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IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end traffic accident cause should have been granted. Defendant’s allegation plaintiff stopped suddenly did not raise a question of fact:

It is well established that a rear-end collision with a slowing or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle … .

… [D]efendant failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . Defendant failed to establish that she maintained a safe following distance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] … ) and that any repeated braking by plaintiff was not foreseeable due to the existence of the construction zone and 15 mile per hour speed limit. Defendant failed to establish that given the circumstances she could have “reasonably expected that traffic would continue unimpeded” … . While defendant claims that plaintiff made a sudden stop, a “claim by the rear driver that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence” … . Ahmad v Behal, 2023 NY Slip Op 06196, First Dept 11-30-23

Practice Point: In a rear-end collision case, alleging the car in front stopped suddenly does not defeat the presumption that the rear driver was negligent.

 

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A DRIVER WHO HAS THE RIGHT-OF-WAY IS ENTITLED TO ANTICIPATE OTHER DRIVERS WILL OBEY THE TRAFFIC LAWS REQUIRING THEM TO YIELD; HERE DEFENDANT ENTERED AN INTERSECTION WITH A GREEN LIGHT AND PLAINTIFF MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF HIM; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the defendant driver demonstrated he had the right-of-way when he entered the intersection with and green light and plaint made a left turn in front of him. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

“A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield to the driver with the right-of-way” … . “Although a driver with a right-of-way also has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision, . . . a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … .

Here, the defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that he had the right-of-way, the plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way, and the defendant did not have sufficient time to react in order to avoid the collision … . The defendant, as the driver with the right-of-way, was entitled to anticipate that the plaintiff would obey the traffic laws which required her to yield … . Smith v Trail, 2023 NY Slip Op 06070, Second Dept 11-22-23

Practice Point: A driver who fails to take evasive action can be contributorily negligent. But here defendant entered the intersection with a green light and plaintiff made a left turn in front of him. Plaintiff did not raise a question of fact whether defendant had time to take evasive action.

 

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THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT TOWN’S AND POLICE-OFFICER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS UNEQUIVOCAL AND DEMONSTRATED THE OFFICERS DID NOT VIOLATE THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD WHEN PURSUING PLAINTIFF MOTORCYCLIST, WHO CRASHED AND WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED; THERE WAS NO INDICATION FURTHER DISCOVERY WOULD UNCOVER ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED AS PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town and police–officer defendants were entitled to summary judgment in this motorcycle-accident case. The plaintiff motorcyclist (Ronnie) was speeding when the defendant officers attempted to follow him with their emergency lights on. Both officers pulled back because of the plaintiff’s speed, losing sight of plaintiff. The officers came upon plaintiff in the woods after he had crashed. Supreme Court ruled that the defendants had demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment but found that the summary judgment motion was premature and should await further discovery. The Second Department held the motion was not premature because there was no indication additional evidence would be uncovered:

… [T]he defendants’ motion was not premature. The plaintiff “failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the [defendants]” … . Here, the officers directly involved in the attempt to stop Ronnie provided sworn affidavits, which were unequivocal and consistent with the other evidence in the case. There is no basis to conclude that depositions or other discovery would render a different account of the accident. The plaintiff’s mere hope or speculation that discovery would render evidence sufficient to defeat the defendants’ motion was not a sufficient basis to deny the motion … . Rojas v Town of Tuxedo, 2023 NY Slip Op 05751, Second Dept 11-15-23

Practice Point: Where the evidence supports summary judgment and there is no indication further discovery will uncover additional evidence, the summary judgment motion should not be denied as “premature.”

 

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PLAINTIFF PASSENGER SUED THE DRIVER WHO STRUCK A CAR FROM BEHIND; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE DRIVER FAILED TO MAINTAIN A SAFE DISTANCE IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff passenger was not entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. The defendant, Rodriguez, was driving the car in which plaintiff was a passenger when it stuck another car driven by Espada. Plaintiff did not demonstrate that Rodriguez did not maintain a safe distance from the Espada car. Therefore plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case that Rodriguez was liable for a rear-end collision:

Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that the accident was a rear-end collision resulting from Rodriguez’s failure to maintain a safe distance behind Espada’s vehicle, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129(a) … . Rather, plaintiff testified that Rodriguez’s vehicle came in contact with Espada’s vehicle as Rodriguez was turning into an intersection, and plaintiff did not see the Espada vehicle prior to the accident and did not know if it was moving or stopped at the moment of impact. Absent a showing that Rodriguez negligently struck Espada’s vehicle due to a failure to maintain a safe distance, plaintiff, even as an innocent passenger, was not entitled to summary judgment … . McDowell v Rodriguez, 2023 NY Slip Op 05368, First Dept 10-24-23

Practice Point: To be entitled to summary judgment in a rear-end collision case, the plaintiff must demonstrate the driver did not maintain a safe distance from the car in front.

