicle and Traffic Law
image_pdfPDF Friendly Versionimage_printPrint Friendly Version
Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER WHO COLLIDED WITH HER CAR WAS ENGAGED IN AN EMERGENCY OPERATION AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether defendant police officer, Breen, was in fact involved in an emergency operation at the time she collided with the car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Therefore there was a question of fact whether the ordinary negligence principles, as opposed the reckless disregard standard, applied:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence” … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that a negligence standard of care was inapplicable to Breen’s conduct, through the submission of evidence establishing that Breen was responding to another officer in need of assistance when she entered the intersection against a red traffic light and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle … . In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether Breen was in fact responding to the other officer’s call at the time of the accident and, therefore, whether the negligence standard should apply … . Modica v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 02287, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 19:47:042021-04-17 20:03:22PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER WHO COLLIDED WITH HER CAR WAS ENGAGED IN AN EMERGENCY OPERATION AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE PEOPLE WERE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE ISSUE WHETHER THE CHEMICAL BREATH TEST SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED; NEW SUPPRESSION HEARING ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, on an appeal by the People, determined County Court should not have suppressed the chemical breath test evidence in this DWI case because the People were not given an opportunity to respond to that suppression issue. The matter was remitted for a new suppression hearing:

… [T]he court erred in granting that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to suppress evidence because the court failed to notify the People of its intention to consider that issue and failed to give the People an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing on that issue … . At the Huntley hearing, the issues of the officer’s compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and defendant’s limited right to counsel were merely ancillary. Moreover, we reject defendant’s contention that the limited evidence that was admitted at the hearing supports the court’s determination to suppress the chemical breath test results. The evidence at the hearing established that the police administered a field breath test and then a chemical breath test at the jail, only the latter of which is the subject of section 1194 (2) (a) and would be admissible at trial … , but the court conflated the administration of both tests in determining that suppression was warranted. On this record, it is unclear whether the officer complied with section 1194 (2) (b) by warning defendant of the consequences of refusal in ” ‘clear and unequivocal language’ ” before administering the chemical test … . The record is also unclear whether defendant, who made a request to speak with his attorney, was afforded the opportunity to do so prior to deciding whether to submit to the chemical breath test … . People v Williams, 2021 NY Slip Op 01570, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

March 19, 2021/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-03-19 11:36:222021-03-20 13:12:36THE PEOPLE WERE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE ISSUE WHETHER THE CHEMICAL BREATH TEST SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED; NEW SUPPRESSION HEARING ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED BY DRUGS, NOT ALCOHOL; DIRECTION TO INSTALL AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE APPLIES ONLY TO OFFENSES INVOLVING ALCOHOL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, determined the offense to which defendant pled guilty did not involve alcohol and, therefore, the direction to install an ignition interlock device must be vacated:

… [T]he County Court improperly imposed an ignition interlock device requirement upon the defendant. The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2-a)(b) for “[d]riving while ability impaired by drugs” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[4]). A court may impose an ignition interlock device as a condition of probation and conditional discharge only for offenses involving alcohol (see Penal Law § 65.10[2][k-1]). The defendant’s conviction here falls outside the scope of the statute authorizing the imposition of such a condition … . People v Miller, 2021 NY Slip Op 00868, Second Dept 2-10-21

 

February 10, 2021/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-02-10 15:03:072021-02-13 15:17:10DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED BY DRUGS, NOT ALCOHOL; DIRECTION TO INSTALL AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE APPLIES ONLY TO OFFENSES INVOLVING ALCOHOL (SECOND DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE SNOWPLOW DRIVER DID NOT VIOLATE THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the reckless disregard standard applied in this traffic accident case involving a municipal snowplow:

“A snowplow operator ‘actually engaged in work on a highway’ is exempt from the rules of the road and may be held liable only for damages caused by an act done in ‘reckless disregard for the safety of others'” … . Reckless disregard requires more than a momentary lapse in judgment … . “This requires a showing that the operator acted in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow” … .

