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SUPREME COURT PROPERLY VALIDATED 25 SIGNATURES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH HAD BEEN INVALIDATED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR COUNTY EXECUTIVE TO RUN IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court properly validated signatures which had been declared invalid by the Oneida County Board of Elections, allowing the Democratic candidate for Oneida County Executive to run in the upcoming election:

The designating petition had been invalidated by respondent Board of Elections of County of Oneida (Board), which determined in response to objections filed by James Genovese (respondent) that the designating petition contained 22 fewer valid signatures than required. After a hearing, Supreme Court validated 25 signatures that had been invalidated by the Board and thus ordered that petitioner be declared a duly qualified candidate of the Democratic Party for County Executive. …

With respect to the merits, we reject respondent’s contention that the court erred in validating the signatures at lines 2 through 4 and lines 6 and 7 of page 28 of the designating petition. Each of those signatures had listed by them the same street address, but no apartment numbers were included even though testimony at the hearing established that there are “maybe 60 [to] 70” apartments at that address. We nonetheless conclude that the designating petition adequately set forth the “residence address” of those signers within the meaning of Election Law § 6-130 “by indicating each signer’s respective street address”… , and that an apartment number is not a required component of a residence address for purposes of section 6-130 … .

… The signatures at line 8 of page 17 and line 8 of page 6 were properly validated based on the testimony of the signers identifying their signatures … . The court validated the other three signatures by crediting the testimony of “subscribing witnesses attesting to the identity of [the signers]” … , i.e., testimony that the subscribing witnesses either personally knew the signer or required the signer to present identification before signing … .

… Respondent also contends that the subscribing witness for page 90 of the designating petition engaged in fraud by attesting in his subscribing witness statement that the signer listed at line 8 signed her name in his presence, when in fact her son signed for her pursuant to a power of attorney. In view of the court’s determination to credit the testimony of the subscribing witness, however, we conclude that the record fails to establish that the subscribing witness statement was false, i.e., that the listed signer did not sign the designating petition herself … . Matter of Hennessy v Board of Elections of County of Oneida, 2019 NY Slip Op 06450, Fourth Dept 9-4-19

 

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PROPOSED 2019 ELECTION REFERENDUM REGARDING PUBLIC EDUCATION OFFICIALS IN THE CITY OF ROCHESTER IS IMPERMISSIBLY ADVISORY AND WAS PROPERLY DECLARED VOID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the proposed 2019 referendum on amendments to City of Rochester Local Laws regarding the Board of Education, Commissioners and the salaries of School Board Members was impermissibly advisory:

Any local law that “[a]bolishes an elective office” or “reduces the salary of an elective officer during his [or her] term of office” is subject to mandatory referendum (Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 [2] [e]), but an “advisory” referendum—i.e., one that lacks legal effect or consequence—is not permitted in the absence of express constitutional or statutory authority for it … .

Contrary to respondents’ contention, we conclude, for two independent reasons, that the referendum on the Local Law is impermissibly advisory and, thus, that the court properly declared the Local Law invalid and the referendum void. First, the language of section 5 of the Local Law, which conditions its effectiveness on subsequent action by the New York State Legislature, strips the referendum of any binding legal effect (…see … Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 [1]). Second, as the court correctly noted, a local government may not legislate in areas “where the State has evidenced its intent to occupy the field” … , and it is well established that the State has preempted local action in the field of public education … . Matter of Rochester City Sch. Dist. v City of Rochester, 2019 NY Slip Op 06449, Fourth Dept 9-4-19

 

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TOWN LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT PETITIONER FROM RUNNING FOR TOWN JUSTICE IN TWO DIFFERENT TOWNS SIMULTANEOUSLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Town Law did not prohibit simultaneously running for Town Justice in two different towns:

At issue is the portion of Town Law § 20 (4) providing that “[n]o person shall be eligible to hold more than one elective town office.” Petitioner interprets this to mean that no person may hold more than one elective office, even if those offices are in separate towns. Bacon [respondent] asserts that this language prohibits a person from holding more than one elective office only within the same town. Because the quoted language is ambiguous and both proffered interpretations are reasonable, we must view the language in the context of the whole statute … . …

Viewing the prohibition in context, Town Law § 20 makes provision for town offices for each town, by class, and contains no other language suggesting that one person cannot fulfill elective town offices in more than one town. Moreover, the prohibition is contained in the same sentence as a provision allowing a town board to consolidate its own town offices and positions, strongly suggesting that the entire subdivision (4) of Town Law § 20 refers to what is permitted in an individual town. …

We further agree with Supreme Court that the offices of town justice in separate towns are not incompatible offices. …Serving as town justice in two separate towns involves jurisdiction over separate, defined geographic town boundaries and each town court thereof (see Town Law § 2). Moreover, the Legislature has expressly recognized that one person may, under certain circumstances, serve as town justice in more than one town (see UJCA 106 [2]; 106-a, 106-b). Although those circumstances are not present here, these statutes indicate the Legislature’s view that no conflict exists to prevent a person from serving as town justice in two towns simultaneously. Matter of Nichols v Bacon, 2019 NY Slip Op 06434, Third Dept 8-29-19