 

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THE DRIVER OF THE FIRE ENGINE RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S STOPPED CAR WHILE MAKING A RIGHT TURN FROM A LANE TO THE LEFT OF PLAINTIFF; IT WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE FIRE-ENGINE DRIVER ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the city was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case involving a fire engine responding to an emergency. Plaintiff had stopped in the right lane and was struck by the fire engine as it made a right turn from the lane to the left of plaintiff, or possibly from the oncoming lane. The Second Department determined the city had demonstrated, as a matter of law, the reckless-disregard standard was not triggered:

“The reckless disregard standard requires evidence that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome” … . “The reckless disregard standard, which requires that a plaintiff show more than a momentary judgment lapse on the part of the defendant, allows emergency personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time protecting the public’s safety” … .

… [T]he defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the applicable standard of care was reckless disregard, as Roberts [the engine driver] was engaging in conduct specified in Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1104(b)(2) and 1104(b)(4) at the time of the collision … . The defendants further demonstrated, prima facie, that Roberts’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others … . Moore v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 05128, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: The fact that the fire engine struck plaintiff’s stopped car while making a right turn from a lane to the plaintiff’s left did not raise a question of fact about whether the engine-driver demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

 

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IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE DRIVER OF THE REAR VEHICLE ALLEGED THE OTHER VEHICLE CHANGED LANES ABRUPTLY AND CAME TO A STOP IN FRONT OF HIM; THAT CONSTITUTED A NON-NEGLIGENT EXPLANATION WHICH RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end traffic accident case, determined defendant raised a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for his striking the car in front:

At his deposition, Guo Lin Wu [the driver of the United vehicle] testified that the Castillo/Lopez vehicle changed lanes abruptly in front of the United vehicle and then came to a sudden stop. Guo Lin Wu’s deposition testimony, if true, would constitute a nonnegligent explanation for his actions, and would establish that Castillo’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident … . The differing versions of events raised issues of credibility to be resolved by the factfinder … . Balanta v Guo Lin Wu, 2023 NY Slip Op 05111, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Ordinarily a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle warrants summary judgment in favor of the stopped vehicle. Here the driver of the rear vehicle raised a question of fact by alleging the other vehicle changed lanes abruptly and stopped in front of him.

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHO HAD THE GREEN LIGHT AND WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER SAW WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact which precluded summary judgment in favor of defendants in this intersection traffic accident case. Although plaintiffs’ car was struck when attempting a left turn across defendant’s oncoming lane, there was conflicting evidence about which party had the green light and whether defendant failed to see what should have been seen:

Susan [plaintiff] testified at her deposition that she entered the subject intersection to turn left when a traffic arrow controlling the left turn was green in her favor. In contrast, Peter [defendant] testified at his deposition that the traffic light was green in his favor as he approached the subject intersection from the opposite direction. In addition, Peter testified that there was nothing obstructing his view of the intersection as he began to drive through it, and it is undisputed that he then struck the plaintiff’s vehicle on the middle portion of the passenger side door. Thus, although the defendants submitted some evidence that Susan failed to yield the right-of-way to the defendants’ vehicle at the intersection in apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141, the evidence submitted by the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Peter entered the intersection against a red traffic light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1) or, if the traffic light was green in his favor, failed to exercise reasonable care notwithstanding the invitation to proceed by the green light facing him … . Accordingly, the defendants did not establish, prima facie, that Susan’s failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the defendants were themselves free from fault … . Schmitz v Pinto, 2023 NY Slip Op 04983, Second Dept 10-4-23

Practice Point: There can be more than one proximate cause of a traffic accident. Although plaintiff was struck making a left turn across defendant’s lane, there were questions of fact about who had the green light, and, if defendant had the green light, whether he should have seen what was there to be seen (plaintiff’s car was struck in the middle of the passenger door).