Oviedo-Mejia [the snowplow driver] testified that he was traveling in reverse at a speed of five to seven miles per hour with the lights and beeping alert of the snowplow vehicle activated. Oviedo-Mejia testified that he kept looking in the mirrors as the snowplow vehicle was moving in reverse, but he did not see the plaintiff prior to the alleged impact. Under the circumstances, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Oviedo-Mejia did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others … . Kaffash v Village of Great Neck Estates, 2021 NY Slip Op 00159, Second Dept 1-13-21

 

January 13, 2021/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-13 14:37:032021-01-16 14:54:57THE SNOWPLOW DRIVER DID NOT VIOLATE THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

AN ALLEGED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WAS NOT IN PLAIN VIEW IN THE VEHICLE; THEREFORE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A CLOSED CONTAINER IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH REVEALED A WEAPON, WAS NOT JUSTIFIED; WEAPONS CHARGES DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, dismissing the weapons charges, determined the search of defendant’s vehicle was not justified. The officer (Chowdhury) saw the top of a prescription bottle, pulled the bottle out of a pouch, determined it contained a controlled substance, a searched a closed container to find the weapon:

Chowdhury observed “two clear cups of brown liquid, alcohol” in the cup holders in the vehicle’s front console and smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. Chowdhury asked the defendant and an individual in the front passenger seat to exit the vehicle, and they complied. Chowdhury further testified that the rear passenger side door was open and that, with the aid of a flashlight, he observed the “white top” of a prescription bottle sticking out of the pouch on the back of the front passenger seat. Chowdhury then entered the vehicle, pulled the bottle out, and observed that it was clear, with no prescription label, and had unlabeled white pills inside that Chowdhury and [officer] Carrieri identified as Oxycodone. Carrieri then began searching the vehicle for any weapons or other contraband and found a handgun inside of a closed compartment under the rug behind the driver’s seat. The defendant was arrested, and later made a statement to the police regarding the gun. …

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress the gun and his statement. The officers’ observations of the brown liquid in the cups in the front console and the smell emanating from the vehicle gave them probable cause to suspect a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1227, which prohibits the possession of open containers containing alcohol in a vehicle located upon a public highway, and would have justified their entry into the vehicle to seize the cups of liquid and search for additional open containers … . However, since there was nothing from Officer Chowdhury’s observation of the top of the prescription bottle located in the seat pocket that indicated that the bottle contained contraband, there was no justification for his removal of the bottle and detailed inspection of it and its contents or for the subsequent search of the car for weapons or other contraband. Chowdhury testified that it was only after he pulled the bottle out of the pouch and pulled upward on the top of it that he was able to see that it was unlabeled and contained what he identified as Oxycodone. Thus, contrary to the People’s contention, it cannot be said that a suspected controlled substance was in plain sight … . People v Boykin, 2020 NY Slip Op 07085, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

November 25, 2020/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-11-25 09:40:122020-11-29 09:54:55AN ALLEGED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WAS NOT IN PLAIN VIEW IN THE VEHICLE; THEREFORE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A CLOSED CONTAINER IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH REVEALED A WEAPON, WAS NOT JUSTIFIED; WEAPONS CHARGES DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

EVEN IF THE OFFICER WERE WRONG ABOUT WHETHER A NON-FUNCTIONING CENTER BRAKE LIGHT VIOLATES THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, THE OFFICER’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE; THEREFORE THE STOP WAS VALID AND THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Term, over a concurring memorandum, a concurring opinion, and two dissenting opinions, determined the police officer who stopped defendant reasonably believed the non-functioning center brake light violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Therefore the stop was valid and the DWI evidence should not have been suppressed. The Vehicle and Traffic Law requires at least two functioning brake lights. Here there were two functioning lights but the center brake light was not working:

