Court of Claims Archives - New York Appellate Digest

Court of Claims, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

CLAIMANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED THE STATE WITH TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimants’ motion for leave to file a late notice of claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act 10(6) in this medical malpractice action should have been granted, primarily because the state had timely knowledge of the nature of the claim and was not prejudiced by the 14 week delay:

… [T]he claimants demonstrated that the State had timely notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries arising from the alleged malpractice, by virtue of the medical records from Southampton Hospital as well as the medical records from Stony Brook University Hospital (hereinafter University Hospital), also owned by the State, to which the claimants’ infant son was transferred and where he later died … . The medical records evidence the medical care received by the claimant and the infant. The records show that during the claimant’s labor, no sonogram of the fetus was taken to determine the fetus’ head size. The records also show that, after approximately nine hours of unsuccessful labor at Southampton Hospital, which included the administration of pitocin, a birth-facilitating drug, and an epidural, the claimant was counseled about using forceps to deliver the fetus. After the claimant agreed to try a forceps-assisted delivery and declined to consent to an episiotomy, the infant was delivered via forceps-assistance and was diagnosed immediately with a hemorrhage below his scalp as a result of “birth trauma.” Thereafter, the infant was transferred to University Hospital, where he died a week later. The autopsy report in University Hospital’s medical records indicates that the infant suffered, inter alia, an injury during the forceps-assisted delivery which separated the infant’s brain stem from his upper cervical spinal cord region, and the infant’s overly large head was noted to be a factor in this injury. Although the treating physician noted in his report—which was created after the delivery—that the claimant did not want a cesarean section, the claimant’s medical record contains a form signed by the claimant on admission consenting to a cesarean section. There is no documentation in the record to show that the claimant was advised that a cesarean section should be performed. In addition, the claimant’s medical records, postdelivery, demonstrate that she experienced perineal lacerations and vaginal tears, which were deep and penetrated the perirectal tissue, as a result of the delivery. Stirnweiss v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 04986, Second Dept 9-16-20

September 16, 2020/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

POLICE OFFICER DID NOT VIOLATE THE RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD BY MAKING A U-TURN IN RESPONSE TO A CALL FOR ASSISTANCE; THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the “reckless disregard” standard applied to a police making a u-turn. Plaintiff motorcyclist alleged he lost control of the motorcycle because he was forced to brake when the officer (Balletto) pulled out from the shoulder to make the turn. Believing it was safe to do so, the officer made the u-turn to respond to another officer’s call for assistance. The state’s (defendant’s) motion for summary judgment was properly granted:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence” … . “Conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) includes disregarding regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions” (… see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[b][4]).

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that by attempting to execute a U-turn in response to another trooper’s radio call for assistance, Balletto’s conduct was exempted from the rules of the road by section 1104(b)(4), and that, as a result, his conduct was governed by the reckless disregard standard of care in section 1104(e) … . The defendant also established, prima facie, that Balletto did not operate the emergency vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of others … . Cable v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 02453, Second Dept 4-29-20

April 29, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Utilities

ALTHOUGH SOME MONETARY RELIEF WAS SOUGHT, THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE CLAIM WAS A DECLARATION VERIZON HAD WRONGFULLY DISCONTINUED CLAIMANT’S LIFELINE SERVICE; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is generally limited to money damages. Therefore the action, which was seeking a ruling that claimant’s Verizon Lifeline Service was wrongfully discontinued, was properly dismissed:

The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction determined by the Constitution and statute (see NY Const art VI, § 9; Court of Claims Act § 9). Its jurisdiction is generally limited to money damage awards against the State … . “Whether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim, is dependent upon the facts and issues presented in a particular case” … .

Here, while the claimant alleges certain monetary losses, the essential nature of his claim is one seeking to compel the PSC [NYS Public Service Commission] to investigate and issue a determination on his complaint that Verizon wrongfully discontinued his Lifeline Service, which he alleges the PSC is required to do. The money damages sought are merely incidental to the primary question of the PSC’s investigation and regulation of Verizon with respect to the Lifeline Service program. Aliksanyan v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01137, Second Dept 2-19-20

February 19, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Labor Law-Construction Law

APPLICATION TO FILE A LATE CLAIM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING A LATE CLAIM UNDER THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT DESCRIBED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimant’s application to file a late claim in this Labor Law 240 (1) action should have been granted. The criteria for allowing a late claim under the Court of Claims Act were described in some detail:

Upon our consideration of the six factors outlined in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying claimant’s application insofar as claimant sought to assert a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1).