 

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PETITIONER-PEDESTRIAN ESTABLISHED THE IDENTITY OF THE DRIVER WHO STRUCK HER COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED THROUGH REASONABLE EFFORTS; THEREFORE SHE COULD SUE THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner-pedestrian demonstrated the driver who violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law, struck her and fled the scene could not be identified. Therefore she was entitled to sue the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). The court noted that, although petitioner relied on a hearsay police report, the report could be considered because the MVAIC also relied on it:

Petitioner alleged that on March 4, 2021, she was injured as a pedestrian in the crosswalk after a two-motor-vehicle collision between a BMW and Cadillac. The police report stated that petitioner was struck by the Cadillac after its driver disobeyed a traffic light and collided with the BMW, and the driver of the Cadillac subsequently fled from the scene by foot. The police later discovered that the Cadillac’s license plate did not match the vehicle.

… [P]etitioner proffered … a police accident report pertaining to the incident, a letter from the BMW’s insurer disclaiming coverage on the ground that its insured driver did not disobey any traffic law, and a sworn Notice of Intention to Make a Claim (Notice of Intention) attesting that the Cadillac’s driver was unknown, and the vehicle had a fake license plate. … [T]hese documents were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Insurance Law § 5218 to commence an action against MVAIC … . Petitioner met her burden of demonstrating that the subject accident was one in which the identity of the owner and operator of the Cadillac was not ascertainable through reasonable efforts … . Although a police report is generally inadmissible as hearsay, MVAIC also relied on it in opposing the petition, and thus it may be considered in support of the Notice of Intention .. . Matter of Richardson v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04950, Second Dept 10-3-23

Practice Point: This decision gives some insight into the proof required to demonstrate the identity of a driver involved in an accident cannot be ascertained, clearing the way for a suit against the MVAIC.

 

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THE RULES OF THE ROAD APPLY TO BICYCLISTS; HERE THE BICYCLIST DARTED OUT INTO TRAFFIC FROM IN FRONT OF A PARKED VAN; THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPARTMENT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the rules of the road apply to bicyclists who suddenly dart out into traffic from in front of a parked car. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 provides that a driver entering or crossing a roadway “from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.” Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231 provides that every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway “shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this title.”

… [T]he defendants established … that the infant plaintiff negligently entered the roadway mid-block from in front of a parked van without yielding the right-of-way to the defendants’ vehicle, and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The evidence submitted in support of the motion, which included, inter alia, transcripts of the deposition testimony of the infant plaintiff, the defendant driver, and a nonparty witness, demonstrated that the defendant driver was traveling only 15 to 20 miles per hour, and had, at most, two seconds to react before the infant plaintiff’s bicycle struck the passenger side of the vehicle. Thus, the defendants demonstrated that the defendant driver was not negligent for failing to avoid colliding with the infant plaintiff … .  A. B. v Waring, 2023 NY Slip Op 04565, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1231 applies all the duties of a vehicle-driver to bicyclists. Here the bicyclist violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by suddenly entering the lane of traffic from in front of a parked van. The defendant driver was not negligent.

 

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DEFENDANT’S UNSAFE LANE-CHANGE, A VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff alleged defendant (Roman) suddenly attempted to change lanes in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and struck plaintiff’s car. Defendant’s claim that he glanced quickly to the left as plaintiff was attempting to pass him did not raise a question of fact:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted a transcript of his testimony at a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h wherein he testified that while the vehicle that Roman was operating was traveling in the far right lane of a three-lane highway, Roman swerved into the vehicle the plaintiff was operating, which was traveling in the far left lane. This testimony established, prima facie, that Roman changed lanes before ascertaining that such movement could be made safely in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a) … .

… Roman’s affidavit, wherein he stated that he quickly steered into the left lane after “glanc[ing]” to his left, when the vehicle operated by the plaintiff “apparently attempted to pass [him] quickly on the driver’s side,” did not establish a nonnegligent excuse for the happening of the accident … . Moreover, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the emergency doctrine was applicable … . Elfe v Roman, 2023 NY Slip Op 04575, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: The evidence that defendant struck plaintiff’s car making an unsafe lane change in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (negligence per se) entitled plaintiff to summary judgment.

 

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