We conclude that the officer’s interpretation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was objectively reasonable. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (40) (b) mandates that motor vehicles manufactured after a certain date be “equipped with at least two stop lamps, one on each side, each of which shall display a red to amber light visible at least five hundred feet from the rear of the vehicle when the brake of such vehicle is applied.” Vehicle and Traffic Law § 376 (1) (a) prohibits, in relevant part, (1) operating a vehicle “during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise, unless such vehicle is equipped with lamps of a type approved by the commissioner which are lighted and in good working condition”; and (2) operating a vehicle at any time “unless such vehicle is equipped with signaling devices and reflectors of a type approved by the commissioner which are in good working condition.” Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (19), in turn, prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle on highways or streets if the vehicle “is defectively equipped and lighted.” Taken together, these provisions could reasonably be read to require that all lamps and signaling devices be in good working condition, and that all equipment and lighting be non-defective, regardless of whether a vehicle is actually required to be equipped with those lamps, signaling devices, equipment, or lights. Even assuming the officer was in fact mistaken on the law, it was nevertheless objectively reasonable to conclude that defendant’s non-functioning center brake light violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law … . Because any error of law by the officer was reasonable, there was probable cause justifying the stop … . People v Pena, 2020 NY Slip Op 06836, CtApp 11-19-20

 

November 19, 2020/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-11-19 10:15:172020-11-20 10:41:35EVEN IF THE OFFICER WERE WRONG ABOUT WHETHER A NON-FUNCTIONING CENTER BRAKE LIGHT VIOLATES THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, THE OFFICER’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE; THEREFORE THE STOP WAS VALID AND THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).
Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 388 (1), WHICH IMPOSES VICARIOUS LIABILITY ON THE OWNER OF A VEHICLE, DOES NOT PERMIT A NEGLIGENT DRIVER TO SUE THE VEHICLE OWNER FOR THE DRIVER’S OWN NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined defendant vehicle-owner’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted. The deceased driver’s estate sued the owner of the car under the vicarious liability statute, Vehicle and Traffic Law 388 (1). The Second Department held that the statute does not permit a negligent driver to recover against the vehicle-owner for the driver’s own negligence:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) provides that “[e]very owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” The predecessor of this provision—section 282-e of the Highway Law, which was enacted in 1924 …—was intended to alleviate the harshness of the common law rule whereby the owner of a vehicle who merely permitted another to drive it could not be held liable for the driver’s negligence unless the driver was the owner’s employee or agent and was using the vehicle as part of the owner’s business … . Thus, the purpose of the new legislation was to ensure that persons injured by a negligent driver had access to “a financially responsible insured person against whom to recover for injuries” … . In other words, while the driver’s own negligence remained grounded in common law, the new statute simply made owners vicariously liable for injuries caused by the driver’s negligence, so long as the driver was operating the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied permission … . The Legislature “did not otherwise change any of the rules of liability,” and “may not be presumed to make any innovation upon the common law further than is required by the mischief to be remedied” … .

In light of the history and purpose of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, we hold that the statute does not permit a negligent driver (or, in this case, the driver’s estate) to recover damages against the owner for injuries resulting from the driver’s own negligence … . Shepard v Power, 2020 NY Slip Op 06568, Second Dept 11-12-20

 

November 12, 2020/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-11-12 13:58:422020-11-17 11:24:55VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 388 (1), WHICH IMPOSES VICARIOUS LIABILITY ON THE OWNER OF A VEHICLE, DOES NOT PERMIT A NEGLIGENT DRIVER TO SUE THE VEHICLE OWNER FOR THE DRIVER’S OWN NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER ON DEFENDANTS’ ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE (ATV), DRIVEN BY DEFENDANTS’ DECEDENT, WHO WAS INTOXICATED, WHEN THE ATV CRASHED INTO A TREE; THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE IS NO COMMON LAW “NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF ALCOHOL TO A MINOR” CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST ADDRESSED IN PLAINITIFFS’ REPLY PAPERS PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined: (1) there is no common law cause of action in New York for negligent provision of alcohol to a minor; (2) summary judgment should have been granted on the negligence cause of action against the estate of the infant driver and owner of the all terrain vehicle (ATV); and (3) the negligent supervision cause of action properly survived summary judgment. Infant plaintiff was a passenger on the ATV driven by defendants’ decedent, who was intoxicated, when the ATV struck a tree. The court noted that the two causes of action which plaintiffs addressed only in their reply papers were properly dismissed:

