Court of Claims – New York Appellate Digest

Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Evidence, Negligence

CLAIMANT’S ATTORNEY WAS NOT AWARE OF THE THIRD DEPARTMENT’S UNIQUE REQUIREMENT OF FULL EXPERT-WITNESS DISCLOSURE FOR A TREATING PHYSICIAN; THAT WAS AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR AN UNTIMELY DISCLOSURE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined claimant’s treating physician (Hopson) in this personal injury case should have been allowed to testify as an expert, despite the failure to comply with full expert disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101. The Third Department is the only department which requires such full expert disclosure by a treating physician and claimant’s attorney had not practiced in the Third Department:

There is no dispute that claimant failed to comply with the expert disclosure requirements of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) in identifying Hopson as a witness. Nevertheless, we disagree with the Court of Claims’ finding that claimant’s excuse was unreasonable. The situation here mirrors that in Schmitt v Oneonta City Sch. Dist. (151 AD3d 1254), where we accepted the explanation of the plaintiffs’ attorney that he was “unaware of this Court’s interpretation of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) and the corresponding need to file an expert disclosure for a treating physician, and the record [was] otherwise devoid of any indication that counsel’s failure to file such disclosure was willful” … . The same holds true here, as claimant’s attorney revealed that she practices law in a different judicial department and candidly conceded that she was unaware of this Court’s interpretation that the statute requires expert disclosure for treating physicians. There is nothing in the record calling into question the veracity of counsel’s representations and no basis to conclude that the noncompliance with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was willful. As such, the court erred in precluding Hopson’s testimony as an expert witness…. . Freeman v State of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 03559, Third Dept 6-2-22

Practice Point: Only the Third Department requires full expert-witness disclosure for a treating physician.

June 2, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Labor Law-Construction Law

CLAIMANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimants’ should have been allowed to file a late notice of claim in this construction accident case. The delay in filing was minimal, claimants made a sufficient showing the defendants were not prejudiced by the delay and defendants did not demonstrate prejudice:

The claimants showed that any delay in ascertaining actual notice of all of the essential facts underlying the claims was minimal … , and that the defendants were provided with an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claims in light of, among other things, the information contained in an accident report and a medical release, which were both prepared by the defendants’ general contractor on the date of the accident…. . …

… [T]he defendants failed to come forward with “a particularized evidentiary showing that [they] will be substantially prejudiced” if the late claims are permitted … . Schnier v New York State Thruway Auth., 2022 NY Slip Op 03267, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: The claimants adequately demonstrated defendants in this construction-accident case were not prejudiced by the minimal delay in filing the notice of claim and defendants were unable to demonstrate any prejudice as they had time to investigate the incident after timely receiving the accident report. Claimants’ motion for leave to file and serve a late notice of claim should have been granted.

May 18, 2022/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Criminal Law

FOR PURPOSES OF CLAIMANT’S ACTION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT, THE TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ACQUITTAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the claimant was retried and acquitted on criminal charges within the meaning of the Court of Claims Act in this action seeking damages for wrongful conviction and imprisonment:

… [T]he court erred in determining that claimant “was not retried.” To the contrary, the record establishes that “a new trial was ordered” and held inasmuch as the jury was sworn, the parties made opening statements, the prosecution called various witnesses and, following the close of the prosecution’s case, the criminal court granted claimant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal … . …

… [T]he court erred in determining that a trial order of dismissal pursuant to CPL 290.10 was not the equivalent of a finding of not guilty, i.e., an acquittal, for purposes of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) (b) (ii). Considering the remedial purpose of the statute (see § 8-b [1]) and the fact that an acquittal is a “useful and relevant indicator of innocence” … , … [T]here is no meaningful distinction for purposes of a claimant’s threshold showing between an acquittal by a trier of fact due to failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt … and a trial order of dismissal due to legally insufficient evidence … . Owens v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 07374, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

December 23, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Negligence

THE STATE BREACHED ITS DUTY TO PROTECT AN INMATE FROM AN ATTACK BY OTHER INMATES; COURT OF CLAIMS REVERSED OVER A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims and granting judgment in favor of the claimant, over a two-justice dissent, determined claimant, an inmate, demonstrated the state was negligent in failing to protect him from an attack by other inmates:

… [C]laimant—who had an unblemished disciplinary record—cooperated with an investigation by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) into an illegal sexual relationship between a female correction officer (Parkinson) and several male inmates. Among the inmates involved in the illegal relationship was a gang leader inside the prison. During the course of the investigation, a state official left documents evidencing claimant’s cooperation where an inmate porter could see them, and the porter shared that information with other inmates, including the gang leader implicated in the investigation. The gang leader then collaborated with other inmates to instigate a brutal assault on claimant. Prior to the attack, one of the inmates informed Parkinson of the plan. * * *

