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PLAINTIFF STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LABOR LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated causes of action for employment discrimination, failure to pay overtime, and failure to pay weekly:

… [P]laintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action for employment discrimination under both the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws … . Plaintiff alleges that she is a member of a protected class; that she was qualified for the position by, among other things, having a decade of experience in leadership roles; and that she was subject to an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination … . Specifically, plaintiff, a Black woman, alleges that her supervisor … , irritated that she had telephoned Human Resources for advice, allegedly stated to her the night before her termination, “Why did you call HR? Blacks . . . I should have never hired her.”

… [W]e find that she has sufficiently stated a claim for unpaid overtime under the Labor Law by alleging that she worked more than 40 hours per week and that defendants never paid her for the overtime (CPLR 3013 …).

Plaintiff’s claim based on defendants’ failure to pay her weekly also is sufficiently pleaded, as she alleges that she was a nonexempt employee under Labor Law § 190, and that defendants were required to pay her each week as a manual worker under New York Labor Law § 191. Kirby v Carlo’s Bakery 42nd & 8th LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 00059, First Dept 1-10-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff stated causes of action for employment discrimination (a racist remark just prior to her termination), as well as failure to pay overtime and failure to pay weekly in violation of the Labor Law.

 

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PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW SECTION 511, THE NEW YORK CITY SUPPER CLUB WAS NOT THE EMPLOYER OF THE MUSICIANS, DANCERS AND OTHER PERFORMERS WHO ENTERTAINED AT THE CLUB; THEREFORE THE CLUB WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO MAKE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PERFORMERS (THIRD DEPT).

​The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined that the musicians, dancers and other artists who performed at a New York City supper club (Griffs) were not employees of the club under Labor Law 511. Therefore the club was not obligated to make additional unemployment insurance contributions with respect to those performers:

Pursuant to Labor Law § 511 (1) (b) (1-a), the term employment includes “any service by a person for an employer . . . as a professional musician or a person otherwise engaged in the performing arts, and performing services as such for a . . . restaurant, night club or similar establishment unless, by written contract, such musician or person is stipulated to be an employee of another employer covered by [the Labor Law]” … . “The statute, which was designed to extend the availability of unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation benefits to those in the performing arts, creates a rebuttal presumption of employment” … — a presumption that may be rebutted by a written contract establishing that the performer in question is the employee of another covered employer … . …

… [T]he sole contested issue is whether a provision contained within the written agreements executed by the performers established that they were “employee[s] of another employer covered by [the Labor Law]” (Labor Law § 511 [1] [b] [1-a]). To that end, paragraph No. 8 of the performers’ contracts with Griffs provides, in relevant part, that Griffs “is not nor shall become [the performers’] employer, as other corporations employ them” … . Matter of Griffs Global Corp. (Commissioner of Labor), 2022 NY Slip Op 06670, Third Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: Under Labor Law 511 the musicians, dancers and other performers who entertained at the New York City supper club were not employees of the club because their contracts stated they were employees of other corporations. Therefore, the club was not required to make unemployment insurance contributions on behalf of the performers.

 

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EVEN IF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE INSURER AND CLAIMANT INSURANCE BROKER INCLUDED ALL THE STATUTORY FACTORS IN LABOR LAW 511, THE BROKER WILL BE CONSIDERED AN EMPLOYEE IF THE SERVICES ACTUALLY PROVIDED BY THE BROKER ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the insurance company, Paul Revere, did not demonstrate that claimant insurance broker was not an employee. Claimant was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Labor Law § 511 (21) provides that “[t]he term ’employment’ shall not include the services of a licensed insurance agent or broker if,” among other things, “the services performed by the agent or broker are performed pursuant to a written contract” … that, in turn, contains seven statutorily enumerated provisions … . Here, the Board concluded that two of the seven statutory requirements were absent from the written agreement entered into between claimant and Paul Revere — specifically, provisions demonstrating that claimant was “permitted to work any hours he . . . chooses” … and was “permitted to work out of his . . . own office or home or the office of the person for whom services are performed” … . Paul Revere disagrees, contending that article XI (A) of the written contract satisfies such requirements by providing that “Paul Revere shall not exercise nor have the right to exercise direction or control over [claimant’s] time, when or how [claimant] may work, or over the activities of [claimant].”