Several factors militate against granting claimant’s application. For instance, his excuse for failing to file a timely notice of intent was law office failure, which, as the court determined, is not an acceptable excuse … . Also, as the court noted, claimant has at least “a partial alternate remedy through workers’ compensation” … . With respect to three of the remaining four statutory factors, we agree with the court’s determination that defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, had an opportunity to investigate the claim and was not prejudiced by the delay … .

The most significant factor, however, is “whether the claim appears to be meritorious” (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]) inasmuch as “it would be futile to permit the filing of a legally deficient claim which would be subject to immediate dismissal, even if the other factors tend to favor the granting of the request” … .

.. [D]ocumentation submitted by claimant indicates that, as he struggled to remove the window and lower it to the ground, the window allegedly “fell” on him, causing him to sustain injuries to his back.

Claimant’s submissions raise issues of fact whether he was injured by the application of the force of gravity to the window as he was moving it between “a physically significant elevation differential” … . Phillips v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 00753, Fourth Dept 1-31-20

January 31, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

THE COURT OF CLAIMS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION CREDITED BOTH EXPERTS, ONE OF WHOM OPINED DEFENDANT WAS AT RISK FOR FUTURE HEART PROBLEMS; THEREFORE THE AWARD OF ZERO DAMAGES FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING WAS ERROR; AWARD INCREASED BY $10,000 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the conflicting expert evidence credited by the Court of Claims forced the conclusion claimant suffered some permanent damage to his heart. Therefore awarding nothing for future pain and suffering was error. The Third Department awarded an additional $10,000:

… [T]he court accepted aspects of both experts’ opinions, crediting both the opinion of defendant’s expert cardiologist that claimant had suffered no significant permanent damage and simultaneously crediting the opinion of claimant’s expert cardiologist that claimant could develop a future arrhythmia because of his injury. As claimant argues, and based upon our review of the record, we find these opinions to be inconsistent with one another. Claimant’s cardiologist based his opinion that claimant was at risk of developing a future arrhythmia upon his opinion that claimant had suffered permanent damage to his heart muscle, consisting of weakness that would not resolve with time and that required the rest of his heart to work harder to maintain normal function. As the court noted, claimant’s cardiologist did not quantify the degree of potential risk to which he believed claimant was exposed. Nevertheless, in order to accept the opinion that claimant’s risk of suffering a future arrhythmia was increased, the court must necessarily also have credited the cardiologist’s opinion that claimant had suffered some, albeit limited, degree of permanent injury.

We thus find that the award of no damages for future pain and suffering deviates from reasonable compensation. Serrano v State of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 00458, Third Dept 1-23-20

January 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Evidence, Negligence

DEFENDANTS’ AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED IN REPLY TO CLAIMANT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim should not have been granted. Claimant alleged she was injured when she collided with a glass exit door at Brooklyn College. The notice of intention to file a claim and the claim indicated photographs of the door were attached. Defendants apparently assumed the door in question was the front door to the building, but discovery indicated it was the back door. Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that claimant failed to give proper notice of the location of the door as required by Court of Claims Act 11 (b). Defendants submitted affidavits stating that the computer files were searched and no photographs of the door were found. The Second Department held there was a question of fact whether the photographs of the door were attached to the notice of intention and the claim:

Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11(b), a notice of intention to file a claim and a claim must set forth, inter alia, the “place where such claim arose”… . “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party'” … . Summary judgment is to be granted only where the moving party has “tender[ed] sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” … . “[O]n such a motion, the court’s role is limited to issue finding, not issue resolution” … . Here, the affidavits submitted by the defendants in reply created a triable issue of fact as to whether the claimant had included, with the notice of intention, photographs, which would have directed the defendants to the precise set of doors at issue. Accordingly, the Court of Claims should have denied the defendants’ motion. Shabat v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 08589, Second Dept 11-27-19

November 27, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Battery, Court of Claims, Employment Law