 

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STATEMENTS POSTED ON AN ELECTION-RELATED FACEBOOK PAGE ABOUT THE OPPOSING CANDIDATE ARE NOT SHIELDED BY IMMUNITY AND ARE ACTIONABLE IN THIS DEFAMATION CASE; TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF A COMPLAINT A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE MADE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined statements posted on an election-related Facebook page by defendant, a Sheriff running for County Executive, concerning plaintiff, a Deputy County Executive also running for County Executive, were actionable in this defamation case. The court noted that the defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to strike certain paragraphs of the complaint (CPLR 3024) was not before the court because a motion for leave to appeal had not been made (CPLR 5701 [b] [3]):

… [W]e reject defendant’s contention that he is shielded from liability due to absolute immunity. This immunity protects government officials, such as defendant, “with respect to statements made during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties” … . As such, plaintiff cannot maintain a defamation claim against defendant based upon statements “emanating from official reports and communications” … . Although defendant was commenting about an investigation being conducted by his office, as well as responding to attacks on the credibility of his office, the documentary evidence in the record establishes that the challenged statements were not posted on the official site of the Chemung County Sheriff. Rather, they were posted on defendant’s campaign Facebook page and another Internet website. Under these circumstances, defendant cannot rely on absolute immunity … .

… The statement that plaintiff was “pilfering free gas from taxpayers” is “susceptible to a defamatory meaning, inasmuch as [it] convey[s], at a minimum, serious impropriety and, at worst, criminal behavior” … . Such statement also “has a precise meaning that is capable of being proven true or false” … . …

The complaint alleged that defendant published the false statements and that they “were made in bad faith, with reckless disregard for the truth” and “tend[ed] to subject plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, and disgrace.” In view of these allegations, as well as the specific statements at issue, we are satisfied that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded malice … . Krusen v Moss, 2019 NY Slip Op 05733, Third Dept 7-18-19

 

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ELECTION LAW 3-222 WHICH PROHIBITS DISCLOSURE OF VOTED BALLOTS FOR TWO YEARS AFTER AN ELECTION APPLIES BOTH TO PAPER BALLOTS AND ELECTRONIC BALLOTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeal, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over two dissenting opinions (three dissenting judges), reversing the Appellate Division, determined that Election Law 3-222 (2), which prohibits, for two years, the disclosure of “voted ballots” absent a court order of legislative committee direction, prohibits the disclosure of the electronic form of the ballots:

Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a), the FOIL exemption at issue, provides that an agency may deny access to records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.” While an applicable “state or federal statute” need not “expressly state it is intended to establish a FOIL exemption, we have required a showing of clear legislative intent to establish and preserve that confidentiality which one resisting a FOIL disclosure claims as protection” … . Respondents assert that Election Law § 3-222 creates such an exemption. To determine whether Election Law § 3-222 reflects the requisite legislative interest in confidentiality, we must interpret the statute. * * *

… . [T]he rule in Election Law § 3-222(2) that “voted ballots” are protected from examination during the first two years after an election absent court order or direction from a relevant legislative committee extends to electronic copies of those ballots. The same is true of absentee and military ballots, which are “voted ballots” under subsection (2) and, along with their envelopes, are also specifically protected in subsection (3). Matter of Kosmider v Whitney, 2019 NY Slip Op 04757, CtApp 6-13-19

 

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THE CANDIDATE SIGNED THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESS STATEMENT WHICH INDICATED EACH VOTER SIGNED THE DESIGNATING PETITION IN HIS PRESENCE, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE, DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPERLY INVALIDATED BASED UPON THE CANDIDATE’S PARTICIPATION IN FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the designating petition was properly invalidated because there was clear and convincing evidence the candidate (Subedi) participated in fraudulent activity:

Regarding the challenged signatures for which Subedi was the subscribing witness, it is undisputed that the voters did not subscribe their signatures in Subedi’s presence nor did they identify themselves to Subedi as the signatories. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Subedi signed the subscribing witness statement on each sheet containing the challenged signatures and attested that, “[e]ach of the individuals whose names are subscribed to this petition sheet . . ., subscribed the same in [his] presence . . . and identified himself or herself to be the individual who signed [the] sheet.” Subedi then filed the designating petition and did not notify the Board of any irregularity or otherwise correct his subscribing witness statement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Supreme Court correctly determined that there was clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent conduct on the part of Subedi … .