… [W]e agree with the Board that the conclusory and sweeping language employed in article XI (A) of the contract does not satisfy the requirements of Labor Law § 511 (21) (d) (iii) and (iv). … [E]ven assuming, without deciding, that the written agreement between Paul Revere and claimant did … fulfill all of the statutory requirements, we agree with the Board’s further conclusion that the parties’ conduct was inconsistent with the provisions of Labor Law § 511 (21) and, therefore, the services performed by claimant do not fall within the statutory exclusion…. . …

… [T]he statute requires both that the contract at issue contain the seven enumerated provisions and “that the services performed by the insurance agent or broker actually be consistent with those provisions” … . Matter of Hoyt (Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.–Commissioner of Labor), 2022 NY Slip Op 06518, Third Dept 11-17-22

Practice Point: Even if the contract between the insurer and claimant insurance broker includes all the statutory provisions in Labor Law 511 (such that the broker would not be considered an employee for unemployment insurance purposes), if the services actually performed by the broker are not consistent with those contract provisions the broker may be deemed an employee eligible for benefits.

 

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PLAINTIFFS-EMPLOYEES SEEKING THE PREVAILING WAGE FOR PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 220 ARE ENTITLED TO FULL SUPPLEMENTAL (FRINGE) BENEFITS, AS WELL AS WAGES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs-employees were entitled to full payment of their supplemental (fringe) benefits in this Labor Law 220 action seeking the prevailing wage for public works projects:

Plaintiffs are members of a class of employees who allege that defendant failed to pay them prevailing supplemental (or fringe) benefits for work they performed on various public works contracts. * * *

Pursuant to Labor Law § 220 (3) (b), contractors undertaking a public works project must provide their employees with supplemental benefits “in accordance with prevailing practices for private sector work in the same locality” … . Supplemental benefits are defined as “all remuneration for employment paid in any medium other than cash, or reimbursement for expenses, or any payments which are not ‘wages’ within the meaning of the law, including, but not limited to, health, welfare, non-occupational disability, retirement, vacation benefits, holiday pay[,] life insurance and apprenticeship training” (§ 220 [5] [b]). * * *

Consider, for example, a hypothetical contractor that fails to pay prevailing wages (as opposed to benefits) to its employees on a public works project, and then pays the shortfall in wages into a common fund out of which all of its employees are compensated, including those who are not prevailing wage workers. Due to the dilution of funds resulting from those funds also being paid to the nonprevailing wage workers, the employees who worked on the public works contracts would not receive the full wages they would be entitled to for their work on the public works project. Under that scenario, the contractor would clearly have failed to comply with Labor Law § 220 (3) (a), notwithstanding that the contractor paid the same amount in wages to a fund as it would have paid if the prevailing wage workers had been paid directly according to scale. We do not perceive any justification in law or logic for treating supplemental benefits differently from wages. Vandee v Suit-Kote Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 04852, Fourth Dept 8-4-22

Practice Point: In an action pursuant to Labor Law 220 seeking the prevailing wage for public works projects, the employees are entitled to full compensation for supplemental (fringe) benefits, as well as wages.

 

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CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS AND OFFICERS MAY ONLY BE LIABLE FOR LABOR LAW (WAGE-PAYMENT-RELATED) VIOLATIONS IF THEY EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS OF THE CORPORATION, WHICH WAS ALLEGED HERE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and reinstating defendants’ counterclaims alleging violations of the Labor Law, noted that corporate shareholders and officers can only be liable for Labor Law (wage-payment-related) violations if they exercise control of a corporation’s day-to-day operations, which was alleged here:

“[C]orporate shareholders and officers generally may not be subjected to civil liability for corporate violations of the Labor Law absent allegations that such persons exercised control of the corporation’s day-to-day operations by, for example, hiring and firing employees, supervising employee work schedules, and determining the method and rate of pay” … . Here, the defendants adequately alleged, inter alia, that the additional defendants controlled the day-to-day operations of the plaintiff, including the plaintiff’s payment practices. Interstate Home Loan Ctr., Inc. v United Mtge. Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 03715, Second Dept 6-8-22

Practice Point: Corporate shareholders and officers may be liable for Labor Law (wage-payment-related) violations only if they exercise control over the day-to-day operations of the corporation.