BRUTAL, UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON CLAIMANT, AN INMATE, BY CORRECTION OFFICERS WAS DEEMED TO HAVE NO RELATION TO THE DUTIES OF A CORRECTION OFFICER; THEREFORE THE ATTACK WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE OFFICERS’ EMPLOYMENT AND THE STATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT LIABLE UNDER A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a three-judge dissent, determined that the state’s motion for summary judgment in this assault and battery action by an inmate was properly granted. Claimant was brutally beaten, without cause, by three correction officers and sued the state under a respondeat superior, vicarious liability theory. The Court of Appeals held the state had demonstrated the officers were not acting within the scope of their employment when they assaulted the claimant:

Correction officers are authorized to use physical force against inmates in limited circumstances not present here, such as in self-defense or to suppress a revolt (see Correction Law § 137 [5]; 7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [a], [b]). DOCCS regulations require correction officers to exercise “[t]he greatest caution and conservative judgment” in determining whether physical force against an inmate is necessary (7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [a]). To be sure, correction officers at times use excessive force. Such conduct will not fall outside the scope of employment merely because it violates department rules or policies or crosses the line of sanctioned conduct. Under our multi-factored common-law test for determining respondeat superior liability, an employee’s deviation from directions or governing standards is only one consideration in the analysis. Here, the gratuitous and utterly unauthorized use of force was so egregious as to constitute a significant departure from the normal methods of performance of the duties of a correction officer as a matter of law. This was a malicious attack completely divorced from the employer’s interests.

Further, there is no evidence in the record that DOCCS should — or could — have reasonably anticipated such a flagrant and unjustified use of force, in which, assisted by other officers who immobilized and handcuffed claimant, Wehby [the primary assailant] repeatedly punched and kicked him during a prolonged assault, removing claimant’s protective helmet in order to facilitate more direct blows to his head. As such, based on the uncontested facts, it is evident that claimant’s injuries were not caused by actions taken within the scope of employment and thus, there were no triable issues of fact as to the State’s vicarious liability for assault and battery. Rivera v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 08521, Ct App 11-25-19

November 25, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

NOTICE OF INTENT WAS TIMELY AND THE CLAIM WAS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, INMATE’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE STATE REINSTATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined that the notice of intent was timely and the notice of intent and the claim are not jurisdictionally defective in this medical malpractice action against the state. The claimant was an inmate when he underwent hip replacement surgery. The claim alleged inadequate treatment led to infection, requiring further surgeries. The date of the accrual of the action was tolled by continuous treatment, and some mistakes concerning the nature of the injuries (i.e., left hip versus right hip) did not prejudice the defendant:

Generally, a medical malpractice claim accrues on the date of the alleged malpractice, but the statute of limitations is tolled “until the end of the course of continuous treatment” … . That toll likewise applies to the time periods contained in Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) … . Here, the record establishes that claimant was receiving ongoing treatment for his left hip replacement during postoperative follow-up visits through June 12, 2014, when he was transported to a hospital for treatment of the infection that developed at the incision site, which had not been diagnosed during those follow-up visits. We thus conclude that the notice of intent, filed and served on August 22, 2012, was timely inasmuch as it was filed and served within ninety days of the accrual of the claim. The fact that the claim listed a different date of the alleged injury than the notice of intent is a matter related to the contents of the documents, not their timeliness.

We recognize that, generally, the failure to treat a condition is not considered continuous treatment so as to toll the statute of limitations … . In such cases, however, there is a lack of awareness of a need for further treatment and thus no concern relating to the interruption of corrective medical treatment … . Here, claimant was already being treated for the surgical incision that eventually became infected and, therefore, “further treatment [was] explicitly anticipated by both [defendant’s medical staff] and [claimant,] as manifested in form of . . . regularly scheduled appointment[s]” to monitor the incision and remove staples … . Moreover, this is not truly a failure-to-treat case inasmuch as defendant’s employees did, in fact, attempt to treat the incision area by applying ointment and dressing the area. Gang v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 08041, Fourth Dept 11-8-19

November 8, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Court of Claims, Criminal Law

WRONGFUL CONVICTION ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED, CONVICTION WAS NOT VACATED ON A GROUND ENUMERATED IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined claimant’s wrongful conviction action was properly dismissed because claimant’s judgment of conviction was not vacated on a ground enumerated in the Court of Claims Act:

… [T]he County Court Judge averred that he vacated claimant’s judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (f) “and/or” CPL 440.10 (1) (h). More specifically, the County Court Judge determined that the People had committed a Rosario violation, which falls under CPL 440.10 (1) (f) (see People v Jackson, 78 NY2d 638, 645 [1991]), “and/or” a Brady violation, which falls under CPL 440.10 (1) (h) … . The transcript of the hearing at which the County Court Judge vacated the judgment fully corroborates his sworn account of his rationale for overturning claimant’s conviction, and the transcript likewise supports the County Court Judge’s averment that he effectively denied claimant’s CPL article 440 motion to the extent predicated on any provision of CPL 440.10 (1) other than paragraphs (f) or (h). Thus, because paragraphs (f) and (h) of CPL 440.10 (1) “are not enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) (b) (ii), the [court] properly dismissed the claim” … . …

It is possible, as claimant notes, that the facts underlying a successful Brady claim under CPL 440.10 (1) (h) could also give rise to a viable claim of newly discovered evidence under CPL 440.10 (1) (g). That, however, is irrelevant for purposes of Court of Claims Act § 8-b, which allows recovery only where the criminal court actually vacated the judgment on an enumerated ground, and not where the criminal court might have vacated the judgment on an enumerated ground, but did not do so … . Jeanty v State of New York,2019 NY Slip Op 06333, Fourth Dept 8-22-19

August 22, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Court of Claims

THE CLAIM WAS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE LOST WAGES AS PART OF THE DAMAGES IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY ACTION, THE DISSENT DISAGREED AND WOULD HAVE VACATED THE AWARD FOR LOST WAGES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department affirmed the award of money damages to claimant for personal injury. The claim did not specifically request lost wages as damages. The majority held the claim was not jurisdictionally deficient and the specific items of damage need not have been spelled out. The dissenter disagreed and argued the award for lost wages should be vacated:

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction with respect to damages for past and future lost wages inasmuch as the facts alleged by claimant “were sufficient to apprise [defendant] of the general nature of the claim and to enable it to investigate the matter” … .

The plain language of the statute requires a claimant to specify “the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained” and, “except in[, inter alia,] action[s] to recover damages for personal injury . . . , the total sum claimed” (Court of Claims Act § 11 [b]). Contrary to the view of our dissenting colleague, a natural reading of the statute requires a claimant to specify the items of damage to property or injuries to a person for which the claimant seeks compensation. Here, claimant sufficiently specified the nature of the claim, the time when and the place where the claim arose, and the injuries claimed to have been sustained, i.e., “injuries to his shoulder, bicep, and elbow” … . Inasmuch as this is an action for damages for personal injury, claimant was not required to specify, in total or itemized by category, his claimed items of damage … . Damages sought by claimant for medical expenses or lost wages are matters for the bill of particulars. Donahue v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 05948, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

July 31, 2019/by Bruce Freeman

CLAIMANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED THE STATE WITH TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

POLICE OFFICER DID NOT VIOLATE THE RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD BY MAKING A U-TURN IN RESPONSE TO A CALL FOR ASSISTANCE; THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

ALTHOUGH SOME MONETARY RELIEF WAS SOUGHT, THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE CLAIM WAS A DECLARATION VERIZON HAD WRONGFULLY DISCONTINUED CLAIMANT’S LIFELINE SERVICE; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (SECOND DEPT).

APPLICATION TO FILE A LATE CLAIM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING A LATE CLAIM UNDER THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT DESCRIBED (FOURTH DEPT).

THE COURT OF CLAIMS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION CREDITED BOTH EXPERTS, ONE OF WHOM OPINED DEFENDANT WAS AT RISK FOR FUTURE HEART PROBLEMS; THEREFORE THE AWARD OF ZERO DAMAGES FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING WAS ERROR; AWARD INCREASED BY $10,000 (THIRD DEPT).

DEFENDANTS’ AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED IN REPLY TO CLAIMANT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

NOTICE OF INTENT WAS TIMELY AND THE CLAIM WAS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, INMATE’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE STATE REINSTATED (FOURTH DEPT).

WRONGFUL CONVICTION ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED, CONVICTION WAS NOT VACATED ON A GROUND ENUMERATED IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT (FOURTH DEPT).

THE CLAIM WAS NOT JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE LOST WAGES AS PART OF THE DAMAGES IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY ACTION, THE DISSENT DISAGREED AND WOULD HAVE VACATED THE AWARD FOR LOST WAGES (FOURTH DEPT).

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