We note that Subedi freely admits his error and contends that he was not trying to gain any unfair advantage. Fraud, however, does not require any proof of a “‘nefarious motive'” … . Matter of Burman v Subedi, 2019 NY Slip Op 04315, Third Dept 5-31-19

 

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PERSONS WHO SIGNED A DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH WAS DEEMED NULL AND VOID COULD VALIDLY SIGN A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BALLOT PETITION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Board of Elections, determined that the persons who signed a designating petition which was deemed null and void could validly sign a subsequent opportunity to ballot petition:

In general, when a qualified voter signs a designating petition and, on a subsequent date, signs an opportunity to ballot petition, the voter’s signature on the later opportunity to ballot petition is invalid (see Election Law § 6-134 [3]…). However, where, as here, a qualified voter signs a designating petition that is subsequently invalidated or deemed “null and void” by operation of law (Election Law § 6-146 [1]), the voter is permitted to sign an opportunity to ballot petition subsequent to the invalidation of the designating petition … . “A contrary holding would deprive persons who signed a designating petition later held invalid from exercising the separate right given to them by the Election Law to request the opportunity to write in the name of a candidate of their choice” … . Matter of Stack v Harrington, 2019 NY Slip Op 04314, Third Dept 5-31-19

 

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PETITIONER DID NOT LIVE IN THE TOWN WHERE THE CHALLENGED CANDIDATE WAS RUNNING FOR OFFICE AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DESIGNATING PETITIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRUCK THE RESPONDENT CANDIDATES’ ANSWER BASED UPON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE VERIFICATION AND DENIALS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the respondent candidates’ answer should not have been stricken based upon alleged defects in the verification and denials and petitioner did not have standing to contest the designating petition because she did not reside in the town where the single challenged candidate was running for office:

CPLR 3026 provides that “[p]leadings shall be liberally construed” and that “[d]efects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced.” Here, we conclude that petitioner did not establish substantial prejudice from any alleged defect in the verification, and thus candidate respondents’ answer should not have been stricken on that ground … . Moreover, “the CPLR does not provide for the striking of improper denials” … .

Furthermore, we note that candidate respondents properly raised standing as an affirmative defense in their April 24 answer, and we agree with candidate respondents that petitioner lacked standing to commence this proceeding pursuant to Election Law article 16. A condition precedent to commencing a proceeding as an objector pursuant to section 16-102 is compliance with the requirements of section 6-154, including that the objector be a “voter registered to vote for such public office” (§ 6-154 [2]).

Here, petitioner served her specifications of objections upon Vickman and upon the chairwoman and the secretary of the Party only, and not on any of the other candidate respondents listed on the authorization. Petitioner, however, lacked standing to challenge the designating petition of Vickman or to challenge the authorization as it pertained to Vickman, who was running for public office in the Town of Farmersville, because petitioner was not a resident of that town … . Matter of Augostini v Bernstein, 2019 NY Slip Op 04312, Fourth Dept 5-30-19

 

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ALTHOUGH THE CANDIDATE’S RESIDENCE WAS BEING RENOVATED AND SHE TEMPORARILY LIVED ELSEWHERE SHE INTENDED TO RETURN TO THE RESIDENCE WHICH WAS INDICATED ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION, THE DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined respondent candidate’s designating petition should not have been invalidated on the ground that the she did not live at the address provided on the petition:

The record reflects that respondent was actively engaged in renovating the property at the address provided on the designating petitions, that respondent signed a temporary lease for a property also located within the relevant voting district, and that respondent intended on permanently residing at the property listed on the designating petitions once renovations were complete. Indeed, Supreme Court expressly noted that it did not “question . . . the integrity of [respondent’s] testimony in saying that [it was] her intention to live [at the address].” Notwithstanding the fact that the address listed on the designation petitions was not respondent’s current residence and thus did not comply with Election Law § 6-132, “[w]here, as here, there is no proof of any intention on the part of the candidate or of those who have solicited signatures on his [or her] behalf to mislead or confuse, and no evidence that the inaccuracy did or would lead or tend to lead to misidentification or confusion on the part of those invited to sign the petition or seeking to verify his [or her] qualification,” the petition should not be invalidated … . Matter of McNiel v Martin, 2019 NY Slip Op 04305, Fourth Dept 5-30-19

 

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ONE FRAUDULENT SIGNATURE DID NOT CONSTITUTE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PERMEATED BY FRAUD (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that Supreme Court properly declined to invalidate the entire designating petition after finding one signature should be invalidated:

Petitioner presented a witness who testified unequivocally that the signature on the petition attributed to her was not her own, noting that her name appears the way it does when her husband signs it. The witness’s husband also testified confirming that he had signed both his own name and that of his wife, which they both agreed was a common practice for them throughout their 40-year marriage. The subscribing witness who gathered the foregoing signatures, however, testified, with notable detail, that he recalled both the husband and the wife signing for themselves. William Nicholas, who had accompanied the subscribing witness but did not formally witness any signatures, gave similar, strikingly-specific testimony. Supreme Court credited the testimony of the husband and the wife and, while reticent to find that the subscribing witness and Nicholas had perjured themselves, rejected their version of events and thereby invalidated the subject signature. We perceive no reason not to give deference to those findings … . However, one fraudulent signature is not clear and convincing evidence that a designating petition is permeated with fraud … . Further, there was no evidence that [the candidate] herself participated in the procurement or submission of any fraudulent signature … . Matter of Overbaugh v Benoit, 2019 NY Slip Op 04261, Third Dept 5-30-19

 

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