 

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ACTION AGAINST AMAZON ALLEGING RETALIATION AGAINST WORKERS WHO PROTESTED COVID-RELATED WORKING CONDITIONS PREEMPTED BY NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this action by the NYS Attorney General against Amazon alleging retaliation against workers for protesting COVID-related working conditions was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA):

… [W]e find that the Labor Law §§ 215 and 740 claims alleging retaliation against workers based, in part, on their participation in protests against unsafe working conditions plainly relate to the workers’ participation in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,” i.e., activities that are protected by the NLRA … , and therefore that the claims are preempted … . Where conduct is clearly protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the NLRB, and not the states, should serve as the forum for disputes arising out of the conduct … .  People v Amazon.com, 2022 NY Slip Op 03081, First Dept 5-10-22

Practice Point: Here a state action, brought by the NYS Attorney General, against Amazon alleging retaliation against workers for protesting COVID-related working conditions was deemed preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

 

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LABOR LAW 198-B, WHICH PROHIBITS WAGE KICKBACKS, DOES NOT PROVIDE A FREESTANDING PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined Labor Law 198-b, which prohibits wage kickbacks, does not provide a freestanding private right of action:

Labor Law § 198-b prohibits “kickbacks” by making it unlawful for any person to “request, demand, or receive” part of an employee’s wages or salary on the condition that “failure to comply with such request or demand will prevent such employee from procuring or retaining employment.” Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor offense (see Labor Law § 198-b [5]). Labor Law § 218 also provides for administrative enforcement of section 198-b by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor. The statute empowers the Commissioner to grant affected employees restitution and liquidated damages in addition to imposing civil penalties. * * *

… [W]e apply a three-factor test to determine whether the legislative intent favors an implied right: “‘(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme'” … . * * *

The statutory scheme … expressly provides two robust enforcement mechanisms, “indicating that the legislature considered how best to effectuate its intent and provided the avenues for relief it deemed warranted” … . Konkur v Utica Academy of Science Charter Sch., 2022 NY Slip Op 00911, CtApp 2-10-22

 

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PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR MINIMUM WAGE, OVERTIME PAY, SPREAD-OF-HOURS PAY AND WAGE THEFT PREVENTION ACT CAUSES OF ACTION, INCLUDING LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion court should not have denied plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint in this action alleging “violations of minimum wage, overtime pay and spread-of-hours pay under the Labor Law and violations of the Wage Theft Prevention Act (WTPA) …” . The First Department granted plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, finding them entitled to liquidated damages, prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees:

Plaintiffs established prima facie that defendants violated Labor Law §§ 190-199, 650, and 652 and 12 NYCRR 142 and 146-1.6 by failing to pay them minimum wage, overtime pay, and spread-of-hours pay. Although 12 NYCRR 142-2.2 requires an employer to pay an employee for overtime, i.e., working time over 40 hours, at a wage rate of 1½ times the employee’s regular rate, defendant Georgios Liristis, owner of defendant GE & LO Corp. d/b/a Burger Hut, testified that plaintiffs each worked 8- to 10-hour shifts, six days a week, and were paid a fixed salary. Although 12 NYCRR 142-2.4(a) requires that, for any day in which an employee’s spread of hours exceeds 10 hours, the employee receive one hour’s pay at the minimum wage rate in addition to the minimum wage, the record shows that plaintiff Galindo Tezoco, who regularly worked shifts over 10 hours, did not receive the additional hours’ pay.

Defendant Liristis’ testimony establishes that defendants failed to pay three of the five plaintiffs the prevailing minimum wage during the relevant periods. Defendants cannot avail themselves of the “tip credit,” since they undisputedly failed to provide notice of the tip credit in writing … .

