The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the breach of contract cause of action was sufficiently alleged. Although the complaint did not specifically identify the breached contract, the reference to the relevant provisions of the NYC Administrative Code and the NYC Department of Transportation (DOT) permits gave sufficient notice of the nature of the claim:
… [P]laintiffs alleged that Con Edison failed to ensure payment of prevailing wages by codefendant … as required by the permits issued by the City Department of Transportation (DOT), in that it breached agreements required to be made, pursuant to Administrative Code of City of NY § 19-142, prior to obtaining such permits. Administrative Code § 19-142 required Con Edison “to agree that . . . the prevailing scale of union wages shall be the prevailing wage for similar titles as established by the fiscal officer pursuant to section  of the labor law, paid to those so employed,” and provides that “[n]o permit shall be issued until such agreement shall have been entered into with the” DOT. As required by the Administrative Code, the DOT permits issued to Con Edison stated that the permittee was required, “before such permit may be issued, to agree . . . that the prevailing scale of union wages shall be the prevailing wage for similar titles” established pursuant to Labor Law § 220 … …
… [T]he fact that the breach of contract cause of action in the complaint does not specifically identify the relevant contract but instead refers to “the promises required to be made pursuant to New York City Administrative Code § 19-142 prior to obtaining such permits,” does not require dismissal. Despite the non-specificity, the complaint “give[s] sufficient notice of the nature of the claim” by referencing Administrative Code § 19-142 and the DOT permits … . Ross v No Parking Today, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 00880, First Dept 2-20-24
Practice Point: Here the failure to identify the specific contract which was breached did not require dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action because the nature of the action was sufficiently alleged by reference to the applicable NYC Administrative Code provision and NYC Department of Transportation permits.