… [T]he trial evidence proves decisively that defendant either knew or should have known that claimant was at serious risk of being attacked as a result of his cooperation. Specifically, defendant knew that claimant had just reported an illegal sexual relationship between Parkinson and an inmate gang leader, and defendant’s failure to safeguard the investigatory file allowed that fact to spread through the inmate population. As defendant’s own witnesses testified at trial, the risk to an inmate in claimant’s position under these circumstances would have been obvious and well-known. Notwithstanding the reasonably foreseeable risk to claimant, defendant failed to take any steps to protect him. In short, given Parkinson’s prior retaliation, the gang leader’s influence, motive, and ability to instigate an attack, and defendant’s failure to safeguard the facility’s investigatory file, we conclude that defendant’s decision to simply leave claimant in his dormitory, surrounded by associates of the gang leader and guarded only by Parkinson, constituted a grave breach of its duty to use “reasonable care under the circumstances” to protect an inmate in its custody … . McDevitt v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 04795, Fourth Dept 8-26-21

August 26, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Evidence, Negligence

THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE APPLIED TO A PLASTIC CHAIR IN THE RECREATIONAL ROOM OF DEFENDANT CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; THE CHAIR COLLAPSED WHILE CLAIMANT WAS SITTING IN IT; THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER THE CHAIR; COURT OF CLAIMS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to a plastic chair in the recreational room of a state correctional facility. Claimant alleged the back legs of the chair broke off at the same time causing him to fall to the concrete floor:

… [T]he evidence of defendant’s exclusive control, under the circumstances of this case, was sufficiently established … . Indeed, “[a]s a species of circumstantial proof, . . . res ipsa [loquitor] does not depend on a showing that the instrumentality causing the harm was within the defendant’s exclusive control; it is enough that the degree of dominion be such that the defendant can be identified with probability as the party responsible for the injury produced” … .

… [D]efendant was “under an affirmative duty to use reasonable care in making sure that the chair it provided was safe for the purpose for which it was to be used. That [claimant] had temporary possession of the chair does not negate the inference that its sudden collapse, under normal usage, was most likely caused by defendant’s negligence” … . Moreover, defendant, who no doubt had sole and exclusive possession of the chair immediately after the accident, failed to offer any evidence to support an inference of any other possible explanation for the accident … . Draper v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 04163, Third Dept 7-1-21

July 1, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Battery, Court of Claims, Employment Law

CLAIMANT-INMATE’S ACTION AGAINST THE STATE ALLEGING HE WAS BEATEN BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE OFFICERS WERE ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE BEATING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, reversing the Court of Claims, over a two-justice dissent, determined the claimant-inmate’s action alleging claimant was beaten by corrections officers after lodging a complaint against one of the officers (Poupore) should not have been dismissed. The Court of Claims ruled the state could not be liable for the beating because the officers were not acting within the scope of their employment:

… [T]he undisputed evidence demonstrated that the incident took place at Clinton Correctional Facility, that the correction officers involved were on duty and that claimant’s encounter with Poupore by the stairway was occasioned by claimant having been called downstairs for an interview with Wood [Poupre’s supervisor] … . … [T]estimony from defendant’s witnesses demonstrated that pat frisks are routinely conducted prior to inmate interviews and that Poupore was instructed to pat frisk claimant prior to his interview. Accepting claimant’s version of events as true, Poupore struck claimant during the course of that employer-sanctioned pat frisk, which then led to the involvement of additional correction officers. If claimant’s account is credited, Poupore’s intentional tortious act of punching claimant in the head was not so divorced from the performance of his pat-frisk duties so as to preclude a finding that he was acting within the scope of employment. Nor can we conclude as a matter of law that the ensuing altercation was wholly outside the scope of the additional correction officers’ duties. Galloway v State of N.Y., 2021 NY Slip Op 02855, Third Dept 5-6-21

May 6, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Court of Claims

THE COURT OF CLAIMS, NOT SUPREME COURT, IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST THE STATE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the proper forum for the declaratory judgment cause of action against the state was the Court of Claims. The plaintiffs had filed a breach of contract action in the Court of Claims and this declaratory judgment action is incidental to the alleged breach of contract. Therefore the Court of Claims should handle it:

The Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction over claims for breach of contract against the State … . As long as the primary claim is for money damages, the Court of Claims “may [also] apply equitable considerations” and grant incidental equitable relief … . Here, because the relief sought in the complaint arises out of an alleged breach of contract, the proper forum for this action is the Court of Claims … . Rice v New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd., 2021 NY Slip Op 01669, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

March 19, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Appeals, Court of Claims, Evidence, Negligence