Plaintiffs established that defendants violated the WTPA by failing to provide them with wage statements (see Labor Law § 195[3]) and by failing to provide wage notices to plaintiff Silverio Tezoco … . It is undisputed that defendants failed to provide any wage notices or wage statements during the course of plaintiffs’ employment. Tezoco v GE & LO Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 06463, First Dept 11-18-21

 

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CLAIMANT’S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS PROPERLY REDUCED TO ZERO BECAUSE CLAIMANT’S PENSION EXCEEDED THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the amount of unemployment insurance benefits for claimant, a professional violinist, was properly reduced to zero based upon claimant’s pension:

Consistent with the provisions of Labor Law § 600 (1) (a), the benefit rate of a claimant who is receiving a governmental or other pension “shall be reduced . . . if such [pension] payment is made under a plan maintained or contributed to by [the] base period employer and . . . the claimant’s employment with, or remuneration from, such employer after the beginning of the base period . . . increased the amount of . . . such pension” … . “Under the plain language of the statute, the specified reduction shall be made where a claimant’s base period employer made a pension fund contribution during the base period which increased the claimant’s pension” … .

… [T]he record establishes that, during the relevant base period, claimant received a pension benefit that, in turn, was fully funded by the contributing employers. The record further makes clear — and claimant does not dispute — that the work performed by her during the base period and the corresponding contributions made by her employers increased the monetary value of her pension. Under these circumstances, and given that the prorated weekly amount of claimant’s pension benefit exceeded her weekly unemployment insurance benefit (see Labor Law § 600 [1] [b]), the statutory reduction was triggered, and claimant’s unemployment insurance benefit rate was properly reduced to zero … . Matter of Morganstern (Commissioner of Labor), 2021 NY Slip Op 06416, Third Dept 11-18-21

 

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THE PURCHASE OF A CHECK CASHING BUSINESS DID NOT TRANSFER THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SELLER TO THE PURCHASER; THE LABOR LAW 581 CRITERIA FOR THE TRANSFER OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS WERE NOT MET (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined the unemployment insurance obligations of PTL Check Cashing Corp. were not transferred to PLS Check Cashiers of New York Inc. when PLS entered an asset purchase agreement with PTL in order to acquire PTL’s license to operate at PTL’s former location in the Bronx:

“Labor Law § 581 establishes an experience-rating system that allows for variations in the unemployment insurance contribution rates from the standard rate of qualified employers in certain situations” … . Under the statute, when a business is transferred either whole or in part from one employer to another, the transferee shall take over and continue the unemployment insurance experience account of the transferor … . A transfer, however, will not be deemed to have occurred if (1) the transferee has not assumed any of the transferor’s obligations, (2) the transferee has not acquired any of the transferor’s goodwill, (3) the transferee has not continued or resumed the transferor’s business either in the same establishment or elsewhere, and (4) the transferee has not employed substantially the same employees as those of the transferor … . …

It is undisputed that PLS did not assume any of PTL’s financial obligations and did not hire any of its employees. Moreover, while PLS operated from the same Bronx location, its business included a variety of financial services and was not limited to check cashing, which was PTL’s sole business. Significantly, the ability to operate from the Bronx location was necessary in order for PLS to obtain a license from the Department of Financial Services given the geographic limitations applicable to businesses that offer check cashing services. Although the asset purchase agreement listed other property included in the sale, PLS’s president testified that the tangible assets were disposed of and the only asset that was of value was the opportunity to acquire the license to operate from the Bronx location. Notwithstanding the fact that goodwill was generally referenced as property included in the sale, PLS did not use PTL’s brand, logo or phone number and had its own customer base, negating any expectation that it would be patronized by PTL’s customers. In view of the foregoing, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that a transfer of business occurred under Labor Law § 581 (4) such that PLS acquired the unemployment insurance experience rating of PTL … . Matter of PLS Check Cashiers of N.Y. Inc. (Commissioner of Labor), 2021 NY Slip Op 05142, Third Dept 9-30-29

 

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