… [T]he Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of the liability of Nicola Trivigno [ATV owner} and Frankie’s [defendants’ decedent’s] estate. A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in order to establish his or her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability … . A violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence as a matter of law …  Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that Frankie operated the ATV while intoxicated in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192). Frankie’s negligence is imputed to Nicola Trivigno, who was the owner of the ATV which was being driven by Frankie with Nicola Trivigno’s permission … . Abtey v Trivigno, 2020 NY Slip Op 06233, Second Dept 11-4-20

 

November 4, 2020/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-11-04 08:53:172020-11-07 09:22:12INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER ON DEFENDANTS’ ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE (ATV), DRIVEN BY DEFENDANTS’ DECEDENT, WHO WAS INTOXICATED, WHEN THE ATV CRASHED INTO A TREE; THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE IS NO COMMON LAW “NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF ALCOHOL TO A MINOR” CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST ADDRESSED IN PLAINITIFFS’ REPLY PAPERS PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Court of Claims, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE DRIVER OF THE STATE DUMP TRUCK WHO SIDESWIPED PLAINTIFF’S MOPED IN THE BICYCLE LANE WHILE LOOKING FOR DEAD DEER DID NOT ACT RECKLESSLY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the driver of a Department of Transportation (DOT) dump truck did not act recklessly within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic law 1103 [b]. The driver was traveling partially in the bicycle lane looking for dead deer and didn’t see the plaintiff on a moped in the bicycle lane:

A State vehicle “actually engaged in work on a highway” is exempt from the rules of the road and may be held liable only for damages caused by an act done in “reckless disregard for the safety of others” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103[b] … ). “Reckless disregard . . . requires more than a momentary lapse in judgment” … . In order to meet the standard required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), a claimant must show that “the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome”… .

… [T]he evidence was insufficient to establish that the DOT workers exhibited a “reckless disregard for the safety of others” (Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1103[b]). The claimant failed to establish that the DOT workers acted in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probably that harm would follow … . Rascelles v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 05788, Second Dept 10-14-20

 

October 14, 2020/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-10-14 13:18:302020-10-17 13:40:04THE DRIVER OF THE STATE DUMP TRUCK WHO SIDESWIPED PLAINTIFF’S MOPED IN THE BICYCLE LANE WHILE LOOKING FOR DEAD DEER DID NOT ACT RECKLESSLY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT, IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN PULLING OUT OF A PARKING LOT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should have been granted. Defendant failed to yield the right of way when entering the roadway from a parking lot:

“It is well settled that a driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the drivers of other vehicles will obey the traffic laws that require them to yield. Because [defendant] was entering the roadway from a parking lot, []he was required to yield the right-of-way to [plaintiff’s] vehicle” ( … see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143). Here, plaintiffs met their initial burden of proof with respect to defendant’s negligence by submitting, inter alia, plaintiff’s deposition testimony recounting the circumstances of the accident and the corroborating police report, which established as a matter of law that defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143, breached his duty to operate his vehicle with due care, and thereby caused the accident … .

… Defendant’s claimed inability to recall the circumstances of the accident “is not affirmative proof that the event did not happen[ and is] . . . thus insufficient to create an issue of fact” … . Moreover, while defendant made inconsistent statements about his actions before pulling into the street from the parking lot, those statements offered no basis for a rational factfinder to excuse his violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 or negate his responsibility for the accident … . Kowalyk v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05346, Fourth Dept 10-2-20

 

October 2, 2020/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-10-02 10:50:372020-10-04 11:05:44DEFENDANT, IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN PULLING OUT OF A PARKING LOT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Page 1 of 16123›»

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2021 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Scroll to top
LATEST ADDITION; CONTRIBUTE?

Just Added: “Weekly Newsletter April 5 – 9, 2021–A Compilation of the Decision-Summaries Posted in “Latest Posts” on Monday April 12–Organized by Legal Category with a Table of Contents

Initial Goal: 100 Contributions–20 So Far

Consider Contributing “$1-a-Week” or “$1-a-Visit”

Thanks to All Who Have Contributed! Bruce Freeman, Editor