THE COURT OF CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CLAIM FINDING THAT CLAIMANT’S DECEDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE CAR ACCIDENT EVEN IF THE PROPER W BEAM AS OPPOSED TO THE IMPROPER BOX BEAM HAD BEEN ERECTED AS A BARRIER ACROSS THE CLOSED BRIDGE; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE MAJORITY IMPROPERLY APPLIED A “BUT FOR” STANDARD OF CAUSATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the Court of Claims properly dismissed the claim on the ground that claimant’s decedent would have been killed in the car crash even if the barrier the car struck was a proper W beam as opposed to an improper steel box beam. The beams were erected across a closed bridge and claimant’s decedent was a passenger in the convertible which struck and passed under the box beams at both ends of the bridge. The dissenters argued that, upon remittal after a reversal in the first appeal, the Court of Claims was called upon to determine if the box beam was a dangerous condition which was a proximate cause in aggravating the injuries and did not do so. The dissenters noted that claimant’s decedent’s head injuries occurred when the car passed under the second box beam and he survived for 18 hours after the accident:

… [W]e remitted the matter to the Court of Claims to determine “whether the steel box beam was a substantial factor in aggravating decedent’s injuries and causing his death” … . …

… [W]e conclude that a fair interpretation of the evidence supports the court’s determination that the steel box beam was not a substantial factor in aggravating decedent’s injuries and causing his death. Claimant’s witnesses testified with respect to the type of barrier that defendants were required to use to block access to the bridge, i.e., a W-beam. Claimant also presented evidence that decedent’s impact with a W-beam would have led to the same result, i.e., a fatality.

FROM THE DISSENT:

… [T]he majority improperly elected to apply a “but for” standard of causation, rather than considering whether the negligence was a proximate cause of injury. In our view, applying a “but for” causation standard “would relieve from liability a negligent actor if the same harm might have been sustained had the actor not been negligent; yet the law is clear that that fact may be considered in fixing damages but does not relieve from liability” … . Reames v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 00712, Fourth Dept 2-5-21

February 5, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Negligence

CLAIMANT’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED IN A MULTIVEHICLE ACCIDENT IN WHITE OUT CONDITIONS ON A STATE HIGHWAY; QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT NOTICE OF THE RECURRING CONDITION AND PROXIMATE CAUSE (NO SNOW FENCE) WERE RAISED; THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the state’s motion for summary judgment in this “white out” traffic accident case should not have been granted. Claimants argued the state had notice of a recurring white=out condition caused by blowing snow on a portion of a state highway. Claimant’s decedent died in a multivehicle accident in white out conditions:

… [T]he claimants raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether defendant had actual knowledge of “an ongoing and recurring dangerous condition in the area of the accident” … . Notably, claimants submitted a Highway Safety Investigation Report that was prepared by an employee of defendant in December 2008. The report states that it was written in response to the subject accident with the purpose of “evaluat[ing] the frequency and potential for similar accidents and evaluate potential countermeasures.” The report compared the number and severity of the accidents on that portion of highway to those occurring elsewhere on I-390, and noted that, “[a]lthough the number of accidents in the study area was lower, the severity of the accidents was [greater].” The report also noted that “[s]everal factors exist which increase the degree of risk of poor visibility and drifting due to blowing snow in this section.” Such factors included the large, flat airport property next to the highway, the “abrupt, topographic change due to the proximity of the airport runway and former Pennsylvania railroad embankment,” and the section’s slight reverse curve. The data thus suggested that “snow on the road [was] an issue to be addressed in this area” and that, although the number of accidents was not extraordinarily high, “their occurrence was sufficiently sensational, disquieting to the public, and disruptive to the traveling public and [defendant] to justify making more than ordinary efforts to prevent them.” Furthermore, the deposition testimony of employees of defendant established that, for years prior to the accident, blowing and drifting snow had been an issue on that section of I-390.

We also agree with claimants that the court erred in determining that defendant established that the lack of a snow fence was not a proximate cause of the accident. Klepanchuk v State of N.Y. Dept. of Transp., 2020 NY Slip Op 07766, Fourth Dept 12-23-20

December 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Labor Law-Construction Law

CLAIMANT FELL OFF AN I-BEAM AND HIS LANYARD DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM STRIKING THE DECK EIGHT TO TEN FEET BELOW; CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimant’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action should have been granted. Claimant alleged he fell off an I-beam and his lanyard didn’t stop him from striking the deck eight to ten feet below:

The record establishes that the safety devices “proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity” … . Specifically, the record shows that the safety cable was set up too low, resulting in claimant’s striking the deck before the lanyard could deploy … . Stigall v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 07306, First Dept 12-3-20

December 3, 2020/by Bruce Freeman